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Abstract
The passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 had a significant effect on the fiscal
conditions and profiles of municipalities in the state and on state-local fiscal relations. The
Proposition instantaneously reduced reliance on the local property tax and restrained the future
growth of this source of revenues for local governments. This study examines the revenue and
expenditure reactions of a stratified sample of 130 California municipalities following the
imposition of the tax limitation measure.
Using a cross-sectional analysis of municipal governments, the short and long-term
revenue and expenditure responses to property tax reductions are examined. The detailed
empirical analysis allows for the investigation of particular relationships between the
characteristics of municipalities, the magnitudes of property tax reductions, and revenue and
expenditure responses. The investigation reveals the significant amount of heterogeneity present
in the fiscal responses of municipalities depending on the magnitude of the property tax loss and
various socio-economic attributes.
In the initial period after the passage of the tax limitation measure, municipalities increased
various types of endogenous revenues and benefited from intergovernmental aid. No one source
of revenue was universally important, however; municipalities seemed to realize increases in
different types of revenues based on their particular characteristics. In large part, municipalities
were able to compensate for revenue declines stemming from property tax losses, but certain
types of cities experienced long-term reductions in total revenues.
The expenditure analysis indicates a trend towards outlays that are linked to particular
identifiable goods and services at the expense of activities more diffuse in nature. The relationship
of these expenditure alterations to the magnitude of property tax reductions is demonstrated to be
quite mixed. After initial reductions and uncertainty, municipalities were largely able to sustain
expenditure patterns, although certain types of cities experienced long-term reductions in
response to property tax cuts.
Alternative specifications of the empirical models facilitate linking revenue and
expenditure changes to particular measures of change. In addition, use of alternative approaches
allows for separating the political effects of the tax limitation measure from its fiscal effects. The
investigation indicates that both factors played a role in the fiscal responses of cities. While the
political impacts may have been of greater magnitude initially, the fiscal impacts of the tax
limitation measure had more lasting effects.
Thesis Supervisor: Paul J. Smoke
Title: Associate Professor of Political Economy and Planning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background and Overview
The passage of Proposition 13 by the California electorate in the primary election of June 1978
represented, in many respects, the apex of the national anti-tax movement. This stringent property tax
limitation measure in no way signaled the movement's universal decline, however. On the contrary,
national anti-tax sentiment remained strong throughout the 1980's, and additional tax cutting measures
were proposed even as ones already in place were continuing to have serious ramifications for local
governments throughout the country.
Proposition 13 also represents a watershed for local governments throughout the State of
California. The radical changes it brought about in the fiscal affairs of state and local governments, and
the rapid fashion in which it was implemented, have resulted in distinct alterations in the expenditure
and revenue behavior of all types of local governments in California. Policy-makers, analysts and
government officials continue to refer to 'pre-13' and 'post-13' as a primary means of describing
predominant fiscal conditions and activities of local governments across the state.
The appearance of an abrupt shock in the form of a tax limitation provides an excellent
opportunity to investigate the types and magnitudes of reactions by local governments to rapid changes
in the fiscal environment. Municipal governments have the latitude to respond to such a stimulus in a
multitude of ways through such variable combinations as reductions and reallocations of expenditures,
increases in alternative revenue sources and the use of existing reserves. The event also facilitates the
examination of changes in intergovernmental relations and state policies in response to alterations in the
fiscal landscape.
Municipalities in California are quite varied in terms of institutional and socio-economic
characteristics. In addition, municipalities have differentiated themselves over time in such a way as to
respond to the different and changing demands of consumer/voters. Accordingly, while there may be
universal (or at least predominant) patterns in the responses of these local governments to abrupt fiscal
policy changes, we would also expect to see variations related to particular municipal characteristics
and qualities. These responses, in turn, become a part of the characteristic fabric of the municipality
and influence responses to subsequent changes in the fiscal and economic environment.
Research Questions
The research questions I address in this dissertation revolve around the central issue of
municipal reactions to the passage of Proposition 13. The subject of tax limitations in general, and
Proposition 13 specifically, have generated numerous academic articles and policy-oriented research
endeavors. While exceptions do exist, generally speaking, such research has focused on the
expenditure changes stemming from tax limits, employed aggregate data that precludes more finely
considered issues and emphasized short-term responses.
Each of these features has been justified on various grounds. Revenue changes stemming from
tax limits have either appeared to be self-evident or simply a mirror-image of expenditure fluctuations
devoid of characteristic traits of their own. The use of aggregate data has seemingly been defended on
the pragmatic basis that it facilitates more comprehensive data analysis. Finally, while the short-term
focus is understandable given the period during which most of the research has been conducted, the
lack of attention to medium and longer-term effects leaves numerous issues unexplored.
The hypothesis put forth in this analysis is that the use of aggregate models over a short time-
span with a primary focus on expenditures fails to capture the diversity of responses stemming from the
enactment of tax limitations generally and Proposition 13 specifically. The use of disaggregated data
and finely differentiated models facilitates the exploration of issues that relate to the potential for
diverse responses among different types of cities, the complex interplay that can occur between
revenues and expenditures and the relationship between short-term responses and longer-term trends.
The research questions are motivated not only by what are the perceived shortcomings of
research conducted to date -- valuable though it is -- but by the span of time that has elapsed since the
passage of Proposition 13. The passage of Proposition 13 was closely followed by state policies that
resulted in additional intergovernmental support (either through direct state grants or through
alterations in existing state-local fiscal relationships) and a period of rapid economic growth in the state
that resulted in buoyant revenue streams. These dynamics may have masked the more serious
consequences or medium to long-term ramifications of the Proposition.
The policy relevance of this analysis relates to a number of distinct state and local finance
issues. At the local level, this investigation addresses how seriously and in what manner municipal
governments were affected by the tax limitation in terms of revenues and expenditures. Variations in
revenue responses can assist in identifying the characteristics of municipalities using different revenue
sources in response to property tax curtailment. In addition, variations in expenditure reactions to the
passage of the tax limit can illuminate the importance of public goods and services for different types of
communities. At the state level, to the extent that intergovernmental assistance can play a role in
mitigating the impact of tax limits on local governments, this analysis should help define the parameters
and timing of appropriate aid policies.
I pursue three related but distinct research questions in this analysis. The fundamental
research question addressed in this dissertation examines the extent to which tax limitation
measures alter expenditure and revenue patterns in the short-term. This issue has been explored
previously using various methodologies with rather mixed results. In this analysis, two separate
techniques will be used to investigate these issues. The approach initially employed in estimating the
effects of the Proposition 13 tax limitation is distinguished by its ex ante methodology. Rather than
relying on comparisons of pre-13 and post-13 data, a model using pre-13 data is employed in order to
estimate what would occur to revenue and expenditure patterns once a tax limitation measure has gone
into effect. This methodology, termed the 'tax capacity model,' represents an attempt to avoid the
possibility of commingling the fiscal effects of Proposition 13 with other contemporaneous but distinct
influences.
The second method employed in estimating changes in expenditure and revenue patterns as a
result of the passage of Proposition 13 is based on the more standard methodology used in some
previous studies. This model, termed the 'revenue/expenditure adjustment model,' measures revenue
and expenditure data during selected pre- 13 and post- 13 periods and is used to estimate aggregate,
percentage and per capita changes stemming from the passage of the tax limitation measure. As in any
social science investigation, the empirical models employed here have certain strengths as well as
weaknesses associated with their theoretical underpinnings and methodological approaches. The
models are, nevertheless, complementary in many respects and lend a completeness and depth to the
overall analysis. Obtaining estimates from both types of models facilitates distinguishing tax limit
aspects of the Proposition from accompanying political-economic ones. This important distinction may
serve as a valuable source of information for state and local officials, as well as public finance analysts.
An accompanying line of inquiry builds from the initial analysis and addresses the
differential effects stemming from the adoption of Proposition 13. The spectrum of municipal
governments in California is both sizable and diverse. In 1979, there were 419 independent municipal
corporations in the State of California, each with the political capability to define its own expenditure
profile and its own revenue streams. In terms of population size they ranged from the City of Los
Angeles with some 2.8 million residents, to the City of Amador with a population of 160.
Economically, they ranged from the lumber-based towns near the Oregon border, to the agricultural
communities of the central valley to the bedroom suburbs of Orange County. Demographic
characteristics, social profiles and historical development of the municipalities are equally varied. They
tapped revenues from seven separate tax sources as well as six other non-tax sources. The different
types of expenditures are too varied to categorize in any terms other than the most general.
With such diverse profiles dictated by characteristic forces, on the one hand, and endogenous
fiscal responses, on the other, it should be not be expected that municipalities would be affected in a
homogeneous fashion. On the contrary, very diverse and varied reactions should result from abrupt
changes in the fiscal landscape. Just as differences among municipalities with respect to preferences
and abilities to pay result in vastly different revenue and expenditure profiles, abrupt changes in
exogenous forces will result in differential adjustments by municipalities. The passage of Proposition
13 represents just such a sudden fiscal change and allows for the careful dissection and analysis of
municipal responses.
The method used to explore the diverse effects of Proposition 13 on municipalities of different
characteristics is a variation of the expenditure determinants approach, whereby particular fiscal and
social variables are employed in order to explain and describe variations in revenues and expenditures.
These determinants are incorporated within the short-term models just described, as well as in the long-
term models discussed below. The determinants approach facilitates constructing general categories
regarding the effects of the tax limit on municipal governments. Results stemming from this analysis
may be of considerable importance with regard to intergovernmental aid policies in times of fiscal
stress.
A final area of inquiry relates to possible long-term effects of Proposition 13. Because of
the nature of the tax limitation measure, the time elapsed since its passage may have, in many respects,
heightened its impact and its importance for certain municipalities rather than diminished it. Just as the
impact of certain events only becomes clear when placed in a historical perspective, the importance of
Proposition 13 with respect to its impact on local public finance in California may only become
apparent from a distance of several years.
The importance of historical perspective is due to individual and combined effects of several
dynamics. First, the fiscal effects of the Proposition may vary due to the stresses and strains of
economic and social change. Second, the effects on different types of municipalities may fluctuate
depending on the differential forces of the Proposition and the changing economic and social
environment. Finally, given the nature of local finance, reactions to exogenous stimuli need not have
been instantaneous; the lagged reaction is a common phenomenon as municipalities define final, as
opposed to immediate, impacts of a measure.
The method used to explore the longer term effects of Proposition 13 on municipalities is a
variation of the expenditure determinants approach with an emphasis on descriptive techniques. As
with the model used to estimate how different types of cities were affected by and reacted to
Proposition 13, the focus here will be on how cities more or less affected by the dictates of the
Proposition adapted to the imposed constraints in the longer term. While imparting a causal
interpretation to the long-term regressions is not a suitable exercise, the descriptive methodology
should lead to a better grasp of the long range impacts of such a tax limitation. Results from the long-
term analysis should prove useful regarding decisions involving appropriate alterations in existing
patterns of state-local service responsibilities, revenue assignment as well as intergovernmental aid
policies.
This investigation is motivated in large part by the belief that, despite the common fiscal
disruption that occurred in the form of Proposition 13, reactions to the tax limitation displayed
significant heterogeneity across municipalities and over time. The discovery of the variety of reactions
is valuable in itself as it helps to clarify the multitude of dynamics that exist within local government. In
addition, greater understanding of the variety of responses is crucial from a policy perspective as well.
Careful consideration of the effects of abrupt changes in fiscal institutions -- such as the one wrought
by Proposition 13 -- on local governments of differing profiles should prove quite valuable.
Chapter Summaries
The remainder of the dissertation is divided into three main sections. In the first section,
consisting of Chapters 1 and 2, I present general background regarding Proposition 13 and relevant
public finance theory. Chapter 2 provides a review of the Proposition, outlines the social
circumstances that attended its passage and describes state policy reactions to its adoption. Chapter 3
outlines the principal theoretical approaches that have been employed in analyzing local government
revenues and expenditures. Given that this dissertation borrows from methodologically different
theories of local government behavior, the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives are
discussed. The discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather is designed to focus on features
relevant to this investigation. Notably, the focus is on the basis -- theoretical or otherwise -- of the
principal models used in this study. Empirical literature regarding tax limitation measures, and
Proposition 13 in particular, is also discussed in Chapter 3.
The next five chapters constitute the second main section and provide the empirical basis of this
investigation. In Chapter 4, the tax capacity model is introduced, the first of the models measuring
revenue and expenditure changes among municipalities. The tax capacity model relies on an ex ante
approach to measuring anticipated revenue and expenditure changes stemming from alterations in
municipal tax capacity. This chapter addresses the rationale for the use of this model and describes the
advantages and disadvantages associated with its use. Model specification, estimation results and an
analysis of the results are also presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 introduces the second model employed in analyzing short-term changes, the
revenue/expenditure adjustment model. In this chapter, the basic outlines of the model are presented
and the model is used to construct profiles of municipalities affected by the tax limitation measure.
Municipalities are categorized based on the severity of the property tax reductions as well as socio-
economic characteristics. Model specification, estimation results and an analysis of the results are also
presented in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, municipal revenues are presented in summary form and according to various
measures of change in order to convey general revenue trends over time and among different types of
municipalities. The revenue/expenditure adjustment model is then used to explain short-term variations
in revenues stemming from Proposition 13. Various socio-economic determinants are incorporated in
the model for this purpose. This chapter presents the rationale for the use of this model and an analysis
of its advantages and disadvantages. Model specification, estimation results and an analysis of the
results are also presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 presents the analysis of municipal expenditures. Expenditure data is presented in
summary form and according to various measures of change in order to convey expenditure trends
over time and among different types of municipalities. The expenditure counterpart to the revenue
model specified and estimated in Chapter 6 is then described. In this chapter, the revenue/expenditure
adjustment model is used to explain short-term variations in expenditures stemming from the passage
of Proposition 13. Chapter 8 uses the revenue/expenditure adjustment model to explore variations in
revenues and expenditures occurring over the long-term. Expenditures and revenues in the last fiscal
year prior to the enactment of Proposition 13 are compared to those occurring a decade after its
adoption.
Finally, in Chapter 9, representing the third main section, I present a summary, analysis and
interpretation of the major findings of the empirical investigation. Since differences in measurement
techniques, assumptions and time periods may lead to different results, the estimations of each of the
models are compared and contrasted in this chapter. Interpretations of the changes in expenditures and
revenues are then discussed within the context of public finance theory. In addition, various policy
implications of the findings of this analysis are discussed and analyzed.
Chapter 2
Proposition 13 and State Policy Responses
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary background regarding Proposition 13
and the role of the property tax in California local finance. An understanding of the major features of
the Proposition, the social circumstances surrounding its passage and state policy responses to its
approval are necessary in order to appropriately analyze and study the Proposition's effects. First, the
social and economic trends leading up to the Proposition's approval are briefly reviewed and the
historical role of the property tax in California local finance is profiled. Second, I describe and analyze
the major provisions of Proposition 13. Finally, the state's responses to the passage of Proposition 13
are discussed with reference to their impacts on municipal finance.
Fiscal and Social Trends
Social Context
Before examining the various details of the tax limitation measure itself, it is important to
consider the social circumstances that accompanied its passage. Proposition 13 was approved during a
time of gradual transition for California, from a state with higher than average state and local revenues
and expenditures, to one of average revenues and expenditures. This gradual but definite change in the
size of the state's overall public sector was due in part to the declining need for intensive capital
expenditures after the initial burst of post-war spending, but also stemmed from an alteration in the
type and size of public sector activity desired by California taxpayers. While the tax limitation measure
did not set this process in motion, it did act as a catalyst of sorts, speeding up the process of change for
state and local institutions.
In the immediate post-World War II era, California chose to create a high-tax, high spending
public sector. Through the 1950's and 1960's, expenditures on education and transportation, for
example, were substantially above those of the nation in per capita terms. In 1962, education
expenditures were 60% above the mean, health and hospitals 50% above the mean and transportation
10% above the mean.' Some of these institutions were perceived of as being among the best examples
of public investment in the U.S. By 1970, however, investment in these areas had all dropped such that
per capita expenditures were equal to or even below averages for other states, a trend which continued
through the 1980's. The initial post-13 fiscal year in 1979 resulted in a slightly steeper decline than in
previous years.
In terms of total state and local spending per $1000 of personal income, California's behavior
exhibits a similar post-war trend. In this case, however, the sharp influence of Proposition 13 is more
readily apparent. From 1961 to 1978, total state and local expenditures were consistently in excess of
the national mean, ranging from 18% above in 1966 to 6% above in 1977. For the initial post-13 fiscal
year, however, state and local expenditures dropped to below the national average and have, almost
without exception, remained at or below the average since that time. Because California was, and
remains, a relatively high income state, the per capita trends are not as stark. They too, however,
indicate a gradual decline in public sector expenditures through the 1960's and 1970's followed by a
rather rapid drop after the passage of Proposition 13.
Even while the state was undergoing gradual shifts in the emphasis placed on public sector
activity, it was concurrently experiencing tremendous growth in population and economic activity.
Through the post-war decades, California was among the fastest growing states, experiencing in-
migration from other regions and, as time passed, from other countries. The state's economy grew in
size and became increasingly diversified as well. Between 1970 and 1980, the state's population grew
from 19.9 to 23.7 million. By 1990, the population had reached 29.8 million. Thus, while the state's
pattern of growth and change seemed to suggest a greater need for public sector investment, resources
were shifting away from such activities. The passage of Proposition 13 represented, in many ways, a
decision to finalize the de-emphasis of public sector activity.
1 John W. Ellwood, "Alternatives for California's Future," Berkeley Institute for Research on
Policy Solutions, Working Paper #PS7 (University of California, Berkeley, Graduate School of
Public Policy, 1994), 7.
Property Tax Trends
In order to understand the circumstances surrounding the passage of Proposition 13, it is
important to appreciate the role property taxes have played in state and local finance. Local
governments in California -- cities, counties, school districts and special districts -- have generally been
quite reliant on property taxes. While the share of total revenues stemming from the property tax for
counties and cities actually dropped over the two decades prior to Proposition 13, in fiscal year 1978
(the last 'pre-13' year) this source still accounted for 33 percent and 22 percent of total revenues for
counties and cities respectively, as shown in Table 2.1 below. For school districts and special districts,
the share of total revenues contributed by the property tax also experienced a general decline over the
same period.
Table 2.1: Property Tax Share for
I ( rc.nt)
California Cities, Counties, School Districts and Special Districts, Fiscal Years
Fiscal Cities Counties School Special Special
Year Districts Districts(]) Districts(2)
1970 30.05 33.04 55.48 17.84 61.45
1971 29.24 36.07 55.76 17.98 61.48
1972 27.94 36.89 57.54 18.68 65.12
1973 25.76 34.49 57.35 19.08 64.11
1974 23.70 32.82 49.04 16.63 56.40
1975 23.87 34.99 49.74 14.01 46.10
1976 23.49 35.21 50.66 15.54 45.12
1977 23.71 35.36 51.96 16.36 46.16
1978 21.73 33.15 52.27 15.77 40.56
1979 10.20 16.87 24.78 10.46 18.92
1980 13.54 20.48 18.46 7.62 23.65
1981 13.71 20.53 18.72 8.67 23.86
1982 13.00 21.21 23.37 9.29 28.55
1983 13.86 22.40 23.01 9.30 31.09
1984 13.28 22.28 22.71 9.43 29.29
1985 12.88 23.11 22.82 10.02 24.22
1986 13.57 23.18 22.02 10.62 26.20
Notes: Initial post-13 fiscal year is 1979. (1) Enterprise Special Districts. (2) Non-Enterprise Special Districts.
Sources: State of California Controller's Annual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, State of California Controller's
Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning Counties in California, State of California Controller's Annual Report of Financial
Transactions Concerning School Districts in California, State of California Controller's Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning
Special Districts in California, Fiscal Years 1970-86-; Proposition 13: A Ten-Year Retrospective.
Table 2.1 also shows the share of total revenues attributable to the property tax during several
years following the passage of Proposition 13. For all four types of local governments, the reduction in
property tax revenues was quite significant between fiscal years 1978 and 1979. For counties, the
property tax share of total revenues dropped from 33 percent to 17 percent; for cities from 22 to 10
percent; for schools from 52 to 25 percent; for special enterprise districts from 16 to 10 percent and for
special non-enterprise districts from 41 to 19 percent. The table also reveals that counties and cities
both received a slightly greater property tax share in the second year after Proposition 13 (fiscal year
1980) than in the first year (fiscal year 1979).
Other fiscal dynamics are not so obvious from Table 2.1. For example, the passage of the
Proposition occurred within the context of generally lessening reliance on the property tax and a
greater, although uneven and varied, reliance on alternative revenue sources. In addition, the passage
of Proposition 13 seems to have led to an increase in revenue diversity for cities while other local
governments began to rely increasingly on just one or two sources of revenue. Counties and school
districts, for example, became increasingly reliant on state support while the diversification of city
revenue sources is shown in Table 2.2 below. The manner in which this increased revenue diversity is
related to the tax limitation measure is one of the focal points of this study.
Table 2.2: Revenue Sources of California Cities, Fiscal Years 1970 - 1986 (percent).
Fiscal Property Sales Local State Federal Fees & Other Enterprise
Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Revenue Revenue Charges Local Revenue
1970 30.05 15.89 3.17 17.20 2.76 9.06 14.21 6.38
1971 29.24 14.40 4.09 16.77 4.47 9.27 14.84 5.92
1972 27.94 14.47 4.76 16.69 5.92 9.32 14.14 5.50
1973 25.76 14.31 5.08 14.86 12.08 8.91 12.47 5.11
1974 23.70 15.06 4.96 15.89 9.74 8.85 14.24 6.26
1975 23.87 15.33 5.34 14.72 11.26 9.03 13.90 5.18
1976 23.49 14.80 6.18 14.04 14.49 8.54 11.74 4.73
1977 23.71 15.42 6.77 13.08 15.93 8.82 11.36 3.48
1978 21.73 15.25 6.58 12.42 19.87 8.36 10.86 3.61
1979 10.20 16.59 7.52 16.14 18.57 8.99 13.27 7.07
1980 13.54 17.65 8.11 12.09 15.88 9.31 15.12 6.96
1981 13.71 16.87 8.20 12.40 14.37 10.16 16.00 7.16
1982 13.00 15.27 9.27 9.46 12.57 13.97 18.17 4.59
1983 13.86 14.40 9.61 9.29 10.97 15.36 17.40 5.03
1984 13.28 14.74 10.86 8.54 9.88 16.20 16.47 5.58
1985 12.88 14.71 11.36 9.89 9.07 16.27 16.55 5.30
1986 13.57 14.62 11.69 11.82 8.16 16.75 16.65 3.46
Notes: Initial post-13 fiscal year is 1979.
Sources: State of California Controller's Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, Fiscal Years 1970-86;
Proposition 13: A Ten-Year Retrospective.
Clearly, the passage of Proposition 13 had a significant impact on local governments of all
types throughout the state. Counties, for example, became less and less able to support programs of
their own choosing, instead becoming increasingly reliant on the state for revenue generation and
expenditure direction. Funding for public education at the K-12 level also shifted rapidly to state
sources as localities lost the ability to raise property taxes and support schools to the extent that they
might desire. The resulting drop in quality of the school system in the state is a sobering and well-
known story. Special districts have had to rely almost exclusively on internal sources of funding --
typically user charges -- to finance both operating costs and capital requirements.
It is possible to argue that among all California local governments, municipalities were among
the least affected by the Proposition and, coincidentally, in the most advantageous position to deal with
the challenges it posed. Oddly, it is this inherent fiscal strength and independence of cities that make
them the most interesting subject of an analysis of local government revenue and expenditure reactions
to tax curtailment. The expenditure characteristics of cities (their ability to deliver a range of goods
and services) and their revenue profiles (the existence of fiscal institutions which allow for multiple
revenue sources) suggest that they are the most appropriate subject of study to ascertain many of the
effects of Proposition 13. Other local governments are distinguished either by their limited spectrum of
service provision (school districts and special districts) or a lack of political and fiscal autonomy
(counties). The relative fiscal and political autonomy accorded cities in California with respect to
revenue raising and expenditures and their multifaceted role in the provision of goods and services
make them an ideal subject for exploring the multiplicity of reactions to Proposition 13.
Provisions and Implementation of Proposition 13
Provisions of the Tax Limitation Measure
The passage of Proposition 13 in June 1978 not only resulted in a one-time fiscal shock to local
governments, it also put in place dramatically different rules and constraints that continued to shape
and define the fiscal profiles of local governments into the future. Both the immediate effects of the
Proposition as well as its long-term ramifications are evident from a close reading of the appropriate
provisions of the Proposition The most important sections of the Proposition:
(i) limited real property taxes to one percent of full cash value except as necessary to pay
for previously incurred voter-approved debt;
(ii) required property to be valued as of March 1, 1975, or as of the date the property
changes ownership or is newly constructed after March 1, 1975;
(iii) prohibited increases in tax assessments to two percent per annum (not to exceed the
rate of inflation);
(iv) prohibited state and local governments from imposing any sales or transaction taxes on
the sale of real property; and,
(v) required two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature to increase or to impose new
state taxes and a two-thirds vote of the qualified electorate to increase or add new local
special-purpose taxes.
There exist a multitude of interpretations of the motivating factors that gave rise to Proposition
13, but a brief scan through the major provisions of the Proposition clearly suggest that, whatever its
varied causes, its primary thrust was intended to limit the use of the property tax by local governments.
A more careful perusal of the Proposition's wording indicates that this limitation was not to be
implemented through a single simple policy change. Rather, three separate provisions of the measure
were directed toward the property tax. First, assessments were rolled back to levels prevailing in 1975,
eliminating the increase in value that occurred between 1975 and 1978. Second, tax assessments were
prohibited from rising more than two percent per year (not to exceed the rate of inflation) except upon
resale. Third, tax rates were limited to one percent of (assessed) full market value.
Issues in the Implementation of Proposition 13
Like many popular initiatives, the apparent simplicity of Proposition 13 hid rather significant
ambiguities and complications. Legislative actions were required in order to eliminate the ambiguities
and reconcile the simplicity of the Proposition with a more complicated reality. Additional court
2 The full text of Proposition 13 is contained in Appendix A.
actions were necessary in order to resolve more serious disputes. Many of the legislative actions dealt
with the meanings of terms and interpretation of particular phrases. For example, the 1975 base year
value of property varied widely due to the inconsistency of assessment practices throughout the state.
Legislative action was necessary to eradicate these inconsistencies and put all local governments on a
common basis.
There were many other examples of interpretive problems with the text of the measure. The
Proposition was unclear on whether change of ownership included putting property into trust or adding
a relative to the deed. New construction was interpreted by some as including repairs and maintenance
while others had a much more limited notion of this provision. Even the application of the one percent
limit on real property to was discussed by the legislative counsel. Unless the limit extended to personal
property as well as real property, this provision would conflict with the state's constitutional
requirement of uniform tax rates.
Other decisions of the legislative counsel interpreted the word 'districts' to include cities and
counties in order to avoid their complete elimination from property tax revenues!' In short, the
interpretations of the Proposition by the Legislature and the courts had a dramatic and decisive effect
on the overall impact of the Proposition -- one that could not have been foreseen by its supporters or
detractors. The ambiguous nature of many of the Proposition's stipulations to a period of
interregnum, during which local governments were left with no clear indication of the legality of fiscal
responses.
The interpretive issues associated with the Proposition are perhaps nowhere more apparent
than with regard to the one percent ceiling on property taxes. While on the face of it, the imposition of
a one percent ceiling seems reasonably clear, the Proposition did not dictate how this one percent was
to be allocated among local governments. In other words, prior to the adoption of the Proposition,
each local government independently established its own tax rate, which was then consolidated with
3 According to California law, cities and counties are not districts. Using the literal interpretation of the
Proposition would have prevented cities and counties from receiving any property tax revenues.
those of overlapping jurisdictions at the county level. As a result of this independence, municipal and
other local government rates varied across the state.
After Proposition 13, however, the one percent levy limit applied to total local government
property taxation and was somehow to be distributed among all local governments. The Proposition
itself, however, gave no guidance regarding the appropriate allocation of the property tax revenue. It
was reasonably assumed by the framers of the initiative that allocation of the one percent among local
governments would occur based on historical patterns. In the absence of such a stipulation, however,
responsibility for the allocation of property taxes fell to the State Legislature, to be addressed as part of
the enabling legislation for the Proposition.
In sum, the passage of the Proposition required changes in both tax levies and assessments, as
well as legislative actions necessary for its implementation. The multi-pronged restrictions on the use
of the property tax required legislative and court action in order to clarify terms and adopt suitable
specific language for its enactment. The passage of the Proposition, therefore, resulted in a series of
related impacts on municipalities. First, the Proposition caused an initial reaction among local
governments to the tax limit provisions. Second, the Proposition affected the policy actions of the state
with regard to its implementation. Third, the Proposition had an impact on state aid with respect to
policies intended to alleviate the impact of the tax limit.
State fiscal policy with respect to local governments in the wake of Proposition 13 comprised
an initial response for the fiscal year 1979, which established set of property tax allocation and state aid
policies, and then a second response for fiscal year 1980, which resulted a second set of allocation and
aid policies. Finally, state aid continued to undergo changes through the 1980's in response to altered
economic and fiscal conditions. The multi-faceted nature of the state reaction has important
ramifications for the design of this research study. The state fiscal reactions are described in the
following section.
What the above discussion suggests is that any investigation of the effects of Proposition 13 on
municipalities must account for a host influences due to both historical developments regarding local
revenues and expenditures as well as influences that, while they may be indirectly set in motion by the
measure, are not a direct result of the Proposition itself Only through a careful delineation of research
questions and parameters is it possible to successfully account for these distinct influences.
State Fiscal Response
The state was required to address a host of issues in designing an appropriate fiscal response
to the tax limitation measure. While a staggering number of questions and issues were left to the
legislature and the courts to decide with respect to the meaning and appropriate interpretation of
Proposition 13, the most important and far reaching of these decisions involved the allocation of the
property tax among the various governmental entities. As indicated previously, the Proposition
specified as to the one percent limit yet left open the question as to the proportion of the levy that each
government agency was to receive 4
Almost immediately following the passage of Proposition 13, the legislature adopted Senate
Bill (SB) 154 in order to temporarily alleviate the fiscal strains caused by Proposition 13. The primary
intent of the measure was to prevent the disruption of public services through the allocation of the one
percent property tax and the distribution of additional state aid. The existing state surplus, which had
built up over the previous years as a result of the expanding economy, was the primary source of these
state aid 'bail-out' funds.'
Under SB 154, the legislature directed counties to levy the one percent tax and allocate the
collected revenues among the local governments which had levied a property tax in fiscal year 1978.6
The allocation procedure was based on a two-stage computation. The initial stage divided property
4 Some analysts make a strong case that the legislature's allocation rules were constitutionally flawed
and in violation of tax situs, tax uniformity and fiscal home rule. See Rodney T. Smith, "Constitutional
Reform Gone Awry: The Apportionment of Property Taxes in California after Proposition 13," Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review 23 (April 1990): 829-918.
' In fiscal year 1978, state surplus funds were reported to be approximately $8.0 billion -- a surplus
which gave Proposition 13 supporters considerable ammunition regarding the Leviathan nature of
government.
6 This eligibility requirement excluded 31 cities which had levied no property tax at all during the 1978
fiscal year.
taxes into two categories: local agencies (cities, counties and special districts) and school agencies
(school districts, county superintendent of schools and community college districts). The local agency
share was computed as the total amount of property tax revenue raised under the one percent limit
multiplied by the percentage that local agencies collected of the total property taxes raised in fiscal year
1978 (the last 'pre-13' fiscal year). The residual amount equaled the school share.
The subsequent stage of the allocation process involved dividing the local agencies' share and
the school agencies' share among their respective institutional members. The revenue pool for local
agencies was allocated among those agencies based on property taxes collected during the three fiscal
years prior to the adoption of Proposition 13. For school agencies, the benchmark used for allocation
was the fiscal year immediately preceding the adoption of Proposition 13.
Allocation of property taxes and the distribution of state bail-out funds were conceptualized in
tandem and perceived as contributing equally to relieving the fiscal stress of cities. Consequently, the
allocation of bail-out funds were also tied to historic property tax collections. One-quarter of a billion
dollars in state block grants was allocated among cities in proportion to the difference between their
share of the one percent tax levy received in fiscal year 1979 and the amount collected in fiscal year
1978 (reduced by one-third of the agencies' surplus funds in excess of 5% of its fiscal year 1978
revenues).7
For fiscal year 1980, the legislature changed both the allocation of the one percent tax levy and
the distribution of state aid and enacted what was to become known as the long-term solution.' The
bail-out program was formally discontinued and the state allocation process was increased in
complexity. Basically, the new allocation procedure redirected property taxes away from schools and
toward local agencies (cities, counties and special districts) and allowed local governments to realize a
David Doerr, "The California Legislature's Response to Proposition 13," Southern California Law
Review 53 (November 1979): 79.
8 California, State Legislature, Assembly Local Government Committee, Assembly Office of Research,
Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee, Assembly Ways and Means Committee, Overview of
State Assistance to Local Governments Since Proposition 13 (Sacramento, California, 1985), 6.
growth in property tax revenues along with the growth in assessed value. All this was accomplished
under Assembly Bill (AB) 8.
AB 8 divided property tax revenues into two components: (i) the amount of revenues raised in
the previous fiscal year (base tax) and (ii) the additional revenue raised due to the increase in taxable
assessed valuation (tax increment). For cities, the base tax was calculated as the amount of property
taxes received in fiscal year 1979 plus state assistance (approximately equal to bail-out moneys
received in fiscal year 1978). The shift of property taxes from schools to local agencies was
accomplished by defining the base for schools as the property taxes received in fiscal year 1979 minus a
pro-rata share of the bail-out funds received by local agencies. The tax increment was allocated based
on tax rate areas (a geographic area of which all is within the jurisdiction of the same combination of
local agencies and school agencies). The annual tax increment was allocated in proportion to the
amount of property tax each jurisdiction received from the tax rate area in the prior fiscal year.
In conjunction with the property tax re-allocation exercise, the legislature addressed whether or
not to continue the state bail-out program or alternatively, address more long term solutions to local
finance issues caused by Proposition 13. The legislature decided that the shift from a schools emphasis
to a local agency emphasis in the distribution of the property tax was preferable to the bail-out
procedures used in the first post-13 fiscal year. In conjunction with this, the state dramatically
increased its funding of public education from both general revenues and special funds.
Clearly, the dramatic nature of Proposition 13 was matched by equally dramatic shifts in state
and local fiscal relationships. As a consequence of the interrelationship of Proposition 13 with state
policies, the research design of this investigation attempts to account for alterations to the existing
dynamic between state and local governments. To the extent possible, the methodologies employed
and the overall research design distinguish between the primary effects of the Proposition on municipal
governments and its secondary effects.
Chapter 3
Measuring Municipal Revenues and Expenditures
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to: (i) identify the principal methods which have been used by
economists, planners and policy analysts to describe and explain revenue raising and expenditure
activities of local government activities; and, (ii) provide a general outline of the approaches used in
this analysis to investigate reactions of municipalities in California to the passage of Proposition 13.
Discussion of existing literature in this chapter will initially pertain to general approaches used in
analyzing municipal revenues and expenditures. Discussion of empirical literature regarding tax limits
in general and Proposition 13 in particular are found in the final passages of the appropriate sections.
In this dissertation I have focused on explaining the response of revenues and expenditures to a
one-time shock in the form of a property tax limitation rather than on explaining the actual level of
revenues and expenditures. Despite this rather narrow emphasis, the theories developed in the local
government budgeting and expenditures literature will be helpful in this investigation. One of the major
goals of this section is not necessarily to improve or elaborate on any particular method of analysis --
all have their various strengths and weaknesses -- but rather to identify the major positive and negative
attributes of each of several methods of inquiry. Through this process of elaboration and explication it
is possible to identify the methodologies or approaches that will be most effectively employed in
analyzing local government behavior following the passage of Proposition 13.
Municipal Expenditures Literature
Median Voter Paradigm
Most of the theoretical work in the area of local government finance has dealt with
expenditures. The models underlying much of this work are based on varying fundamental theories
regarding the relationship between government and numerous internal and external institutions. As
identified by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), the most important of these fundamental theories of
government behavior are:
(i) voting models, viewing public choices as the outcome of an explicitly specified political
process, typically majority voting:
(ii) bureaucratic models, emphasizing the limited control of the electorate over many aspects of
decision-making and the goals of those who administer government policies;
(iii) interest group models, including as an important special case, Marxist models based on
class interests.'
Clearly there are situations where each of these models would be an appropriate means by
which to conceptualize or explain governmental activities. Voting models may be most appropriate in
the context of local government decision-making by direct democracy -- such as the New England
town meeting -- but may also be applied to indirect democracy with some loss in validity. Examples
also exist of bureaucratic power being used to influence budget decisions and protect turf. This
particular model may be most appropriate as the links to voter-consumers become more tenuous, such
as with regard to defense spending at the national level. Finally, the class interest approach may be the
most insightful of all, but also the most intricate and difficult to model formally. While the Marxist
model and other interest group theories may provide ultimately the greatest degree of insight into the
role of particular levels or functions of government, they are based principally on an interpretation of
the historic development of social relationships in their analysis. As a consequence, their insights are
difficult or impossible to generalize or to explore in quantitative terms.
The goal in this investigation is much more modest than seeking to explain the role of class
interest in the historic development and exercise of power by government. Rather, the focus is on
analyzing the immediate reasons as to how and why local governments reacted in particular ways to
alterations in institutional constraints. An interest group approach might be one quite suited for an
1 Anthony Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics (New York, New York and
Maidenhead, England: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 295.
2investigation as to why Proposition 13 was approved by the voters. In order to understand the local
government fiscal responses to the passage of the Proposition, it is more appropriate to seek less
profound, albeit more precise, models.
The most widely used model for describing and explaining local government behavior is the
median voter model.3 Partially in response to perceived theoretical shortcomings of the determinants
studies of government expenditures (discussed below) a demand framework for analyzing government
budgeting was formulated. In the demand framework, a preference function is specified and in the
median voter model, the preference function is assumed to be that of the median (50th percentile)
consumer/voter.
The median voter demand function assumes that voters determine the budgetary outcome.
Other key assumptions of the model include the following: barriers to public office are low, voters are
well-informed about the issues and all voters vote, majority rules and the candidate and budget package
favored by the median voter wins. In order to facilitate the reduction to quantitative terms, most
models identify the median voter in each locality as the one with that locality's median income.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) identify several concerns with this particular treatment of income,
however, and indicate that the conditions which relate the median voter to median income are quite
restrictive with respect to variations in income and differences in taste.
Other problems associated with the median voter model generally are set forth in Mueller
(1976 and 1979).4 Among the difficulties he notes is that levels of public service must be decided by
2 See, for example, Clarence Lo, Small Property Versus Big Government: The Social Origins of
the Property Tax Revolt (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1990).
3 The dominant party has been used by analysts to a lesser extent. This specification views local politics
as an occasional two-party fight with barriers to the formation of new parties, complex issues, costly
voting and other components that result in budgetary outcomes being decided by dominant parties.
4 Some models based on the median voter rationale deal with these inconsistencies by avoiding the
public choice conundrum and simply assume that the allocation process can be modeled after a single
decision-maker whose tastes accurately reflect that of the community. See, for example, Helen F.
Ladd and John Yinger, America's Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health and the Design of Urban Policy
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
single-issue elections, yet typically elections are held to select individuals who make a multitude of
simultaneous decisions involving budget size and allocation. Mueller also observes that representatives
may select the proper distribution of activities but set the aggregate budget too large for the median
voter. Inman (1979) further notes that the median voter specifications are based on the simplifying
assumption that local government supplies only one good or service.
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) formulated a median voter expenditure model which is typical
of the genre. Their model assumes that an election results in a platform identical to the optimal
position of the median voter. They specify structural supply and demand functions for the municipal
goods and services market and then combined supply and demand equations into a final municipal
expenditures model. Expressed in expenditures per capita, their log-log reduced form expenditure
equation results in only exogenous variables on the right side of the equation or:
Ine - hnA ' + (i1--J) lnw- + (a-1)(r7+1) lnp + 8/n y (3.1)
where: e = per capita expenditures for a particular category;
A '= constant;
y = the income of the median voter;
w = observed wage rate of labor;
p = population of the political unit.
The Borcherding and Deacon model allows for the estimation of the important parameters of
(i) price elasticity of demand; (ii) income elasticity of demand; and, (iii) the degree of publicness of
goods being produced. In addition to the parameters noted above, Borcherding and Deacon add
several determinants which are not normally used and result in the estimation of spending dynamics
which would not otherwise be captured. They add separately and together measures of degree of
urbanization and the total area of the state.
In a subsequent development, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) formulated a model similar to
that of Borcherding and Deacon but which is focused more on the demand aspects of municipal
expenditures. The assumptions for their median voter model are: (i) unit costs are constant within each
jurisdiction but not necessarily across jurisdictions; (ii) a citizen's tax share is a function of the total
cost of expenditures and may only vary by income, wealth or other individual characteristics; (iii)
citizens are aware of the tax price and can determine the quantity of the municipal commodity they
would choose for the municipality based on this tax price; (iv) the quantity of the municipal commodity
supplied is equal to the median of the quantities demanded by citizens; and, (v) the median of the
quantities demanded is the quantity demanded by the citizen with the median income.
Bergstrom and Goodman extend the traditional model by refining definitions of income and tax
share and allowing the incorporation of additional family characteristics in the demand equation. Their
demand model for public goods and services relates public demand to proportions of the population in
each income group. In addition, their price variable is a function of randomly distributed variations
around the share of the property tax paid at the median income, in contrast to Borcherding and
Deacon's assumption that the tax share is simply 1/P where P is equal to population. Finally, their
model allows for expressed demand for government goods and services to depend partially on family
characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, age and voting behavior. Their approach creates a logical
connection between community demand functions and individual demand functions.
In a manner similar to that of Borcherding and Deacon, Bergstrom and Goodman conducted
regressions for different expenditure types and for different states. However, instead of basing their
data on aggregate state and local government expenditures, Bergstrom and Goodman improved the
connection between expenditure levels and the decision-making process by limiting themselves to
expenditures made by municipalities based on revenues received by those municipalities. Thus, two
criticisms of earlier work in this area -- the vast aggregation of data across budget categories and the
combining of different levels of governmental units into a total expenditure measure -- were generally
successfully addressed in this subsequent empirical work.
Several issues associated with this approach are far from resolved however. Oates (1986)
raises several issues about the 'standard' model of demand for local public goods as represented by the
Borcherding and Deacon and Bergstrom and Goodman methodologies. He raises concerns about the
interpretation of the models with regard to: (i) the specification and measurement of the congestion
properties of local public goods; (ii) so called 'Tiebout' or 'sorting' bias in the estimation of the demand
functions for different communities; (iii) the effects of community characteristics on the provision of
local public services; and, (iv) renter versus homeowner behavior.5
To the extent that this investigation deals with the relationship of the types of responses to
Proposition 13 and the characteristics of various types of communities (and their residents), there is less
concern here with the actual levels of revenue and expenditure estimates than with the changes that
occur in these levels as a consequence of the one-time institutional shock represented by the passage of
a tax limitation. Assuming the influences that Oates discusses remain static, they should not influence
the validity of the interpretations stemming from this study. Nevertheless, to the extent that the models
result in ambiguous estimates, these issues should be taken into account in the interpretation of the
regression results..
Specifically, the issues that Oates raises that are of concern here deal with the interpretation of
the community characteristics variables and housing tenure variables. As he points out, particular
community characteristics such as income levels may affect the cost of provision of public services,
implying that the effective price of these services is lower in higher-income communities than in lower-
income communities. As Oates observes, this implies that higher-income communities would not be
accurately measured since some of the higher consumption is hidden in the lower price.6 Thus, unless
income is entered in the equation as both a determinant of demand and a determinant of price, the
estimates of income as a factor of demand are likely to be biased downward.
' A more fundamental criticism with the entire approach comes from U-Jin Jhun and Jang H. Yoo,
"The Public Good Demand Function: Tax Share as a Dependent Variable," Public Finance Quarterly
6 (July 1978): 277-286, who argue that the cause and effect relationship is misspecified. They develop
and estimate a demand curve for local government services based on the hypothesis that quantity
demanded determines price as opposed to the standard approach where price determines quantity
demanded; however, the standard approach of price determining quantity demanded remains dominant
in the literature.
6 Oates, Wallace, "The Estimation of Demand Functions for Local Public Goods: Issues in
Specification and Interpretation," Unpublished Manuscript (University of Maryland, Department of
Economics, 1986), 16.
Oates also argues that the distinction in demand for public goods made between homeowner
and renter may be inadequately or inappropriately attributed to 'fiscal illusion' -- the belief that the cost
of higher levels of public spending demanded by renters are not passed on in the form of higher rents.
The distinction made between the two groups suggests that a dummy variable for tenure choice may be
an inadequate means to capture the different demands. Separate demand functions may be necessary
especially if some type of Tiebout' sorting occurs in the selection of housing tenure. If such
endogeneity of housing-tenure/public-spending choice occurs, cross-sectional and longitudinal
parameter estimates may be biased. Representation of short-term, within-city response would still be
possible, however.
Merriman (1983) also has criticisms of the traditional approach to modeling local government
expenditures employed by the majority of analysts. The traditional approach assumes that the total
local government budget is exogenously determined -- i.e., that communities are given a certain level of
resources and then allocate this among different activities according to their preference functions.
Merriman takes issue with this, averring that the treatment of budget size and allocation as separate and
distinct events is unrealistic and misrepresents the revenue and expenditure dynamics that actually
transpire.
Merriman argues that just as the consumer makes simultaneous decisions regarding work,
leisure and goods consumption, local governments make simultaneous decisions regarding the total
proportion of what Merriman terms 'tax capacity' to collect and allocate to particular government
goods and services, and the proportion of that tax capacity to go uncollected. Because the local
government budget size is not exogenously determined, but rather simultaneously determined with
budget allocation, the parameters of community preference functions should not be estimated based on
this assumption.'
David F. Merriman, "The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the Size and Allocation of
Municipal Budgets," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Economics,
1983), 98.
Merriman's analysis of government budget size and allocation takes into account the possibility
that decision-makers allocate tax capacity to: (i) uncollected taxes; and, (ii) collected taxes. At the
same time, the various needs of the community in terms of desired levels of expenditures for various
goods and services influence the allocation of tax capacity. This simultaneous decision-making is
important in any estimation process of local government expenditure levels. He argues that this
dynamic is particularly important in estimating the effect of a tax limitation measure. As a result of this
dynamic process, tax limitation measures are likely to have an effect on both the size and the allocation
of the local government budget.'
Expenditure Determinants Approach
The models discussed above are grounded in or have their roots in neoclassical consumer
theory and consequently have a great deal of theoretical development associated with them. Unless
augmented or supplemented by additional descriptive variables, however, such models tend to be of
limited use in addressing the ramifications of tax limitations for cities or constructing urban policy
alternatives in response to such measures.
Some median voter models go far enough afield from the strict neoclassical paradigm to
incorporate additional socio-economic characteristics in the models. Merriman, for example, in his
regressions to explain the share of local government spending going to various goods uses density,
population, residential proportion, unemployment rate and political institutions variables to add
explanatory depth to his models. To a lesser extent, earlier median voter papers, such as those by
Borcherding and Deacon and Bergstrom and Goodman, also incorporate such additional variables to
augment the income and price parameters which were the focus of their investigation.
An alternative method, which is based not on consumer theory but rather on estimating the
influence of various social and economic characteristics on variations in expenditure levels, has been
8 Another possible approach to local government decision-making represents some blending of the
two methods and models the process as a sequential or reiterative one. In such a model,
municipalities would first assess the need for spending on different goods and services. Tax
revenues required to fund such expenditures are then calculated and the resulting tax burden is
compared to that of previous years and surrounding communities. Finally, adjustments are made
in spending levels (usually down) in order to bring expenditures in line with fiscal realities.
termed the 'determinants' approach. Chronologically, the expenditure determinants approach pre-dates
the neoclassical paradigm described above. The latter was, in fact, developed partially in response to
the lack of a firm theoretical foundation to explain expenditure variation (see, for example, Bahl and
Saunders 1965, Bahl 1968a and Fisher 1961). The approach used in many of the studies using
expenditure determinants involves cross-sectional data analysis. As Bahl (1968b) points out, this
approach allows only for static interpretation of differences between governmental units and does not
facilitate dynamic or temporal inferences. Comparisons of static estimates in different years, however,
is one method by which to make temporal inferences.
Some of the expenditure determinant variables clearly represent an attempt to incorporate taste
or preference measures of the population (as expressed through the median voter or the government
agent) and as such could be considered part of a causal relationship. Examples of these could be
certain demographic or educational characteristics. Other variables that have typically been used in
econometric modeling can be considered descriptive only -- such as those that relate to the distribution
of property types or the rate of population growth. The magnitude and, in some cases, even the sign of
the coefficients on these parameters may be theoretically ambiguous.
Clearly, it is possible after the parameters are known to speculate as to what type of dynamic
may be occurring with regard to variations of expenditures on particular goods and services. For
example, the effect of city size where economies or diseconomies of scale may be operable can be
deciphered on an ex post basis. However, without a firm theoretical foundation, it is difficult to be
certain regarding the characteristics of the parameters on an apriori basis.
Some of the early work in expenditure determinants (e.g. Sternlieb et al, 1973) tends to be
largely atheoretical and statistical in its methodological approach. Not only were no direct links made
to particular theories of public expenditures, but the independent variables themselves were chosen
based on statistical performance rather than in accordance with a preconceived notion of budgetary
choices. As a consequence, as Beaton observes, "...the coefficients derived from [such an]... analysis
may in reality be functions of unspecified exogenous and endogenous variables..."1
A more recent and more conceptually consistent effort in the determinants vein is Ladd and
Yinger's (1989) comprehensive analysis of local government expenditure patterns. Their particular
approach made the determinants paradigm more policy relevant than formerly. In their study, the
authors explicitly disavow a direct econometric specification of how citizens' preferences and city
political institutions interact to generate spending outcomes. Instead they take a pragmatic approach
and "...identify summary measures of citizens' demand for public services [while] ... control[ing] for
political institutions."10
In their expenditure model, the authors use five basic categories of independent variables for
their regressions. First they use dummy or categorical variables representing the year of the data and
the region within which the local government lies. Second, they control for institutional factors by
including measures of housing characteristics (price and tenure), households (number and voters), age
of populace, type of government and whether there is a tax limit. Third, they include basic demand
measures such as family income, exported taxes, property tax base and intergovernmental aid. Fourth,
the authors incorporate service responsibilities since these vary from state to state. Fifth, input and
environmental costs are included in the model through such variables as manufacturing wage,
consumer price index, population, density, poverty, unemployment rate, type of employment, city size
as a proportion of surrounding metropolitan area, type of housing and land use patterns.
In foregoing the explicit theoretical foundation that is employed in the neoclassical expenditure
models, Ladd and Yinger are able to construct a paradigm which is quite rich and detailed. They
estimate their basic model for general government expenditures, police expenditures and fire
9 W. Patrick Beaton, "The Demand for Municipal Goods: A Review of the Literature from the Point of
View of Expenditure Determination," in Municipal Expenditures, Revenues and Services: Economic
Models and Their Use by Planners, ed. W. Patrick Beaton (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for
Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1983), 145.
'
0 Ladd and Yinger, America's Ailing Cities, 218.
expenditures. The Ladd and Yinger model provides a direct link between the choice of independent
variables and the theoretical basis of expenditures, even though an explicit theoretical model is not
invoked. Their model, in a sense, provides a bridge between the more theoretical approach, which has
not proved particularly edifying in empirical work, and the statistically-based expenditure determinants
approach, which lacks an explicit theoretical framework. In this analysis, I draw upon the Ladd and
Yinger approach in my investigations in addition to employing a model derived more directly from
theory.
Expenditures and Tax Limitation Measures
Both general approaches outlined above have been used in the study of expenditure
changes stemming from the passage of tax limitation measures. Some studies have estimated
elasticities for various public goods in an effort to predict changes in expenditures given the
passage of tax limitations (see Cline, 1981). Although helpful in interpreting small changes in
relevant influencing variables, the estimates are unlikely to have much validity in situations
involving more dramatic quantitative shifts. Studies such as Cline's typically ignore the possibility
that elasticities could be altered by the imposition of a tax limitation, thus weakening the validity
of such predicted changes. In addition, income elasticities rather than budget elasticities have
often been employed in many studies, severely undercutting their applicability in the municipal
sphere.
Other analysts present evidence suggesting that the enactment of tax limitation measures
should result in a budget reordering inversely proportional to the ease with which municipally-
provided goods can be produced by private purveyors. White (1979), for example, argues that
expenditure limitations (which have effects similar to those of tax limitations) raise the 'shadow
cost' of public funds thus increasing the probability that municipalities will reduce expenditures for
elastically-demanded goods and/or those with private sector substitutes. Presumably, however,
this same dynamic would exist prior to the imposition of a tax or expenditure limitation.
Consequently, this analytical approach does not address the type of mechanism that could lead to
such expenditure shifts.
Shapiro and Sonstiele (1982) study the effects of the passage of Proposition 13 on budget
shares for different public goods in order to assess the validity of the 'Leviathan' theory of
government. They estimate a demand equation before and after the passage of Proposition 13
and test the stability of the estimated parameters in order to ascertain the effect of the tax
limitation measure. Using this procedure they reject the null hypothesis that budget parameters
are equal over the entire period. While this approach is a reasonable means by which to examine
changes in budget shares, their study can be questioned on the basis of the implicit assumption
that budget size and allocation are consecutive rather than simultaneous decisions." More
seriously, their study does not consider fiscal changes coinciding with, but not a direct result of,
the passage of Proposition 13.
Two studies which address expenditure reactions in the context of tax limitation restrictions are
of particular interest. The literature addressing the effects of tax limitation measures in general and
Proposition 13 in particular, has traditionally been limited to aggregate studies compiled with little
attention paid to differences among cities regarding their socio-economic characteristics and range
of fiscal impacts. Yet characteristics of cities affected by the tax limitation measures and how
those characteristics help shape their own fiscal reactions can provide important information for
policy analysts at the state and local levels.
One attempt to provide such detailed information with respect to the socio-demographic
characteristics of cities affected by fiscal stress is the work by Reid (1988). Based on a stratified
random sample of California municipalities, Reid looks at average (mean) per capita expenditure
changes between the fiscal years 1978 (the last pre-Proposition 13 fiscal year) and fiscal year
1986 (the last year in which data were available). Reid also analyzes the variation of such
response based on a few important municipal characteristics comprising population size, rate of
population growth, assessed valuation and income levels.
" David F. Merriman, The Control of Municipal Budgets (New York, New York: Quorum
Books, 1987), 57.
Reid's findings are of some interest to those concerned about changes occurring in the
realm of intergovernmental finance but primarily with regard to revenues rather than expenditures.
Reid does find reductions in certain expenditures categories (general government, public works,
parks & recreation and libraries) and increases in other categories (public safety, health and
other/contributions). The patterns he detects in the period under study can be summarized as
follows: a modest increase in essential services, a shift away from expenditures that do not result
in final services, significant reductions in non-essential services and a shift into intergovernmental
arrangements and enterprise activities.
Some of the conclusions drawn by Reid are helpful in understanding what types of cities
are affected by fiscal stress and what types of expenditures are affected most. However, Reid
detects no pattern in the relationship between types of expenditure changes and types of cities.
The study also does not address changes in the variance regarding expenditures; while an analysis
of mean changes provides one measurement of his sample, an analysis of the second moment of
the sample would shed additional light on the topic. In addition, his comparisons are limited to
per capita changes, which can lead to distortions and misinterpretation unless supplemented by
other measures.
Another more serious drawback of his study is the time period over which the analysis was
conducted. During the observation period fiscal years 1978 to 1986, numerous changes occurred
in local finance in California, only one of which was the tax limitation imposed by Proposition 13.
In addition, economic changes affecting local financial affairs were also quite prevalent during this
period. These numerous effects make it impossible to separate Proposition 13-related affects
from other fiscal and economic influences. With no early post-13 fiscal analysis provided, the
results are quite difficult to interpret. Saltzstein's (1986) study of expenditure changes suffers
from some of the same deficiencies.
The polymorphous reactions of municipal governments to changes in the external fiscal
and economic environment has not been a traditional focus of analysis for those specializing in
municipal and public finance issues. Typically, in the aggregate, revenues and expenditures are
seen as being in balance. This conceptualization avoids dealing with more complex relationships
between revenues and expenditures including the use of or additions to fiscal reserves, the
issuance of debt and the initiation of additional revenue streams in the face of revenue
curtailments.
Rothenberg and Smoke (1984) address just such issues on the expenditure side in
investigating municipal reactions of cities in Massachusetts to the passage of the property tax
limitation popularly known as Proposition 21/2. Using dissaggregated data, the authors look at
changes in aggregate expenditures in the first two years following the passage of the Proposition
in 1980 and analyze the relationship between these changes and the magnitude of property tax
reductions net and gross of additional revenue adjustments. Although they include a few socio-
demographic variables, these are for control purposes as opposed to representing a focus of their
investigation.
Among the most important characteristics that they make note of are: (i) a reversal in the
strong growth trend in aggregate expenditures to one of absolute decline in year one and a return
to growth in year two; (ii) a decrease in the dispersion of expenditures; and (iii) only modest
growth recovery in year two after the Proposition. Using fiscal characteristics (revenue change
prior to and after adjustments) of the municipalities, Rothenberg and Smoke attempt to explain
differences among the municipalities. Generally, their findings suggest that cities react quite
conservatively to drastic changes in the fiscal environment as represented by the enactment of
Proposition 2i/2.
As evidence of such budgetary conservatism, the authors find that the relationship
between aggregate expenditure changes and gross revenue changes is much stronger than
between expenditure changes and net revenue changes, suggesting that cities viewed property
taxes as a surer form of revenue than the offsets (such as state aid or other local revenues)
received in lieu of such taxes. By year two such responses have been altered with a much
stronger relationship between expenditure changes and net revenue changes than gross revenue
changes, suggesting that municipalities have become adjusted to the new types of revenue streams
and more confident of their consistency. With respect to aggregate expenditure responses, the
authors conclude that: (i) appropriations were reduced in the first year following the enactment of
Proposition 21/2 despite the possibility of offsetting revenues to property tax curtailment; and, (ii)
localities allowed cutbacks in expenditures only as modified by supplemental revenues.
Rothenberg and Smoke's investigation into the responsiveness of different expenditure
categories to the constraints of Proposition 21/2 results in somewhat less definitive answers
regarding patterns of responses. The degree of heterogeneity continues to hold true both across
cities and expenditure categories. In addition, wide dispersion -- even as to direction as well as
magnitude -- of expenditure responses dominates the data. The authors find that aggregate
responses do not mesh with any expenditure category and no separate expenditure categories
match in their responses. Overall, they conclude that the asymmetry of response in expenditures
is a function of a series of concurrent concerns such as; inadequate or excess capacity, political
ease of adjustment, sporadicness and scale of adjustments and the relative budget importance of
the expenditure category. Given the complexity of the decision-making process, the outcome is
likely to be strongly influenced by specific city circumstances.
Rothenberg and Smoke make a valuable contribution to the understanding of municipal
reactions to tax limitations. They make use of several measures of change in order to study the
expenditure effects of the tax limitation measure and they are able to incorporate parameters
measuring the severity of the tax limitation's effect on different municipalities. Their study,
however, could benefit from additional clarity in the presentation of their findings. In addition, a
finer-toothed analysis of expenditure categories might have revealed somewhat different
relationships. The rather broad 'other' category, for example, includes activities as essential as
general government and public works to those perceived as less vital services such as parks &
recreation.
Unlike the immediate fiscal reactions of local governments to the passage of Proposition
13, the longer term impacts of the tax limitation measure have been virtually unexplored by public
finance analysts. There were, however, a handful of analytical studies conducted to coincide with
the ten-year anniversary of the Proposition's passage.' 2 Smith's (1991) discussion of the effects
of Proposition 13, for example, does provide some valuable insight regarding the longer-term
effects of tax limitation measures. Using data over a 27 year period, his longitudinal regression
methodology indicates that Proposition 13 had a significant negative effect on certain
expenditures (general government and recreation) and no significant effect on others (public
safety, health and public works.
Smith's study also highlights many of the weaknesses common to aggregate studies of tax
limitation measures. As has been previously observed, the use of aggregate data does not allow
for exploring differences among and between cities in their responses to Proposition 13. In
addition, Smith uses a dummy variable to represent the pre-13 and post-13 environments. This
does not facilitate any exploration of the linkage between the severity of property tax losses and
subsequent expenditure changes. While his longitudinal methodology succeeds in separating
underlying expenditure trends from the effects of Proposition 13, it does not shed any light on the
characteristics of affected cities or the severity of the tax limitation's effect of expenditure
reactions.
Municipal Revenues Literature
Analysis of Local Government Revenue
For a number of reasons, the development of a theoretical and empirical literature regarding
local government revenues has not proceeded to the same degree in either breadth or depth as has the
literature on local government expenditures. Little theoretical development regarding issues of local
revenue choice has occurred and, as a result, few rigorous models of local revenue choice have
emerged. Even an approach to modeling local revenue choice similar to the determinants paradigm
used in expenditure analysis has not been adequately developed.
12 See, for example, Proposition 13: A Ten Year Retrospective, ed. Frederick D. Stocker
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1991).
The reasons for the absence of theoretical development and the small number of empirical
investigations in this area are several, but two primary explanations suggest themselves. First, the
expenditure process of local governments is conceived of, in most cases, as being analogous to
microeconomic consumer theory. Whether one relies on median voter paradigm or the more
pragmatic determinants approach, local government expenditure choice can be modeled in a fashion
similar to consumer expenditures. In both cases, income and price, enhanced by preference variables,
are appropriately included in the modeling process.
The link between consumer theory and local government revenues is, in contrast, not as
apparent or direct. Local governments cannot choose among a large variety of revenue sources.
Institutional constraints are quite binding regarding the source of revenues made available to cities as
well as the rate at which taxes and fees can be levied. As a result, modeling local revenue choice
requires addressing the issue in a different manner. Since the selection of local revenues appears to
involve little choice but rather an acceptance of available revenue streams, this side of the local finance
equation seems inherently less interesting than the expenditure side.
Second, public finance economists who focus on local government fiscal issues implicitly treat
aggregate revenues as the mirror image of aggregate expenditures. It is implicitly assumed in most of
the literature that expenditures in any given year will equal revenues. However, a variety of individual
institutional responses by local governments can result in situations where aggregate revenues and
expenditures are not balanced. Although they may show varying tendencies to do so, most local
governments do have the ability to accumulate reserves, utilize existing reserves or issue long and
short-term debt obligations.
In one of the few academic investigations into alternative local revenue streams, Inman (1971)
modeled total taxes per capita and tax shares of various sources as finctions of public service prices,
dollar tax subsidies, income, expenditure demand variables and tax regulations. Using a two-stage least
squares procedure, Inman argues that the data from 41 large U.S. cities suggest that the availability of
alternative taxes (general sales, selective sales and income) results in a reduction of the property tax
share of total local taxes and an increase in the diversity of the tax stream. Surprisingly, Inman also
finds that the imposition of a property tax mill limit has a positive and significant effect on total taxes
and little or no impact on the share of the total borne by the property tax. '
These confusing results probably say more about the limitations of cross-sectional models
across states than about how local governments execute revenue choices. The counter-intuitive results
from the tax mill limit suggest that some tax restrictions were not, in fact, binding on local governments
because they were set in excess of revenues or because they included no assessment limit. A different
specification using something other than a binary variable might have resulted in quite a different
interpretation. On the other hand, Inman's finding that allowing for alternative revenue sources results
in a decline in the reliance on the property tax is an important and intuitively appealing result. In
addition, it suggests that the obverse may also occur: a restriction on the use of particular taxes may
result in an increased reliance on remaining sources of income rather than a reduction in total taxes.
This, in fact, addresses one of the central questions of this investigation.
Revemies and Tax Limitation Measures
The available revenue literature that relates to the issue of revenues and tax curtailment
measures suffers from rather limited scope and applicability. In addition to Inman's (1971) study,
however, a few other investigations are worth noting. Using a time-series regression and
comparing states with tax limitation measures to those without, Lowery (1983), discovers no
evidence that tax limitations reduce the size or constrain the growth of local government budgets
but apparently do have an effect on the share of the total revenues borne by the property tax.
Lowery also discerns a concomitant shift toward non-property tax local revenue and state aid.
However, Lowery's conclusions regarding the shift in revenue composition are dependent on the
selection of appropriate comparison states and a stable time-series over the approximately twenty-
year period of the study.
Several other studies suggest a trend away from property taxes and toward other forms of
local income in a post-tax limitation environment, but these are largely anecdotal accounts and
" Robert P. Inman, "Subsidies, Regulations and the Taxation of Property in Large U.S. Cities,"
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surveys. With regard to fiscal changes following the passage of Proposition 13, for example,
Florestano (1981), Cline and Shannon (1982) and Barber (1984) all suggest that changes in
revenue streams occurred in the wake of the measure. However, these accounts are not directly
linked to the tax limitation measures nor do they begin to describe the mechanism by which such
revenue changes might occur.
Two studies cited earlier regarding the effect of tax limitation measures on revenues are of
particular interest. Some minor progress regarding revenues in a post-tax limitation environment
has been made by Reid (1988). His inquiries regarding revenue changes stemming from the
passage of Proposition 13 are more conclusive than those in which he addressed expenditure
variations, but suffer from some of the same difficulties as well.14 Reid finds that property tax
losses hit high assessed value cities the hardest and that state aid exacerbated this pattern instead
of ameliorating it. Furthermore, state and federal aid favored high income cities, which were at
the same time benefiting from rising sales and use taxes.
In general, Reid finds that over the six-year period cities responded to exogenous revenue
losses by generating endogenous revenues roughly in proportion to the magnitude of those
pressures. Reid also discovers variations in the types of endogenous revenue responses based on
municipal socio-economic characteristics. Although Reid's work sheds some light on revenue
trends, this aspect of his study suffers from several weaknesses, including the absence of variance
analysis, the duration of time between his selected data periods and the exclusive reliance on per
capita measures of change.
Rothenberg and Smoke (1984) address the issue of municipal reactions to Massachusetts'
Proposition 21,2 in their study cited earlier. Using dissaggregated data, the authors analyze
revenue streams after the passage of the Proposition in order to explain variations in changes
14 Reid includes assessed value and income as independent variables in the same regression model
which, based on data analysis carried out in this investigation, could result in severe
multicollinearity issues. No correlation matrix is provided by Reid that would facilitate an
assessment of a linear relationship between these two variables; however, in many of the
regressions one or both of the estimated coefficients have very low t-statistics.
based of the characteristics of municipalities. They include socio-economic control variables in
analyzing aggregate revenue changes and include fiscal variables as well in analyzing alternative
revenue responses of state and local governments.
The authors find that revenue losses were large and widespread in the first year after the
adoption of the Proposition with modest revenue gains in the second year. Socio-economic
characteristics explain a large proportion of the variation in aggregate revenue changes, with
revenue changes varying directly with population and inversely with wealth. They find that with
respect to alternative revenue sources, state aid tended to be redistributive with regard to wealth
in year one but not necessarily with respect to revenue losses. In year two, state aid was more
closely directed towards compensating for revenue losses. Increases in fees & charges seem to be
highly related to size and the magnitude of revenue losses. Increasing endogenous revenue
sources appears to be an important response to revenue reductions stemming from Proposition
212.
More recently, Smith (1991) estimated a simultaneous equation model for municipalities in
California over the time period 1960 through 1986. His results indicate that the passage of Proposition
13 resulted in an approximately 10% reduction in local revenues and a 2.4% reduction in state
subventions. Although his results are consistent with general theory, his revenue model suffers from
two important weaknesses. First, his use of aggregate data precludes any interpretations with regard to
individual city characteristics or changes. More seriously, the study combines local revenues with state
explanatory variables which could lead to biased coefficients.
Principal Analytical Models
The empirical models I employ in this thesis to analyze the effects of Proposition 13 on
municipalities' revenue and expenditure characteristics, as well as to explore municipal typology with
respect to these changes, draw from a number of the studies cited above. The approaches embodied by
the Merriman, Ladd and Yinger and Rothenberg and Smoke investigations are all sources for the
methodologies employed in this study. This blend of approaches follows from the fact that the various
models are developed for the purposes of exploring different fiscal issues. The Merriman approach,
termed the 'tax capacity' model, is an attempt to estimate, ex ante, alterations in revenues and
expenditures in the event of an abrupt change in tax capacity. The Ladd-Yinger/Rothenberg-Smoke
approach, termed the 'revenue/expenditure adjustment' model, uses measurements of revenues and
expenditures before and after the passage of Proposition 13 in order to estimate the effects of the tax
limitation measure.
Tax Capacity Model
Merriman's model represents an attempt to explore the effects of a tax limitation on the size
and allocation of municipal budgets by measuring changes in municipalities' tax capacities. Merriman
defines tax capacity as the maximum revenue that a local government can raise in a fixed period of time
given the statutory and institutional restraints imposed on it." He reasons that the enactment of tax
limits has a restrictive effect on tax capacity by limiting the amount of revenue that can be raised. This
restriction would occur regardless of whether the tax limit were applied to all taxes or to one tax in
particular, such as the local property tax.
With regard to expenditures, Merriman investigates the changes in the allocation of municipal
budgets by regressing the share of the municipal budget devoted to each of seven separate categorical
activities (general government, public works, police, other public safety, health and welfare, recreation
and other) against uncollected taxes (defined as tax capacity less total expenditures) and a vector of
political and demographic variables. He also uses the model to estimate variations in total budget size
stemming from changes in tax capacity. In the empirical application of his model, Merriman uses a
cross-section of New Jersey municipalities.
The coefficient for uncollected taxes in his model represents the change in the share of the
budget devoted to a particular activity with respect to the change in uncollected taxes. If the
coefficient is significant, it indicates that the imposition of a tax limitation measure which results in a
change in tax capacity and uncollected taxes has an effect on the allocation of the municipal budget
* Merriman, The Control of Municipal Budgets, 42.
shares. While Merriman includes several demographic and institutional variables in his regressions,
these are of a limited nature. He argues that economic theory gives little guidance on which variables
are appropriate and selects his variables based on past experience and data availability.
Using the limited explanatory data available and a cross-section of California municipalities, I
employ Merriman's basic methodology in this study in order to construct the tax capacity model and
explore the expected effect of a change in tax capacity on expenditures in various categories and total
expenditures. This ex ante approach facilitates separating the effects of changes in tax capacity caused
by Proposition 13 from accompanying but distinct phenomena. Separate regressions for each of the
selected expenditure categories represent unrestricted equations wherein coefficients are allowed to
vary based on the category of expenditure. Although the coefficients on the demographic control
variables are of some interest, the primary focus in this model is on the coefficients on the variable
representing uncollected taxes.
Revenue issues dealing with the change in total revenues and the contributing shares of
alternative revenues following the passage of Proposition 13, are also addressed by using a variation of
the Merriman model. The model utilizes the concept of tax capacity, which local decision-makers have
the ability to devote to either revenue streams or uncollected taxes. Viewed in this way, uncollected
taxes can be seen as just a different use of tax capacity and for purposes here can be treated in a fashion
similar to other budgeted items.
The methodological approach used here is to apply the tax capacity model to the several
sources of revenue for selected municipalities in California. Specific local revenue sources available to
municipalities throughout the state -- local taxes, other local income, fees and charges and
miscellaneous revenue -- are used in the regressions. The share of total tax capacity attributable to the
revenue sources indicated above is regressed against a vector of socio-economic, demographic and
institutional variables and uncollected taxes.
The imposition of a tax limitation such as Proposition 13 would be expected to result in a
decrease in tax capacity and a change in uncollected taxes. This model will illuminate the issue of the
expected effect of a change in uncollected taxes on the share of tax capacity attributable to selected
local revenue sources. As with the expenditures application of the tax capacity model, all data is
estimated on an ex ante basis, facilitating the separation of tax capacity effects from other concomitant
but distinct events.
Revenue Expenditure Adjustment Model.
The tax capacity model is a useful means by which to estimate likely reactions to the imposition
of the tax limit aspects of Proposition 13, but due to the limited spectrum of socio-economic,
institutional and fiscal data available, it sheds little light on the question of what types of cities reacted
in what ways to the property tax limit. In addition, it does not capture the political-economic and
institutional changes that accompanied the passage of the Proposition. These questions are addressed
by constructing an revenue/expenditure adjustment model which employs a more comprehensive set of
variables, as exemplified by the Ladd/Yinger and Rothenberg/Smoke approaches. The use of two
methods of measuring expenditure change allows for the separation of the tax limit components from
other effects of the Proposition. Such differentiation can provide important information for state and
local policy-makers.
The 1980 Census data used in these regressions provides a more complete set of variables than
the more limited state-compiled set of municipal characteristics used in the tax capacity model.
Because the data were not compiled exactly contemporaneously with the passage of Proposition 13,
the model is not meant to approximate causal relationships, but rather represents an attempt to
categorize cities with respect to differing reactions to the tax limitation measure. In this sense, the
estimated coefficients should be interpreted as descriptive. Nevertheless, there exist explicit links to
economic theory regarding the choice of independent variables -- whether they are related to demand
or supply characteristics -- and municipal revenues and expenditures.
The primary procedure in the expenditure application of the revenue/expenditure adjustment
model is to regress the aggregate, percentage and per capita changes in total expenditures and in each
separately identified expenditure category against particular demographic, socio-economic, fiscal and
political characteristics associated with each city. The estimated coefficients relate the differing
municipal characteristics to changes in total expenditure levels and the allocation of expenditures to
various local government activities and services. The procedure is carried out for the first two fiscal
years after the adoption of Proposition 13 (1978-79 and 1978-80) in order to capture temporally-linked
changes undertaken in response to Proposition 13.
Despite the fact that the passage of Proposition 13, according to most interpretations, had and
will continue to have long-term repercussions for fiscal operations of local government, little academic
work has appeared that addresses these effects. The absence of scholarly activity regarding this issue
relates to the difficulty of modeling the long-term effects of single events as well as the lack of a
continuous series of data that covers a sufficient period of time. The issue of the long-run expenditure
effects of Proposition 13 is addressed through the application of the revenue/expenditure adjustment
model over a more extensive time period.
For the longer term analysis, the revenue/expenditure adjustment model is re-estimated to
measure the change ten years after the tax limitation went into effect. This application of the model
includes variables representing effects stemming from the passage of Proposition 13 as well as various
socio-economic variables. Focusing on expenditures both in the aggregate and by category, the
principal independent fiscal variable is the change in property tax revenue between fiscal years 1978
and 1979. This methodology allows for the linkage of the severity of property tax losses and changes
in expenditure patterns.
As with the short-term application of this model, the explanatory variables cannot be viewed as
causal in any sense, but rather represent an attempt to add a descriptive dimension to the model. For
example, while theoretically a large percentage reduction in property taxes could be a factor in
depressing future revenues, such an impact could have also resulted in the increase in income from
sources other than the property tax, negating the initial impact. It is for this reason -- that these
descriptive variables potentially represent a host of related effects -- that the focus is as much (or more)
on the statistical significance of the parameter as on the magnitude of the coefficient.
The tax capacity model sheds little light on revenue differences among cities. For this reason,
the determinants-based, revenue/expenditure adjustment model is again relied upon for the estimation
of revenue characteristics. Employing the vector of variables discussed above in conjunction with the
expenditure application of the model, I analyze changes in revenue streams in order to estimate the
effects of the Proposition on different types of cities with respect to revenue sources and total
revenues.
This procedure is conducted for the first year following the adoption of the Proposition 13 as
well as for the accumulated change over the first two years after its adoption in order to capture
delayed effects. In addition to the vector of descriptive variables discussed in the expenditure section,
several variables designed to address the link between Proposition 13 and changes in the relationship
between revenues and expenditures are included.
The quantum shift in property tax revenues for municipalities as a result of the passage of
Proposition 13 has been well researched and documented. The reduction in property tax levies was,
after all, the prime impetus for its passage. Due to the manner in which the Proposition was written (as
well as the way in which it was enacted, as I have discussed), it not only resulted in a one-time
reduction in taxes but also had a long-term depressing effect on future property tax revenues compared
to the period prior to 1978.
While the issue of the long-term effects of the Proposition on property taxes seems clear, its
effect on other revenues is less obvious. For this reason, the long-term revenue effects are explored in
a manner similar to that in which long-term expenditure effects were investigated. The approach to
understanding the longer-term effects of Proposition 13 is to again employ the revenue/expenditure
adjustment based model and apply it to changes occurring during 1978-88 period. The focus of this
section encompasses aggregate revenues as well as revenues from separate categories. As with the
expenditure application of the model, the change in per capita property taxes between fiscal years 1978
and 1979 serves as the principal explanatory variable used to estimate the relationship between this
one-time tax limitation and future revenues.
Summary
I have covered a substantial amount of ground in this chapter, ranging from a general
discussion of revenue and expenditure theory to a more detailed discussion about the particular fiscal
issues addressed and investigative techniques used in this dissertation. Given the breadth of coverage
of this discussion, it is worthwhile to restate some of the overall objectives of this chapter. This brief
review should provide some guidance for the empirical work that immediately follows.
The overall purpose of the first part of this chapter has been to illuminate the strengths and
weaknesses of the various approaches to measuring expenditures and revenues of local governments.
The various models used in explaining variations in levels of expenditures and revenues were then
discussed in relation to the goal of this investigation, which is focused on explaining variations in
changes in these levels. In this process, two cross-sectional models were identified as being particularly
appropriate as a means of explaining variations in municipal reactions to Proposition 13.
The first model is used to estimate, on an ex ante basis, expected changes in expenditures and
revenues as a result of changes to tax capacity and uncollected taxes caused by a tax limitation
measure. This model, called the tax capacity model is theoretically grounded in consumer choice
theory and is used to measure expected changes based on cross-sectional analysis of data in the last
pre-13 fiscal year. The second model, termed the revenue/expenditure adjustment model, is more akin
to the expenditure determinants paradigm. It does not separate the tax capacity effects of Proposition
13 from other accompanying dynamics, but rather explains variations in the change in expenditures and
revenues for three separate time periods.
Table 3.1: Features of the Explanatory Models.
Model Name Model Type Alodel Basis Data Method Time Focus Measurement
Tax Capacity cross section of consumer theory pre-13 data measurement expenditure and
municipalities on ex ante basis revenue shares
Revenue/Expenditure cross section of expenditure compares 1978 short-term aggregate, per
Adjustment municipalities determinants data to 1979 capita. percentage
changes
Revenue/Expenditure cross section of expenditure compares 1978 short-term aggregate, per
Adjustment municipalities determinants data to 1980 capita, percentage
changes
Revenue/Expenditure cross section of expenditure compares 1978 long-term aggregate. per
Adjustment municipalities determinants data to 1988 capita, percentage
changes
An encapsulation of important features of the two models is provided in Table 3.1 above. As
outlined in the table, the two models are applied to both the expenditure and the revenue side of the
municipal finance equation. They are used in four separate time periods in an effort to understand the
short and long-term effects of the tax limitation proposition. The use of two quite different approaches
facilitates the exploration of a number of issues including the effects of tax capacity changes, the
importance of non-fiscal or political economic aspects of tax limitations, variations in changes in
expenditures and revenue based on municipal characteristics, and magnitudes of expenditure and
revenue changes in relation to magnitudes of property tax losses. These issues are further addressed in
the empirical chapters which follow.
Chapter 4
Changes in Tax Capacity: Expenditure Allocation and Revenue Composition
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the tax capacity model adumbrated in the previous
chapter to the Proposition 13 context. This exercise will allow for the measurement of the effect
of Proposition 13 on tax capacity and separate it from other accompanying effects. The tax
capacity model is presented first, not because it is the principal model for this investigation, but
rather because it represents an approach based on data taken prior to the enactment of a tax
limitation measure. The results stemming from this model can then be compared and contrasted
with results from the revenue/expenditure adjustment model which employs data taken before and
after the enactment of the tax limitation measure. This comparative exercise facilitates sorting out
the fiscal effects of the tax limit from accompanying but separate political effects. In this chapter,
I also lay the groundwork for further explorations into the effects of Proposition 13 on the
allocation of municipal government expenditures and the composition of revenue streams.
I have divided this Chapter into four major components. First, the theoretical basis of the
tax capacity model is discussed, with specific reference to possible applications to the Proposition
13 situation. Second, the principal data sources for the analysis are described in conjunction with
a presentation of empirical proxies. Third, the models employed to address the impacts of
Proposition 13 are formulated along with a discussion of alternative specifications. Fourth, the
results of the estimation process are presented together with an analytical interpretation and
discussion of the results.
Tax Capacity Model
Theoretical Basis
Most studies of the effects of tax limitation measures, whether they address expenditures
or revenues, compare budgets prior to the imposition of a tax restriction with budgets
immediately following the imposition of the restriction. This is the dominant approach whether
the studies are based on comparatively simple measurements of data variation and change or
involve more intricate econometric modeling. As Bradbury et al (1982) point out, however, the
ideal manner in which to conduct measurements of the impact of tax limitations is to measure the
difference between revenues or expenditures occurring in the presence of the tax limitation with
revenue or expenditure levels which would have been achieved in the absence of the tax
restriction. Generally, the traditional 'before and after' means of measuring the impact of a tax
limitation results in a downward bias in the estimates of the impact of such measures even after
indexing for inflation. Such a downward bias will occur unless no revenue or expenditure growth
would have taken place in the absence of the tax limitation.
Merriman's model incorporating the notions of tax capacity and uncollected taxes is an
effective alternative manner in which to study changes in expenditure shares and revenue
composition, thus avoiding the 'before and after' approach and its associated problems. While not
strictly the preferred approach of Bradbury et al, Merriman's procedure does avoid some of the
measurement difficulties associated with the more traditional procedure. Tax limitation measures
such as Proposition 13 typically result in changes in both tax capacity and uncollected taxes and
consequently can result in alterations to choices in the funding of public goods and services and
the composition of the revenue stream.
If the local government spends (or taxes) the maximum allowed under the tax limitation
(or would have raised additional revenue in its absence) the tax limitation is binding and therefore
determines the total amount of government spending. In the case of Proposition 13, property
taxes were restricted to one percent of fair market value with no curtailment placed on other
sources of local revenue or intergovernmental aid. In this situation, actual spending and
aggregate revenues may not have been altered directly by the tax limitation measure, although
uncollected taxes and, most likely, tax capacity would still have been affected.
Graphically, the effect of a tax limitation measure on budget shares can be depicted as
shown below in Figure 4.1.1 The x and y axes indicate the magnitude of spending on government
goods G, and G2 respectively. In the absence of a tax limit, it is assumed that the local
government selects an allocation between G, and G2 such that its budget constraint AB intersects
* Note that indifference curves cross only because each represents a subset of an alternative
spectrum of indifference curves.
with its highest attainable indifference curve I(JTj) at point e. The indifference curve goes
through all those bundles which the municipality finds as equally desirable as point e. Given this
set of fiscal circumstances, the local government budget allocation is G/1 and G2', and uncollected
taxes are UT,.
The imposition of a tax limitation measure results in two effects. First, it reduces the
amount of resources available for public sector spending. This resource reduction shifts the
budget constraint to CD. If this uncompensated effect (i.e., a reduction in the amount of public
resources holding constant the level of uncollected tax capacity) were the sole result of the tax
limitation, spending on the two government goods would decrease and point f, representing the
tangency of 12(UT) and CD would represent the optimal allocation for the local government. The
reduction in the amount of money available for spending on government goods and services
results in G,2 and G/ being consumed. This reduction in the consumption of G, and G2
represents a decline in the utility of the local government.
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Note, however, that the tax limitation also results in an increase in the amount of
uncollected taxes. The amounts of G, and G2 purchased at point f would put the local
government on indifference curve I 3('UT2). But given the budget constrain is CD, f does not
represent the optimal bundle following the imposition of the tax limitation measure. Instead, the
local government will select a point such as h, a point representing the tangency of budget
constraint CD and indifference curve Ih(UT2). The increase in uncollected taxes to UT2 would
result in a shift in budget shares. This final allocation of the budget results in G,3 and G2 being
consumed, with uncollected taxes of UT22
The shift in local government spending priorities is a result of both the reduction in
available resources and the change in uncollected taxes. Merriman notes that the process is
similar to a situation in which the hours of work are reduced for an employee. Earnings (local
government budget) are reduced but leisure time (uncollected taxes) are increased. Both can
result in adjustments to the allocation of budget expenditures.3 It is important to note, particularly
with regard to Proposition 13, that a tax limit which does not necessarily result in a downward
shift of the budget constraint, can still cause a reallocation of the budget due to the increase in
uncollected taxes. This might occur if, for example, intergovernmental aid were sufficient to
compensate for declines in locally-based tax capacity. This would result in a shift in the trade-off
between G, and G2, as depicted graphically in Figure 4.2 below. I2(UT2) represents the
uncompensated shift. With the alteration in uncollected taxes, the local government budget shares
would shift from point c on indifference curve 11(UT) to point d on indifference curve I 3(UT2).
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2 The first of these shifts, Merriman terms the 'capacity' effect since it is a result of a change in
the municipal budget capacity. The second effect he terms the 'price' effect, since it relates to the
trade-off between municipal expenditures and uncollected taxes.
' Merriman, The Control of Municipal Budgets, p. 60.
Merriman's model is largely based on neoclassical consumer theory, which posits that as
income expands or contracts, expenditures on various goods expand or contract differentially as
opposed to proportionately. The general theory discussed in Chapter 3 suggests that similar
dynamics may occur with respect to municipal expenditures. Tax limitation measures result in a
restriction of all or some revenue sources which may cause local governments to reallocate
budget shares among spending categories depending upon demand elasticities. Put another way,
it is unlikely that the elasticity of municipal spending on each budget category with respect to
budget size is equal to one.
The tax capacity model can also be used to estimate the effect of tax limits on aggregate
spending for all categories of expenditures. In this situation, the notion of tax capacity can be
used directly in the estimation process as opposed to being used to calculate proxy variables for
uncollected taxes. The reason for this is that total spending is directly related to the ability to pay
for public goods (tax capacity) and only indirectly to the change in uncollected taxes which affects
the choice among the various expenditures.
Expected changes in revenue composition can also be estimated using the tax capacity
model. Using Merriman's notions of tax capacity and uncollected taxes, the process by which
such a shift in revenue composition might occur becomes more apparent. With a given tax
capacity, based for ease of exposition on local property taxes and local non-property taxes, a
municipality has the ability to select levels of taxes and uncollected taxes (comprising uncollected
property taxes and uncollected non-property taxes). With the imposition of a binding property
tax limitation measure, such as Proposition 13, local governments must reallocate between
uncollected other taxes and all government goods and services given a predetermined level of
uncollected property taxes.
Using this paradigm, an increase in uncollected property taxes should result in an increase
in collected non-property taxes and/or a decrease in spending on government goods and services.
In fact, uncollected property taxes and uncollected non-property taxes can be treated in a fashion
similar to other government goods and services; they too involve decisions on how to allocate tax
capacity. Graphically, Figure 4.1 can be used to visualize the possible change in allocation
between uncollected sales taxes and government goods and services in response to a change in
uncollected property taxes. The tax capacity model can also be adapted to estimate changes in
total revenues.
Data Sources
The principal source of financial information for dependent variables for expenditure and
revenue analysis is Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, published annually by
the State of California Controller's office. Detailed information for this report is filed by each of
the individual cities and audited by the state. A stratified random sample of 130 cities from across
the state has been used in this study.4 In this sample, all the cities with populations equal to or in
excess of 100,000 were used, 50% of those with populations between 25,000 and 99,999, 25% of
those with populations between 10,000 and 24,999 and 10% of those with populations of less
than 10,000.' Population size was used as the selection criteria based on the assumption that
increased city size will lead to increased homogeneity of government services and revenue
streams. This implies variations with regard to expenditures and revenues based on population
size. Independent variables used in the expenditure allocation and revenue models discussed in
this chapter were obtained from standardized state and federal sources including the State of
California Department of Finance, the State of California Controller's Office and U.S. Bureau of
the Census. 6
Empirical Proxies
Establishing proxies for the dependent variables used in the estimation process is fairly
straightforward. In order to estimate changes in the share of local government budget as a result
4 The state had 418 incorporated municipalities in 1978, not including the City and County of San
Francisco which has a unified city-county governmental structure and unique revenue and
expenditure profiles.
' Within each population group, an even distribution of population size was selected. In addition,
those cities with populations of less than 2500 were eliminated from the sample due to the lack of
explanatory variables compiled by either state or federal sources. The stratified methodology is a
standard sampling technique. See, for example, Thomas H. Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott,
Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1977), Chapter 24.
6 Specific sources of variables are presented in Appendix B.
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of changes in uncollected taxes, the total budget for each municipality was broken down into nine
expenditure categories:
(i) general government -- includes city council, manager or administrator, city clerk,
controller or finance officer, city treasurer, city attorney, planning, personnel administration,
general government buildings, retirement, insurance, community promotion, elections and debt
service;
(ii) police -- includes expenses and outlays associated with police departments;
(iii) fire -- includes expenses and outlays associated with fire departments;
(iv) other public safety -- includes building regulation and inspection, animal regulation
and civil defense;
(v) public works -- includes engineering and administration, streets, storm drains, street
lighting, parking facilities, sewage collection and disposal, waste collection and disposal and shops
and corporation yards;
(vi) health -- includes expenses and outlays associated with health services;
(vii) library -- includes expenses and outlays associated with library facilities and services;
(viii) parks and recreation -- includes expenses and outlays on parks, recreation services
and cultural expenses;
(ix) contributions -- includes contributions for services and goods to other governments
and governmental enterprise funds.
All categorized budget expenditures were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index
and expressed in per capita terms in order to adjust for population size.
In order to investigate changes in the composition of revenues, each municipality's
revenues were categorized as follows:
(i) property taxes -- includes current years secured and unsecured and interest and
penalties;
(ii) sales and use taxes -- includes sales and use taxes and transportation taxes;
(iii) local taxes -- includes transient lodging taxes, franchise taxes, business license taxes,
property transfer taxes and other non-property taxes;
(iv) other local -- includes licenses, permits, vehicle code fines, other fines, penalties,
investment earnings, rents and royalties;
(v) fees and charges -- includes zoning fees, subdivision fees, sale of maps, other filing
fees, special police services, special fire services, plan checking fees, animal shelter fees,
engineering fees, local assessments, lot cleaning, sewer service, refuse collection, sale of refuse,
vital statistics, first aid and ambulance, health inspection fees, library fines and fees and park and
recreation fees;
(vi) state aid -- includes apportioned state fees including alcohol beverage license fees,
motor vehicle in lieu taxes, gasoline taxes, homeowners' property tax relief, business inventory
property tax relief, trailer coach in lieu taxes, cigarette taxes, state and county grants;
(vii) federal aid -- includes federal revenue sharing and federal grants;
(viii) local miscellaneous -- includes sale of property, sewer connection fees, contributions
from enterprises and non-governmental sources and other revenue.
All categorized revenue sources were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index and
expressed in per capita terms in order to adjust for population size.
Since this portion of the study addresses the issue of how changes in the level of
uncollected taxes affect budget shares and the composition of local revenues, it is necessary to
develop a suitable proxy for tax capacity. Once this is calculated, the estimation of uncollected
taxes is a simple exercise. Several measures of tax capacity have been used with the most
common represented by the sum of real per capita income, state aid, federal aid and other non-
property tax income. This method is traditionally used in work carried out by the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). Such a measure, while useful for some
purposes (such as state level services) is not as readily applicable to this situation. Municipalities
in California do not have access to any revenue stream which relates directly to income. The
dominant source of endogenously determined revenue in the pre-Proposition 13 environment was
the property tax -- a tax directly linked to property values in each municipality.
This investigation follows the Merriman approach which utilizes a proxy for tax capacity
based on market value of property within the municipal boundaries. Even this approach, which is
more reflective of actual tax capacity of local governments than is the traditional measure, falls
short of the ideal. Specifically, it accounts for the contribution of other local revenue sources to
tax capacity based only on their actual contribution levels. A more encompassing proxy would tie
these non-property tax revenues to an underlying base, such as disposable income. This flaw is
not fatal however, since (as further analysis will demonstrate) variations in budget and revenue
shares are not terribly sensitive to incremental changes in tax capacity. The general equation for
tax capacity can be expressed in the following manner:7
tcap, = [d!(J-k)]mv, + trimv, + oi, (4.1)
where: tcap, = tax capacity of i'h municipality;
d= discount rate;
k = index of value of government goods and services;
myi = market value of property in i' municipality;
tri = tax rate in i' municipality;
oi, = other revenue of /'h municipality.
The discount rate (d), or the rate of time preference, will be equal to the market rate of
interest in perfectly competitive markets. There is reason to believe, however, that equilibrium in
the capital and land markets is such that the discount rate on real property may be less than the
market rate of interest.' As is indicated in equation 4.1, as the discount rate increases, the ability
of municipalities to capture additional property taxes increases, ceteris paribus. Two values for
the discount rate are used in the following regressions representing alternative assumptions
regarding the relationship between capital and land markets: a discount rate of 10%
(approximately equal to the rate on long term investments during this period) and a conservative
estimate of 5% equal to half this value.
Tax capacity is also affected by the value which is placed on the goods and services
delivered by local government (k). Since the value of goods and services are capitalized in the
value of the land, as k increases, tax capacity increases. If no value is placed on municipal goods
7 In The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations, Merriman presents a complete derivation of
this equation.
8 This may be due to different values of risk and reward associated with alternative investments or
limitations on access to capital.
and services, the value of the land will drop with each increase in taxes. Thus, if k is set equal to
0 it implies an unwillingness to pay anything for additional government spending. A value of k
equal to 0.8 implies that government goods and services are valued at $.80 per $1.00 of increased
spending. The alternative values of 0 and 0.8 are used for k in the regressions.
Finally, market value of property will be related to the tax rate of the municipality. Just as
government services are capitalized to a greater or lesser extent in the value of land, the tax rate is
also capitalized. ti1 represents the tax rate for the particular municipality i. If the market value for
two municipalities is equal -- given the negative capitalization of tax rates -- it follows that the
municipality with the higher tax rate has the greater tax capacity.
Tax capacity for each municipality is affected by state aid, federal aid and other local
income. For purposes of this investigation, it is assumed that each of these is exogenously
determined and the amounts are accounted for in an additive fashion in the tax capacity
calculation. For state and federal aid, this is a standard and reasonable assumption. For other
local income, much depends on the actual types of local income collected. The ability to collect
certain fees and charges may be closely related to income or the existence of commercial activity.
Since the focus of this analysis is specifically focused on changes in uncollected tax capacity
generated by property tax limits, the assumption of exogeneity is acceptable.
Once the different permutations of tax capacity have been calculated, the estimation of
uncollected taxes is a simple process. Uncollected taxes is simply:
untx, = tcap, - exp, (4.2)
where: untx, = uncollected taxes in it' municipality;
tcap, = tax capacity in i' municipality,
exp, = expenditures for l' municipality.
All values are then expressed in per capita terms and adjusted by the Consumer Price Index to
represent constant dollar amounts.
Additional available explanatory variables are also used in the regressions. Specifically,
municipal population is included to control for the effect of population size on the share of the
municipal budget. Density in population/square mile is used to control for the effects of high or
lower density on budget shares. Area is included to control for variation linked to geographic size
independent of density. Unemployment rates are also included as a control variable since public
expenditures may be related to long-term employment trends. Finally, a binary variable indicating
whether the municipality is governed by city charter or general law is used, since during this
period, charter cities had access to a slightly wider range of local government revenues which
could affect budget shares.
Expenditure Analysis
Specification of Expenditure Equations
The functional form of the expenditure share equations is:
esy = a, -+ area; + dens, -+ glaw, + unem, + pop, + In(untx)i -+ e (4.3)
where: es, = the share of expenditures devoted to the jth category for it' municipality on a
per capita basis;
a, = constant or intercept term;
area, = geographic area in square miles of ith municipality;
dens, = density in population per square mile of it' municipality;
glaw, = binary variable indicating governing law of i'" municipality;
unem,= unemployment rate for it' municipality;
pop, = population of ith municipality in 1978;
In(untx), = the natural log of uncollected taxes for the it'municipality,
6i= random error term component.
The functional form of the total expenditure equation is:
9 Actual unemployment rates for 1978 are not calculated by the state at the municipal level. The
unemployment rate for each municipality as reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census was used
and adjusted based on the assumption that the proportionate relationship between the overall state
unemployment rate and the unemployment rate for each municipality was static between 1978 and
1980. Therefore, the formula (mur8O/sur8)sur78 = mur78 was used to estimate municipal
unemployment rates in 1978 where mur and sur represent municipal and state unemployment
rates respectively. This procedure results in capturing short-term cyclical changes in the state's
economy during the two-year period. Longer-term structural changes which might result in
disproportionate changes in the relationship between municipal unemployment rates and the stateqpemployment rate would be unlikely to occur in the short two-year time frame.
tei = ai - area, - dens, - glaw, -+ unemi - popi + tcapi + ei (4.4)
where: te, = total expenditures for ,'h municipality on a per capita basis;
tcap, = tax capacity of ith municipality;
all other variables are as defined in equation 4.3.
All variables were entered in linear form except for the log specification of uncollected
taxes. The resulting model is a semi-log function. The log specification for uncollected taxes
variable is a reasonable assumption since it implies that changes in uncollected taxes are likely to
have a multiplicative impact on budget shares rather than linear. This functional form is
frequently used in Engle curves and implies a declining propensity to shift budget shares as
uncollected taxes increase. As uncollected taxes grow, the effect on budget shares declines
marginally. To add additional weight to the validity of this functional form, linear specifications
of uncollected taxes were also calculated resulting in less satisfying results in terms of fit and
levels of significance.
Preliminary regressions and graphical analysis suggested the possible presence of
heteroscedasticity. The Cook-Weisberg (1983) test for heteroscedasticity was used to estimate
error variance based on fitted values for the regressions. Based on this test, the null hypothesis of
homoscedascity was rejected at the .05 level or better in all equations. White's (1980) method
was used to correct for heteroscedasticity in all expenditure regressions.
Results of Expenditure Regressions
In the following section, the results of the estimated models are presented. The focus is
primarily on the estimated coefficients on uncollected taxes and tax capacity since these are the
variables assumed to be affected by the passage of Proposition 13. The influence of the other
independent variables will also be addressed in a less comprehensive manner. Summary statistics
for each of the dependent variables in the expenditure share regressions is presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Expenditure Share Dependent Variables.
Dependent Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation
General Government 0.3036584 0.2924314 0.113853
Police Services 0.1896905 0.1875284 0.064675
Fire Services 0.0973215 0.1120143 0.061764
Other Public Safety 0.0160211 0.0142557 0.010937
Public Works 0.2450182 0.2246301 0.099878
Health Services 0.0035935 0.0 0.012171
Libraries 0.0188894 0.0 0.028097
Parks & Recreation 0.1025491 0.0981486 0.052896
Contributions 0.0260431 0.0002250 0.057750
Notes: Dependent variable is share of total expenditures devoted to ead of the nine categories. Due to the fact that large numbers of municipalities
had no expenditures on health services or libraries, the median value for these two categories is 0. Number of observations is 130.
The results of the expenditure share regressions are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The
share of the budget devoted to each of the nine budget categories and total expenditures were
each estimated twice using the alternative values for d and k indicated above. In the first set of
regressions described in Table 4.2, d was assigned a value of 0.05 or approximately one-half the
contemporaneous rate of return. k was assigned a value of 0 which implies that additional
government spending is valued at zero. Thus the value of the expression d (1-k) in this set of
regressions is 0.05.
Table 4.2: Total Expenditures and Expenditure Shares (d=.05, k=O).
Dependent area dens glaw unem pop In(untx) a R
Variable tcap (adj. R)
General 0.001562 -2.38e-06 0.026716 0.000619 -0.000311 -0.024042 0.475704 .1129
**(2.082) (-0.583) (1.001) (0.184) **(-2.05) (-0.711) *(j 749) (.0697)
Police -0.000791 3.63e-06 -0.058392 0.000281 0.000181 0.032115 -0.040780 .1091
*(-1.884) (1.021) **(-2.40) (0.087) **(2.278) (1.015) (-0.168) (.0657)
Fire -0.000578 -9.81e-07 0.051843 0.002052 0.000095 0.048163 -0.270165 .2162
*(-1.838) (-0.445) **(3.042) (1.007) (1.652) **(2.075) (-1.612) (.1780)
Oth. Safe. 0.000077 4.58e-08 -0.002948 -0.000434 -0.000001 -0.001154 0.026213 .0618
**(2.433) (0.075) (-1.159) (-1.323) (-1.618) (-0.341) (0.959) (.0161)
Pub. Wks. -0.000371 -0.000012 -0.018278 -0.002468 0.000055 -0.061790 0.764062 .1722
(-1.465) **(-3.40) (-1.078) (-1.251) (1.180) **(-2.76) **(4.449) (.1319)
Health -0.000041 9.80e-07 0.000068 0.001688 0.000009 0.003824 -0.039484 .3853
(-1.652) **(2.166) (0.026) **(3.114) *(1.688) *(1 780) **(-2.18) (.3553)
Librarn -0.000112 -2.53e-06 0.012169 -0.000984 0.000023 -0.003484 0.057380 .0516
(-1.292) (-1.248) *(1.854) (-0.723) (1.399) (-0.265) (0.507) (.0053)
Pks.&Rec -0.000169 4.82e-06 0.005541 0.001703 0.000028 0.028226 -0.134838 .0878
(-0.666) **(2.283) (0.520) (0.839) (0.560) *(1.755) (-1.075) (.0433)
Contrib. 0.000422 8.51e-06 -0.016719 -0.002457 -0.00007 -0.021858 0.161909 .2322
**(2.803) **(3.432) *(-1.816) **(-2.55) **(-2.66) **(-2.64) **(2.464) (.1947)
Total 1.358202 -0.001173 36.49408 17.27273 -0.1632 0.138107 36.86493 .5676
(1.220) (-0.192) (0.976) **(2.896) (-0.832) **(5.064) (0.573) (.5465)
Notes: Dependent variable is share of total expenditures devoted to eadi of nine categories. For total regression, the dependent variable expenditure
share (es) has been replaced by total per capita expenditures (te): the variable tax capacity (tcap) was substituted for ln(unrx): all other variables
remain identical. pop is in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better: ** indicates significance at the .05 level
or better. Number of observations is 130.
In Table 4.3, the results from the second variation of the total expenditure and expenditure
share models are presented. In this set of regressions, d was assigned the value 0.10 or
approximately equal to the long-term rate of return during the period of investigation. k was
assigned the value of 0.8, suggesting that government goods and services are valued at $.80 on
the dollar. The resulting value of the expression d (1-k) in this set of regressions is 0.5.
Table 4.3: Total Expenditures and Expenditure Shares (d=.10, k=.8).
Dependent area dens glaw unem pop In(untx) a
Variable tcap (aLd R2)
General 0.001536 -2.30e-06 0.027470 0.000537 -0.000307 -0.024653 0.535893 .1141
**(2.079) (-0.575) (1.028) (0.149) **(-2.04) (-0.724) (1.524) (.0708)
Police -0.000758 3.54e-06 -0.059435 0.000401 0.000175 0.033084 0.122683 .1130
*(-1.966) (1.001) **(-2.42) (0.124) **(2.392) (1.065) (-0.400) (.0697)
Fire -0.000491 -1.27e-06 0.051526 0.001861 0.000078 0.044410 -0.341554 .2105
*(- 1.770) (-0.565) **(2.943) (0.925) (1.559) *(1.931) (-1.573) (.1720)
Oth. Safe. 0.000076 4.83e-08 -0.0029 -0.000441 -0.000009 -0.001230 0.029571 .0623
**(2.589) (0.079) (-1.125) (-1.316) *(-1. 702) (-0.363) (0.845) (.0165)
Pub. Wks. -0.000461 -0.000012 -0.017208 -0.002420 0.000072 -0.059744 0.883002 .1738
*(-1.911) **(-3.34) (-0.996) (-1.261) (1.621) **(-2.79) **(4.228) (.1335)
Health -0.000035 9.62e-07 -3.48e-06 0.001687 0.000008 0.003718 -0.047047 .3858
(-1.601) **(2.132) (-0.001) **(3.164) (1.645) *(1.713) **(-2.05) (.3558)
Library -0.000123 -2.49e-06 0.012061 -0.000931 0.000025 -0.002666 0.057147 .0510
(-1.497) (-1.255) *(1.837) (-0.672) (1.640) (-0.203) (0.400) (.0047)
Pks.&Rec -0.000122 4.66e-06 0.005217 0.001632 0.000019 0.026603 -0.182368 .0866
(-0.524) **(2.221) (0.483) (0.796) (0.418) *(1.679) (-1.147) (.0420)
Contrib. 0.000378 8.66e-06 -0.016728 -0.002325 -0.000062 -0.019521 0.18804 .2281
**(2.474) **(3.472) *(-1.834) **(-2.42) **(-2.29) **(-2.51) **(2.365) (.1904)
Total 3.424126 -0.002667 44.59505 16.22815 -0.5454 0.011323 136.0112 .4466
**(2.782) (-0.389) (1.164) **(2.459) **(-2.55) **(2.904) *(1.737) (.4196)
Notes: Dependent variable is share of total expenditures devoted to ead1 of nine categories. For total regression. the dependent variable expenditure
share (es) has been replaced by total per capita expenditures (te); the variable tax capacity (tcap) was substituted for ln(untx): all other variables
remain identical. pop is in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level
or better. Number of observations is 130.
Turning initially to the expenditure share regressions (lines 2-9), a comparison of the
results of the regressions presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 above, indicates that alternative
parameters of d and k in the calculation of tax capacity make little difference in the size of the
coefficients or the level of significance. In fact, of the 63 estimated coefficients, only once did the
alternative specification used in construction of Table 4.3 result in a sign change (the coefficient
on governing law in the health equation). Given the lack of significance that alternative
specifications of tax capacity with respect to assigned values of d and k have on any of the
qualitative interpretations, for purposes of this discussion, the primary reference will be the results
shown in Table 4.2 based on the more conservative estimates of tax capacity.
The R2 in each of the equations is rather low, ranging from .0516 for the libraries equation
up to .3853 for the health equation. This indicates that, for the most part, uncollected taxes and
the handful of socio-economic and institutional variables that have been used in the equations
leave much of the variation in municipal budget shares unexplained. Nevertheless, the regression
has resulted in statistical significance for many of the estimated parameters, with coefficients
significantly different from 0 at the .05 level or better. Before discussing the coefficients on
uncollected taxes, the variable In(untx), which is the primary focus of this section, it is worthwhile
to review the socio-economic and institutional variables.
Regarding the population-based variables, population (pop) has a mixed effect on budget
shares. It is significant in the equations for general government, police services, and
contributions. The budget share of general government declines with an increase in population
indicating the presence of increasing returns to scale for general administration. The opposite
dynamic appears to be operable with respect to police services. Density (dens) is a significant
factor in several budget share equations, comprising public works, health services, libraries, parks
& recreation and contributions. Lower density appears to lead to a declining budget share of
relatively capital intensive activities such as public works and libraries and an increased share
devoted to programmatic activities such as parks & recreation.
The variable unemployment (unem) is insignificant in all equations except for health
services, contributions and total. Municipalities in California are not responsible for any form of
welfare or general assistance and are therefore somewhat sheltered from expenditures which
might be generated by changes in the regional or local economy. Cities are responsible for
maintaining limited health services, however, and unemployment is related to other municipal
features which have an impact on total expenditure levels. Therefore the relationship between
increases in percent unemployment and the health services share of the budget, as well as total
expenditures, does have some intuitive appeal.
The coefficient for area (area) is significantly different from 0 at the .05 level in several
equations, and with the exception of general, other public safety and contributions, exerts a
negative influence on the budget share. Thus, the share of the budget devoted to diffuse goods
and services seems to increase along with changes in geographic size. Finally, governing law
(glaw) is significant for police and fire, with charter status leading to an increased budget share for
police and a decrease in the share for fire.
The primary purpose of this section of the investigation of Proposition 13 is not, of
course, to explore the impact of socio-economic and demographic factors on budget shares or to
investigate how the characteristics relate to different types of cities. These issues will be
addressed in a more comprehensive fashion in subsequent chapters. The focus here is to examine
the relationship between expenditure patterns and uncollected taxes and investigate their
interaction after the introduction of a severe property tax restriction.
The effect of Proposition 13 on tax capacity and, in turn, uncollected taxes is quite
direct. ' Using the data presented in Table 4.2, the log form of the variable uncollected taxes is
statistically significant at the .05 level in three of the nine equations: fire services, public works
and contributions. The coefficient is statistically significant at the .10 level or better in two of the
other equations. " Given the semi-log specification, these parameters are interpreted
econometrically as the absolute change in the expenditure share for municipality i (es,) due to a
percent change in uncollected taxes for municipality i (untx) or Aes, given %Auntx,.
10 As indicated, the standard used for the calculation of tax capacity (and uncollected taxes, since
untx, = tcap, - exp) is given in equations 4.1 and 4.2. Regressions were also conducted with tax
capacity based only on state and local income with federal income excluded. One data point was
lost since the variable untx is in log form and for one city, expenditures exceeded this calculation
of revenues (and the data are not complete enough to eliminate federally funded expenditures to
compensate for the elimination of federal revenues). With this construction of untx the coefficients
for the health services and parks & recreation were also significant (the coefficients on ln(untx) in
the three equations discussed above retained their significance at a higher level). This suggests
that cities react to changes in state and local income in making budget decisions but discount
federal revenue, perhaps due to its more uncertain nature. It is also interesting that budget shares
of general government and police are independent of changes in unix. This may be related to the
relatively high fixed overhead associated with the former and the sacrosanct status of the later.
" In two other equations, health services and parks & recreation, the null hypothesis that the
coefficient on In(untx) is zero had probability values (P-values) of 0.078 and 0.082 respectively.
The estimated coefficients from Table 4.2 indicate that a fifty percent increase in
uncollected taxes would result in an approximately two and one-half percent increase in the share
of the budget devoted to fire services. In the other two equations where the ln(untx) variable is
significant, a fifty percent increase in uncollected taxes would be expected to result in a roughly
three percent decrease in the public works share of the budget and a one percent decrease in the
share devoted to contributions.
These represent very large changes in the level of uncollected taxes necessary to generate
comparatively small alterations in the budget shares devoted to various categories. Fluctuations
in expenditure shares due to other influencing factors would occur in any event as a result of other
fiscal dynamics, making it difficult to isolate share changes generated by changes in the amount of
uncollected taxes. In addition, the different signs associated with each of the coefficients defy
easy explanations.
Despite the large changes in uncollected taxes seemingly necessary to generate
comparative small changes in budget shares, alterations in tax collections of considerable
magnitude can arise from severe tax limits. Proposition 13, in fact, did radically alter the fiscal
landscape for cities throughout the state. Statewide, general property taxes for cities decreased
from $1.3 billion in fiscal year 1978 to $639 million in fiscal year 1979, representing a decline of
over 50%. For particular cities, the reduction was even more dramatic. For example, the City of
Berkeley (admittedly a high tax municipality) had its property tax revenues decrease from $13.9
million to $5.4 million during the same period.
Using the standard assumptions for d and k, the tax capacity for the City of Berkeley prior
to the passage of Proposition 13 was $136.1 million. Expenditures were $54.2 million that year
resulting in $81.9 million of uncollected taxes. Using the same procedures to calculate post-
Proposition 13 figures for the city results in calculated values of $145.2 million in tax capacity and
$91.3 million in uncollected taxes.12 Uncollected taxes increased by roughly 11% between the
12 Since Proposition 13 required that assessed values be rolled back to assessments in place as of
1975, assessed value and market value became unlinked. Since the calculation of tax capacity is
contingent on the incorporation of market value of property within the municipal boundaries, an
estimate was used for tax capacity for fiscal year 1979. An assumption was made that the entire
reduction in taxes in year one was capitalized into property values but no allowance was
incorporated for capitalization of the future reduction in property taxes. In addition, it was
two years. This would result in a 0.5% change in the share of the budget devoted to fire services,
a -0.7% change for public works and a -0.24% change for contributions.
The issue of why certain categories of expenditures have a particular relationship to
changes in tax capacity and uncollected taxes is central to this investigation. Classification of
goods and service as to their 'vitalness' or essentiality does appear to lend some insight since, by
any measure, police and fire services are both vital, and they show a positive relationship with
uncollected taxes. On the other hand, libraries and parks & recreation are less vital yet they have
different signs. Classification according to private substitutability for publicly delivered goods and
services is also a plausible explanation. Increases in uncollected taxes might result in a decreased
demand for goods and services with similar private counterparts and increased demand for those
with few or none. These activities would be spread across any of the coarse budget categories
used in this study and a more finely detailed analysis would be required to sort out individual
reactions.
Leaving aside, for heuristic purposes, the magnitudes and the statistical significance of the
estimated parameters, the concept of essentiality seems even more useful. Note that general
government, public works and libraries all show a negative relationship with uncollected taxes.
The first of these is usually associated with bureaucracy and non-essential overhead.
Expenditures on the second of these can be easily delayed or canceled to the extent that it relates
to maintenance. The last of these three can hardly be termed as an essential government service
by most taxpayers. In addition, police and fire services, which to many are sine qua non, show a
positive relationship with uncollected taxes.
The lack of completeness represented by the tax capacity model has been discussed and
the evidence for this is borne out by the rather small explanatory values of most of the equations.
In addition, however, the model may be inadequate to the task of capturing shifts in tax capacity
stemming from the passage of a tax limitation measure. Differences in tax capacity between and
among municipalities as a result of differences in property values and income may be quite
assumed that property values would appreciate at a rate of 10% (appreciation in the three years
prior to this was roughly 12% per annum and during the prior five years was approximately 7%
per annum).
different than dynamic changes stemming from the sudden imposition of a tax limitation measure.
This is simply a restatement of the common difficulty of seeking to explain dynamic shifts through
the use of a static cross-sectional model.' 3 Despite these weaknesses, however, the model
represents a reasonable means of separating tax capacity and political economic effects of a tax
limit.
Despite the relatively small coefficients generated by the regression analysis, it is clear that
the change in uncollected taxes which was caused by Proposition 13 is a potentially important
means by which to explain small shifts in budget shares. In addition, the magnitudes of the
coefficients indicate that the more dramatic shifts in budget shares suggested by other studies may
misrepresent the role of the tax capacity aspect of tax limitation measures. The comparative
dramatic shifts indicated by Saltzstein (1986) and Reid (1988), for example, that are implicitly
ascribed to the effects of Proposition 13 may be due to other factors entirely. They employ before
and after expenditure figures, but do not account for unrelated trends or events already in
existence prior to Proposition 13. In addition, institutional changes coincidental to but not part of
Proposition 13 should be included for an analysis to result in reasonable estimates. For example,
the large positive changes in fire and police expenditures cited by some investigators may be due,
in part, to the maintenance of effort requirement of receiving additional state aid.
The regression models for total per capita expenditures are presented more for
completeness than edification and warrant little more than a brief comment regarding the
importance of tax capacity on expenditure levels. As indicated, expenditures are related more
directly to changes in tax capacity than to changes in uncollected taxes since the relative change in
the 'price' of uncollected taxes is relevant only with respect to budget shares. The coefficient on
the Icap variable is quite significant and indicates an increase of $0.14 for every $1.00 increase in
tax capacity. Not surprisingly, given the formulation of tax capacity in equation 4. 1, the equation
" Bahl addresses this difficulty in his exposition regarding determinant studies of public
expenditures. He indicates that the difficulty with cross-sectional data is that it enables only a
static interpretation even though the objective may be to make a dynamic inference. See Roy W.
Bahl, "Studies in Determinants of Public Expenditures: A Review," in Sharing Federal Fundsfor
State and Local Needs, ed. Selma J. Mushkin and John F. Cotton (New York, New York:
Praeger Press, 1968b), Appendix, ii.
explains more of the variation in the total expenditures than it does the variations in expenditure
shares.
Revenue Analysis
Specification of Revenue Equations
As has been suggested previously, changes in levels of uncollected property taxes can
affect changes in the revenue shares contributed to the budget by other forms of revenue. Recall
that municipalities can allocate tax capacity to government goods and services or uncollected
taxes. As has been demonstrated, a change in the level of uncollected taxes can generate changes
in the allocation of expenditures by municipalities. The tax capacity proxy does not allow for the
calculation of uncollected taxes other than the property tax, but it is clear that uncollected non-
property taxes do exist from such potential sources as user charges and fees, business taxes and
other local bases.' 4
Just as a change in uncollected property taxes can generate changes in expenditure
allocation, it is likely that changes in uncollected property taxes can also generate changes in
respective levels of other types of uncollected taxes and revenues. The available proxy for
uncollected taxes is insufficiently detailed to estimate the effect of a change in uncollected
property taxes on changes in the levels of other uncollected taxes and revenues. However,
changes in the shares of uncollected taxes and revenues from various sources should be mirrored
in changes in the share of collected taxes (revenues) contributed by the various sources.
Therefore, lacking an appropriate proxy to represent forms of uncollected non-property tax local
revenue, it is necessary to use alternative means of estimating the effect of changes in revenue
composition.
The method which will be employed to estimate this revenue change process is to use as
the dependent variable the share of total revenues borne by four forms of local income -- other
local taxes, other local income, fees & charges and other revenue -- and regress these against
socio-economic and institutional variables and uncollected taxes. Given this particular method of
"4 Revenues and taxes are used interchangeably here since their distinguishing characteristics are
not important for these purposes.
estimation, certain patterns should emerge. In particular, an increase in the level of uncollected
property taxes should, ceteris paribus, lead to a decline in the levels of uncollected non-property
taxes and an increase in the share of revenue composition borne by these other non-property tax
revenue sources.
The functional form of the revenue share equations is:
rsy = a, - area, -t dens, + glaw, + popi -- ln(untx), + .6 (4.5)
where. rsy = the share of revenues from the jth category for ith municipality on a per capita
basis;
a, = constant or intercept term;
area = geographic area in square miles of i' municipality;
dens = density in population per square mile of i'" municipality;
glawi = binary variable indicating governing law of ith municipality;
pop = population of ith municipality in 1978;
ln(untx), = the natural log of uncollected taxes for the i'h municipality,
,6 = random error term component.
All variables were entered in linear form except for the log specification of uncollected
taxes. Because the variable unemployment used in the expenditure regressions was insignificant
in all equations (and was highly correlated with uncollected taxes) it was dropped from the model.
The resulting model is a semi-log function. The reasoning for the log specification of uncollected
taxes is based on assumptions similar to those discussed in conjunction with the expenditure
equations. As with the expenditure equations, preliminary regressions and graphical analysis
suggested the possible presence of heteroscedasticity. The Cook-Weisberg (1983) test for
heteroscedasticity was used to estimate error variance based on fitted values for the regressions.
Based on this test, the null hypothesis of homoscedascity was rejected at the .05 level or better in
all equations. White's (1980) method was used to correct for heteroscedasticity in all regressions.
Results of Revenue Regressions
In the following section, the results of the estimated revenue models are presented.15'' 6
The focus is primarily on the estimated coefficient on uncollected taxes since this is the variable
which would be directly affected by the passage of tax limitation measures such as Proposition 13.
The influence of the other independent variables will also be addressed in a less comprehensive
manner. The mean and the standard deviation for each of the dependent variables is presented in
Table 4.4 below.
Table 4.4: Revenue Composition Dependent Variables.
Dependent IVariable Mean Median Standard Deviation
Local Taxes 0.0720245 0.0579491 0.0494815
Other Local 0.0766918 0.0707176 0.0424538
Fees & Charges 0.0873842 0.0813037 0.0547534
Local Miscellaneous 0.0430382 0.0228237 0.0565487
Notes: Dependent variable is share of total revenues attributable to each revenue source. Number of observations is 130.
The results of the regression modeling are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. The share of
the revenues stemming from each of the four endogenously determined sources was estimated
twice using alternative values for d and k. In the regressions described in Table 4.5, d was
assigned a value of 0.05 or approximately one-half the contemporaneous rate of return. k was
assigned a value of 0 which implies that additional government spending is valued at zero. Thus
the value of the expression d (1-k) in Table 4.5 is 0.05.
15 Regressions for total revenues were not conducted since, given the construction of tax capacity,
the results would shed little new information that has not been obtained from the parallel total
expenditure regression.
16 Regressions were also run to estimate the effect of a change in uncollected property taxes (as
opposed to uncollected total taxes) on the share of revenues contributed by other local sources.
Using the values of 0.05 and 0 for d and k respectively, uncollected property taxes were
calculated as untx, = tcap, - coltx,,, where untx,, represents uncollected property taxes for the i'I
municipality, tcapp, represents property tax capacity for the i'h municipality and coltxi represents
collected property taxes for the frh municipality. The parameter estimates for ln(untx) were not
significantly altered although the level of significance increased slightly in each case. The ln(untx)
coefficients (t-statistics) for local taxes, local income, fees & charges and local miscellaneous
were 0.0231035 (3.118), 0.0463171 (3.120), -0.0245559 (-2.221) and -0.0044449 (-0.633)
respectively.
Table 4.5: Revenue Composition (d=.05, k=O).
Dependent area dens glaw pop In(untx) a R2
Variable (adj.R2)
Local Taxes -0.000430 -8.16e-07 0.055871 0.0000854 0.023636 -0.107148 .3020
**(-2.111) (-0.575) **(2.411) **(2.821) **(2.939) **(-2.047) (.2739)
Other Local 0.000655 3.00e-06 -0.033339 -0.0001150 0.048084 -0.269923 .4781
**(2.932) **(2.375) **(-2.782) **(-2.898) **(3.095 **(-2.624) (.4570)
Fees & Charges -0.000264 -6.60e-06 0.009775 0.0000413 -0.028365 0.315116 .1433
(-1.644) **(-2.702) (0.734) (1.421) **(-2.648) **(4.017) (.1087)
Local Misc. 0.001761 -1.19e-06 0.003706 -0.0003210 -0.003947 0.063741 .4634
**(3.944) (-0.850) (0.285) **(-3.866) (-0.516) (1.203) (.4618)
Notes: Dependent variable is share of total revenues attributable to each revenue source. pop is in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates
significance at the .10 level or better. ** indicates significance atthe .05 level or better. Number of observations is 130.
In Table 4.6 below, d is assigned the value 0.10 or approximately equal to the long-term
rate of return during the period of investigation. k is assigned the value of 0.8, suggesting that
government goods and services are valued at $.80 on the dollar. The resulting value of the
expression d (1-k) is 0.5.
Table 4.6: Reve ue Composition (d=.10, k=.8).
Dependent area dens glaw pop ln(untx) a R
Variable (adj.R")
Local Taxes -0.000398 -9.22e-07 0.055390 0.0000793 0.023138 -0.155444 .3040
**(-2.103) (-0.640) **(2.381) **(2.821) **(3.092) **(-2.387) (.2759)
Other Local 0.000724 2.77e-06 -0.034189 -0.0001280 0.046720 -0.364908 .4815
**(3.382) **(2.156) **(-2.829) **(-3.352) **(3.126) **(-2.763) (.4606)
Fees & Charges -0.000323 -6.39e-06 0.009364 0.0000526 -0.025071 0.347974 .1316
**(-1.986) **(-2.625) (0.689) *(1.751) **(-2.274) **(3.309) (.0966)
Local Misc. 0.001758 -1.19e-06 0.003915 -0.0003200 -0.004215 0.075077 .4637
**(3.968) (-0.843) (0.301) **(-3.871) (0.590) (1.153) (.4421)
Notes: Dependent variable is share of total revenues attributable to eadi revenue source. pop is in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates
significance atthe .10 level or better, ** indicates significance atthe .05 level or better. Number of observations is 130.
As was shown in the expenditure regressions, the alternative values for d and k make little
difference in the magnitude of the coefficients, the level of significance or even the explanatory
value of the equations. Only for the coefficient on governing law in the other revenue equation
did a sign change occur, and the parameter estimate was insignificant anyway. Therefore, for
purposes of my discussion of the revenue composition equations, the parameter estimates shown
in Table 4.5 will be used.
The explanatory value of the revenue composition equations is typically somewhat higher
than that of the expenditure share equations. The R2 for the equations ranges between .1433 for
the fees & charges equation up to .4781 for other local income. This particular specification of
revenue composition determinants, at best, only explains about one-half of the variation that
occurs. Additional socio-economic variables (such as commercial or industrial presence) would
undoubtedly add to the explanatory power.
Despite the relatively modest R2 values, many of the parameters have statistically
significant coefficients. Turning to the socio-economic and institutional variables, area (area) is
significant at the .05 level or better in all equations except for the fees & charges equation. It
exercises a negative influence on other local taxes and a positive one on other local income. A
perusal of the revenue included in each of these two categories indicates that other taxes are
largely linked to commercial activities whereas other income would appear, at least, to be less
dependent on commerce. As area increases therefore, the relative reliance on commercially linked
revenues declines.
Density (dens) is a significant influence on revenue composition in two of the four
equations -- other local income and fees & charges. In the former case it exercises a positive
effect and in the latter situation a negative one. The relationship between other local taxes and
other local income holds true with regard to the variables governing law (glaw) and population
(pop). This dynamic suggests that with regard to these particular municipal characteristics, these
revenue sources appear to serve complementary as opposed to duplicative roles.
As with the discussion regarding expenditure allocation, the primary purpose of this
section of the analysis is not to explore the effect of various socio-economic and institutional
characteristics on revenue composition, but rather to investigate what effect, if any, changes in
uncollected taxes have on revenue composition of municipalities. As indicated, an increase in the
level of uncollected property taxes should intuitively lead to a decline in the level of uncollected
non-property taxes and an increase in the share of revenue composition borne by these other non-
property tax revenues. This can be best seen when placed in the context of possible fiscal
reactions to a property tax limitation measure.
The change in revenue composition as a result of a tax limit can stem from two different
dynamics. First, since a tax limitation increases the amount of uncollected property taxes, if
uncollected property taxes and uncollected non-property taxes serve a similar purpose, then this
dynamic should result in a decrease in the amount of uncollected non-property taxes. If, on the
other hand, they serve different purposes, then an increase in uncollected property taxes may or
may not result in an increase in uncollected non-property taxes. Assuming they serve similar
purposes, this trade-off effect would most likely result in a decrease in uncollected non-property
taxes and a resulting increase in the share of the budget composed of non-property tax income.
Second, the tax limitation would reduce the overall tax capacity of the municipality (due to a
decrease in the effective tax rate). This would militate for a decline in the consumption of all
goods including uncollected non-property taxes.
As uncollected property taxes increase, its marginal utility would decline. To the extent
that uncollected property taxes and uncollected non-property taxes are gross substitutes, we
would expect to see a decline in the marginal utility of uncollected non-property taxes as well,
relative to government goods and services. This should result in an increase in non-property taxes
and a decline in the amount of uncollected non-property taxes. If uncollected property taxes and
uncollected non-property taxes are complements of some kind, the increase in uncollected
property taxes could be coupled with either an increase or stasis in uncollected non-property
taxes.
A perusal of the regression parameters estimated in the revenue composition equations for
other local taxes and other local income indicates that these dynamics appear to be operating in
manner that makes some intuitive sense. The coefficients on the variable ln(untx) for both of
these sources of local income are positive and significant at the .01 level. According to these
estimates, as uncollected taxes increases, the share of revenues contributed by other local taxes
and other income increases as a proportion of total revenues.
The equation for fees & charges, as shown in Table 3.5, is more difficult to interpret. For
fees & charges, the coefficient on uncollected taxes is significantly different from 0 at a high level
of significance but the sign is negative. This suggests that as uncollected taxes increase, the share
of overall revenues contributed by fees & charges declines. The relationship between uncollected
taxes and fees & charges is clearly different than that between uncollected taxes and both other
local taxes and other local income. Instead of an increase in uncollected taxes resulting in an
increase in the share of revenues composed of fees & charges, it results in a decrease in the share
(and commensurate increase in uncollected fees & charges). This suggests that somehow
uncollected property taxes and uncollected fees & charges may be complements.
Summary and Interpretation
In this chapter, I have used the ex ante tax capacity methodology developed by Merriman
to study the effects of a tax limitation measure on the pattern of municipal expenditures and
revenues. Through this process, I have estimated that sizable changes in the level of uncollected
taxes are necessary to cause discernible movement in expenditure allocation and revenue
composition. The results generally suggest that the 'price' effects of a tax limitation measure are
fairly small and that measures such as Proposition 13 have their impact primarily with regard to
'capacity' effects.
In the case of expenditures, the R2 is relatively low in all cases This strongly indicates
that there are other factors present which account for a good deal of expenditure variation
between cities. The coefficient on uncollected taxes is significant at a reasonably high level of
confidence in only one-third to one-half of the equations (depending on the confidence level).
Finally, the magnitude of the coefficients indicates the necessity of large movements in uncollected
taxes to generate changes in expenditure shares.
In the case of revenue composition, the equations generally have a higher explanatory
component judging from the range of the R2 measurements of fit. The coefficient on uncollected
taxes is significant at a high level of confidence in three of the four equations. Even with these
more impressive statistical results, relative to the expenditure equations, a close look at the
magnitude of the coefficients in the revenue equations indicates that large movements in
uncollected taxes are required to generate much variation in the local composition of the revenue
stream.
In interpreting the results from the estimation procedure, it is vital to keep in mind what
the process is actually measuring. Some of the drawbacks of the tax capacity approach have been
mentioned previously, but it is worthwhile to state them again. First, the models I have used are
incomplete in the sense that many other factors clearly are influencing the variation in expenditure
and revenue levels. Even if a more complete set of data were available, more than likely the
estimation process would still be somewhat lacking since much of the variation may not be
reflected in quantitative proxy measures.
Second, the concept of tax capacity which is used in this study is a somewhat restrictive
one. It is a measure which does not account for the use of accumulated reserves in either
expenditure allocation or revenue composition. The proxy for tax capacity of local governments
which is used represents a notable improvement over the traditional proxies, in that it is tailored to
reflect the dominant source of local government income -- the property tax. However, its
treatment of other sources of local income falls short since it lacks a measure for the underlying
relevant bases for various local revenue sources.
Finally, while the model developed by Merriman and employed here represents a step
forward in terms of a theoretical basis of local government reactions to tax limitations, it is
restrictive in the sense that it is tied quite closely -- perhaps too closely -- to the model of
consumer sovereignty. Local governments are not simply the equivalent of individual consumers
with macro-budgets. The constraints and opportunities available to local governments in
expenditure allocation and revenue composition are qualitatively different than those facing the
consumer. The nuances of municipal budget behavior left out of the model account for the
relatively low explanatory values of the estimating equations.
While the results indicate relatively small changes in expenditure allocation and revenue
composition occur as a result of changes in uncollected taxes, other studies have shown through
various models that tax limitations result in much larger changes as a result of these measures.
With respect to Proposition 13 in particular, one representative study indicates a reduction in
expenditures from six percent for public safety to 21 percent for general government.'" This
* Rodney T. Smith, "Local Fiscal Arrangements, Home Rule, and California's Fiscal Constitution
after Proposition 13," in Proposition 13: A Ten-Year Retrospective, ed. Frederick D. Stocker
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1991), 87.
differential in expenditure reductions would result in changing expenditure shares of a magnitude
quite different from those detected in my analysis.
This phenomenon is a result of two separate dynamics. First, the model employed in this
study has the characteristic of measuring only the tax capacity change stemming from a tax
limitation such as Proposition 13, i.e. the increase in uncollected taxes as a result of assessed
value rollback and tax levy limitation. This is possible only by using an ex ante methodology.
Other studies using before and after measures of expenditures and revenues, by the very nature of
the model formulations, incorporate a host of other influences in addition to the tax limitation.
The most notable among these influences with respect to Proposition 13 are: (i) the
implementation policies undertaken by the state legislature with respect to the allocation of
property taxes and state aid assistance; and, (ii) the social and political atmosphere which
accompanied the Proposition's passage. The ex ante tax capacity approach separates these
factors from the tax limitation per se. the traditional before and after approach does not.
The second dynamic which is occurring relates to the expectations of municipal officials.
The cross-sectional nature of our investigation accounts for long-term changes that have occurred
and, if the median-voter theorem is at all relevant, incorporates the preferences of
consumer/voters with respect to expenditures and revenues. There is no anticipation of, or role
for, dramatic changes anticipated with respect to local resources or state aid. The situation is
distinctly different with respect to tax limitations. In this situation, many factors are concurrently
in flux and municipal officials will tend to react based on their expectations of change (which may
be unduly pessimistic) rather than reflecting long-run consumer/voter preferences. The tax
capacity model does not incorporate any of these profound notions of fiscal uncertainty faced by
municipalities.
In this portion of my analysis, I have made an effort to measure the expected effects of
Proposition 13 on municipal government revenues and expenditures. The investigation has
indicated that the fiscal aspect of Proposition 13 may not have had as influential an effect on
expenditure allocation and revenue composition as other studies have suggested. Instead, other
concurrent influences and expectations may be the driving force that has resulted in quite different
levels and shares of expenditures and revenues before and after the adoption of Proposition 13.
Chapter 5
Direct Impacts of Proposition 13
Overview
As a result of the curtailment of property taxes, the passage of Proposition 13 had a direct
impact on municipal finance in terms of revenue and expenditure patterns. In the previous chapter, an
estimation process based on a neoclassical paradigm was used to examine, on an ex ante basis, the
expected effects of a tax limit measure. In this chapter, I have undertaken to assess the actual
repercussions of such a measure using a determinants-based paradigm on a cross-section of California
municipalities. Before analyzing what responses of cities with respect to revenue and expenditure
adjustments, it is important to understand certain aspects of Proposition 13's immediate impact. This
chapter provides an assessment of several important features of the tax limitation measure. First, an
overview of revenue trends during the years prior to the passage of Proposition 13 and the first few
years following its passage is provided together with a brief analysis. Second, an assessment and
analysis of the uniformity and diversity of municipal impacts of the measure is presented. Third, using
both summary statistics as well as multiple regression techniques on an extensive cross-section of
California municipalities, important characteristics of municipalities directly affected by the passage of
the Proposition are explored.
Municipal Revenue Sources and Trends
Municipalities are unique among California local governments (and local governments in the
U.S. in general) in their degree of fiscal and political independence. This fiscal independence is
manifest in a number of different ways including the ability to issue a wide variety of debt instruments,
the power to establish strong redevelopment authorities, flexibility with regard to accrual and
expenditure of fund balances, great latitude with respect to expenditure choice and, most importantly,
access to a wide variety of revenue sources. This revenue diversity is reflected in the data which was
presented earlier in Chapter 2 and is duplicated for convenience in Table 5.1 below. The table displays
the pattern of municipal reliance on different types of revenues for fiscal year 1970 through fiscal year
1986.
Table 5.1: Revenue Sources of California Municipalities, Fiscal Years 1970-86 (percent).
Fiscal Propertv Sales Local State Federal Fees & Other Enterprise
Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Revenue Revenue Charges Local Revenue
1970 30.05 15.89 3.17 17.20 2.76 9.06 14.21 6.38
1971 29.24 14.40 4.09 16.77 4.47 9.27 14.84 5.92
1972 27.94 14.47 4.76 16.69 5.92 9.32 14.14 5.50
1973 25.76 14.31 5.08 14.86 12.08 8.91 12.47 5.11
1974 23.70 15.06 4.96 15.89 9.74 8.85 14.24 6.26
1975 23.87 15.33 5.34 14.72 11.26 9.03 13.90 5.18
1976 23.49 14.80 6.18 14.04 14.49 8.54 11.74 4.73
1977 23.71 15.42 6.77 13.08 15.93 8.82 11.36 3.48
1978 21.73 15.25 6.58 12.42 19.87 8.36 10.86 3.61
1979 10.20 16.59 7.52 16.14 18.57 8.99 13.27 7.07
1980 13.54 17.65 8.11 12.09 15.88 9.31 15.12 6.96
1981 13.71 16.87 8.20 12.40 14.37 10.16 16.00 7.16
1982 13.00 15.27 9.27 9.46 12.57 13.97 18.17 4.59
1983 13.86 14.40 9.61 9.29 10.97 15.36 17.40 5.03
1984 13.28 14.74 10.86 8.54 9.88 16.20 16.47 5.58
1985 12.88 14.71 11.36 9.89 9.07 16.27 16.55 5.30
1986 13.57 14.62 11.69 11.82 8.16 16.75 16.65 3.46
Notes: Data includes all California municipalities. 1979 is the initial post-13 fiscal year.
Sources: State of California Controller's Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning
Proposition 13: A Ten-Year Retrospective.
Cities of California. Fiscal Years 1970-86:
There are a number of features from Table 5.1 that are of interest in developing an analysis of
municipal fiscal impacts of Proposition 13. As depicted in the table, the diversity of revenue sources is
quite wide. In fact, the eight different sources shown comprise many combinations of individual
revenue streams. This obscured diversity is particularly true for locally-based and controlled revenue
sources. While property taxes, sales taxes, state aid and federal aid can all legitimately be considered as
single source revenue streams, at least from the perspective of the municipality, other local, local taxes,
fees & charges and enterprise revenues are much more diverse than Table 5.1 would indicate. They
are typically comprised of a host of various types of business taxes, permits, fees and fines and revenue
from various types of municipal enterprises. Despite these disparate sources, they have been combined
in categories based on shared characteristics and qualities.
Before continuing further, it is helpful to define two important terms regarding municipal
revenues. For purposes of this analysis, endogenous revenues are defined as those revenues
controlled and raised by the municipality whereas exogenous revenues are defined as those
controlled or raised by an outside agency. Using these definitions, in the pre-13 environment,
endogenous sources identified in Table 5.1 are property taxes, local taxes, fees & charges, other
local and enterprise revenue. State and federal aid are considered exogenous, along with sales
taxes (since the state establishes the sales tax rate for all local governments). Only in the long
term can municipalities effectively alter sales tax revenues based on land use and zoning decisions.
In the post-13 environment, property taxes also became an exogenous revenue source since tax
rates and property assessment became subject to control by the constitutional and legislative
changes stemming from the adoption of Proposition 13.
In terms of endogenous and exogenous revenue sources, the data presented in Table 5.1
convey a gradual shift over the 17-year period. Taking the year just prior to the passage of
Proposition 13 as a representative year in the pre-13 environment, endogenous revenues
constituted 51. 14% of all those revenues received by municipalities. In the immediate post-13
fiscal year 1979, endogenous revenues dropped to 36.85% of the total. This drop was partially
due to the reclassification of property taxes as an exogenous revenue source; however, even if this
were still considered an endogenous source, endogenous revenues would have comprised only
47.05% of the total. By fiscal year 1986, endogenous revenues increased relative to exogenous
sources such that they again comprised almost half (48.55%) of the total revenues received.
Trends within each revenue category are also of considerable interest. The most notable
feature of the data shown in Table 5.1 comes as no surprise. The drop in property taxes in fiscal
year 1979 is dramatic. While in fiscal year 1978 this source comprised over one-fifth of total
revenues, in the next fiscal year it was reduced to approximately ten percent of total revenues. In
the subsequent fiscal year 1980, it recovered to approximately 13% and held more or less
constant at this level for the next few years. It should be noted that the reduction in 1979 and the
increase in the next fiscal year is a result not only of the tax limitation measure itself but also of
state legislation regarding apportionment of property taxes among local governments.
In addition to the steep drop in property taxes after the adoption of Proposition 13, it is
also important to note the general decline in the importance of property taxes even prior to the
adoption of the Proposition. In fiscal year 1970, this source comprised over 30% of the total, but
had declined steadily to 21.73% by the time Proposition 13 was approved. As a result of this
ongoing process of change, to attribute the decline between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 solely to
the passage of the tax limitation measure would be inaccurate unless, for some reason, there was
an abrupt reversal of the long-established decreasing trend.
To continue with this data analysis of exogenous revenue sources, there are some
additional features which bear on this investigation. Sales taxes, with the exception of a minor
uptick for fiscal years 1979 through 1981, are quite consistent in their contribution to total
revenues. Their mean composition of total revenues during the nine-year, pre-13 period is
14.99%, while for the eight years after its passage, the mean value is 15.61%. The pattern for the
other two exogenous revenue sources is distinctly different. Federal aid constitutes a very small
portion of the total in fiscal year 1970 but climbs rapidly due to federal revenue-sharing, peaking
at 19.87% of the total in fiscal year 1978. The subsequent decline in federal aid, as it happens,
coincides with additional strictures on local fiscal latitude imposed by Proposition 13. By fiscal
year 1986, federal aid had declined to roughly eight percent of the total.
The story of the steep decline in federal aid has been told numerous times and comes as no
surprise. In contrast, the decline in state aid is rather more striking. This source of revenue
underwent a slow decline between fiscal year 1970 and 1978, dropping from a 17.20% to a
12.42% share over this period. In the first post-13 fiscal year, state aid jumped to over 16% of
the total; however, instead of stabilizing at this level, it declined in the subsequent fiscal year to
roughly 12%. If property taxes and state aid are combined, based on state apportionment and aid
being considered in tandem, these drop from 34.15% of the total in fiscal year 1978 to 26.34% in
fiscal year 1979. They stabilize at roughly 26% of the total through fiscal year 1981 before
declining again and reaching a nadir of 21.82% in fiscal year 1984.
With regard to those revenue sources which are endogenous over the course of the years
shown in Table 5.1, much variation occurs. It might be expected that as exogenous revenues
decline, municipalities would increase revenues from sources under their own control by
establishing new taxes or increasing rates for existing taxes and fees. While this general dynamic
does occur in three of the four endogenous sources, the patterns of change are quite distinct.
Fees & charges, which remained at basically a nine percent share throughout the 1970's, rose
slightly in the first two post-13 years, before increasing more rapidly to a 16.75% share by fiscal
year 1986. Other local follows a slightly different pattern, but also displays an increasing share of
total income. After dropping from 14.21% to 10.86% of the total during the nine years prior to
the passage of Proposition 13, the sources in this category provided 13.27% of total revenues in
the immediate post-13 fiscal year and continued to rise to provide 18 17% in fiscal year 1982,
before declining slightly.
While it is possible, in analyzing fees & charges and other local, to visualize an inflection
point occurring contemporaneously with the advent of the post-Proposition 13 regime, no such
change in regime is immediately obvious with regard to local taxes. Over the 17 years shown in
Table 5.1, local taxes steadily increase in importance, from a 3.17% share in fiscal year 1970 to
almost twelve percent in fiscal year 1986. The immediate post- 13 years show no abrupt departure
from this general trend line. However, local taxes do show an increasing gain in revenue share
after fiscal year 1978. The monotonic function of the previous years shows an increase in slope
based, in part, on new fiscal circumstances. This becomes apparent when the years immediately
preceding the adoption of Proposition 13 are isolated and compared with those years immediately
following its adoption. For the last six pre-13 fiscal years local taxes gained 1.82% in share
composition; for the first six post- 13 years, they gained 4.82%.
The revenue trends for enterprise funds displays yet an additional pattern of change.
Contributions from these sources were rather erratic prior to the adoption of Proposition 13:
dropping then rising, then dropping again to 3.61% in fiscal year 1978. After the passage of
Proposition 13, revenues from these sources more than doubled in share composition for the three
years immediately following the enactment of the tax limitation measure. After this period,
however, instead of stabilizing or increasing as might be expected from sources available to
compensate for the loss in property tax revenues, these revenues drop considerably as a share of
the total, collapsing to a 3.46% share in fiscal year 1986 from a 1981 high of 7.16%.
Despite the aggregate nature of the data presented in Table 5.1, several important features
of municipal revenues are apparent. First, and most obvious, is the dramatic decline in the
importance of property taxes in the municipal revenue portfolio following the passage of
Proposition 13. Second, contrary to common belief, exogenous revenues from state and federal
sources do not, except for the initial post- 13 year, appear to be instrumental in compensating for
property tax losses. Third, compensation for the loss in property taxes seems to stem from
increases in local endogenous revenue sources, but this compensatory reaction is not by any
means consistent across all types and for all post-13 years.
The data shown in Table 5.1 hints at the complex nature of municipal decision-making in
the post-13 environment. In Tables 5.2 and 5.3 shown below, further evidence of the intricate
pattern of revenue trends is presented. These tables show percentage changes in revenue sources
for the nine years prior to the adoption of Proposition 13 and the first three years following its
adoption. Table 5.2 presents the data based on nominal dollars whereas in Table 5.3 constant
dollars were used in the computation of the summary data.
Table 5.2: Percent Change in California Municipal Revenues, Fiscal Years 1970-81 (nominal $).
Fiscal Property Sales Local Other State & Fees & Misc. Total
Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Local Federal Charges Revenue Revenue
1970 5.071 8.212 68.383 -16.811 18.167 9.096 7.895 9.073
1971 7.810 0.405 39.099 8.755 20.451 13.039 2.520 11.092
1972 5.417 10.866 22.636 -0.261 12.998 10.892 17.526 10.935
1973 8.078 15.939 14.673 1.963 38.150 12.103 9.177 17.071
1974 0.314 14.731 7.534 34.146 4.629 9.107 6.675 7.871
1975 9.537 10.761 12.826 5.614 9.797 11.224 10.423 9.955
1976 13.297 11.131 16.705 -2.295 25.466 8.556 25.289 15.484
1977 11.765 15.291 17.436 6.646 11.822 13.772 0.209 12.049
1978 8.939 17.594 13.967 16.087 31.516 12.681 7.856 18.326
1979 -50.982 13.661 19.484 32.409 12.538 12.868 25.300 1.444
1980 42.960 14.519 16.266 26.494 -12.848 11.835 8.349 7.733
1981 12.706 6.465 13.446 20.962 6.392 21.586 -6.532 10.452
Notes: Data includes all California municipalities. 1979 is the initial post-13 fiscal year.
Source: State of California Controller's Annual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCalifornia. Fiscal Years 1970-81.
Table 5.3: Percent Change in California Municipal Revenues, Fiscal Years 1970-81 (constant S).
Fiscal Property Sales Local Other State & Fees & Misc. Total
Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Local Federal Charges Revenue Revenue
1970 -1.264 1.688 58.232 -21.826 11.043 2.519 1.390 2.498
1971 2.114 -4.899 31.750 3.009 14.088 7.067 -2.896 5.223
1972 2.057 7.332 18.727 -3.440 9.396 7.358 13.780 7.399
1973 4.520 12.122 10.898 -1.393 33.601 8.413 5.582 13.217
1974 -7.797 5.455 -1.160 23.330 -3.830 0.285 -1.950 -0.851
1975 -2.127 -1.033 0.812 -5.632 -1.900 0.620 -1.330 -1.753
1976 5.666 3.646 8.844 -8.877 17.015 1.244 16.849 7.705
1977 6.797 10.167 12.217 1.906 6.852 8.717 -4.244 7.069
1978 1.972 10.074 6.679 8.663 23.105 5.475 0.958 10.759
1979 -54.940 4.484 9.836 21.718 3.451 3.754 15.183 -6.747
1980 25.573 0.591 2.125 11.110 -23.448 1.767 -11.429 -5.370
1981 5.775 -0.050 1.229 7.694 -5.066 8.492 -16.598 -1.443
Notes: Data includes all California municipalities. 1979 is the initial post-13 fiscal year.
Source: State of California Controller's Annual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities of California. Fiscal Years 1970-81.
The data reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above largely confirm the trends and patterns of
change suggested by Table 5.1.' Property taxes show a sharp drop in the immediate post-13
fiscal year followed by a recovery and then a leveling out. Sales taxes and state and federal
revenue show slow growth or a drop after fiscal year 1978. Endogenous revenue sources display
quite disparate patterns as were detected in the revenue share data in Table 5.1. Miscellaneous
revenue shows a sharp increase in fiscal year 1979, then a decline. Other local shows rapid
growth after the passage of the Proposition, while local taxes and fees & charges display growth
patterns in keeping with existing pre- 13 patterns.
A more detailed analysis of revenue growth patterns based on revenue origin and
combined fiscal years may prove instructive at this point. Turning first to exogenous sources, for
the last three pre-13 years, sales taxes increased in nominal (real) terms an average of 14.67%
(7.96%), whereas for the first three post-13 years the change was 11.55% (1.68%). Thus, during
the period when cities were most in need of increases in other revenues such as sales taxes, the
increase in revenues from this source actually dropped. The patterns for other exogenous
sources, specifically state and federal aid, display an even more abrupt change. For the last three
1The format of financial reporting for municipalities changed after fiscal year 1981 making more
recent data incompatible with previous years.
pre-13 fiscal years, these sources grew in nominal (real) terms by an average of 22.93%
(15.66%); by the first three post-13 years their growth had slowed to a mean figure of 2.03% (-
8.35%).
In view of the sharp decline in property tax revenues and the lack of consistent
compensation from exogenous revenues, it might be expected that endogenous revenues were the
source of additional revenues for cities. While this is indeed the case, the responsiveness of local
revenue sources was far from consistent. For example, in the last three pre-13 years, local taxes
increased an average of 16.04% (9.25%), while in the first three post-13 years, they increased at
an average rate of 16.40% (4.39%). This more rapid increase in the post-13 period, in nominal
terms, was accompanied by quite different rates of change for other sources of endogenous
revenues. For the last three pre-13 fiscal years, growth rates for the remaining three endogenous
revenue sources were as follows: other local income -- 6.81% (1.69%); fees & charges -- 11.67%
(5.15%); miscellaneous revenue 11.15% (4.52%). The post-13 rates of growth for these
categones were: other local income -- 26.62% (13.51%); fees & charges -- 14.85% (4.67%);
miscellaneous revenue -- 9.04% (-4.28%). Thus, over the three year post-13 period, rapid
increases in real terms in other local income were accompanied by more moderate increases in
local taxes and fees & charges and declines in miscellaneous revenue.
These very different revenue responses can be considered within the overall context of
severe declines in property taxes and slow growth in total revenues. In the immediate three years
prior to Proposition 13, property taxes increased in nominal (real) terms by an average rate of
11.33% (4.81%); for the immediate three post-13 years, they changed by 1.57 (-7.86%). Despite
increases in certain forms of endogenous revenues, in nominal (real) terms total revenues for
municipalities also slowed (declined) in the years after the passage of Proposition 13. Growth in
total revenues in the three years prior to Proposition 13 was 15.29% (8.5 1%) compared to 6.54%
(-4.52%) after the Proposition was passed.
Property Tax Changes and Municipal Characteristics
Data Sources and Measurement Methods
The aggregate data summarized above provides information regarding overall reductions
in property taxes for all cities in California. Municipalities were not at all homogeneous in their
immediate reaction to the passage of the Proposition, however, and the data presented above only
describe a relatively small component of the total fiscal dynamic. In fact, the aggregate data only
obliquely reveals one of the important pieces of information about the fiscal effects on
municipalities of the tax limitation measure. This has to do with the vast heterogeneity of
municipal effects of this measure. In order to begin to get a perspective on these diverse effects,
in this section, I examine the magnitude of property tax reductions on different municipalities and
attempt to classify municipalities into general categories based on various characteristics.
The basic fiscal data for this investigation is based on a sample of California cities taken
from Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California published annually by the State of
California Controller's Office. For the regression analyses, dependent and independent variables
are constructed from this source, as well as from standardized state and federal sources including
the State Department of Finance, the State Controller's Office and the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. As discussed in Chapter 4, the sample of 130 California cities is based on a random
sample stratified by population group. The data are then weighted in inverse proportion to their
sampling ratio.
There are several options available for isolating and analyzing the magnitude of the effects of
Proposition 13. Each of these methods has its own strengths and weaknesses. Since each of the
methods will be used at some point in this analysis, it is valuable to go through the heuristic exercise of
discussing their various advantages and disadvantages. One method commonly used by analysts is
based on changes in property taxes in per capita terms. Since the focus here is on analyzing the
magnitude of changes from one year to another as opposed to measuring levels of revenues, this has
the distinct advantage of being removed from past expenditure patterns. Rather, this approach accepts
2 Sources for specific variables are included in Appendix B.
these past levels as a given and simply measures the change. However, this procedure of measuring
change can also be a disadvantage. Since using per capita figures ignores the size of base spending, it
does not account for the magnitude of change with respect to total property taxes. As a result, large
per capita changes can actually represent rather small alterations in revenues or expenditures and fairly
small per capita changes can represent substantial alterations in existing patterns.
Percentage change is the standard method by which to capture the importance of a particular
revenue or expenditure category. In capturing the importance of the category, this method also
incorporates past levels of expenditures. This aspect of the measurement strategy may cause an undue
focus on particular categories of revenues or expenditures which are of rather minor overall
importance, but suffer unusually large rates of reduction or increase. Similarly, categories of revenues
or expenditures which are sizable and experience moderate changes, may be downplayed or completely
overlooked in the analysis.
For quite different reasons, aggregate changes in revenues and expenditures are also used in
certain cases. While accounting for base and population, as per capita and percentage measures do,
makes intuitive sense, municipalities may not, in fact, consider these factors in their decision-making.
Municipal officials traditionally make budgeting and revenue source decisions by looking at past years
and adjusting levels as deemed necessary. Rarely do such decisions involve the calculation of
population or per capita-based measures. Increases and decreases in population at the municipal level
are truly exogenous events and typically do not enter into the budget decision-making in a systematic
fashion.3 Thus, the aggregate change method may arguably be a more appropriate reflection of
municipal behavior.
A final method of comparison that is used to define the change in property taxes is based on the
increase or decrease in revenue share contribution. This measure considers the relative magnitude of
3 This is true for zero-based budgeting as well as traditional methods. Zero-based budgeting
involves an analysis of activities and costs for individual categories for each budget year rather
than looking at past years as a guide. While per capita revenues or expenditures may be part of
the basis of measurement, they are not a rationale for increases or decreases in revenues or
expenditures.
property tax changes in the context of the overall contribution to total revenues; or, put another way,
the change in property taxes as a percent of total revenues. This method accounts for the fact that
large or small per capita and percentage changes in property taxes can result in large or small changes
in the overall composition of total revenues. This relative magnitude method is particularly valuable in
gauging the effort involved in raising compensatory revenues in the wake of Proposition 13.
In selecting the apposite method of measurement, much depends on the perspective one prefers
to take. If the study focus takes the perspective of municipal decision-makers, the use of aggregate or
relative magnitude methods of measurement are the appropriate ones. If the study's perspective is one
of more objective detachment, however, with a focus on ascertaining the 'real' effect of tax limitations,
the use of percentage or per capita methods may be more useful. These considerations also appertain
to the use of current or constant dollars in analyzing revenues and expenditures. While constant dollars
may more accurately reflect the 'real' effect of tax limitations, municipal decision-makers make no such
constant dollar adjustments in budgeting.4
This study takes a middle ground with regard to measurement techniques and nominal versus
constant figures. Where feasible and appropriate, aggregate, percentage and per capita change and
relative magnitude measures are all used in assessing revenue and expenditure data before and after the
passage of Proposition 13. This is true in presenting summary statistics of the data as well as in
conducting the regression analyses. Similarly, the use of both nominal and constant dollars are used in
the presentation of certain summary statistics. In the short-term regression analyses, however, nominal
4 Some tension exists between budget analysis and economic analysis in the presentation of
government revenues and expenditures. Budget analysis uses nominal dollars in the compilation of
annual expenditure and revenue statements. These figures are presented and understood by
taxpayers on a current dollar basis. Comparisons with past years, except for the immediately
preceding ones, are rarely made and the current basis of presentation in most periods has few
hidden implications. Economic analysis, on the other hand, emphasizes expenditures and revenues
in real terms and uses constant dollars. In analyses, such as this one, that deal with data over an
extended period of time or during unusually inflationary periods, the basis of presentation may
make a substantial difference. Where appropriate, this analysis presents data in both nominal and
constant dollar terms. Both approaches have validity despite their distinct perspectives.
dollars are used based on the assumption that these models represent an attempt to capture the
dynamic relationships that existed at the time.5  For longer-term regressions, presented in a later
chapter, both nominal and constant dollar measures are employed.
Summary Statistics
Before investigating the variations in the fiscal impacts of Proposition 13 on municipalities, it is
necessary to gauge the range of reliance on the property tax before and after the passage of the tax
limitation measure. Table 5.4 below presents a series of summary information regarding the property
tax for the sample of municipalities. With respect to the 130 municipalities in the sample, a comparison
reveals that the reliance on property taxes largely reflects the characteristics of all California
municipalities. In fiscal year 1978, the mean (median) share of total revenues borne by the property tax
for the sample was 18.96% (18.01%). For the immediate post-13 fiscal year 1979, the comparable
figure was 8.62% (8.50%). As a comparison with the data in Table 5.1 makes clear, these figures are
only slightly below those for all California municipalities during these two years. The subsequent
increase in property tax share for fiscal year 1980 is due to two primary factors; (i) the increase in
property values and, (ii) the reallocation by the state legislature of property taxes among local
governments.
Table 5.4: Property Tax Summary Data for Municipalities, Fiscal Years 1978-80.
Measurement Mean Median Standard Deviation
Basis FY78 FY79 n80 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY78 FY79 FY80
share of revenues (%) 18.996 8.622 11.454 18.014 8.501 11.982 9.796 5.109 6.733
total (000's nominal $) 6.031 2,963 4,166 1,829 792 1,157 27,376 14,266 18,672
total (000's constant $) 9,711 4,385 5,416 2,945 1,173 1,504 44,077 21,114 24,273
per capita (nominal $) 57.357 25.395 37.007 50.225 23.625 33.117 53.822 20.782 28.479
per capita (constant $) 92.344 37.584 48.109 80.862 34.965 43.053 86.654 30.757 37.023
Notes: Number of observations is 130.
One measure of the variation among cities is the degree to which municipal tax portfolios
became more or less similar with respect to property taxes following Proposition 13. Representing the
' For all regressions, preliminary estimates of the models were conducted using both nominal and
constant dollars. Although some slight variations in coefficients and statistical significance of the
estimated parameters occurred, these were not of sufficient magnitude to alter the overall interpretation
of the model.
standard deviation as a proportion of the mean is one method by which to measure this particular
characteristic. In fiscal year 1978, the ratio of standard deviation/mean was 0.516. The comparable
figures for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 were 0.593 and 0.588, respectively. These ratios suggests that
with respect to reliance on the property tax municipalities became somewhat less alike in the years after
Proposition 13.
One perfectly logical reason for this divergent drift has to do with the particulars of Proposition
13. Recall that the tax limit provisions were written such that, not only were tax rates limited to one
percent of assessed value, but in addition, reassessment of property was limited to two percent per
annum (except upon resale or new construction). Thus, slow growth, non-transient communities
would find property tax revenues lagging relative to fast growth, transient communities. Compensating
for this deceleration in property taxes were perforce, increases in other local tax sources. As property
tax revenues lagged, municipalities may have gravitated to other revenue sources that presented a
relatively deeper or broader fiscal resource.
On initial analysis, the comparable ratios from the per capita data appear to contradict this
explanation. The calculated standard deviation/mean ratios for fiscal years 1978, 1979 and 1980 are
0.938, 0.818 and 0.769 respectively, suggesting an increasing convergence in per capita property taxes.
The different directions in these measures of municipal variation with regard to revenue composition
and per capita property taxes, while not incompatible, do require further explanation. Clearly, the per
capita calculation is a normalizing factor, for faster growing communities, additional assessed value is
added but presumably brings with it additional population resulting in dampening influence on the
overall property tax effect. In essence then, Proposition 13 acted as a 'great leveler' with respect to
municipal access to property taxes on a per capita basis. The virtual growth ceiling of two percent per
annum reduced differences among municipalities on a per capita basis. Why this leveling quality did
not have a similar impact on revenue composition relates partially to the assessment exceptions granted
turnover and new construction.
Table 5.5 below presents summary statistics regarding the change in property tax levels for
fiscal years 1978 through 1979. As indicated by the data presented in the table, the drop in property
taxes from fiscal year 1978 to fiscal year 1979 is quite steep by any measure. Using the nominal
figures, in percentage terms the drop is in excess of 50%, with the decline in per capita terms equally
dramatic. Based on constant dollar calculations, the decline in property taxes in the aftermath of
Proposition 13 is even more precipitous.
Table 5.5: Property Tax Change for Municipalities, Fiscal Years 1978 -79.
Measurement Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Basis Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
total change -5,325,901 -1,694,217 2.30e+14 -3,068,799 -964,261 1.32e+07
percent change -56.694 -56.537 16.370 -52.890 -52.719 17.808
per capita change -54.460 -44.594 58.791 -31.962 -25.916 35.085
Notes: Number of observations is 130.
Like the data conveyed in the summary data in Table 5.4, the change calculations provided in
Tables 5.5 suggest that municipalities were much more similar in their reliance on the property tax on a
revenue composition basis than on a per capita basis. The standard deviation with respect to the
percent change figure is quite small relative to the mean whereas the standard deviation for per capita
change actually exceeds the mean figure. These interpretations are borne out by the measure of
skewness for each of the measures of property tax change.' For the percent change figures, the
skewness coefficient is 0.133 indicating a distribution skewed slightly to the right. For per capita
change, however, the coefficient of -7.095 indicates a distribution severely skewed left. With regard to
range, percent change ranged from 99.99% to +26.32% while per capita change ranged from -$368.50
to +$44.53.
Municipal Characteristics
The discussion thus far has focused on differences among cities with respect to the immediate
effects of the passage of Proposition 13. Trend and growth data, along with summary statistics based
on various measures of change, have suggested the presence of significant differences among
municipalities. These differences have been manifest both in the reliance on the property tax and the
6 Skewness measures the lack of symmetry of the distribution with 0 indicating perfect symmetry.
A negative coefficient indicates median > mean and the distribution is skewed left; a positive
coefficient indicates median < mean and distribution is skewed right.
magnitude of the property tax effects of the tax limitation measure. Clearly, an important piece of the
puzzle that warrants investigation is whether the variations among municipalities with regard to the
initial property tax losses are based on some underlying pattern of municipal socio-economic
characteristics.
This portion of my analysis represents an attempt to explain the diverse effects of Proposition
13 on municipalities. The basic analytical technique selected is cross-sectional regression models
structured to explain changes in levels of property taxes. The use of changes in property taxes as
opposed to property tax levels is a simplifying technique which avoids many of the complications
associated with fashioning a much more comprehensive model of municipal revenue and expenditure
levels. This simplifying technique is quite appropriate in this context, however. The concern in this
investigation is not with explaining how or why different municipalities have varying levels of property
taxes; rather the focus is on explaining how the enactment of Proposition 13 resulted in different
magnitudes of property tax losses for different types of cities.
There are several possible alternative specifications for the dependent variable, property tax
change. As I discussed previously, each of the four measures which are employed here -- aggregate
change, percentage change, per capita change and relative magnitude -- possess its own advantages
and disadvantages. Aggregate change is more directly linked to municipal budget decisions, but it
lacks the population adjustment that might facilitate inter-municipal comparisons. Percentage change
accounts for the relative importance of the property tax decline, but can lead to an exaggerated concern
with an unimportant part of the budget. Per capita change can lead to a distorted perspective regarding
the importance of the property tax, nor is it linked to the typical process of budgetary adjustments. The
relative magnitude measure gauges the severity of the cuts in relation to total revenues but does not
account for per capita burden. In view of these measurement issues, all four approaches are
incorporated in this analysis.
Empirical Proxies
This portion of the analysis presents an explanation of the diversity of property tax impacts of
the passage of Proposition 13 through the use of a series of fiscal and socio-economic variables.
Specifically, the models estimated represent an attempt to describe and explain the characteristics of
cities affected differentially by the passage of the tax limitation measure. The principal dependent
variables used in the regression modeling consist of (i) the change in total property taxes from fiscal
year 1978 to 1979; (i) the percent change in property taxes from fiscal year 1978 to 1979; (iii) the per
capita change in property taxes from fiscal year 1978 to 1979; and, (iv) the change in property taxes
from fiscal year 1978 to 1979 as a percent of fiscal year 1978 total revenues.
The models used to address the characteristics of municipalities and their relationship to
property tax reductions employ three types of variables. Two of the variables relate to the general
economic well-being of the municipality and have a direct relationship to the ability of municipalities to
raise own-source revenue. The economic variables employed, median household income and
nonresidential property value, represent an attempt to capture important measures of wealth and
income. Clearly, as other analysts have suggested, they are related to the willingness to pay for local
government goods and services. They are included here to address the issue as to whether they may
also influence the pattern of differential impact of tax limits.
Two additional measures of economic status were also considered for inclusion in the models.
Median house value was initially included but was rejected due to multicollinearity issues with
household income. A broader measure of wealth, total assessed value, was also rejected based on the
same rationale. While total assessed value is a much broader and more complete measure of wealth in
a community, it was highly correlated with median household income. Non-residential property value
as a percent of total assessed value was selected as the most suitable available substitute.
Two additional explanatory variables are similar in the sense that they relate to a municipality's
well-being, but are measures of fiscal health as opposed to economic health. The first is a measure of
the fund balance or surplus for the municipality. The standardized source of financial information for
municipalities in the state does not track fund balances, necessitating the construction of a suitable
alternative. Employed as a proxy variable for fund balance is the difference between revenues and
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expenditures for the five fiscal years prior to the adoption of Proposition 13 expressed as a percent of
total expenditures.
A second fiscal health explanatory variable relates to the ability of a municipality to raise
revenues to pay for goods and services, and is commonly known as tax capacity. The measure of tax
capacity incorporated in this portion of the investigation is an income based measure which relates the
overall tax capacity of the particular city to the average tax capacity of the reference group, in this case,
all other cities in the sample.' As a consequence, this measure of tax capacity is a means by which to
gauge the fiscal health of a municipality in relation to all other cities in the sample.9
Finally, included in the regressions is a series of institutional and demographic variables which
may help explain variations in the impact of Proposition 13 on municipal finance. The rate of
population change between 1970 and 1980 is used as a measure of the rapidity of growth during the
decade under the assumption that fast growing cities with a continuing need for infrastructure and
related projects may have been affected more severely by the tax limitation measure. Municipal
population in 1980 is included based on the theory that impacts may be related to the size of the
municipality, not only with respect to aggregate property tax reductions but also on a per capita and
7 Fund balance should constitute a running cumulative total of moneys available for expenditures
since the inception of fiscal autonomy for the municipality. Using a one or two-year cumulative
total would probably misrepresent the actual balance since municipalities may choose to amass or
expend surpluses during any one period of time. The longer the period of time over which the
measure is calculated the closer it will approach a true representation of fund balance, such that
the periods of fund balance expenditure will tend to offset periods of accumulation leaving as a
residual the chosen level of fund balance. The five-year period used is extensive enough to capture
the overall pattern of surpluses.
' For a discussion of alternative measures of tax capacity, see Robert Berne and Richard
Schramm, The Financial Analysis of Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1986), Chapter 6.
9 Formally, the measure of tax capacity is: (locrev78/8443.715)pcinc78, where locrev78 is total
endogenous revenues for municipality i in fiscal year 1978, 8443.715 is mean per capita income
for reference group (random sample of 130 municipalities) in dollars and pcinc78, is per capita
income in 1978 for municipality i. Per capita income in 1978 is based on 1980 per capita income
and adjusted for inflation.
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percentage basis. The ratio of municipal population to county population is included based on the
supposition that as this changes, the effect of the tax limitation may also change. Finally, the last
effective pre- 13 standardized tax rate for the municipality has been included in order to control for tax
rate effects.
Specification of Property Tax Equations
The general form of the estimating equations is:
pxAi =f[popi, growi, couni, incmi, resd, trati, endb, tcap,] (5.1)
where: ptXA, = property tax change from fiscal year 1978 to 1979 on aggregate,
percentage, per capita and percent of total revenues basis for I' municipality;
popI= population in 1980 of ith municipality;
grow, = percent population change from 1970 to 1980 of ith municipality;
coun, = proportion of population of county represented by it" municipality;
incmin = median household income in 1980 of i'h municipality;
resd = residential property as percent of total property value for /' municipality,
trat, = equalized property tax rate in fiscal year 1978 for i municipality,
endb,= ending balance of i'" municipality;
tcap,= tax capacity of i'd municipality.
In Chapter 2, I discussed theoretical models for estimating revenues and expenditures Here,
the emphasis is on changes in the levels of a particular revenue source, the property tax, in response to
an abrupt alteration in the fiscal environment in the form of a tax limitation measure. In this situation, it
is appropriate to eschew the more theoretical models in favor of a pragmatic determinants-based
approach to estimation. Despite the absence of an explicit theoretical basis for this determinants-based
approach, the equations nevertheless include a number of fiscal and economic variables that relate
directly to the overall health of a municipality and influence its ability to provide a particular level of
municipal goods and services.
Expectations regarding parameter estimates for the included variables will be discussed in
conjunction with the presentation of the regression results. However, it is appropriate at this time to
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review briefly the correlation matrix for the included variables. As presented in Table Cl in Appendix
C, the figures shown in the correlation matrix do not suggest the presence of multicollinearity issues
that could unduly influence the estimation process. The highest correlation between explanatory
variables is 0.42 for pop and coun. In particular, no unusually high correlation exists between any of
the economic and fiscal condition explanatory variables that are central to this inquiry.
No strong a priori conviction regarding the functional form of the estimating equation is held.
Unlike equations which seek to explain variations in the levels of revenues of expenditures, there is no
well-developed, theoretically-grounded functional form used for explaining variations in changes in
revenues. Instead the functional form employed in most determinants studies is used and the
parameters are estimated based on a linear specification. Given the particular theory of the estimation
model and its specification, the model should not be viewed as implying causality but rather as an
attempt to describe important characteristics of municipalities which explain variations in the impact of
Proposition 13.
The functional form of the estimating equations is:
pIxA, a, - /1popi - 2grow; + /couni + 4incm, - psresd - /tr at,
fendbi - 88tcap, - E (5.2)
where: a, constant or intercept term,
e = random error term component;
all other variables are as defined in equation 5.1.
For all models, preliminary regression estimation and graphical analysis suggested the presence of
heteroscedasticity. The Cook-Weisberg (1983) test for heteroscedasticity was used to estimate error
variance based on fitted values for the regressions. Based on the results of this test, the null hypothesis
of homoscedasticity was rejected at the .05 level or better for all regressions. White's (1980) method
was used to correct for heteroscedasticity in all regressions.
Results of Property Tax Regressions
The results of the estimated models based on the four identified methods of measurement are
shown in Table 5.6 below. Overall, the socio-economic and fiscal control variables explain a sizable
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proportion of the change in property tax revenues, with the exception of percentage change. With
respect to the aggregate change model (1), the regression equation explains over 95% of the variation
in property tax losses after the adoption of Proposition 13. The coefficient on population is significant
at better that the .01 level and indicates that an increase in population (pop) of 1,000 corresponds to a
decrease in property taxes in excess of $46,000. Since larger cities spend more and raise more
revenues, their disproportionate burden of the aggregate property tax loss is not surprising.
Table 5.6: Property Tax Change, Fiscal Years 1978-79.
Independmt Variable (1) pxaA (2) pxpxA (3) ptcA (4) ptxtA
pop -46676.12 -0.000060 0.00514 -0.000014
**(-14.47) (-1.293) (-0.696) (-1.079)
grow -33899.2 -0.016412 -14.01301 0.0205323
(-0.221) (-0.491) *(-1761) (1.511)
coun 5276787 0.3077845 67.64641 0.0955022
**(2.053) *(1.892) **(2.655) **(2.013)
incm -9701.507 -0.00274 -0.7721 -0.00644
(-0.802) (-1.386) *(-1.856) **(-5.470)
resd -285085.3 -0.068997 21.65067 -0.033880
(-.619) (-0.846) (1.153) (-1.089)
trat -2.63e+08 -10.11937 -12157.17 -15.71552
**(-2.469) (-0.903) **(-3.670) **(-3.648)
endb 984.8424 0.000619 0.080513 0.0002602
*(1.827) **(6.796) **(4.838) **(7.026)
tcap -454.1969 -0.000019 -0.127415 -0.000034
(-1.060) (-0.254) **(-2.983) (-1.405)
a 1821500 -0.380340 40.20094 0.102657
**(2.398) **(-4.200) **(4.213) **(3.063)
R2  0.955 0.099 0.850 0.634
R2 0.952 0.038 0.840 0.609
Notes-ptxaA is aggregate dange in property taxes; ptcpA is percentage dange in property taxes; pIxcA is per capita dange in property taxes; ptA is
property taxes as a percent oftotal revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates sigsificance at the .10 level or
better ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127.
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Only three other variables in the aggregate property tax change regression are statistically
significant at any reasonable level. The sign for municipal population/county population (coun)
indicates that as a municipality's population dominance in the surrounding county decreases, property
taxes also decrease, ceteris paribus. The sign on tax rate (trat) indicates that increases in the last pre-
13 tax rate are related to decreases in property taxes. Thus, in the aggregate, higher property tax rates
correspond to greater reductions in property taxes. Finally, the sign on ending balance (endb) indicates
that those cities with smaller proportionate ending balances had larger property tax reductions.
For the percent property tax change regressions (2), the explanatory value is quite small and
indicates that the equation explains less than 10% of the variation in percentage change. This much
more rigorous test of property tax change results in only two of the estimated parameters having a
reasonable level of statistical significance. The sign and coefficient on coun indicates that a one unit
increase in the proportion of municipal population/county population results in an increase in the
property tax percentage of 0.30%. The sign on endb indicates that better off municipalities, with
respect to this measure of fiscal status, were not as affected by the tax limitation measure as less well-
prepared ones.
The drop-off in explanatory value and significant coefficients between the aggregate change
model and the percentage change model is dramatic. The cause of this is the much higher hurdle that
the percentage change regression posses as a measure of impact. Note that none of the explanatory
variables exhibit a sign change from one model to the other, indicating that the dynamics all work in the
same direction; only the statistical significance of the measurement has declined for most of the
variables. Interestingly, one of the few variables that does show a dramatic increase in significance in
the percentage change regression is income (incm), which exhibits a negative influence on property
taxes based on both measures.
The third of the four models shows per capita changes in property taxes between fiscal years
1978 and 1979 (3). The results of this test are more in keeping with the aggregate change model than
the percentage change model. The overall explanatory value is quite high, with an R2 of 0.85. The
importance of pop drops to the point of statistical insignificance while several other variables retain
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their significance. The variable coun exercises the same effect as it did in the aggregate and percentage
regressions. with decreasing population dominance leading to decreasing per capita property taxes.
The variable trat also continues to have a negative influence on property tax changes, and endb a
positive one.
Several other variables are statistically significant at a reasonable level in the per capita change
model. The coefficient on population growth (grow) indicates that fast growing municipalities during
the 1970-80 decade suffered more from property tax reductions on a per capita basis than slower
growth cities. This suggests that faster-growing municipalities may, in fact, have relied on property
taxes to finance the necessary growth-driven infrastructure and suffered commensurately when
Proposition 13 was approved. The parameter estimate for incm is also negative and significant at the
0.06 level. The negative sign indicates that as income increases, property taxes decline on a per capita
basis. Finally, the tax capacity (icap) parameter indicates that those municipalities with a higher tax
capacity suffered disproportionately from property tax cuts.
The forgoing models all suffer from some drawback in terms of measuring the severity of the
impact of Proposition 13. In the aggregate change model, much of the variation is explained by the
dominant role of population. The percentage change model could misstate the real severity of the
property tax loss since it does not account for the importance of the property tax in the overall budget.
Per capita change suffers from the same problem; large per capita changes may represent only a small
part of the total budget. Despite these issues and the variation in the overall explanatory values of the
equations, it is important to note the consistency in the parameter estimates; only the constant (a) and
residential proportion (resd) display a sign change in any of the three models.
The last regression model, where the dependent variable represents the change in property
taxes as a percent of total fiscal year 1978 revenues (relative magnitude), is an attempt to deal with the
issues raised above in conjunction with the previous measures of property tax change. Thus, this
measurement of change avoids the distortions inherent in the percentage and per capita approaches
which do not capture the relative budget importance of the property tax. It also avoids the dominant
effect of population which was quite apparent in the aggregate change model.
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The overall explanatory value of the relative magnitude model (4) is quite high with an R2 value
indicating that the equation explains almost two-thirds of the variation in the property tax as a share of
total fiscal year 1978 revenues. The comparable figure for adjusted R2 indicates that inclusion of
irrelevant or misspecified explanatory variables is not a significant issue in this equation. This
performance, in terms of explanatory value, places it well above that of the percentage change model
although slightly worse than the aggregate or per capita changes models.
The statistical performance of many of the independent variables is also quite good. With the
exception of pop and tcap, any variables statistically significant in any of the previous three models are
also significant in the relative magnitude model as well, with the former two variables each significant
in only one of the other models -- ptxa (1) for pop and ptxcA (3) for tcap. The coefficients on the
variables relating to economic and fiscal status are perhaps the most interesting of the results. The
parameter on incm is statistically significant and indicates that higher income cities experienced the
largest proportionate declines in property taxes. The estimated parameter indicates that a $1,000
increase in median household income corresponds to a change in property tax share of -0.64%.
The sign on resd indicates that a lower proportion of residential property value corresponds to
less of a reduction in property tax as a share of revenues, or municipalities with a greater non-
residential presence were not as seriously affected as other municipalities by the property tax
reductions. However, the parameter is not statistically significant at a reasonable level. The coefficient
on trat, however, is statistically significant at a reasonable level, and indicates that those municipalities
with higher tax rates were disproportionately affected by Proposition 13.
Combining the estimated parameters for resd and trat paints an interesting picture of
municipalities most affected by Proposition 13. It is logical to surmise that those municipalities with a
higher proportion of non-residential presence could set tax rates relatively low and still generate
aggregate or per capita property tax revenues sufficient to maintain a revenue balanced budget and
deliver an adequate level of goods and services to residents. More residential municipalities would
tend to have correspondingly higher tax rates in order to generate the same aggregate or per capita
property tax revenues. Thus, the imposition of a one percent tax limit could affect the latter more
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seriously than the former. While it may be true that less residential municipalities would be enticed to
rely on property taxes for a disproportionate share of the budget, this is not sufficient to overcome the
more dominant tax rate dynamic.
The performance of the endb variable continues to be quite good in this regression and
consistent with previously discussed models of property tax change. Those municipalities with high
ending balances were not as seriously affected as those with relatively smaller ending balances. The
surmise must be that those cities better positioned to cushion the blow of property tax cuts were also
not as deeply affected by the reductions. tcap is also consistent across the estimated models, indicating
that larger tax capacity corresponds to greater property tax reductions; however, the parameter is not
statistically significant in this regression.
With the exception of coun, none of the population-based independent variables is statistically
significant at a reasonable level of confidence. The estimated parameter for coun indicates that greater
population dominance in the surrounding county corresponds to increases in property taxes. It is not
intuitively obvious why this should be so and, in fact, a stronger case can be made for the converse.
That is, population dominant municipalities would offer a more complete range of goods and services
in greater amounts than less population dominant municipalities. This would open them up to greater
forced reduction in revenues with the advent of Proposition 13.
Further interpretation of the parameter estimates for coun requires uncoupling this variable
from other related factors such as population size. The variable coun is most likely representative of a
host of underlying factors which fall in favor of population dominant municipalities in the event of a tax
limitation. Being larger than other municipalities in the county may simply carry with it hidden
advantages that reduce reliance on the property tax (and reduce the impact of property tax
curtailment). For example, dominant municipalities are frequently the county seat, with all the
associated business activities that go with this designation. They may have more a more diverse and
varied property base or benefit from a disproportionate share of tourist related activities. The
consistent performance of this variable across all four models of property tax change, with respect to
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both significance and sign, suggests the stability of the affect of these underlying factors, although the
actual dynamic remains hidden from view.
Summary and Interpretation
The purpose of this chapter has been to set the stage for a detailed revenue and expenditure
analysis of California municipalities in the aftermath of Proposition 13. This review of immediate
impacts of Proposition 13 was accomplished through three primary means: (i) the overall budget share
and growth trends of important revenue sources for all California municipalities were analyzed; (ii) the
diversity and range of changes in the property tax after the passage of Proposition 13 were
investigated; and (iii) the various socio-economic characteristics of affected municipalities were isolated
and discussed.
In the first part of this chapter, trends for municipal revenues based on budget shares and
growth patterns were presented. Several important features fell out of the analysis of these trends.
The budget share data indicated a gradual lessening of the reliance on the property tax leading up to the
passage of Proposition 13, followed by a steep drop after its passage. Equally important, the use of
exogenous revenue sources, specifically state and federal assistance, did not occur in sufficient
magnitude to compensate for the decline in property taxes. Finally, while municipalities did increase
their use of endogenous revenues following the passage of Proposition 13, the increases were not
internally consistent. Based on the aggregate patterns of revenue changes presented in this chapter, it
appears that municipal revenue reactions to the passage of Proposition 13 were quite diverse. This
surmise was generally borne out by more complete data presented for the cross-section of 130
California municipalities.
In the second part of the chapter, the cross-section of California municipalities was used to
isolate and analyze the immediate impacts of Proposition 13. This was accomplished by representing
the change in property tax revenues based on three separate measures of change: revenue share change,
aggregate change and per capita change. Based on an analysis of the variance, municipalities appear to
be most alike in terms of budget share with much higher divergence among them based on per capita
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calculations. The passage of Proposition 13 seems to have slightly increased the budget share
divergence among municipalities and reduced it on a per capita basis. Overall, the differences among
municipalities with regard to property tax use appears to be quite high.
The foregoing discussion highlights one of the important findings of this study; municipalities
were quite heterogeneous in their relationship with the property tax. This dynamic is reflected in the
diversity of reliance on the property tax both prior to and after the passage of Proposition 13 as well as
in the diversity of the property tax changes following the passage of the tax limitation. In view of the
diverse and seemingly unpatterned relationship of municipalities to the property tax, the last part of the
chapter is an attempt to create some sense of order of the municipal reaction to Proposition 13.
The question I addressed in the final section is whether the heterogeneous reactions interpreted
from the summary data occurred based on some underlying socio-economic characteristics or represent
truly haphazard and idiosyncratic events. Four different measures of property tax change were
employed as dependent variables and regressed against a series of socio-economic variables
representing essential municipal features in terms of economic heath, fiscal stability and demand
requirements.
Despite the heterogeneity which has been discussed, some very real patterns regarding the
magnitude of property tax reductions do appear. Based on the four measures of change, differences in
magnitude of the estimated coefficients do occur in the four regression models, but there is also a
considerable amount of consistency in both the statistical significance of the important parameters and
the sign of such estimates. Based on the econometric analysis, the general outline of the type of city
most seriously affected by the passage of Proposition 13 in terms of property tax reductions begins to
emerge.
Drawing upon all four models of property tax change, the types of municipality suffering the
greatest property tax reduction is a high income city with a high pre-13 tax rate, comparatively large
fiscal cushion and not population dominant with respect to the surrounding county. The city may have
a large tax capa&. and may be slow growing in terms of population. The dominance of residential or
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business property does not appear to be an important underlying characteristic with respect to property
tax change.
This preliminary profile of the cities most affected by the passage of Proposition 13, and by
implication, those more protected from its effects, will prove a useful reference point as further
reactions to the tax limitation measure are explored. Specifically, it will facilitate the connection
between the magnitude of revenue and expenditure reactions to the passage of Proposition 13 and the
magnitude of property tax losses. These are the issues which I address in the chapters that follow.
I1
Chapter 6
Distinctions in Municipal Revenue Patterns
Overview
In Chapter 5 it was revealed that'certain patterns existed with respect to the immediate
impacts of Proposition 13 on municipalities. In this chapter, I investigate the role the passage of
Proposition 13 played in influencing changes in total revenues and the composition of revenues
for municipal governments. Just as alterations in the fiscal landscape can affect local governments
in different ways, these alterations also can be expected to result in variations in the changes in
revenue profiles of local governments. This is particularly true when the fiscal changes are as
dramatic as those stemming from the passage of Proposition 13.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the revenue responses of municipal
governments to the enactment of Proposition 13. First, a series of summary statistics is presented
which displays the overall changes in revenues for municipal governments during the initial post-
13 period. Second, cohort groups and several municipalities are analyzed in order to ascertain
individual city revenue responses to the tax limitation measure. Finally, utilizing fiscal variables as
well as socio-economic variables, I employ a variation of the determinants approach discussed
earlier to draw generalizations about the relationship of revenue changes to the passage of
Proposition 13.
Municipal Revenue Changes
Summary Statistics
In Chapter 5, overall municipal revenue trends were presented for cities in California.
Generally, I observed that there was a gradual lessening in the reliance on the property tax up
until fiscal year 1978, and then a steep drop in revenues from this source after Proposition 13 was
passed. During the same period, it was noted that endogenous revenue sources grew in
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importance; however, this growth was not monotonic in nature nor was it similar across revenue
types. Exogenous revenues too, showed patterns which suggest much variation.
These patterns of revenue change are explored using the cross-section of California
municipalities introduced in Chapter 5. Statistics were complied for the last pre-Proposition 13
fiscal year as well as the first two fiscal years following the passage of the measure. Table 6.1
below presents the pattern of gross revenue changes which occurred in the aftermath of
Proposition 13. None of the data presented are particularly surprising and the general trends have
been identified in numerous other studies of Proposition 13; however, it is beneficial to discuss
these gross revenue changes again in preparation for a more detailed look at municipal reactions
to the Proposition. In addition, the variance measures shown below have not been the subject of
much previous analysis: an oversight that suggests the appropriateness of this investigation into
the varieties of responses to the tax limit measure.
Table 6.1: Per Capita Revenues, Fiscal Years 1978, 1979 and 1980.
Revenue Alean Median Standard Deviation
Source FY78 FY79 FY80 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY78 FY79 FY80
Property Tax 57.357 25.395 37.007 50.225 23.625 33.117 53.822 20.782 28.479
Sales Tax 52.086 58.534 65.304 46.355 53.364 56.929 34.697 39.264 48.219
Local Taxes 21.810 25.889 28.695 14.924 17.690 19.923 19.397 21.637 24.918
Other Local 25.306 32.976 35.248 18.704. 24.286 29.086 45.202 53.479 23.378
State Aid 42.696 53.180 46.636 39.944 48.081 41.663 12.935 23.020 20.928
Federal Aid 59.892 66.472 46.218 45.752 39.104 32.005 52.039 128.456 46.293
Fees & Charges 26.766 31.897 35.624 22.785 28.943 29.028 19.707 22.148 28.637
Local Misc. 18.472 21.151 19.861 6.158 8.334 6.707 63.317 61.817 79.039
Total 304.385 314.402 312.712 278.828 268.965 272.616 185.081 238.555 169.315
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
One of the most prominent features of the revenue pattern shown above is the dramatic
drop in property taxes between fiscal years 1978 and 1979. These tax receipts are sliced by
almost fifty percent on a per capita basis before recovering slightly in the subsequent fiscal year.
Every other category of income shows an increase from 1978 to 1979, according to both mean
and median measures. The situation is slightly different the following year. Two principal
intergovernmental revenue sources -- federal and state aid -- decline steeply in both mean and
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median terms. At the same time, three out of four of the revenue sources under the direct control
of local governments -- local taxes, other local, fees & charges and local miscellaneous -- continue
to increase on a per capita basis. The increase in locally controlled revenues in the first two years
after the passage of the Proposition is almost sufficient to balance out the immediate and
precipitous decline in property taxes and the decrease in intergovernmental aid occurring in the
second post- 13 fiscal year following its initial year uptick.
The summary statistics shown above also suggest an interesting pattern regarding indices
of dispersion. All categories which had relatively stable revenues in the initial post- 13 fiscal year
also show an increase in the standard deviation (except for local miscellaneous). For the two-year
period this increase in dispersion appears to continue, although one local revenue source (other
local) shows a decline in the measure of variance. This trend suggests that rapid change in
revenue sources resulted in a period of turmoil during which cities sought to balance declines in
particular revenue sources with increases in other sources, all against the backdrop of uncertain
and fluctuating intergovernmental aid policies. It may also be indicative of differential reactions
among municipalities depending on relative fiscal strengths and weaknesses.
Comparing the ratio of standard deviation/mean for per capita revenues, no particular
patterns occur in the 1978-79 period. In this initial post-13 fiscal year, five revenue sources had a
decrease in the ratio, suggesting convergence among municipalities, while three displayed an
increase in the ratio, suggesting divergence. For the two year period, the results were generally
the same. For aggregate per capita revenues, however, the initial year saw a rather large increase
in the ratio as it rose from 0.61 to 0.76, followed by a two-year decrease to 0.54. This suggests a
initial period of divergence in total per capita revenues followed by a trend towards convergence.
Per capita changes during the two periods are shown in Table 6.2 below. The
presentation of revenue trends in this format facilitates a somewhat closer scrutiny of municipal
reactions over the two-year period. For the initial 1978-79 period, all revenues increased on a
mean per capita basis with the exception of property taxes. Three of the four revenue sources
which increased the most on a mean basis were exogenous sources outside of local control: state
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aid, federal aid and sales taxes. With the exception of other local, all locally controlled revenue
sources gained the least in the initial year on a per capita basis. On average, exogenous revenues
(excluding property taxes which, in essence, experienced a shift from endogenous to exogenous
revenue source as a result of the passage of Proposition 13) experienced a mean unweighted gain
of $7.84, while endogenous revenues averaged an unweighted gain of $4.89.
Table 6.2: Per Ca ita Change in Revenues, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Revenue Mean Median Standard Deviation
Source nY78-79 FY78-80 T178-79 FY78-80 T178-79 178-80
Property Tax -31.962 -20.350 -25.916 -16.066 35.085 29.331
Sales Tax 6.448 13.218 5.457 10.847 7.267 17.066
Local Taxes 4.079 6.884 2.601 3.953 7.007 10.954
Other Local 7.669 9.942 5.609 9.855 10.958 41.282
State Aid 10.484 3.940 8.627 2.264 19.452 19.042
Federal Aid 6.585 -13.674 -3.657 -7.796 110.945 46.435
Fees & Charges 5.131 8.859 3.249 5.268 11.396 19.009
Local Misc. 2.679 1.389 0.304 0.404 37.059 22.675
Total 10.018 8.328 -5.204 4.155 156.477 92.757
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
The corresponding median figures for changes in each of the revenue categories indicates
the presence of outliers resulting in long right-hand tails. Nevertheless, the 1978-79 patterns
indicated by the means closely resemble the median figures, with the exception of federal aid
which is significantly different and shows a sign change as well. The standard deviation for the
federal aid category is correspondingly huge. Total revenues also show a sign difference between
mean and median per capita change, with the median figure showing a drop in income. Here
again, the standard deviation is quite sizable.
The patterns change quite significantly when the two-year composite period 1978-80 is
considered. Three of the four revenue sources which increased the most over the two-year period
were endogenous. State aid, so important in the initial post-13 year, declined significantly.
Federal aid, which would not be expected to be linked to any tax limit relief also dropped. The
robust growth in the sales tax, the final exogenous revenue source, is due both to an economic
expansion and rate increase. In this two-year period, the average unweighted mean change for
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exogenous revenue sources is only $1.16, due largely to the significant decline in federal aid. The
corresponding change in endogenous revenues is a robust $6.77.
These statistical patterns suggest that the first year after the passage of Proposition 13
ushered in a period of uncertainty during which municipalities were limited regarding their own
fiscal options. As a consequence, it should not be surprising that nothing much beyond ordinary
increases occurs in locally-controlled revenue sources. By year two, however, municipalities
would have had sufficient time to adjust existing revenue sources and/or impose additional taxes
and fees. Thus, it is possible over the two-year post- 13 period to detect the drop in importance of
most exogenous sources and an increase in the importance of some locally-controlled ones.
The pattern of median figures compared to mean figures indicates the continuing presence
of a long right-hand tail during the two-year composite period. The change in standard deviations
from the one-year to the two-year period also suggest an initial period of turmoil regarding total
revenue change and then a trend toward more stability. For individual revenue sources, however,
the trend is quite the opposite. While cities seem to converge on the basis of total per capita
revenues, the measures of standard deviation for most individual revenue sources actually increase
from the one-year to the two-year period. Most importantly, in three of the four endogenous
revenue sources --local taxes, other local and fees & charges -- standard deviations rose. Among
local revenue sources, only local miscellaneous (a comparatively small and highly individualized
source of funds) showed a decrease in spread.
These trends suggest that municipalities may diverge by playing to their various strengths
in seeking-out alternative revenue sources. The curtailment of property taxes, long a dominant
staple of local revenues, may have obscured (at least as with respect to local revenue choice)
some of the fiscal strengths and weaknesses of municipalities. As this source of local funding was
restricted, municipalities began to differentiate themselves, drawing on particular endogenous
revenue sources that represented the relatively deeper financial pool. Some of this was revealed
in year one. Then as state aid slumped and municipalities were forced to rely more on their own-
source revenues, further differentiation occurred in subsequent years.
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Table 6.3 below presents a different basis of measure of revenue changes for the two
periods. The table presents percentage changes in aggregate revenues for the sample of California
municipalities on a total and categorical basis. In this somewhat more rigorous measure of
change, some of the patterns identified above are not so apparent. On the other hand, certain
other trends are revealed more clearly based on relative magnitudes of change rather than per
capita dollar amounts.
Table 6.3: Percent Change in Revenues, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Revenue Mean Median Standard Deviation
Source FY78-79 FY78-80 FY78-79 FY78-80 FY78-79 FY78-80
Property Tax -52.890 -30.099 -52.719 -27.646 17.808 22.155
Sales Tax 15.036 32.937 13.922 29.514 15.996 20.469
Local Taxes 31.636 51.817 16.202 34.072 69.102 95.253
Other Local 38.175 43.902 33.667 29.908 35.874 63.908
State Aid 27.998 17.877 24.359 10.816 33.931 37.685
Federal Aid 5.006 -6.410 -10.386 -14.980 79.942 57.118
Fees & Charges 62.797 65.140 20.009 38,964 307.089 169.747
Local Misc. 170.698 223.742 12.026 16.090 763.698 963.216
Total 5.071 10.701 -0.008 9.020 36.711 23.275
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
Table 6.3 clearly shows that all local non-property tax revenue sources experienced robust
growth. In percentage mean terms, local taxes, other local, fees & charges and local
miscellaneous -- all endogenous revenue sources -- experienced the most rapid increase in growth
over the two-year period. Sales taxes, state aid and federal aid were the slowest-growing of all
revenue sources. These mean statistics are largely verified by the median figures, with the
exception of the results for local miscellaneous, which grew faster than state and federal aid but
more slowly than sales tax revenues. Again, the huge standard deviations for this category
indicate the high variability associated with the revenue source.
The standard deviations presented also verify the suspicions discussed above; after an
initial year of disarray, municipalities seemed to converge in terms of per capita and percentage
changes in total revenues. With respect to individual revenue categories, however, there seems to
exist a continuing divergence. The apparent ability of municipalities to play to their respective
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fiscal strengths is an important quality revealed by the introduction of fiscal stress. Nor are these
trends simply an artifact of the percentage change approach; rather they are confirmed by data
presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. In virtually every case, the standard deviations for total revenues
decrease over the two year period while increasing for locally based and controlled revenue
sources.
Compensating for Property Tax Declines
The summary data presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 strongly suggest that a common
reaction among municipal governments to the mandatory curtailment of property taxes was to
initiate increases in existing local revenue streams or develop new sources of local revenues. The
data are unambiguous regarding local revenue trends after the passage of Proposition 13 and
point to a widespread tendency to seek revenue alternatives. However, numerous issues
regarding alternative revenues remain either unexplored or unresolved. One issue not explicitly
addressed by the data is the extent to which different revenue sources compensated for the deficit
created by property tax reductions in the wake of Proposition 13.
Using the summary data from Table 6. 1, it is possible to construct an outline regarding
magnitudes of compensation from different revenue sources. One drawback of comparisons
based on percentage or per capita changes is that such calculations do not necessarily indicate the
magnitude of the overall effect on the budget. In order to rectify this shortcoming, Table 6.4
shows the contribution in percentage terms of each revenue source to the overall net gain in non-
property tax revenues for the two periods.
Table 6.4: Revenue Change as Percent of Total Revenue, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Period Sales Tax Local Taxes Other Local State Aid Federal Aid Fees & Chg. Local Misc.
1978-79 14.971 9.471 17.806 24.342 15.277 11.913 6.220
1978-80 43.255 22.527 32.535 12.894 -44.747 28.991 4.545
Notes: Nominal dollars. Does not include property taxes in perctage calculations.
Table 6.4 provides a certain amount of clarity regarding the fiscal dynamics that occurred
following the passage of Proposition 13. In the first year, the gains that were made in municipal
revenues were comprised largely of exogenous sources. State aid, federal aid and sales taxes
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together constituted almost 55% of the total gains in municipal revenues in the initial post-13
fiscal year, with endogenous revenues comprising the remaining 45%. For the two-year period,
however, contribution ratios show an abrupt reversal. For this period, exogenous revenues
contributed only eleven percent of the gain. Some of the steep decline in exogenous revenues can
be attributed to the drastic reduction in federal aid, but state aid drops significantly as well. Sales
taxes, bolstered by a reviving economy, showed a significant enough advance to balance the steep
decline in federal aid.
In contrast with exogenous revenues, endogenous revenue contributions to overall
revenue gains show considerable growth for the two-year period. In the initial post- 13 fiscal year,
much of the endogenous revenue gain is comprised of other local, with local taxes, fees & charges
and local miscellaneous contributing substantially less. For the two-year composite period,
however, all endogenous revenue sources with the exception of local miscellaneous, were
contributing substantial amounts to the overall revenue gain for municipalities. While other local
income grew considerably in the second year, both local taxes and fees & charges more than
doubled in terms of their overall contribution.
Variations in Revenue Changes
Changes By Cohort
The data presented in the summary statistics suggest the degree of variation that occurred
in the reaction of municipalities to the curtailment of the property tax after the passage of
Proposition 13. One method by which to begin to ascertain the degree of divergence in revenue
reactions is by dividing the sample of California municipalities into two groups based on the
severity of property tax losses. The severity of property tax loss is represented by the ratio of
property tax change to total fiscal 1978 revenue -- in other words, the property tax loss as a
percent of total revenues.
Table 6.5 below shows the reactions of municipalities in the sample based on the
magnitude of property tax reductions as a percent of total revenues. The mean property tax loss
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as a percent of total fiscal year 1978 revenues for the sample of municipalities was -10.49%. The
sample was split into two groups: those that experienced property tax losses in excess of 10.49%
of total revenues and those that experienced property tax losses less than 10.49%. By dividing
the sample in this manner, it is possible to gauge the extent of total revenue effects of the tax
limitation measure.
Table 6.5: Change in Revenues by Cohort, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Revenue Categorv Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
and PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49% PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49%
Measurement Basis Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
% A total revenues 4.677 -7.601 11.570 5.035 7.160 8.864 13.062 9.020
% A endogenous rev. 32.424 23.424 31.294 22.454 55.442 46.223 51.504 39.421
% A exogenous re. 13.481 12.870 17.238 10.338 12.637 11.082 8.819 3.166
per capita A total rev. -21.521 -14.749 31.043 10.043 3.318 5.641 11.667 2.635
per capita A endog. rev. 15.818 13.193 22.052 14.629 24.895 24.646 28.526 20.989
per capita A exog. rev. 11.790 12.357 31.327 12.969 11.791 9.177 -2.054 0.375
Notes: Nominal dollars. Municipalities with property tax losses> 10.490o totaled 52: those with property tax losses< 10.49*ototaled 78. Endogenous
revenues are local taxes. other local, fees & charges and local miscellaneous: exogenous revenues are sales taxes, state aid and federal aid.
Table 6.5 presents two measures of change in revenues for three different categories. The
percentage and per capita change in total, endogenous and exogenous revenues were calculated
for each of the groups. Of these two measures, the percentage change is the better gauge of the
level of the importance placed on the particular revenue category; however, it is expected that the
results of the percentage and per capita changes would not be in direct contradiction. Generally,
that is, signs and magnitudes of change would be reinforcing. In the discussion of the bifurcated
sample below, primary reference is made to the calculations of revenue responses in percentage
terms. In addition, reference will be made to both mean and median measures of change, since in
certain key situations, they tell quite different stories.
In the initial post-13 fiscal year, the results are in keeping with prior expectations.
Municipalities with significant property tax losses suffered percent mean (median) reductions in
total revenues of -4.68% (-7.60%) while those with moderate losses actually showed percentage
gains. During the two-year 1978-80 period, those municipalities suffering large losses had
recovered to the extent that they experienced overall revenue gains of 7.16% (8.86%). These
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gains were only of a slightly lesser magnitude than those of municipalities with smaller property
tax losses.
This pattern raises the issue regarding which general sources of revenue experienced
increases in those municipalities suffering from large property tax losses and how were these
different from revenue changes experienced by municipalities experiencing smaller losses. In the
initial post- 13 fiscal year, the endogenous revenue gains for both groups were roughly equivalent,
suggesting that this percentage increase was not in aggregate a compensating response but simply
a continuation of a growth trend. In the second period, however, some distance does appear to
emerge between the two groups, with large loss cities experiencing a 55.44% (46.22%) gain and
small loss cities gaining only 51.50% (39.42%).
Overall, the endogenous revenue data suggest that the tendency to increase revenues from
other sources are not strictly proportional to the magnitude of property tax losses. The reasons
for this are not obvious from the data; however, it may relate to the tendency of all municipalities
to increase local revenues in the face of property tax reductions, fiscal stress and profound
uncertainty of future revenue availability. The tendency of all municipalities to raise local
revenues would explain the relative similarity in endogenous revenue responses between the two
cohorts irrespective of the magnitude of property tax losses.
The results from the exogenous revenues calculations are somewhat less clear. In the
initial post-13 fiscal year, the mean indicates that municipalities with lower percentage losses
received more exogenous revenues than those with more severe losses. The median figures
directly contradict this, however, with large loss cities receiving slightly greater exogenous
revenues than those less affected by property tax losses. The aggregate nature of the category
may be responsible for this contradiction; the sharp contrast between the mean and median
measures for smaller loss municipalities may be a result of large exogenous aid for specific
projects. Based on data presented earlier, this is most likely attributable to federal and grants.
This surmise is supported by the results from the two-year period which show exogenous
revenues appearing to compensate those municipalities suffering from larger property tax losses.
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Changes By Municipality
A few specific examples may help to illustrate some of the general observations made
here. Six municipalities have been selected for individual analysis, three from each of the two
cohorts. Two of the three municipalities chosen from each group approximate the median change
in property taxes as a share of total fiscal year 1978 revenues for that group. The third
municipality represents the extreme value for that group. For the large loss group, the median
property tax loss was -13.45% of total revenues with a low value of -43.33%. For the small loss
cohort, the mean property tax loss was -7.06% of total revenues with a high value of +0.32%.
The selected cities and their respective changes in revenues are shown in Table 6.6 below.
Table 6.6: Percent Change in Revenues by Category for Selected Cities, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Revenue Category PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49%
and Time Period Havward Walnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
PT A as % of tot. rev. -13.552 -13.354 -43.328 -7.112 -7.009 0.325
1978-79
total revenues -8.387 -5.217 -14.329 -5.821 0.584 3.020
endogenous rev. 28.401 34.153 156.950 36.476 1.680 23.143
exogenous rev. 1.472 -2.719 43.876 -9.169 11.446 -5.971
1978-80
total revenues 9.335 13.579 -6.207 29.594 -4.008 10.208
endogenous rev. 60.504 56.402 222.709 191.839 -12.467 34.474
exogenous rev. 11.347 18.555 -15.191 -16.078 7.282 1.029
Notes: Nominal dollars. Municipalities with property tax losses > 10.49% totaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.490 ototaled 78. Endogenous
revenues are local taxes. other local, fees & charges and local miscellaneous; exogenous revenues are sales taxes, state aid and federal aid.
The data gathered in the table serves to highlight some of the revenue developments
occurring in the aftermath of Proposition 13. Turning first to those municipalities suffering large
proportionate losses from the tax limitation, all three suffered losses in total revenues the first
year, generally in proportion to their property tax losses. Hayward and Walnut Creek both
increased endogenous revenues by roughly one-third while exogenous revenues were quite flat.
Piedmont, on the other hand, increased endogenous revenues by over 150%. Exogenous revenue
gains were also quite strong. Despite gains from the two sources, however, overall revenues for
Piedmont dropped in the initial post-13 fiscal year.
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For the two year period, Hayward and Walnut Creek continued to increase endogenous
revenues with exogenous revenues growing moderately as well. The combination of these two
sources was sufficient to establish overall growth in total revenues for both cities. Piedmont,
however, despite continued rapid growth (>200%!) suffered declines in overall revenues due, in
part, to reductions in exogenous revenue sources. Overall, the three municipalities appeared to be
positioned in a way that allowed them to generate alternative revenues. Even Piedmont, with its
tremendous property tax reduction, suffered only a relatively minor six percent decline in total
revenues over the two-year period.
For the municipalities suffering less dramatic changes in property tax reductions, the
stories are somewhat more varied. Two of the three, Soledad and Southgate, did not suffer
overall revenue losses in the first year as a result of the property tax losses. Southgate appears to
compensate through endogenous revenues and Soledad through the receipt of exogenous
revenues. For the two-year period, however, Soledad's endogenous revenues reverse themselves
and show a decline sufficient to lead to an overall revenue drop, despite increases in exogenous
sources. Southgate continues to show a moderate increase in overall revenues.
Fairfield's pattern is quite different from those two outlined above. Despite fairly large
endogenous revenue growth, Fairfield experiences an overall decline in revenues the first post-13
fiscal year. For the overall two-year period, however, endogenous revenue growth explodes,
displaying a rate of increase nearing 200%. Exogenous revenues drop over the two-year period,
but the municipality's own source revenues are sufficient to lead to an overall increase for the
composite period of 29.59%.
The data shown in Table 6.6 attests to the diversity of municipal fiscal responses in the
context of a common disruption. Although each of these cities has its own individualized story
regarding reactions to the property tax reduction, a perusal of some key socio-economic
characteristics for each municipality, shown in Table 6.7 below, can be helpful in sorting through
some possible explanations for these responses. Perhaps most important among these factors are
captured by the variables corresponding to economic condition. With respect to those cities
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experiencing large property tax losses, Piedmont and Walnut Creek, display economic resources
well in excess of the mean. Median house value, per capita assessed value and median household
income are well above the norm, as is the measure of tax capacity. Hayward's measures are more
mixed, with a median house value below the group average and a lower than average tax capacity,
but assessed value in excess of the mean.
The indices of economic health and fiscal capacity suggest reasons why Piedmont was able
to increase endogenous revenues so dramatically, almost compensating for the drop in property
taxes. Its tax capacity and median house value were more than twice the norm while its
household income was 25% higher than the mean. The reservoir of untapped capacity allowed
Piedmont initiate local revenue increases to supplant property tax losses. While Walnut Creek's
measures were not as high as those of Piedmont's in terms of wealth and income, they were
bolstered by a high proportion of employment relative to the mean as well as a high rate of
population growth. This would give it access to other business-linked revenues or charges based
on new development. Hayward too, although it lagged in certain measures of wealth and income,
exceeded the mean employment proportion by a substantial measure, thus opening up the
potential for revenue increases linked to economic activity.
Table 6.7: Socio-Economic Characteristics of Selected Cities.
Social or Economic Total PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10. 4 9 %
Characteristic Sample Hayward Walnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
Growth Rate (%) 34.6 1.2 34.6 -3.8 31.6 40.4 17.4
Household Income ($) 19,766 19,987 24.813 25,540 17,975 15,615 14,609
House Value ($) 90,311 75.700 135,300 192,100 66,100 57,200 64,200
Assessed Value ($) 25.662 29,603 37,814 46,613 17.948 8,890 20,194
Tax Capacity ($) 207.87 180.27 288.76 464.43 116.60 50.14 66.05
Employment Ratio(%) 26.634 31.782 32.168 1.924 12.571 3.177 19.126
Tax Rate (%) 0.377 0.356 0.233 0.655 0.423 0.448 0.319
Ending Balance(%) 7.270 0.149 10.942 3.940 5.724 -2.757 -0.913
Notes: Growth rate is percent change in population from 1970 to 1980; Household income is median household income in 1980; house value is
median owner-occupied house value in 1980; assessed value is total per capita assessed value in 1978; tax capacity is income-based measure of tax
capacity defined in Chapter 5: employment ratio is number of employees/population; tax rate is municipal tax rate in fiscal year 1978: ending balance
is defined in Chapter 5.
The distinctions between the large loss and the small loss municipalities with respect to
underlying socio-economic conditions are quite striking. For the three small loss cities, median
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house value, total assessed value, tax capacity and median household income are all below the
representative figures for the entire sample, sometimes significantly so. In addition, their
proportion of employment is also below the average for the entire group. Endogenous revenue
growth for two of the cities, perhaps as a partial consequence, is below that of the large loss
cities. Fairfield was able to increase endogenous revenues considerably despite its below average
indices; it also has the highest measure of fiscal and economic health. Soledad, which has the
lowest measures of fiscal and economic health, also shows the greatest lag in endogenous revenue
growth.
The data presented in Table 6.8 below shows how the six municipalities varied in the types
of revenue reactions after the passage of Proposition 13. More than anything else, the data
demonstrates the difficulty of drawing simple generalizations regarding revenue reactions. In this
regard, for any one particular revenue type, changes do not appear to be obviously related to the
severity of the property tax loss. Although it was shown in Table 6.5 that endogenous revenue
sources generally increased more among municipalities harder hit by the tax limitation, this
dynamic does not appear to operate universally at the more detailed level of revenue type.
Table 6.8: Percent Change in Revenues by Source for Selected Cities, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Revenue Categorv PT Loss 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49%
and Time Period Hayward Walnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
PT A as % of tot. rev. -13.552 -13.354 -43.328 -7.112 -7.009 0.325
1978-79
Local Taxes 26.966 7.232 615.769 21.964 10.937 3.452
Other Local 35.737 35.231 79.7005 35.540 45.074 15.278
Fees & Charges 19.986 13.284 21.651 67.456 19.259 41.876
Local Misc. 9.858 144.443 794.099 59.554 -61.282 -8.808
State Aid 32.772 21.634 106.172 49.026 2.910 18.400
1978-80
Local Taxes 48.876 25.937 896.490 40.855 29.349 52.936
Other Local 29.076 17.414 507.877 38.841 19.538 58.135
Fees & Charges 54.876 21.048 480.814 92.529 5.582 27.728
Local Misc. 4.463 119.699 576.088 201.997 -94.317 104.503
State Aid 0.173 41.206 -5.198 20.645 -12.683 15.661
Notes: Nominal dollars. Municipalities with property tax losses> 10.49%totaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.49%totaled 78.
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The revenue reactions indicated in Table 6.8 suggest that municipalities were very
heterogeneous in their responses. While increases in all locally controlled revenues may be
patterned after the magnitude of the tax losses, increases in any particular source may relate more
directly the municipality's own particular economic and fiscal strengths. Differences among and
between cities only marginally different are difficult to discern at the level of aggregation used
here; however, municipalities which are sharply differentiated in terms of socio-economic
characteristics and property tax losses show rather distinctive reactions.
Soledad, for example, which is at the low end in vitally every measure of fiscal and
economic strength, is also lagging when it comes to raising revenues from any endogenous
source. For Piedmont, on the other hand, the experience was distinctly different. This city by
virtue of its wealth and income levels was able to affect dramatic percentage increases in every
category of local income. Despite experiencing a reduction in its budget of over 43% due to the
passage of Proposition 13, Piedmont was able to increase endogenous revenues such that its
overall decline for the two-year period was just slightly in excess of six percent.
On a more macro level, the data from Table 6.8 show that all cities increased local
revenues in the aftermath of Proposition 13. While clearly some of the increase can be attributed
to the passage of Proposition 13, arguably growth would have occurred anyway. In addition, the
growth that occurred among municipalities less affected by tax reductions may still be attributed
to Proposition 13, if only indirectly. By affecting the ability of municipalities to raise revenues
from a very stable source (property) and forcing them to rely on more uncertain sources (local
taxes, state aid, etc.) the measure may have in fact encouraged cities to 'overreact' and set rates
and charges higher than necessary in order to compensate for the decline in stability and certainty
of revenues.
While the data presented above is strongly suggestive of certain patterns both in the initial
impact of Proposition 13 as well as the revenue reactions of affected municipalities, it also raises
questions as to whether these revenue reactions are a response to reductions in property taxes or
simply artifacts of underlying social and economic conditions. In addition, the question of
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whether the dynamics that occurred in this small sample of six cities are representative of a
general phenomenon is unanswered. To address these types of issues, a more sophisticated
analytical approach is required. The following section describes the multivariate regression
procedure employed to address further the revenue responses of municipalities to the curtailment
of the property tax.
Revenue Adjustment Models
Empirical Proxies
In this portion of the analysis, I present an examination of the diversity of municipal
revenue reactions to the passage of Proposition 13 through regression modeling and the
employment of a series of fiscal and socio-economic variables. Specifically, the models estimated
represent an attempt to describe and explain two related but distinct phenomena. Addressed in
the analysis are the issues of how municipalities' alternative revenue raising relates to: (i) the
severity of the property tax losses, and (ii) the socio-economic characteristics of the
municipalities.
Like the previous piece of this analysis in Chapter 5 which examined initial property tax
changes following the passage of Proposition 13, the basic analytical technique selected to explain
the variety of revenue changes is cross-sectional regression modeling. The dependent variables
used in the regression analysis consist of (i) the change in total and categorical revenues in the
year immediately following the passage of Proposition 13 and, (ii) the composite change in total
and categorical revenues in the first two years after the passage of Proposition 13.
The models are presented with increasing specificity in order to analyze the effect of both
property tax changes and socio-economic characteristics at various levels of detail. First,
regression models based on total revenue change are presented. Second, regression models
relating to endogenous and exogenous revenues are presented. Finally, I undertake a micro-
analysis of individual revenue sources in order to isolate the sensitivity of separate revenue
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streams. This format will facilitate the identification of the differential effects of fiscal and
economic characteristics based on various types and sources of revenues.
As was discussed in Chapter 5, the use of changes in revenues as opposed to levels is a
suitable simplifying technique for the purpose of this analysis. The main focus of this
investigation, after all, relates directly to changes in revenue levels and sources (arguably) put into
motion by the passage of Proposition 13. In keeping with the procedures followed in the
preceding portions of the analysis, the change in the dependent variable is expressed on aggregate,
percentage and per capita bases. In addition to the alternative revenue options, the possibility of
municipalities relying on debt or fund balances in response to the tax limitation measure is also
addressed.
The equations in this revenue analysis incorporate two types of explanatory variables:
fiscal and socio-economic. The most important of the fiscal variables is the change in property tax
revenues. The change in property tax revenues for the one and two-year periods is included in
order to relate revenue reactions to the severity of property tax losses. Property tax loss for the
two periods is expressed as aggregate, percentage and per capita change, as well as property tax
loss as a percent of the total budget (relative magnitude). In addition to this principal fiscal
response, an attempt has been made to address the issue of alternatives to new revenue sources
such as the use of fund balances. The proxy for fund balance (running five-year average
balance/expenditures) precludes the use of this as a dependent variable. Instead, it has been cast
as an independent variable in order to estimate the effect of large or small (or negative) balances
on alternative municipal revenue-raising.'
I have argued previously that with respect to property tax losses, municipalities may show
variations based on particular social, economic and demographic characteristics. This variation
should be no less true for other revenue changes. The model employed therefore, addresses the
1 To round-out the circle of fiscal options, debt change was also regressed against the change in
property tax revenues to estimate debt reactions. Given the strictures of Proposition 13 (as well as
the results of the estimated revenue models) a significant reaction would not be anticipated, nor
was one obtained in the estimation process.
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issue of the socio-economic character of municipalities in relation to the change in total revenues
and various revenue sources. Since most of the independent variables employed have been
discussed in Chapter 5, a brief restatement will suffice. Several variables relate to the general
economic well-being of the municipality and have a direct relationship to the municipalities' ability
to raise own-source revenue. These economic condition variables are: household income, tax
capacity and the residential proportion of assessed value.
In addition, the model includes several variables of an institutional or demographic nature.
The rate of population change between 1970 and 1980 is used as a measure of the rapidity of
growth under the assumption that fast growing cities may respond to tax limits in a fashion
different from that of slow or no growth communities. Municipal population is included based on
the possibility that revenue responses may be related to size. The ratio of municipal population to
county population is included based on the assumption that as this ratio increases the change in
revenues should be positive as municipalities find it increasingly difficult to benefit from services
provided by relatively larger municipalities. The last effective property tax rate prior to the
adoption of Proposition 13 has also been included in order to control for tax rate effects.
Specification of Revenue Equations
In analyzing property tax changes in Chapter 5, theoretical models of government
expenditure patterns were eschewed and a more pragmatic approach was utilized. In analyzing
the changes in revenue patterns set in motion by the passage of Proposition 13, I again rely on a
variant of the determinants approach discussed in Chapter 3. While this approach is not based on
an explicit theoretical model of municipal revenue generation, the explanatory fiscal and economic
variables include those that have a direct causal link to revenue change. In addition, while other
socio-economic variables which have been included may in fact represent proxies for other
distinct influencing factors, they are nevertheless measures of the equity ramifications or other
important indicators of the differential effects of the tax limit.
2 Generally, the subject of local government revenue patterns and levels is a relatively unexplored
one compared to local government expenditure patterns. In fact, no theoretically rigorous models
of local government revenue determination have been put into widespread use.
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The models employed estimate changes in total, endogenous, exogenous and individual
revenue types with respect to differences in fiscal and socio-economic factors for the periods
1978-79 and 1978-80. The general form of the equations for each of the two periods and for
each of the revenue variables is:
revA =f[ptxAi, pop,, grow,, couni, incmi, resdi, trat,, endbi, tcap,] (6.1)
where: revAj = revenue change for j'" total, endogenous, exogenous and individual
revenue sources on aggregate, percentage and per capita basis for i'h
municipality;
ptxA = property tax change from fiscal year 1978 to 1979 on aggregate,
percentage, per capita and percent of total revenue basis for i'h municipality;
pOI), = population in 1980 of 1h municipality;
grow, percent population change from 1970 to 1980 of 1 h municipality;
coun, = proportion of population of county represented by /h municipality;
incm=, median household income in 1980 of /'h municipality;
resd,, = residential property as percent of total property value for i' municipality;
trat, = equalized property tax rate in fiscal year 1978 of i' municipality;
endb,= ending balance of i'h municipality;
tcap,= tax capacity of i'" municipality.
The primary purpose of the models presented in this section is to indicate the variety of
revenue reactions that occurred in response to the passage of Proposition 13. Each revenue
source has its own particular relationship with each of the selected variables. Total, exogenous
and endogenous revenues, on the other hand, actually represent portfolios of different revenues --
similar to a portfolio of stocks -- each component of which may react differently to changes in
fiscal and socio-economic factors.
As a consequence of this, the coefficients for these three composite revenue equations
should distinguish themselves from those of the individual revenue type equations and generally it
would be expected that the statistical significance of most variables would change as well. It may
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be that those variables with the highest significance in the individual revenue type equations will
have the lowest for the composite revenue equations. In as much as the explanatory variables do
relate to some notion of fiscal capacity, however, a sign change on the estimated parameters
would be unlikely. In addition, to the extent that changes in total revenues reflect a proportionate
relationship to changes in property taxes, similar statistical significance with respect to many of
the variables used in parallel regressions (i.e., aggregate, percentage and per capita change) is
quite probable.
Much of the reaction of municipal governments to the passage of Proposition 13 was
dependent on expectations and interpretations -- particularly with regard to the severity of the tax
limit and the likelihood of ameliorating conditions, either in the form of state aid or economic
growth. These features add a non-trivial amount of ambiguity to the process of speculating on the
likely signs and magnitudes of the variables identified above. Despite the ambiguity inherent in
the exercise, it is worthwhile to review briefly the variables employed in the regressions. With
respect to the primary fiscal variable, it should be expected that larger changes in property taxes
(ptxA) result in larger changes in all types of revenues, with the exception of total. However,
there may be considerable variation based on the particular measure of revenue change. In
addition, the results should become much more varied and uneven as the level of detail becomes
more specific. That is, large changes in property taxes would not be expected to result in an even
display of increases across all revenue sources.
Population (pop) should have a large effect with respect to aggregate changes in all
categories, but less of an effect with respect to other measures of change. Still, to the extent that
larger municipalities rely disproportionately on the property tax even after controlling for
population, this variable could exercise a strong negative effect on total revenues. For separate
sources of revenues, there is no a priori basis for predicting parameter magnitudes or signs. It is
probably true, however, that larger cities have access to a more diverse revenue base and this may
result in population being a significant factor with respect to changes in certain revenue types.
Based on the same reasoning, the expected sign on the variable representing each municipality's
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proportion of the surrounding county (coun) would take on similar characteristics since
proportionately larger municipalities might tax property more heavily and increase other revenues
more dramatically.
The variable for population growth (grow) could reflect quite strong offsetting forces;
while fast growing communities might rely on property taxes for increasing infrastructure needs
(leading to increases in other revenue types when property taxes are cut), increasingly
communities have instead funded such requirements from user charges or special assessments.
The dominant force in this situation would control the sign on the coefficient. The sign on the
municipal tax rate variable (trat) should be negative with respect to total revenues as those
municipalities with the highest tax rates would experience the steepest drops in property tax
revenue and potentially the largest total revenue decreases. Again, this variable should be positive
with respect to increases in certain revenue types.
With respect to variables which relate to the economic well-being of the municipality,
somewhat less ambiguity prevails. Given the high correlation between assessed value and income,
assessed value has not been used as a variable.3 Fortunately, an apposite substitute proxy is
available. In order to capture the effects of non-residential based property, the variable resd
representing residential property value as a proportion of total assessed value has been used. The
coefficient on resd would most likely be negative with respect to total revenue change if
municipalities with high assessed value rely disproportionately on property tax, and positive with
respect to specific revenue sources. While this relationship is by no means certain, it is quite
likely.
Household income (mcm) remains somewhat ambiguous. Since this variable was
positively linked to property tax losses, it would be expected to continue this negative relationship
3 This variable, and the variable representing house value, were also eliminated based on the rule
of thumb which holds that multicollinearity is likely to be an issue when the simple correlation
between two variables is greater than either or both variables with the dependent variable. While
this procedure does not address more complex multicollinear relationships which may exist in
multivariate models, it results in vastly reduced standard errors and higher statistical significance
in the equations which have been estimated.
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with total revenue change. Again, this might translate into a positive relationship with other
revenue sources but only those where the relationship to income is sufficiently strong. In other
cases, the reverse relationship might hold. For example, business-linked taxes might be more
easily raised in more commercial or industrial cities which are typically lower-income. Exogenous
revenues, such as state aid, might also favor lower-income municipalities.
With respect to changes in total revenues, the dynamics of tax capacity (tcap) and ending
balance (endb) are ambiguous, only their behavior with respect to the property tax change
equations suggests that the sign should be negative with respect to the former and positive for the
latter. Their behavior for individual revenue responses, at least for endogenous sources, should
be mirror images. That is, to the extent that municipalities show definitive influence over own-
source revenues, increases in ending balance should act as a drag on increasing these revenues.
Larger tax capacity, on the other hand, should result in increases with respect to certain revenues.
Tables C2 and C3 in Appendix C present the correlation matrices for independent and
dependent variables used in the revenue change equations for the periods 1978-79 and 1978-80
respectively. After eliminating the use of assessed value (ava) and house value (hva) as
explanatory variables, the likelihood of multicollinearity issues drops considerably for all
regressions, although potential multicollinearity issues continue to be present. When two
independent variables are highly correlated, while the parameter estimates remain unbiased, the
standard errors of the estimates increase in magnitude resulting in low t-statistics . Thus, the
interpretation of statistical insignificance may be a result of multicollinearity between the two
independent variables rather than the relationship between the independent and the dependent
variables.
Other notable potential problems relate to some high correlations shown in Tables C2 and
C3. With the exception of the population variable in the aggregate equation, these variables were
eliminated from particular relevant regressions since they represent potential problems in only one
4 Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models & Economic Forecasts, 3rd
ed. (New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 84.
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of the four regression models.' They were retained in parallel regressions where no
multicollinearity issues would arise. The population variable was retained in the aggregate
equation since its omission would lead to unacceptable bias in other estimated coefficients, most
notably the property tax change variable. No other explanatory variable is highly correlated with
another explanatory variable in more than one of the aggregate, percentage, per capita or relative
magnitude equations.
In theory, each particular revenue source, whether user charges, property taxes or
business taxes, would be expected to exhibit a slightly different form due to the use of different
revenue bases as well as the presence of other influencing factors. The multivariate regression
model specified below facilitates the investigation of the relationship between changes in property
tax revenues, on the one hand, and other revenues and important socio-economic characteristics,
on the other. The models are estimated based on a linear specification. The functional form of
the multivariate equations is:
revA, = a, + 61ptaxA, + 82pop, - psgrow, + 64coun, - 9sincm, - p6resd, + 8-trat, - 8 endb, +
/J9tcap, - E (6.2)
where: a, = constant or intercept term,
,,= random error term component;
all other variables are as defined in equation 6.1.
Initial estimation of all models indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity which was
detected by using the Cook-Weisberg (1983) procedure described earlier in Chapter 5. White's
(1980) method was used to correct for heteroscedasticity in all regressions. The results from the
multivariate regression model specified above for the fiscal years 1978-79 and 1978-80 at
increasing levels of specificity are shown below in the several sections which follow. For each
' Neither pop nor coun were eliminated from any of the regressions. Trial regressions including
and eliminating these variables in sequential fashion revealed virtually no alteration in the
estimated coefficients or statistical significance of the estimates.
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category or type of revenue, regressions were run based on aggregate, percentage and per capita
change in the dependent variable.
Total Revenue Regressions
The results of the total revenue change regressions are shown below in Table 6.9. The
model was run using all variables as shown in the functional form of the multivariate equation.
Each of the four models based on the four permutations of property tax change was estimated for
each of the two time periods, 1978-79 and 1978-80. The models are shown on the horizontal and
labeled (1) through (4). Independent variables are shown on the vertical in Table 6.9.
Overall, the multivariate regressions explain approximately 15% to 40% of the variation in
total revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year. The regression using percentage change in
property tax (2) is somewhat better performing than the aggregate (1), per capita (3) and relative
magnitude (4) regressions. For the two-year composite period, the performance of the percentage
change regression drops in explanatory value; however, the performance of the aggregate and per
capita models improve rather dramatically with R2s of 0.65 and 0.59 respectively.
The difference in explanatory values for the aggregate and per capita models, on the one
hand, and the percentage models, on the other, largely relates to the more rigorous test that the
latter pose for the set of independent variables. The noticeable improvement in the second year
for the aggregate and per capita models is a result of the vast improvement in the statistical
significance of virtually all the independent variables. Although there is much agreement in the
estimated parameters of the models, there is some suggestion of conflict in the interpretation of
some of the parameters. These contradictions are explored in the discussion of the coefficient
estimates.
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Table 6.9: Total Revenue Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)lotraA (2)totrpA (3)totrcA (4)totrtA (I)totraA (2)totrpA (3)totrcA (4)totrlA
0.333075 0.163810 1.691037 1.777614 0.649210
(1.631) (0.561) **(2.393) **(2.500) **(2.820)
0.010167
(0.143)
2.040712
**(9.221)
0.079648
(0.264)
24334.08 -0.000127 -0.1368 -0.000148 43229.31 0.000001 0.0109 -0.000013
**(2.487) (-0.559) (-0.855) (-0.610) **(6.169) (0.023) (0.413) (-0.267)
136713.3 -0.272739
(0.454) (-1.476)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
6.569559
(0.121)
155.7572
(0.470)
-36266.32 -0.0221 -1.7761
*(-1.899) **(-2.52) (-0780)
-0.295578
(-1.509)
341695.1
(1.231)
0.806082 -75050.52
(1.223) (-0.034)
0.087513 -11.22831 0.090975
*(1.785) (-0.567) *(1 895)
0.178232 -28.48365
(0.861) (-0.283)
0.245144
(1.054)
-5875.366 -0.004910 2.2407
(-0.410) *(-1.801) **(2.023)
-461586.5 0.079215 -222.8636 0.003567 -1566863 -0.136152 -119.2959 -0.182939
(-0.602) (0.246) (-0.830) (0.010) **(-2.27) (-1.589) *(-1.906) **(-2.01)
-3.90e+08 -198.3172
**(-2.65) **(-2.64)
1224928 1.759944
(1.257) *(1.839)
758.3994 -0.000160
(1.324) (-0.512)
1962270 1.286729
*(1.667) **(2.346)
-149.8237 -2.56e+08 -53.73146
**(-2.28) **(-2.52) **(-3.55)
1.79299 -956387 -0.380006
*(1 787) (-0.933) **(-2.02)
-0.000270 995.6497 0.000150
(-0.796) (1.629) *(1.902)
44.16448
**(-2.94)
-0.352290
**(-2.04)
0.000082
(1.328)
309.3264 0.849855 1900135 0.450743 99.47437 0.364977
(1.318) *(1.856) **(2.186) **(4.105) *(1.798) **(3.767)
0.3823 0.4193 0.1559 0.3810 0.6581 0.2823 0.5901 0.2535
0.3348 0.3746 0.1063 0.3391 0.6318 0.2271 0.5696 0.2028
Notes: totraA is aggregate dange in total revenues: totrpA is percentage change in total revenues; totrcA is per capita change in total revenues:
totrtA is percent diange in total revenues based on diange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For totraA totrpA and totrcA regressions, the
variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate. percentage and per capita change respectively. For totrtA regression. ptxA is expressed in terms of the
property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 change for both periods. Variables pop and incmn are in 000's. t-
statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is
127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
The primary focus of concern in this particular estimation process is to what extent did
reductions in property taxes have an impact on overall municipal revenues. In a sense, the
regressions depicted in Table 6.9 address this issue by estimating the effect of a reduction in
property taxes after accounting for all other revenue offsets. The results, indicated by the
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0.761811
(1.328)
581124.6
(0.230)
trat
endh
tcap
a
R2
adi. R2
coefficient on ptxz, initially appear somewhat mixed. A large percentage change in property
taxes has little or no effect on the percentage change in total revenues in either of the two periods
measured. Per capita reductions in property taxes and increases in the magnitude of property tax
losses relative to the overall budget result in decreases in total revenues for the initial period.
Both coefficients are significant at a reasonable level of .05 or better. A per capita change of
$1.00 in property taxes results in a $1.69 reduction in total revenues per capita. An increase in
the magnitude of the property tax loss from 10% to 11% of total revenues would result in a
decrease in total revenues of 1.78%. For the second period, the effect of per capita change
continues, whereas changes in the severity of the property tax loss becomes insignificant.
The results from the aggregate change in property taxes suggest a quite similar
relationship to the one outlined above. Here, reductions in property taxes lead to decreases in
total revenues in both of the periods. The estimated coefficient in the initial period indicates that a
reduction of $1 .00 in property taxes results in a $0.33 reduction in total revenues. However, the
estimate is only significant at the .11 level. The performance of this variable improves for the
composite period. For the two-year period a reduction of $1.00 in property taxes results in $0.65
decrease in total revenues with statistical significance at better than the .01 level.
Although there is some variation in the results with respect to the significance of the
estimated parameters, the various models are all quite consistent with each other in terms of
general magnitudes and direction. All of the four models suggest the negative impact of declines
in property taxes during both periods. The relative magnitude model indicates that those
municipalities experiencing larger property tax losses were somehow able to compensate by the
second period. Municipalities with large aggregate losses, however, continued to experience total
revenue declines through the second period. The more dramatic effect of property tax reductions
in period two for the aggregate change model may be due to the curtailment of state bail-out
funds and inadequate substitution of local revenues for many cities. The results of the exogenous
revenue and state revenue regressions give confirming evidence in this regard.
137
Clearly, an important area of focus must be to what extent municipalities of varying fiscal
and economic conditions were affected in terms of total revenues. To assess the impact of the tax
limitation measure on municipalities of varying conditions, the estimated parameters for the
economic and fiscal variables were analyzed. The results for the proxy representing median
household income (imcm) is fairly consistent across all regressions for the 1978-79 period. For
the initial period, the sign is negative in all three models in which it was used, indicating that
increases in income were linked to decreases in total revenues. In two of the three models, the
coefficient was statistically significant at better than the .05 level. In terms of magnitude, the
results for the percentage change regression indicates that an increase in median income of $1,000
corresponds to a 2.72% decrease in total revenue.
The results for the two-year composite period suggest a rather different relationship with
income. Here, the parameter on income is statistically insignificant in the aggregate equation and
for the per capita equation, the coefficient is actually positive and significant at better than the .05
level. In the percentage equation, the coefficient is still negative and significant. Combining the
results from the two periods suggests that high income municipalities were unable to compensate
completely for losses in property tax revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year. In the second year,
however, they were able to make up the losses to the extent that income was not as important an
influencing factor. Increasing income had a positive effect on per capita total revenues but a
negative one on percentage change in revenues.
The ratio of residential property value to total assessed value (resd) is not a significant
factor with respect to total revenue change in the initial post-13 fiscal year. This variable is
insignificant in all regression models. For the two-year period, however, the variable is negative
and statistically significant in three of four cases, indicating that an increase in residential
proportion results in a decrease in total revenues. This suggests that an increase in non-residential
property value may facilitate municipalities generating increased local revenues to compensate for
declines in the property tax. The results for the relative magnitude equation (4) indicates that an
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increase in residential proportion of ten percent (for example, from 70% to 80% of total assessed
value), would result in a decrease in total revenues of 1.83%.
The proxy for ending balance (endb) also displays a distinct shift in behavior from period
one to period two. In the initial post-13 fiscal year, the estimates are all positive and statistically
significant for two of the three operative models. The results suggest that increases in ending
balance coincide with increases in total revenues. This may reflect the fact that municipalities with
relatively larger fiscal cushions are also those able to raise alternative revenues more easily and
sustain overall revenue growth. It may also indicate a tendency to save in times of fiscal
uncertainty. The proxy for ending balance, in this situation, may represent a broad notion of
municipal fiscal health. At the very least, the estimates suggest that large ending balances did not
dissuade municipalities from benefiting from other revenues of a local or intergovernmental origin.
For the two-year period, all parameter estimates on endb are negative and, in two of the
three models, are statistically significant at better than the .05 level. The results indicate that
increases in ending balances correspond to decreases in revenues. This may be due to the change
in the state aid formula which penalized municipalities to the extent ending balances exceeded a
certain proportion of total expenditures. Alternatively, the reversal may relate to fiscally stable
municipalities actually lessening their revenue raising activities after the effects of Proposition 13
became more clear. The more fiscally stable municipalities, as represented by those with larger
ending balances, may have overreacted the first year; the two-year composite models accounted
for the subsequent adjustment.
Finally, with respect to the last two fiscal and economic variables, tax capacity (tcap) and
municipal tax rate (trat), the results are somewhat mixed. Tax capacity does not seem to have an
appreciable effect on total revenues in any of the regressions. The parameter is statistically
insignificant and the magnitude of the coefficient is so small that the effect would be de minimis.
Tax rate, on the other hand, is estimated with considerable precision in all the regressions in which
it is employed. It is negative in every case, indicating that increases in the municipal tax rate
coincide with decreases in overall revenues. Thus, municipalities with high tax rates were unable,
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through endogenous or exogenous revenue sources, to compensate for reductions in the property
tax.
None of the demographic or population-based variables were significant with any
consistency in any of the equations, with the exception of the variables representing growth rate
(grow) in two of the models in the two-year period and the variable for proportion of the county
population comprised by the municipality (coun) in the aggregate equation for the two-year
period. The conclusion from these results must be that growth seemed to have a positive effect
on total revenue change, but that municipalities' total revenues increased or decreased irrespective
of differences in population and whether or not they dominated the surrounding county in terms
of population.
The results from the total revenue regressions indicate the instability and temporal
variation of alternative revenues. Coefficients vary significantly, as do the probability values for
the variables. In fact, given the composite change for the two-year period, the second year alone
must have brought about changes more dramatic than those suggested in the regressions. Despite
this turmoil, total revenue regressions also indicate that the reductions did, in fact, occur in some
systematic fashion based on certain socio-economic factors and property tax losses. The
explanatory variables included in the regressions encompass some of the most important factors
with respect to municipalities' ability to raise alternative forms of revenues to compensate for
property tax losses. Given the results from the total revenue regressions, the pattern of variations
with respect to other revenue sources is also likely to be quite significant.
Before turning to an analysis of the origins and types of revenues used to compensate for
declines in property taxes, it is worthwhile to review briefly the relationship between property tax
losses and total revenue changes. In Chapter 5, my analysis indicated that the more serious
property tax losses, according to most measures, occurred in high income, high tax rate
municipalities with large fiscal cushions. In addition, the most severely affected municipalities in
terms of some measures had relatively large tax capacities and experienced slow growth in the
prior decade. In terms of total revenue change, the analysis conducted in this section suggests
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that, according to most measures, the property tax loss did affect total revenues negatively, at
least in the initial post-13 year. In addition, communities with high income, high tax rates and a
large ratio of residential value/assessed value experienced greater declines in total revenues than
other municipalities. Thus, in several key fiscal and economic areas, municipalities suffering from
greater property tax losses also suffered large total revenue losses.
The regression results also demonstrate the importance of different measures of property
tax change. For example, municipalities with larger aggregate and per capita property tax losses,
as well as those with higher relative magnitude losses, all suffered total revenue declines in the
initial post-13 fiscal year. But for the two-year regressions, the relative magnitude of the property
tax loss did not seem to matter. Those municipalities with larger aggregate and per capita losses
continued to experience total revenue declines with respect to these property tax alterations.
Important variables such as income also show some variations based on measurement methods.
Exogenous Revenue Regressions
This section explores the extent to which exogenous revenues assisted those municipalities
most seriously affected by the property tax cuts stemming from the passage of Proposition 13.
Exogenous revenues have been defined as those revenues outside of direct and immediate local
control, comprising sales taxes, state aid and federal aid. While two of these sources -- sales taxes
and federal aid -- would not be expected to be reactive to property tax reductions, it would seem
likely that state assistance should be somewhat responsive to property tax losses. The
combination of sales taxes, state aid and federal aid into one category will hide or obscure many
of the offsetting effects of individual revenue sources. Federal assistance is typically based on
categorical requirements or is project linked. Sales taxes are related to the presence of
commercial activity. Finally, state aid may, in part, have been linked to property tax loss, but also
to other quite unrelated factors.
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Table 6.10: Exogenous Revenue Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (J)exogaA (2)exogpA (3)exogcA (4)exogtA (J)exogaA (2)exogpA (3)exogcA (4)exogtA
-0.783548 -0.027155 0.290683 1.100613 0.030756 -0.224643 0.132081 -0.318979
**(-2.78) (-0.083) (0.548) (1.284) (0.101) *(-1.841) (0.763) (-0.585)
-0.000106
(-0.400)
-0.346839
*(-1.745)
-0.0972 -0.000125 9997.889 -0.000018 -0.004410 -0.000002
(-0.809) (-0.446) (0.999) (-0.225) (-0.168) (-0.026)
-1.557525 -0.356277
(-0.036) *(-1.691)
49419.71
(0.243)
0.077395
(0.916)
-3.617755
(-0.219)
0.075679
(0.897)
197376 0.752301 76.98577 0.810661 -546527.7 0.157003 -31.68299 0.092406
(0.074) (1.097) (0.294) (1.045) (-0.291) (0.421) (-0.326) (0.225)
-37542.15 -0.0185 -2.2822
**(-2.05) *(-1.722) (-1.038)
-11432.37 -0.002780 0.8267
(-1.020) (-0.534) (1.025)
250422.4 0.173962 -127.7945 0.087216 -763619.1 -0.090476 -82.93294 -0.145523
(0.409) (0.479) (-0.625) (0.216) (-1.448) (-0.637) (-1.401) (-0.963)
-3.53e+08 -209.399
**(-2.99) **(-2.45)
1956279 2.283061
**(3.071) **(2.250)
222.3078 0.000066
(0.456) (0.209)
-169.8841 -2.20e+08 -66.17961
**(-2.30) **(-2.73) **(-2.35)
2.348068 -51288.97 -0.246721
**(2.207) (-0.068) (-0.743)
-0.000075 683.638 0.000276
(-0.230) (1.311) *(1.781)
-60.11296
**(-2.34)
-0.169053
(-0.525)
0.000179
(1.368)
1503347 1.143871 210.6515 0.847345 1596639 0.340102 58.23979 0.354005
(1.365) *(1.812) (1.208) (1.631) *(1.927) (1.619) (1.039) **(2.176)
0.9101 0.4036 0.0615 0.1255 0.3464 0.1544 0.0891 0.1358
0.9032 0.3578 0.0146 0.0662 0.2961 0.0893 0.0435 0.0772
Notes: exogaA is aggregate dange in exogenous revenues; exogpA is percentage dange in exogenous revenues; exogcA is per capita dange in
exogenous revenues; exogtA is percent change in exogenous revenues based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For exogaA,
exogpA and exogcA regressions. the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respedively. For exogtA regression,
ptrA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 change for both periods.
Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the .10 level or better, ** indicates significance at the .05
level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to
multicollinearity.
Despite these features which could lead to offsetting effects, an estimation as to the
overall response of exogenous revenues, irrespective of the intended results of such revenue, can
be quite helpful in ascertaining the overall fiscal pressure placed on municipalities. For example, if
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460.4061
(0.034)
-111248.7
(-0.460)
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exogenous revenues were not responsive to property tax losses, this would place additional
pressure on municipalities to raise additional endogenous revenues to compensate for property tax
losses. Sorting out the effects of the separate exogenous revenue streams is reserved for the
following section. Multivariate regressions for exogenous revenues are shown in Table 6.10
above.
With the exception of the aggregate and percentage change models, the overall
explanatory values of the regressions is rather poor. For the initial period, the R2 for the
aggregate equation (1) is 0.91, largely due to the performance of the ptxA variable. The
explanatory value for the percentage change equation (2) is also reasonably high. For all the other
models, however, the R2 is quite low, even flirting with single digits. For the second period, the
explanatory value increases only slightly for the per capita (3) and relative magnitude (4)
equations and declines dramatically for the aggregate and percentage equations. It appears that
the combination of fiscal and socio-economic variables used in the equations explain little of the
variation in total exogenous revenues; on balance, these revenues appear to be based on
considerations not captured in the models.
Not surprisingly, few of the included variables are statistically significant. Turning first to
the variable ptxA, the variable is significant for period one only in the aggregate regressions. The
estimated coefficient for ptxa in this regression indicates that a decrease of $1.00 in property
taxes results in a $0.78 increase in exogenous revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year. For the
second period, however, this effect is washed out and the coefficient is quite small and statistically
insignificant. Apparently, while the combination of state and federal revenues had an ameliorative
effect in year one, this had subsided by year two.
For the other regression models, the ptxA variable is insignificant in the initial post-13
period and significant only in the percentage change regression in the composite period.
According to this estimation, a ten percent decrease in property tax revenues would lead to a
2.25% increase in all exogenous revenues. The variable displays no response in the per capita or
relative magnitude equations. The lack of significance of the property tax change variable in other
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regressions, however, suggests that exogenous revenues did not experience a strong pattern with
respect to changes in property tax revenues over the two-year period.
None of the population-based or demographic variables were statistically significant in any
consistent manner in the four models, although population growth (grow) seems to be negatively
related to exogenous revenues in the initial period. The variables representing economic
conditions also show mixed results, but in most models are insignificant. The variable incm is
significant only in period one and indicates that increasing income corresponds to decreasing
exogenous revenues on a percentage and aggregate basis. The proxy for residential proportion of
total property value (resd) is insignificant in almost all equations. Similarly, tax capacity (tcap) is
significant in only one of the equations in which it is employed (percentage change in the two-year
regressions), and indicates that exogenous aid tended to favor those municipalities with larger tax
capacity.
The variable with the most consistent performance was the proxy for 1978 tax rate (trat),
which was significant in all models and indicates that increasing tax rates were associated with
decreasing exogenous revenues. Using the relative magnitude equation for the two-year period as
an example, an increase in the municipal tax rate from .005 to .006 would result in a decrease in
exogenous revenues of 6.62%. Ending balance (endb) is also quite consistent. Although it is
largely insignificant during the second period, during the initial period, it is consistently significant
and indicates increasing balances are linked to increases in exogenous revenues.
Given the sub-par performance of many of the variables and the low explanatory value of
most of the regression models, the question arises as to whether exogenous revenues considered
as a group displayed particular patterns that lead to any deeper understanding of the effects of
Proposition 13 on municipalities. The important variable representing property tax loss is
unhelpful in explaining any of the variation in exogenous revenues as are most of the other fiscal
and economic control variables.
Clearly, the mixed sources combined in the exogenous revenue category make any
speculation as to why revenues reacted in any particular fashion somewhat difficult. Nevertheless,
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the variables that are measured with sufficient precision shed some important information. For
example, although municipalities suffering higher property tax losses were higher income, this
quality had a negative effect on exogenous revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year. Higher tax
rate cities also suffered disproportionate property tax losses, yet this also had an overall negative
effect on outside revenues in both periods. Finally, higher tax capacity municipalities, arguably
those most able to raise own-source revenues, might have benefited more from exogenous
revenues than lower tax capacity municipalities, although the statistical significance of these
estimated parameters is not very high.
The overall impression that can be gleaned from the exogenous revenue regressions is that
total exogenous revenues did not compensate for property tax reductions, except on a aggregate
basis in year one. Rather, they were distributed to municipalities irrespective of tax losses.
Exogenous revenues seemed to benefit those types of cities which were less hard hit and more
economically sound, according to several measures. In a sense, some municipalities were hit
twice, once by property tax reductions and second through non-responsive exogenous revenues,
or even reductions in these revenues. While there is some evidence that such revenues benefited
those municipalities less able to compensate, based on measures of economic well-being (incm
and resd), the results are quite mixed and inconsistent.
Endogenous Revenue Regressions
Table 6.11 below shows the results from the endogenous revenue change regressions.
Overall, the results in the initial period are rather disappointing in terms of the explanatory value;
only the aggregate change regression explains a large amount of the variation in endogenous
revenues for either of the two periods. However, the lack of explanatory value in the initial year
is quite understandable upon further reflection. The lack of strong relationships is largely due to
the rapid implementation of Proposition 13 after its passage. Its enactment left little time for
municipalities to take action with respect to developing alternative local revenue streams to
compensate for the decline in property taxes.
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Table 6.11: Endogenous Revenue Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)endoaA (2)endopA (3)endocA (4)endotA (J)endoaA (2)endopA (3)endocA (4)endotA
0.133899
(0.726)
24698.77
**(2.718)
-0.01367
(-0.067)
-0.000271
(-1.262)
0.401324 -1.971049 -0.334192
**(2.048) *(-1.857) *(-1. 700)
-0.0397 -0.000326 34956.66 -0.000093
(-0.985) (-1.404) **(5.394) (-1.089)
-0.215467 0.914147 -3.261815
(-1.204) **(7.457) **(-3.90)
0.0143 -0.000128
*(1.731) *(-1.685)
190781.2 -0.186871 7.754011 -0.140184 221337.2 -0.105123 -8.917237 -0.047440
(1.313) (-1.571) (0.582) (-1.357) (1.295) (-0.725) (-0.929) (-0.396)
949518.2 0.565634 81.38476 0.894771 1267383 0.229438 2.105444 0.504912
(0.817) (1.060) (1.046) (1.525) (0.907) (0.599) (0.068) (1.513)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
Icap
a
R2 2
adi. R2
5276.237 0.0129 1.2642
(0.564) (1.297) **(2.087)
-589438.1 -0.214394 -94.42213 -0.385156 -635714.8 -0.121280 -34.81836 -0.312988
(-1.585) (-0.714) (-1.382) (-1.280) (-1.631) (-0.476) *(-1.843) (-1.629)
-2.26e+07 -65.51404
(-0.596) (-1.002)
-687832.5 0.619630
(-1.315) (1.452)
581.8217 -0.000196
(1.586) (-0.898)
-79.32035 -3.39e+07 23.45987
(-1.462) (-0.585) (0.611)
0.716795 -847464.2 -0.017423
(1.567) (-1.227) (-0.037)
-0.000421 390.7378 -0.000321
*(-1.812) (1.035) (-1.393)
-11.85212
(-0.407)
0.126332
(0.270)
-0.000581
**(-2.05)
341541.7 0.749989 99.40258 0.801821 152193 0.251215 45.91752 0.514967
(0.643) (1.377) (1.620) *(1.916) (0.277) (0.924) **(3.121) **(2.973)
0.8057 0.1341 0.1813 0.2154 0.9512 0.0880 0.6423 0.2597
0.7908 0.0675 0.1404 0.1622 0.9475 0.0179 0.6244 0.2095
Notes: endoaA is aggregate change in endogenous revenues; endopA is percentage dange in endogenous revenues; endocA is per capita dange in
endogenous revenues: endotA is percent dange in exogenous revenues based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For endoaA
endopA and endocA regressions. the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respedively. For endotA regression.
pbxA is expressed in terms of the property tax redudion as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods.
Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05
level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to
multicollinearity.
This surmise is confirmed by the general improvement in the R2 values for the two-year
composite period. By this point, municipalities would have had sufficient time to react to the
abrupt change in fiscal environment represented by the passage of Proposition 13. With the
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1273.916 0.003250 0.4821
(0.163) (0.263) (1.037)
exception of the percent change regression (2) which is basically stable, all models show a
discernible improvement in the explanatory value.
Even more than the exogenous revenue models, it would be expected that endogenous
revenues would react in a negative fashion to changes in property taxes: that is, reductions in
property taxes should result in increases in own-source revenues. Exogenous revenues, after all,
are outside of the control of municipal decision-making, and the federal revenue component is
truly extraneous to the entire process. Furthermore, even were intergovernmental revenues
specifically designed to assist municipalities severely affected by Proposition 13, there would be
no guarantee that such revenues would be specifically linked to the magnitude of losses.
The presence of locally-controlled, locally based revenues, however, gives municipalities a
specific means of compensating for the steep decline in property taxes. As shown by the
parameters and t-statistics in the initial period, the results are rather mixed. The parameter shows
the expected negative sign for both the percent change (2) and relative magnitude (4) equations.
However, ptxA is significant only in the relative magnitude equation. Furthermore, in the
aggregate change equation (1) the sign is positive, and in the per capita change equation (3) the
parameter is actually positive and significant.
Again, timing may be an issue here as municipalities were unable to react sufficiently to
compensate for decline in the initial year. The results for the two-year composite period are more
in keeping with a priori expectations. Three of the four models indicate that the relationship
between property tax change and the change in endogenous revenues is negative, and for the
aggregate change and relative magnitude equations, the coefficient is statistically significant. The
estimated parameter from the relative magnitude equation indicates that an increase in the severity
of the property tax reduction of 5.0% (for example, from 20.0% to 25.0%) would result in an
increase in endogenous revenues of 16.31%. Similarly, as shown in the percentage model for the
1978-80 period, an increase in property tax losses of ten percent would result in an increase in
endogenous revenues of 2.15%. An aggregate in property taxes of $1.00 results in compensating
endogenous revenues of $0.33.
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The estimated coefficients from some of the economic and fiscal condition variables are
also helpful in understanding the reaction of endogenous revenues to various municipal
characteristics. Household income (incm) does not appear to be an important influence on
endogenous revenue changes, but residential proportion (resd) seems to have a negative affect on
raising alternative local revenues. As the proportion of non-residential property value increases,
in other words, endogenous revenues also increase. This dynamic may be related to the presence
of commercial and other business related enterprises which could facilitate instituting of business
related taxes and fees.
Tax capacity (tcap) also has a negative effect on raising endogenous revenues, according
to some measures. Ironically, those cities in a relatively stronger position to raise local revenues
raised less than cities with a lower tax capacity. For the initial period, those municipalities with
higher ending balances (endb) may have raised more endogenous revenues. For the second
period, however, the presence of larger or smaller ending balances does not seem important.
Addressing the questions raised by the inconsistencies in the behavior of many of the economic
condition variables requires a more specific analysis of individual revenue sources. This is
conducted in the next section.
The performance of the remaining population-based and institutional control variables do
not appear to be very consistent across the various models. Tax rate (trat) and population
proportion of the surrounding county (coun) are not significant in any of the equations. Neither is
growth rate (grow) statistically significant in any of the equations. Population (pop) is significant
for the 1978-80 period in the per capita and relative magnitude models, but the estimated
parameters show conflicting signs.
Overall, the estimated parameters from the endogenous revenue regressions suggest that
these sources were quite responsive to declines in property taxes, but the results are not so nearly
as monolithic as might be expected. In the exogenous revenue regressions, it was seen that these
sources were not particularly responsive to property tax declines, and only slightly more
responsive to other fiscal and economic characteristics. With the endogenous regressions, there
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was more responsiveness to the property tax change, but changes in revenues were not as affected
by socio-economic characteristics.
Several dynamics may be occurring with respect to endogenous revenues. Instead of
increasing revenues, for example, severely affected municipalities may be cutting expenditures
instead. This possibility is investigated in Chapter 7. A more complex dynamic involves the
interaction of exogenous and endogenous revenues. It may be that exogenous revenues were less
responsive in the second period than in the first period. Concurrently, endogenous revenues were
more responsive to property tax changes in the second period than the first.
Partially, these dynamics may have to do with timing. To the extent that state aid
designed to mitigate the effects of the Proposition comprised a large portion of exogenous
revenues, this could be put into place with more alacrity than internal changes on the part of most
municipalities.6 By the second period, municipalities would have had sufficient time to implement
compensating revenue streams. In addition, however, the decision on the part of municipalities
may have been dependent on their expected receipt of exogenous revenues. In other words,
municipalities increased endogenous revenues not only in response to property tax reductions but
also in expectation of receiving a particular level of exogenous aid -- specifically state aid.
The simple correlation between changes in endogenous revenues and changes in both
exogenous revenues and state aid alone were quite low. Nevertheless, to test for the presence of
a simultaneous system, regressions were run estimating the effect on endogenous revenues of both
exogenous revenues and state aid alone for both the 1978-79 and 1978-80 periods. In addition,
the regressions were conducted using both the current years and the past years exogenous and
state aid changes, based on the assumption that either one might capture 'expectations' regarding
outside aid.
Despite the reasonableness of the supposition that endogenous revenues could be related
to expectations of outside aid, none of the regressions resulted in estimated coefficients on
6 Recall that initial state aid was comprised largely of existing state reserves on the order of some
$8.0 billion.
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changes in exogenous revenues or state aid that were statistically significant at any reasonable
level. Based on the data presented in this section, it appears that municipalities reacted in raising
locally-controlled revenues largely in response to the magnitude of tax cuts and their own fiscal
and economic abilities to do so. The amount of past outside aid, or expectations of future levels
of aid, does not appear to have been a factor.
Which were the municipalities that raised internal funds? To a large extent, they suffered
disproportionate losses in property tax revenues. Interestingly, based on several characteristics,
these cities were not necessarily homogenous with respect to their socio-economic qualities. For
example, higher income cities suffered steeper property tax reductions, but changes in income had
little or no effect on endogenous revenues; incm was significant in only one of the six equations in
which it was used. High tax rate and high tax capacity municipalities also suffered larger tax cuts,
yet these two variables were either negatively related to endogenous revenue increases or
insignificant factors. The independent effect of the various socio-economic variables, therefore, is
rather small.
The reasons for the somewhat perplexing relationship between certain fiscal and economic
factors are not intuitively obvious; however, three alternatives suggest themselves. First,
exogenous aid filled the gap created during the two-year period being studied, obviating the need
to raise additional locally-controlled revenues. Second, hard-hit municipalities were willing to
develop new sources to compensate for the drop in property taxes, but only some cities with these
particular socio-economic characteristics were, in fact, affected by the property tax losses and
chose to increase revenues. Third, municipalities of certain fiscal and economic characteristics
simply chose to reduce expenditures rather than generate supplementary income streams. Clearly,
these reactions may also have occurred simultaneously.
While an analysis of the last of these particular fiscal options will be addressed in Chapter
7, the first two of these possibilities have been largely addressed by the exogenous revenue
regressions. In the next section, the use of specific alternative revenues is investigated. While
endogenous revenues considered as a group may show a particular pattern of reactions with
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respect to property tax losses and municipal characteristics, the aggregation of these revenues
may also obscure some important differences in the revenue streams. It is these issues which are
addressed below.
Specific Revenue Sources Regressions
The results from the total, exogenous and endogenous revenue regressions suggest that
variations among municipalities may also result in differences regarding the types of revenues used
as well as the sources of those revenues. This section, therefore, analyzes changes in different
individual types of revenues for the initial period after the passage of Proposition 13. The concern
here lies not only with the ability of municipalities to raise (or, in the case of state aid, benefit
from) alternative revenues proportionate with the severity of property tax losses, but also with the
municipalities' own fiscal and economic resources.
In total, five separate revenue types are analyzed with respect to fiscal and socio-economic
characteristics: local taxes, other local, fees & charges, local miscellaneous and state aid. With
the exception of state aid, which is subject to legislative determination, each municipality has
direct control over these sources of revenue (limited by general constitutional and legislative
maximums which were and continue to be non-binding). Federal aid and sales & use taxes were
not analyzed due to the exogeneity of both and the state-wide uniformity of the latter.
Local Taxes7
The results from the local taxes regressions are shown below in Table 6.12. The results
from the regressions are uniformly poor, with the exception of aggregate change, and at first
glance say very little about the relationship of any of the independent variables to changes in per
capita local taxes. The explanatory power of the equations does not exceed much more than .20
for any of the regressions other than for aggregate change (1). The statistical significance of most
of the independent variables is rather low with only scant consistency in performance across the
four models of change.
7 Local taxes includes transient lodging taxes, franchise taxes, business license taxes, property
transfer taxes and other non-property taxes.
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Table 6.12: Local Taxes Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)loclaA (2)locIpA (3)locIcA (4)IocItA (JfloclaA (2)1ocIpA (3)IocicA (4)/ocitA
pIxA -0.059806 -0.057437 -0.014456 -2.046391 -0.318671 0.092181 -0.00828 -3.141807
(-0.671) (-0.139) (-0.692) (-0.844) **(-2.81) (0.268) (-0.285) (-0.887)
pop 4995.853 -0.000034 0.002330 -0.000129 8169.859 0.000061 0.006120 -0.000076
(1.137) (4204) (1.227) (-0.642) **(2.149) (0.353) **(2.474) (-0.354)
grow -53242.68 -0.427475 -1.357713 -0.365830 -18853.58 -0.595342 -3.58208 -0.504984
(-1.112) (-1.436) (-0.547) (-1.348) (-0.221) (-1.496) (-1.178) (-1.427)
coun 698426.1 -0.385744 -3.00618 0.142811 1136392 -0.737324 -5.983872 0.027554
(1.300) (4591) (-0.492) (0.228) **(2.265) (-1.023) (-0.850) (0.044)
incm 1946.235 -0.009820 0.0106 1200.027 -0.005580 0.0194
(0.670) (-1.138) (0.140) (0.334) (-0.667) (0.232)
resd 87986.76 1.431557 7.476537 1.111567 69623.41 1.417366 3.115586 1.018866
(0.857) **(2.304) (1.427) **(2.252) (0.533) (1.630) (0.489) *(1.880)
trat 8009626 -11.53194 -0.608381 -7102268 33.39528 30.9882
(0.458) (-0.135) (-0.008) (-0.328) (0.279) (0.316)
endb 62849.32 1.15365 1.350422 89694.27 1.52891 1.741009
(0.498) (1.121) (1.214) (0.427) (1.010) (1.104)
tcap 99.21687 0.000104 -0.000341 111.6084 -0.000152 -0.000683
(0.952) (0.256) (-0.822) (0.906) (-0.256) (-1.280)
a -264283.7 -0.451719 -1.463867 -0.603291 -314235.4 -0.387512 4.612029 -0.522497
(-1.095) (-0.603) (-0.347) (-1.007) (-1.249) (-0.399) (1.100) (-0.623)
R2 0.8718 0.2028 0.0763 0.2228 0.9647 0.1451 0.0440 0.1817
adj. R2  0.8620 0.1414 0.0301 0.1701 0.9620 0.0794 -0.0038 0.1262
Notes: loclaA is aggregate dange in local taxes; locipA is percentage dange in local taxes; loccA is per capita dange in local taxes: locItA is
percent dange in local taxes based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For loclaA. loclpA and loclcA regressions, the variable
ptrxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For locitA regression. ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax
reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods. Variables pop and incn are in 000's. t-statistics in
parenthesis. * indicates significant at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank
cells indicate that con-esponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
The lack of descriptive power in the regressions is itself rather interesting, however.
Particularly noteworthy is the indication that changes in other local taxes were not at all
responsive to large changes in property taxes (except, again, for the aggregate equation in year
two). In the regressions for three of the models covering both periods of time, the coefficient on
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property tax change (ptxA) is quite small and statistically insignificant. Despite dramatic
reductions in the level of property taxes on a percentage, per capita or relative magnitude basis,
municipalities were apparently not universally able and willing to compensate for the decline by
the enactment of new taxes or a rate hike in existing levies in the initial post-13 fiscal year. While
the short time period between the adoption of Proposition 13 and its enactment might partially
explain the 1978-79 results, the continuation of this pattern in the 1978-80 period suggests that
something more must be going on. The results from the aggregate equation for the two-year
period indicate some compensating response, but the lack of response based on other measures
suggests that there was some hesitancy in relying on local taxes.
One reasonable explanation for this lack of responsiveness may be the fact that the taxes
and revenues generated by this category are linked quite closely to the level of business and
economic activity Given the degree of anti-government sentiment that prevailed in the
Proposition 13 environment, municipalities may have felt pressure not to react to the curtailment
of property taxes by increasing other taxes on one of the chief beneficiaries of the tax limit --
business owners. The result may have been a reluctance to levy new taxes on a politically
powerful constituency.
An alternative explanation for the lack of responsiveness in local taxes is their uncertain
legal status given the constitutional changes wrought by the passage of Proposition 13. Recall
that in addition to reducing property taxes, Proposition 13 also: (i) prohibited local government
from imposing sales or transaction taxes on the sale of real property; and, (ii) required that
special taxes be approved by two-thirds vote of the qualified electors. These stipulations created
a type of 'neverland' for many local taxes. Were special taxes deemed so because of their use or
base? If they were not special taxes but rather general taxes, did this imply that they could be
imposed by the elected body of the municipality instead of two-thirds of the qualified electors?
This grey area created by the passage of Proposition 13 for all types of non-property taxes
was, in fact, litigated over the next several years. The initial case specifying the nature of special
taxes, City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell was not decided by the State Supreme Court
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until 1982.8 As a consequence, between the years 1979 and 1982 cities could not levy such
'special taxes' with any certainty that such taxes would be held constitutional. Given this degree
of uncertainty, reluctance on the part of municipalities to compensate for property tax declines
with local taxes is understandable.
With regard to the other explanatory variables included in the multivariate regression,
none of the population-based and demographic variables show distinctive patterns with any
consistency. For the fiscal and economic condition variables, the results are also generally poor.
For example, changes in local taxes occurred irrespective of income levels, tax capacity or the
estimated relative ending balance. There is some sensitivity to the municipality's proportion of
the county (coun), however the coefficient is significant only in the aggregate equation for the
two-year composite period
Based on the foregoing analysis, the estimated signs and coefficients on the variable
representing the amount of residential property as a proportion of the total are counter-intuitive.
The signs are all positive, and in two cases, the parameters are statistically significant at a high
confidence level. The positive coefficient indicates that as the residential proportion increases,
local taxes also increase. This belies the assumption that local taxes are inevitably business linked,
otherwise the opposite relationship would obtain.
Other Local9
The results from the other local income regressions are in Table 6.13 below. For the most
part, the results are only slightly more in keeping with the expected reactions of municipalities to
the passage of the property tax limitation measure. Only the aggregate (1) and per capita (3)
8 In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (32 Cal. 3d 47, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 648 P. 2d
935, August 5, 1982) the Supreme Court found that 'special taxes' means 'taxes which are levied
for a specific purpose rather than . . . a levy placed in the general fund to be utilized for general
governmental purposes'. The ruling legitimized San Francisco's increases in payroll and business
taxes which had been approved by only 55% of the vote.
9 Other local includes licenses, permits, vehicle code fines, other fines, penalties, investment
earnings, rents and royalties.
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change regressions display overall expected reactions and only in the initial post-13 fiscal year.
As shown in the table, in the initial post- 13 fiscal year, these equations explain upwards of 70% of
the changes in other local with many of the independent variables showing statistical significance
at a high level of confidence. In the second period, the R2 continues to be quite good for both
models. For models based on the percentage change (2) in property taxes and the relative
magnitude of the property tax reduction (2) the overall performance continues to be quite poor.
The coefficient and sign on ptxA in the aggregate, per capita and relative magnitude
equations indicates that municipalities suffering reductions in property tax revenues responded by
increasing revenues from other local income sources. A glance at the components that comprise
other local income suggests that these may be changed much more rapidly than local taxes while
not raising the same sorts of constitutional issues that raising other local taxes might in the
immediate post-13 environment. The magnitude of the reaction indicates that a decline of $1.00
in per capita property tax revenues corresponds to a per capita increase in other local revenue of
$0.18.
Given the estimated parameters in the 1978-79 regressions, particularly for ptxA, it would
be natural to expect to see a continuation of this pattern for the 1978-80 composite years
regressions as well; however, for the aggregate and per capita equation, the results provide a
distinct contrast to the earlier regressions. The coefficient on ptxA is now positive instead of
negative and indicates an increase of $1.39 in other local revenues with every $1.00 increase in
per capita property taxes. As shown by the R2 , the regression even explains slightly more of the
variation in this second period than in the initial period.
The estimations for ptxA in the percentage change and relative magnitude equations do
not exhibit the same characteristics of aggregate or per capita change. In fact, these much more
rigorous tests of change indicate that changes in other local income were not particularly sensitive
to reductions in the property tax on a percentage basis or as a percent of total revenues. The
coefficient on ptxA is not statistically significant in the percentage change regression in either
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period and, in addition has an unexpected positive sign.
the sign is negative, but again the parameters are not estimated with any statistical significance.
Table 6.13: Other Local Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (I)othraA (2)othrpA (3)othrcA (4)othrtA (J)othraA (2)othrpA (3)othrcA (4)othrtA
-0.055073 0.137358 -0.181755 -0.327751 0.126364 0.123182 1.391055 -1.400933
(-0.753) (0.575) **(-9.05) (-0.539) (1.210) (0.558) **(12.94) (-0.676)
3461.561 -0.000084 -0.006150 -0.000108 14217.5 0.000377 0.0139 0.000300
(0.967) (-0.695) (-1.519) (-0.862) **(4.390) **(2.363) **(2.345) *(1.805)
83747.62 0.044128 3.317753 0.053532 71234.73 -0.259580 -3.600782 -0.213742
(1.576) (0.381) (1.517) (0.475) (0.822) (-1.165) (-0.561) (-1.097)
-103811.4 -0.069286 2.377581 0.054549 145957 -0.484490 -18.63879 -0.067232
(-0.297) (-0.141) (0.249) (0.113) (0.203) (-1.097) (-1.018) (-0.170)
-3371.397 -0.001010 -0.086
(-1.510) (-0.173) (-1.280)
pixA
pop
grow
coul
incm
resd
trat
endh
tcap
a
-2.34e+07 -22.03309
(-1.362) (-0.683)
-203173.8 -0.067837
(-1.294) (-0.200)
209.6446 -0.000112
**(1.998) (-0.721)
-1973.698 -0.003440 1.0586
(-0.359) (-0.639) **(2.097)
0.836526 -18.62501 0.644679
*(1.698) (-1.413) **(2.101)
-0.512068
(-0.008)
-21.78819 -5.53e+07
(-0.722) *(-1.714)
-0.052950 -822856.4 0.907200
(-0.164) **(-2.35) (1.199)
-0.000179 78.5058 -0.000158
(-1.506) (0.550) (-0.479)
-0.509445
(-0.009)
0.994148
(1.286)
-0.000408
*(-1.714)
397708.5 0.875163 18.58419 0.797580 683449.3 -0.052749 32.06655 -0.151937
(2.273) **(3.891) **(3.173) **(5.345) **(2.356) (-0.095) **(3.097) (-0.312)
0.7208 0.0849 0.7146 0.0842 0.7471 0.1314 0.9006 0.1478
0.6993 0.0145 0.7004 0.0221 0.7276 0.0645 0,8956 0.0900
Notes: othraA is aggregate dange in other local income; othrpA is percentage dange in other local income; othrcA is per capita dange in other
local income; othrtA is percent dange in other local income based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For othraA othrpA and
othrcA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For othrtA regression, pixA is
expressed in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods. Variables
pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the .10 level or better: ** indicates significance at the .05 level or
better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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-253699.9 -0.342407 -18.70879 -0.402727 -391781.9
**(-2. 121) **(-2.19) **(-2.90) **(-2.77) **(-2.01)
R2
adj. R2
.
For the magnitude of reduction model,
The exact dynamics that resulted in: (i) the quite rapid shift in the pattern of the
relationship between changes in property taxes and other local income in the per capita equation;
and, (ii) the lack of significance in percentage and magnitude models are not apparent. However,
two possible explanations suggest themselves. First, the summary statistics presented indicate
that the recovery of property taxes in fiscal year 1980 was quite rapid. Considering the mean
figures, the increase in per capita property taxes between 1979 and 1980 resulted in a recovery of
over 36% of the initial property tax loss which occurred in 1979. Growth in property values
clearly softened the blow of Proposition 13 in the second year. This increase in property taxes
may have been enough to change the dynamic of the relationship between the two revenue
sources.
Second, the summary statistics also indicate that other local is the only one of the four
local revenue sources to show a decrease in the standard deviation from 1979 to 1980. What this
strongly suggests is that while only some municipalities increased revenues from other local
sources in the initial year after Proposition 13, in the second year many more cities increased
revenues from these sources, resulting in a drop in the standard deviation. Combining what we
know from the summary statistics together with the regression equations implies that
municipalities suffering the greatest reductions in per capita property taxes increased other local
income the most in year one. However, in year two, many more cities increased income from this
source, regardless of the severity of their property tax losses. In fact, given the results from the
composite 1978-80 regressions, the increases were enough to overwhelm the previous
relationship.
Several other independent variables are statistically significant at high levels of confidence
in the 1978-79 regression. While the growth rate (grow) and the relative population dominance of
the municipality (coun) were largely insignificant, population (pop) had a positive effect on
revenue raising from other local income sources in the composite period 1978-80. Tax capacity
(tcap) is negatively related to other local income changes. Municipalities with higher incomes
(incm) showed less tendency to increase other local income in the initial post-13 years than lower
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tax capacity municipalities. A higher ending balance (endb) does not appear to be a strong factor
in raising other local income. The coefficient on resd indicates that increases in the proportion of
residential property has a negative effect in the initial post-13 fiscal year. For the two-year
composite period, however, the results are more ambiguous suggesting that increases in the
residential proportion coincide with increases on other local income. The municipal tax rate is
insignificant in all but one of the equations as is median household income.
What can be made of these rather inconsistent results? First of all, the option of increasing
other local revenue in response to property tax reductions does not appear to be very strong, or at
least does not represent a universal response among municipalities. A review of the components
of other local revenues reveals it to be a not particularly deep source of income. The sources
included are those that may be imposed fairly rapidly in contrast to local taxes, but may be
increased with much less flexibility. For example, permits and penalties may be increased only as
a reflection of increases in cost of service. Investment earnings might be raised only by more
aggressive investment policies. Rents and royalties are relatively inflexible in the short-term.
The estimated coefficients for ptxA for most of the regression models indicate either that
all municipalities increased other local income irrespective of the percentage change or severity of
property tax losses or, alternatively, these sources of income did not change much at all for those
municipalities experiencing larger property tax losses. The generally greater magnitudes and
significance of the estimated coefficients for the socio-economic characteristics indicate that the
former of these reactions appears to be the case. That is to say that other local income did
change, but it changed more with respect to underlying socio-economic characteristics (reflecting
an ability and willingness to raise these revenues) rather than property tax reductions (reflecting
the need to raise new revenues).
This reaction may reflect the built in conservatism of municipal decision-makers. With an
event as dramatic as the passage of Proposition 13, all municipalities may have been encouraged
to increase this source of revenues, regardless of the actual impact on their particular city. This
interpretation is bolstered by the sign on the parameters for some of the economic status variables
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as well as the abrupt change in sign on ptxA in the per capita change regression. While some
severely affected cities with relatively large amounts of maneuvering room may have increased
revenues from this source more, this effect could have been washed-out by other equally-affected
municipalities who chose or were forced to look to other compensating revenue sources.
Fees & Charges'0
As shown below in Table 6.14, the patterns of the explanatory power of the fees &
charges equations are quite similar to those of the previous regressions of individual revenue
sources; the aggregate equation (1) has the highest R2 , largely because it incorporates the effects
of population; the per capita change equation (3) is the next highest in explanatory power while
both the percentage change (2) and relative magnitude (4) models show quite low R2 . In addition,
these models display the common characteristics of a general improvement in explanatory power
in moving from the one-year to the two-year regressions. In other words, the additional period of
time elapsed following the passage of Proposition 13 gives municipalities more of an opportunity
to formulate a reaction.
With respect to the relationship between property tax change and changes in fees &
charges, all of the models show the expected negative sign in the initial year, with increases in fees
& charges resulting from decreases in the property tax. However, only in the aggregate model is
the parameter statistically significant. The performance of this variable improves in the composite
two-year period, as expected, but only in the aggregate equation. The performance of ptxA in the
percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations continues to be insignificant, although the
sign is negative.
'0 Fees & charges includes zoning fees, subdivision fees, sale of maps, other filing fees, special
police services, special fire services, plan checking fees, animal shelter fees, engineering fees, local
assessments, lot cleaning, sewer services, refuse collection, sale of refuse, vital statistics, first aid
and ambulance, health inspection fees, library fines and fees and recreation fees.
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Table 6.14: Fees & Charges Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)feesaA (2)feespA (3)feescA (4)feestA (1)feesaA (2)feespA (3)feescA (4)feestA
-0.086447 -2.835836 -0.014379 -1.567624 -0.166872 -0.253310
**(-2.13) (-1.022) (-1.290) (-1.162) **(-2.51) (-0.745)
-0.031557
(-1.245)
-1.155252
(-1.140)
981.9401 -0.000047 -0.000522 0.000043 7710.801 0.000169 0.003200 0.000191
(0.492) (-0.272) (-0.276) (0.212) **(3.595) (1.091) (1.077) (1.151)
53939.9 -0.733454 -0.791494 -0.676861 120436.8 0.053401 0.197716 0.061605
(1.421) (-1.023) (-0.287) (-0.965) *(1.942) (0.319) (0.064) (0.362)
-901092.8 0.055714 -7.950364 -0.279005 -370896.9 -0.667464 -1.804854 -0.738200
(-1.599) (0.091) (-0.894) (-0.457) (-0.500) (-1.102) (-0.140) (-1.161)
-4034.638 -0.0187 -0.0571
**(-2.11) (-0.827) (-0.746)
-203.6896 0.006870 0.1369
(-0.076) (1.184) (0.999)
pop
grow
coun
incmf
resd
trat
endb
tcap
a
R2
adj. R2
-7350858 -109.6978
(-0.584) (-0.852)
-243091.3 1.436605
**(-2.20) (0.633)
51.03685 -0.000157
(0575) (-0.240)
-71.82175 2.12e+07 94.47694
(-0.858) (1.018) **(2.095)
1.9072 -333048.6 -0.754996
(0.724) *(-1.850) **(-2.33)
-0.000583 97.27311 0.000214
(-0.618) (0.976) (1.156)
79.15181
(1.644)
-0.689461
**(-2.27)
0.000153
(0.785)
235206.3 -0.506940 12.67852 0.384888 -155256.9 -0.176700 11.29919 0.005251
**(2.083) (-0.573) **(2.986) (1.399) (-0.883) (-0.679) *(1.910) (0.020)
0.7969 0.0644 0.1251 0.0289 0.9265 0.0808 0.0805 0.0819
0.7812 -0.0076 0.0814 -0.0369 0.9208 0.0101 0.0345 0.0197
Notes: feesaA is aggregate change in fees & charges; feespA is percentage change in fees & charges; feescA is per capita change in fees & charges;
feestA is percent change in fees & charges based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For feesaA, feespA and feescA regressions.
the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. For feestA regression, pxA is expressed in terms of the
property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 change for both periods. Variables pop and incm are in 000-s. t-
statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is
127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
The rather mixed results from the ptxA equations are similar to what was estimated for
changes in other revenue. There seem to be increases in fees & charges based on reductions in
property tax revenues, but these are significant only on an aggregate basis. High percentage
reductions in property taxes or reductions as a percent of total revenues do not seem to generate
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ptxA
-38544.49 0.550139 -8.197671 0.472850 13510.19 0.050140 -11.53167 0.015688
(-0.450) (0.676) **(-2.03) (0.606) (0.103) (0.176) *(-1.803) (0.050)
the same widespread response, although the estimated coefficients do have the expected sign.
The interpretation from this must be that although many municipalities did increase fees & charges
after the constriction of Proposition 13, this was not a universal response. Clearly, fees & charges
were not looked upon by all municipalities as a means of bolstering the balance sheet in the
aftermath of Proposition 13. Had this been the case, the parameters would have been more
consistent in terms of statistical significance across all models.
The reasons for the lack of consistent responsiveness of the ptxA variable to changes in the
property tax are not apparent from the regressions, but they may relate to the particular
characteristics of the revenue source. This is not a revenue category which could simply be
increased based on political will. Unlike new taxes or increased tax rates, which (assuming the
political will is sufficient) can be imposed subject only to largely non-binding constitutional and
legislative limitations, fees & charges are typically limited to the cost of service delivery. The
ceiling for increasing or imposing such rates might, as a result, weaken the ability of municipalities
to tap this source of revenue to the extent that they might be otherwise inclined. If municipalities
were already collecting fees & charges based on cost of service delivery prior to the adoption of
Proposition 13, this would have limited increases in this particular revenue source. If they were
already collecting the maximum amount, this would placed an absolute prohibition against the
collection of further fees & charges.
Generally, the responsiveness of fees & charges to variations in socio-economic
characteristics of the municipalities is quite poor. With the sole exception of pop and grow in the
two-year aggregate equation, none of the population-based or demographic variables is significant
at a reasonable level of confidence. While changes in fees & charges appears to be negatively
related to variations in residential proportion, the estimated parameter for resd is statistically
significant in only the per capita change regression in both time periods. Tax rate may be
positively related to increases in fees & charges, at least for the two-year period. The ending
balance variable shows the most consistent pattern. While the initial period largely indicates no
161
response to changes in the level of ending balance, for the composite period the estimated
coefficients indicate that the increases in fees & charges are related to decreases in ending balance.
The increase in the overall fit from the one-year to the two-year models in most of the
regressions may relate to the performance and shift in the trat and endb variables. The reasons for
the shifts in this variables are not clear; however, they may relate to the importance of timing in
the raising of fees & charges. Like other types of revenues, municipalities may have been unable
to raise fees & charges in the short period of time between the passage of Proposition 13 and its
effective date in the subsequent fiscal year. The responsiveness of the endb variable may have to
do with the shift in attitudes toward fund balances on the part of municipal decision-makers in
response to state-aid funding decisions." Given the fact that this variable represents the excess of
revenues in excess of expenditures for the five years prior to the passage of Proposition 13, the
dramatic change in the coefficient and significance could be due to the tendency of all cities to
raise fees & charges, especially those cities with comparatively large fund balances.
Local Miscellaneous12
The responses by municipal governments to the property tax reductions in terms of local
miscellaneous revenues reveals a further pattern. Table 6.15 below presents results of the four
regression models for the two post-13 periods. The explanatory values for the aggregate and per
capita equations in the initial post-13 fiscal year range from an R2 of .30 to .46. For the
percentage change and magnitude of change models, however, the R2 values are quite a bit lower.
For the two-year composite period, the explanatory power in the aggregate and per capita
equations improve substantially; these models explain roughly one-half and two-thirds of the
variation in change of these revenue sources, respectively.
" Recall that state-aid funding formula in the post-13 environment penalized municipalities whose
fund balances exceeded a certain base limit.
" Local miscellaneous includes sale of property, sewer connection fees, contributions from
enterprises and non-governmental sources and other revenue.
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Table 6.15: Local Miscellaneous Revenue Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)miscaA (2)niscpA (3)misccA (4)misctA (1)miscaA (2)miscpA (3)nisccA (4)misctA
0.335225 4.620758 0.611915 -28.92458 0.024986 10.76257 -0.437073 -16.54666
**(5.470) (0.942) **(3.675) (-1.367) (0.239) (0.833) **(-12.7) (-0.899)
15259.43 -0.001920 -0.0354 -0.002730 4858.496 -0.001560 -0.008880 -0.003650
**(5.032) (-0.975) (-1.013) (-1.236) (1.389) (-0.450) **(-2.04) (-1.001)
106336.3 -1.439511 6.585594 -0.888618 48519.26 0.203715 -1.932092 1.163663
(1.084) (-1.096) (0.569) (-0.850) (0.585) (0.072) (-0.542) (0.445)
1255996 -5.057416 89.964 -0.405804 355930.7 -19.82511 28.53297 -9.208878
**(2.267) (-0.635) (1.337) (-0.055) (0.634) (-0.842) *(1.697) (-0.589)
ptxzl
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endh
tcap
6253.597 0.0429 0.0493
(1.253) (0.243) (0.340)
-385180.4 -0.942449 -74.99291 -2.681117 -327066.5 -1.851019 -7.777259 -3.565536
(-1.470) (-0.377) (-1.277) (-1.328) (-1.418) (-0.420) (-0.795) (-0.878)
-9835209 -252.7112
(-0.208) (-0.411)
-304417 1.176736
(-0.832) (0.240)
221.9235 0.000716
(0.836) (0.132)
-27089.5 4.539286 69.60398
(-0.078) (0.745) (1.317)
-674.1592 7220620 -644.4214
(-1.366) (0.220) (-0.546)
1.3919 218746.5 -9.352971
(0.309) (0.799) (-1.111)
-0.000970 103.3506 0.007326
(-0.204) (0.388) (0.670)
5.094586 -61763.86
(1.605) (-0.228)
11.34458 -2.060251
(0.950) (-0.308)
-881.2363
(-0.862)
-10.53836
(-1.161)
0.006001
(0.554)
8.977586
(1.247)
R2
adj. R2
0.4659 0.0515 0.3067 0.0762 0.5123 0.0534 0.6347 0.0418
0.4248 -0.0221 0.2720 0.0130 0.4748 -0.0200 0.6164 -0.0238
Notes: miscaA is aggregate change in local miscellaneous revenues; miscpA is percentage change in local miscellaneous revenues; misccA is per
capita change in local miscellaneous revenues misctA is percent change in local miscellaneous revenues based on change in property tax as a percent
of total revenues. For miscaA. miscpA and nsccA regressions. the variable ptx is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change
respectively. For miscIA regression, ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial
1978-79 change for both periods. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better: **
indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in
regression due to multicollinearity.
The estimated parameters for ptxA in the equations is quite inconsistent in the initial year.
In three of the four models, the coefficient has a positive sign, indicating declines in property taxes
occurred in tandem with declines in local miscellaneous revenues. In two of these models, the
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6733.715 0.1589 0.6146
(1.155) (0.651) (1.423)
parameters were estimated with significant precision. In the two-year regressions, however, in
two of the four models, ptxA takes on the expected negative sign.
The regressions results from the two periods indicate the abrupt reversal in the
relationship between other local revenue and the ptxA variables. What this suggests is that timing
again may be an issue in raising revenues from this rather varied source. The short duration
between the passage of Proposition 13 and its enactment, may mean that revenue generation from
local miscellaneous sources remained elusive until the second period. Alternatively, the results
may indicate that revenue raising from these sources occurred among all municipalities in the
initial year, but predominantly among those cities disproportionately affected by Proposition 13
tax reductions in the second period. This could be a result of municipalities fully appreciating the
meaning of the Proposition 13 in the second-year, with those cities not seriously affected scaling
back and those more deeply affected increasing reliance on revenues from this source.
The difficulty in a clear interpretation of the results stems from the inability to separate the
willingness to increase revenues from these sources in response to property tax curtailment, and
the ability to do so. Despite the dramatic rollback in property taxes, all severely affected
municipalities may not have been able to increase revenues from these sources simply because the
resources were not there, despite their willingness to do so. Both characteristics were required to
exist if local miscellaneous revenues were to be raised in response to property tax curtailment.
The additional socio-economic variables address, in part, the ability of municipalities to
raise revenues from these sources. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that increases from these
revenues source were patterned after many of the included variables. With the exception of a
slight indication that increases in local miscellaneous revenues increased as population size
declined and population dominance in the county grew, none of the population-based or
demographic variables show any significant results. Income and tax rate also do not appear to be
important. There is some indication that increased non-residential proportion of assessed value
led to increases in revenues from these sources as did lower municipal tax rates.
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A review of the types of revenues included in local miscellaneous attests to their diversity;
however, they share one important characteristic that would have a strong influence on the ability
of municipalities to increase revenues from this source. Increases in any of the sources (with the
minor exception of sewer connection fees which comprised only 5.0% of total miscellaneous
revenues in fiscal year 1978) is contingent of pre-existing conditions. That is, sale of assets is
contingent on possession of those assets. Increases in revenue from enterprises is contingent on
the presence of municipal enterprises. In the short-term, more than any other individual revenue
source, increases in revenues from local miscellaneous sources depends on the particular
municipal profile and the presence of particular attributes. This characteristic may be a significant
factor in the lack of response of this revenue source to changes in socio-economic characteristics.
State Aid
The regression results shown in Table 6.16 indicate that the relationship of state aid to the
independent variables displays yet a further pattern of responsiveness. Only the aggregate
equation for the one-year period explains a large amount of the variation in state aid; the other
models have R2s in the .15 to .20 range for this period. In the two-year composite period, the
explanatory power of the aggregate equation (1) drops considerably, as does the per capita
equation, although to a less dramatic extent. Both the percentage change (2) and relative
magnitude models (4), show increased R2s in the second period, explaining roughly one-quarter of
the variation in state aid.
Even more notable than the shifts which occur in the explanatory power of the equations,
is the inconsistency of the estimated parameters onptxA. In the first period, the coefficient on this
variable is strongly negative for the aggregate and per capita equations, but weakly positive in the
percentage and magnitude equations. In the second period, the parameters are now positive for
the aggregate and per capita equations and negative for the percentage and magnitude equations.
The results from the state aid equations are much less responsive to changes in property
taxes than would be expected. The change in the magnitudes and signs from the one-year to the
two-year periods can be partially explained by the alteration of the state aid formula. Recall the
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change in the state allocation formula described in Chapter 2, which relied increasingly on
underlying fiscal capacity in calculating municipal aid and less on property tax loss. This does not
explain the lack statistical significance of the ptxA parameters in the more rigorous percentage and
magnitude of change equations, however.
Table 6.16: State Aid Change, 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (J)stataA (2)statpA (3)statcA (4)stattA (1)stataA (2)statpA (3)statcA (4)statt A
-0.346932 0.191976 -0.158395 0.230055 0.258208 -0.123187 0.149351 -0.213138
**(-7.68) (0.741) **(-4.46) (0.301) **(2.772) (-0.727) **(2.752) (-0.310)
5435.126 0.000185 0.007960 0.000162 7753.29 -0.000141 -0.001430 -0.000138
**(2.420) (1.398) (0.694) (1.225) **(2.524) (-0.997) (0.128) (-0.931)
-39926.43 -0.099960 -2.674419 -0.100339 75892.11 0.203179 5.232354 0.204550
(-0.419) (-0.946) (-0.519) (-0.916) (1.321) **(2.469) (1.210) **(2.517)
290903.4 -0.351001 -52.14178 -0.252088 1025497 0.767895 -8.595781 0.760349
(0.372) (-0.663) (-1.140) (-0.484) (1.302) (1.587) (-0.215) (1.372)
-1783.526 -0.005320 -0.3215
(-0.433) (-0.779) (-0.947)
2279.277 -0.002870 0.4812
(0.523) (-0.406) **(2.244)
-16358.89 0.017227 -5.059535 -0.037961 -293487.5 -0.383553 -34.83585 -0.432765
(-0.076) (0.087) (-0.311) (-0.206) (-1.474) *(-1.819) *(-1.894) *(-1.877)
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
tcap
-44.79808 -5.90e+07 -110.9702
(-1.379) *(-1.890) **(-2.48)
0.754347 -68992.51 -0.568228
(1.557) (-0.316) *(-1.764)
0.000369 229.5846 0.000219
(1.483) (1.113) (0.823)
22.00656 0.436112
*(1.891) **(2.100)
342613.6 0.794935
(1.108) **(2.198)
-105.2344
**(-2.77)
-0.513959
*(-1.739)
0.000139
(0.606)
22.76148 0.779591
(1.408) **(2.662)
R 2
adi. R2
0.9696 0.2187 0.1661 0.2056 0.2669 0.2939 0.1381 0.2898
0.9673 0.1586 0.1244 0.1517 0.2106 0.2396 0.0950 0.2416
Notes: stataA is aggregate dange in state aid; statpA is percentage dange in state aid; statcA is per capita dange in state aid; stattA is percent
dange in state aid based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For stataA statpA and statcA regressions, the variable ptxA is
expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For stattA regression, ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction
as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in
parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank
cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
166
-1.70e+07 -55.2659
(-0.504) (-1.416)
197405.5 0.747649
(0.775) (1.543)
-14.96905 0.000429
(-0.103) (1.496)
-50431.53 0.607744
(-0.138) **(2.187)
The answer to such erratic behavior may, in addition, be attributable to simple data
compilation. Rather than representing a unidimensional aid policy, the state aid category
represents many aid, grant and assistance programs, only one of which was designed to assist
cities affected by the passage of Proposition 13. The lack of statistical significance and
consistency in the equations may be due to the fact that other aid and grant programs simply
overwhelmed the effects of the state bail-out program. Perhaps the dominant force in state aid
was not the bail-out program but rather a combination of various programs that, together, acted
as a countervailing force in the post- 13 environment.
The parameters for the population based and demographic variables are largely
insignificant, with the exception of that relating to population growth. State aid appears to be
positively related to increases in the rate of population growth. With regard to the measures of
economic and fiscal well-being, income and tax capacity seem to be unimportant in the effect on
overall state aid policy. On the other hand, increases in state aid correspond to decreases in the
last pre-13 tax rate, decreases in the proportion of residential property and decreases in relative
size of the ending balance. The socio-economic variables are much more significant for the two-
year period than the one-year, suggesting that following the initial post-13 fiscal year, socio-
economic characteristics reasserted their dominance with respect to state aid.
Those socio-economic variables that are significant in the equations, tend to be so with a
certain amount of consistency. This is particularly true in the second period, where grow, trat,
endb and resd are all significant in most of the models at a high level of significance. In fact, there
is more consistency with respect to these variables in the state aid regressions than in any of the
other individual revenue type regressions. This suggests that state aid, considered as a monolithic
source, may be based more on socio-economic characteristics than on property tax losses. For
this reason, the inconsistency in the ptxA coefficients should not be considered unreasonable.
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Summary and Interpretation
Based on what seem to be rather erratic results of the revenue change regressions, it is
tempting to dismiss municipal reactions as sui generis and resistant to econometrically-based
generalizations. Yet the methods of data analysis that have been pursued in this chapter in
actuality create opportunities for considerable precision in tying particular types of local revenue
responses to particular types of municipalities. The combination of aggregation and
dissaggregation of different types and sources of revenues facilitates the formulation of a number
of important observations with regard to municipal behavior under fiscal stress.
Based on the results of the total revenue change regressions, if one goal of the proponents
of Proposition 13 was to reduce total revenues, the measure does appear to have met with some
success. Generally, the regressions suggest that in the initial post-i 3 fiscal year, larger property
tax reductions resulted in larger reductions in total revenues. For the composite two-year period,
decreases in property tax revenues had an even greater effect, in the aggregate, than in the initial
period. However, the negative effect of property tax reductions on the basis of percentage
change and magnitude in the initial period was completely washed out by the second year effects.
The percentage change and magnitude equations clearly represent the more demanding
tests regarding the effects of property tax reductions, but they also measure different responses to
the property tax restriction than does the aggregate measure. Based on the results for these
equations, municipalities were affected in terms of total revenues in the first post-13 fiscal year,
but were able to recover by the second period, either through the use of own source revenues or
through intergovernmental assistance. In the initial year, both of these sources were unable to
completely compensate for the drop in property taxes.
This interpretation is given additional weight by the data shown for cohorts and individual
municipalities. Table 6.5, for example, indicates that municipalities whose property tax loss
exceeded the mean, suffered total revenue declines the first year, but succeeded in reversing this
trend by the two-year period. The median gains of this group, in fact, were almost the equal of
the small property tax loss cohort. This pattern is repeated for the individual municipalities shown
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in Table 6.6. Even the City of Piedmont,which suffered a property tax decline in excess of 43%
of its total budget, managed to compensate completely. While Piedmont's initial year loss was
over 14%, by the second period, this gap had been reduced to a mere six percent.
The overall responsiveness of exogenous revenues to the severity of declines in property
tax revenues was quite poor in both periods based on the regression models. Even the state aid
regressions, which would be expected to be quite responsive to the magnitude of declines in
property taxes, show very mixed results. State aid shows a strong and expected negative
relationship to property tax loss on an aggregate and per capita basis for the initial period, but this
is reversed by the second composite period. The estimates in the percentage and magnitude
equations are not significant in either period. Given the multi-purpose nature of state aid, it is
apparent that the impact of the Proposition 13 'bail-out' funds was not sufficient to counteract the
prevailing bias of other state grant and loan programs. The assumption that the 'bail-out' funds,
in fact, benefited municipalities most affected by property tax reductions is a safe one; however,
the overall effect of all state aid was not distributed with this mitigation as a goal.
To the extent that municipalities were able to compensate for the declines in property
taxes, municipalities must have relied to some extent on endogenous sources of revenue. The
data sorted by cohort shown in Tables 6.5 as well as individual municipal reactions shown in
Table 6.6, strongly suggest that municipalities most affected in terms of relative magnitude by the
tax limitation measure, also increased endogenous revenues the most. The results of the
endogenous revenue regression (with the sole exception of the per capita model) also indicate a
strong negative relationship between property tax losses and endogenous revenues. The clear
results from the percentage and relative magnitude equations are particularly noteworthy.
While cities responded to declines in the property tax with increases in endogenous
revenues, there was no one source that appears to have been a particularly strong form of
compensation. In fact, as indicated in the separate revenue regressions, the significance of the
ptxA variable is very inconsistent in all the models and only significant in a few cases. What this
suggests is that municipalities raised different sorts of revenues in response to the passage of
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Proposition 13 instead of one particular source. Municipalities severely affected by Proposition
13 may have increased different types of local revenues based on particular strengths and
attributes.
This interpretation is given credence by the results of individual municipalities in Table
6.6. Among all of the six cities, the variation in the increase in endogenous revenue sources is
quite substantial, regardless of the cohort of the particular municipality. In addition, there is
considerable variation across cities with respect to each local revenue source. While generally,
the municipality relying on a particular revenue source the most is in the large loss cohort, this is
not universally true. The only municipality relying on substantial increases in all types of local
revenues is Piedmont, which suffered the largest proportionate loss from among the entire sample.
Given the lack of responsiveness to changes in property taxes by any one source of
endogenous revenues, it is likely that to the extent that these increased, it came more as a
response to the socio-economic characteristics of these municipalities. That is, if cities did raise
revenues from particular sources based on their relative strengths, this should be reflected in the
socio-economic coefficients included in the regressions to the extent that these variables capture
revenue related factors. Clearly, there may be many other factors not captured by the regression
which account for a municipality's ability to raise, for example, fees & charges or local taxes.
Table 6.4 indicates that those endogenous revenue categories which contributed the most
to the post-13 revenue gains were other local and fees & charges, which rose 22.5% and 29.0%
respectively. These were the very categories which showed the most response to the socio-
economic variables included in the regressions. In fact, local taxes and local miscellaneous
showed very little response to socio-economic variations among cities, suggesting that all cities
raised these revenues irrespective of variations. For other local and fees & charges were more
responsive to socio-economic variations, although still on a rather limited basis.
Increases in fees & charges occurred as the relative size of the municipality's ending
balance declined and as the last pre- 13 municipal tax rate increased. The reaction of other local to
variations in socio-economic characteristics was even more apparent. Revenues from this source
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rose among larger municipalities with higher residential proportions (for the composite period).
Income and tax capacity appeared to exercise a negative influence regarding this revenue source,
with increases in either of these measures associated with decreases in other local.
In addition to alternative revenue raising being influenced by socio-economic
characteristics of the municipality, the qualities of the revenue source itself may be a factor.
Evaluating the qualities of the separate revenue sources in terms of two simple criteria can be a
useful means of ascertaining the impact of these qualities -- administrative impact and political
impact. Administrative impact relates to the internal ability of municipalities to alter the revenue
source, whereas political impact relates to the outside repercussions of such changes.
Virtually all revenue increases require action by the elected governing body with the
exception of changes to investment portfolios. Nevertheless, there are additional studies
conducted and forums held before any granting of increases in existing taxes or imposition of new
taxes. Consequently, changes in other local income, fees & charges and local miscellaneous
revenue would generally entail less of an administrative undertaking than changes in local taxes.
Given this interpretation, other taxes are seen as having a high administrative impact, while the
other sources of revenue have a moderate or low impact. Fees & charges are more rigorously
limited to the cost of service or goods delivery and thus would entail slightly more work than
effecting increases in other income or miscellaneous revenue.
Regarding the political impacts of different revenue increases, it is fair to say that given the
general hostility toward government and government revenue raising during this period, increases
in any source would meet with resistance and anger. However, there are clear differences in
degree. Increases in general taxes whether levied on individuals or businesses would likely face
the most opposition. Not only would elected representatives be unlikely to impose such new
taxes, but also as we discussed earlier, their constitutionality would be questionable. The political
impact of other sources of revenue relate to their visibility or directness. Fees & charges would
likely have moderate political impact since many (but not all) of these charges would be borne by
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all residents. Other income and other revenue would either only be borne by a particular segment
of the population or be completely hidden (such as sale of assets).
Some evidence suggests that municipalities may have avoided revenues whose
constitutionality was in question (other taxes) and relied on revenues of low or moderate impact
or directly tied to the delivery or production of a service (fees & charges and other revenue). But
this was not a reaction tied to the severity of property tax losses. Rather, it seems to be relevant
to cities irrespective of such losses. Generally then, municipalities gravitated to the use of
substitute revenues whose political and administrative impacts were relatively less pronounced
and eschewed the use of higher impact sources. Although local miscellaneous revenues might fit
these criteria, it is too minor a category to contribute appreciably to overall revenue growth.
In conclusion, municipalities were generally affected in terms of total revenues in the initial
post- 13 fiscal year but generated or received sufficient revenues to compensate for this in the two-
year composite period. Exogenous revenues, including state aid, did not sufficiently compensate
cities for any declines in property taxes and, in fact, may have exacerbated the problem.
Municipalities did generate considerable endogenous revenues in response to the decline in
property taxes, but increases were quite varied. Different cities relied on quite different
endogenous revenue sources based on their particular fiscal and economic strengths as well as the
characteristics of the revenue source. Increases in alternative revenues were more sensitive to
socio-economic characteristics than changes in total endogenous revenues, which were more
sensitive to changes in property tax revenues.
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Chapter 7
Distinctions in Municipal Expenditure Patterns
Overview
In the previous chapter, I investigated the municipal revenue behavior in the aftermath of
the passage of Proposition 13. This chapter involves a similarly detailed look at the effects of the
Proposition, but with a posture towards dissecting the varied expenditure responses of
municipalities based on their fiscal and socio-economic attributes. My focus is on explaining, by
means of multiple regression as well as other data techniques, variations in the changes in total
expenditure levels and expenditure composition.
First, I present a statistical summary of municipal expenditure levels and changes using
several different measures. Second, variations in these changes are investigated by exploring
differences based on separate cohorts of the sample of municipalities. Several individual
municipalities are then selected in order to facilitate the discussion of particular strategies
employed by different types of cities. Finally, variations in municipal expenditure responses are
analyzed econometrically. Using the revenue/expenditure adjustments model -- a variation of the
expenditure determinants approach -- a series of generalizations are drawn regarding municipal
fiscal responses to Proposition 13 as well as the socio-economic characteristics of affected
municipal governments.
Municipal Expenditure Changes
Summary Statistics
In order to analyze general patterns of expenditure change, I relied on the cross-section of
California municipalities introduced in Chapter 5, and compiled relevant data for the last pre-
Proposition 13 fiscal year as well as the first two fiscal years following the passage of the
measure.' Table 7.1 below presents the pattern of gross expenditure trends which occurred
1Expenditures include both recurrent expenses and capital outlay.
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during the period just prior to and immediately following the adoption of Proposition 13. None of
the data presented are particularly surprising and the general trends have been identified in
numerous other studies of Proposition 13; however, it is beneficial to discuss these gross
expenditure changes again in preparation for a more detailed look at municipal reactions to the
Proposition. In addition, the variance measures shown below have not been the subject of much
previous analysis: an oversight that reinforces the appropriateness of this investigation into the
varieties of responses to the tax limit measure.
Table 7.1: Per Capita Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978, 1979 and 1980.
Expenditure Mean Median Standard Deviation
Category FY78 FY79 FY80 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY78 FY79 FY80
General 86.049 81.436 78.786 67.963 68.796 63.320 71.416 62.526 48.569
Police 47.129 50.087 55.418 44.741 45.457 49.885 18.041 20.434 21.956
Fire 27.109 27.306 30.716 27.885 28.250 29.941 22.250 22.269 27.038
Oth. Pub. Safety 4.135 4.036 4.625 3.780 3.801 4.080 3.055 2.842 3.583
Public Works 67.804 83.253 77.593 53.469 59.695 64.766 46.199 134.828 69.147
Health 1.084 1.017 1.110 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.292 3.632 4.149
Library 6.033 5.271 5.131 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.684 8.103 7.085
Parks & Rec. 27.498 26.707 32.153 24.538 22.254 25.574 18.811 20.549 23.933
Contributions 5.242 5.398 5.788 0.070 0.0 0.0 10.239 23.636 17.396
Total 272.084 284,512 291.321 245.221 255.721 261.943 123.378 194.518 154.357
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
A close examination of the expenditure summary statistics for California municipalities
over the three year period reveals some interesting patterns. Regarding mean expenditure levels,
per capita total expenditures show a slight increase from fiscal year 1978 to 1979. Furthermore,
most of the expenditure categories show a decrease during this period -- general government,
other public safety, health, libraries and parks & recreation, The categories that show an increase
in per capita expenditures are police, fire, public works and contributions to other governments.
At least in the eyes of most public finance professionals, if not in the opinion of the public,
the distinctions between these two groups of expenditures seems relatively easy to categorize by
simple criteria. Those expenditure categories which suffered per capita reductions include
activities which are either not linked directly to the delivery of a good or service -- such as general
government -- or those considered non-essential -- such as health, libraries and parks &
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recreation. 2 Those expenditures which experienced smaller decreases during this immediate post-
Proposition 13 period represent what many feel is the very essence of what the public sector
should be providing -- police and fire services. Per capita changes are shown more clearly in
Table 7.2 below.
Table 7.2: Per Capita Change in Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Expenditure Mean Median Standard Deviation
Categorv FY78- 79 FY78-80 FY78- 79 nY78-80 F178-79 F178-80
General -4.613 -7.263 -3.757 -1.474 44.706 57.054
Police 2.958 8.289 0.951 5.528 9.540 11.942
Fire 0.197 3.606 0.000 3.362 7.435 10.230
Other Public Safety -0.099 0.490 0.081 0.343 2.375 2.946
Public Works 15.449 9.789 4.389 6.534 117.363 58.650
Health -0.067 0.026 0.000 0.000 1.619 2.063
Library -0.762 -0.903 0.000 0.000 6.075 5.881
Parks & Recreation -0.791 4.654 -0.439 1.066 15.466 17.811
Contributions 0.157 0.546 0.000 0.000 25.597 20.599
Total 12.428 19.236 -1.309 11.303 125.833 88.678
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
The apparent irregularities to these pattern rules are not as inexplicable as they may first
appear. Public works which many associate with street maintenance and similar activities is, in
fact, heavily influenced by a few large projects linked to specific income from federal and state
grants. Thus the explosive increase between fiscal year 1978 and 1979 is most likely simply an
indication of the lumpiness of some public works outlays rather than a dramatic permanent shift of
dollars to an essential service. Other public safety, unlike police and fire, shows a slight decline in
per capita expenditures. This category, in fact, comprises a very small proportion of municipal
expenditures and consists mainly of animal impounding and civil defense activities -- services not
typically considered vital at the local level. The slight decrease in contributions to other
governments also occurs in a category which represents a small percentage (2.6%) of
expenditures but which may represent payments for essential services (such as water and sewer)
provided by other governmental entities.
2 Primary health services are the responsibility of county governments. Municipal health
expenditures are supplementary in nature rather than basic.
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This general pattern of mean per capita expenditures continues into the second post-
Proposition 13 fiscal year, but with some clear exceptions. For example, total mean expenditures
for fiscal year 1980 increases, but at a slower rate than the previous year's increase. In addition,
general government and libraries also show decreases in funding while police, fire, other public
safety and contributions to other governments continue to increase in per capita terms. Other
public safety, health and parks & recreation show a recovery from their drop in the initial post-
Proposition 13 fiscal year, and public works expenditures decline a moderate amount after the
strong increase in the initial post- 13 fiscal year.
An analysis of the median per capita expenditures for the sample of cities reveals some
divergence from the mean trends. General government expenditures, for example, show a much
greater decline based on the mean than on the median measure. Police, fire and public works all
show moderate increases in median expenditures, paralleling the mean results. Parks & recreation
and other public safety also show increases in median per capita funding, although at very low
rate. The data for health, libraries and contributions indicate the sizable number of cities in the
sample that do not expend any portion of their budget on these categories. The most notable
feature is the large distinction between mean and median measures for total expenditures for both
periods.
Standard deviations show no particular surprises either, as they generally change in the
same direction and size as the per capita expenditures themselves: i.e., increasing standard
deviations of roughly the same magnitude as the increases in per capita expenditures. The only
exceptional case is public works which displays a huge increase in the standard deviation in fiscal
year 1979 before returning to a more reasonable level in the following year. This result bears out
the previous view of this expenditure category as being characterized by wide disparities between
municipalities caused by one-time expenditures. The standard deviations help explain the
distinctions between mean and median measures of the first moment of the sample.
If the relationship between standard deviations and means is considered, overall per capita
expenditures shown in Table 7.1 seem to reveal an initial increase and then a subsequent decrease
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in the variation among cities. The ratio of standard deviation/mean for total expenditures
increases from 0.45 in fiscal year 1978, to 0.68 in 1979 before declining to 0.53 in 1980. In
virtually all categories however, this ratio remains quite steady over the period under
consideration. The most notable and important exceptions to this are for public works, which --
based on previous observations -- should be expected, and general government. For this latter
category, the ratio decreases from 0.83 to 0.77 to 0.62, indicating proportionally increasing
convergence of municipal expenditures in this category within a pattern of decreasing per capita
expenditures.
Table 7.3 below presents a different basis of comparison regarding expenditures. The
table presents the percentage changes in aggregate expenditures on a total and categorical basis
for the sample of California municipalities. In this stricter measure of change, some of the
previous patterns are not so readily apparent. On the other hand, this basis of presentation reveals
some characteristics of expenditure trends which would otherwise not be obvious. For example,
per capita measures do not necessarily reflect the importance which municipalities would place on
marginal changes in particular expenditure categories; percentage changes in that category would
be a more accurate reflection of the degree of importance of marginal changes.
Table 7.3: Percent C ange in Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Expenditure Mean Median Standard Deviation
Categorv FY78-79 FY78-80 FY78-79 FY78-80 FY78-79 FY78-80
General 2.724 12.683 -3.301 3.757 36.734 53.731
Police 14.646 29.791 4.246 19.873 58.595 52.634
Fire 3.511 27.799 0.697 18.817 51.366 103.269
Other Public Safety 45.987 120.028 4.372 17.005 367.607 927.179
Public Works 20.938 31.823 9.927 21.969 70.258 65.709
Health -0.589 62.448 -3.590 -25.887 132.103 427.662
Library -8.406 -5.358 -8.380 -2.864 33.781 28.055
Parks & Recreation 20.812 100.112 -2.487 9.234 182.916 638.053
Contributions 752.250 1371.993 -71.873 -100.000 5703.818 5983.474
Total 5.457 14.202 0.877 11.662 27.043 26.321
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
There are relationships of some importance to note from the data presented in Table 7.3.
First, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean in all cases is quite large indicating that there
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is a sizable difference in percentage changes among cities in the first two years after Proposition
13 -- much larger, in fact, than per capita differences shown in Table 7.1. The standard deviation
in relation to the mean is particularly sizable for the change between fiscal years 1978 and 1979.
For the period between fiscal years 1978 and 1980, however, the ratio of standard deviation to
mean drops somewhat for all (save one) expenditure categories and for total expenditures. This
dynamic suggests that the period of disarray continued (but declined in magnitude) throughout the
two-year period following the passage of the Proposition. In terms of total expenditures, on the
other hand, there was a steep decline in the ratio suggesting a trend towards more uniformity.
This should not be overstated since the standard deviation is still quite large; however, the
appearance of a trend is important.
Second, a comparison of mean and median percentage changes reveals quite different
patterns of reactions in the immediate post- 13 era. Whereas only the health and library categories
display a mean percentage decline from fiscal year 1978 to 1979, those two expenditure
categories plus general government, parks & recreation and contributions all display median
percentage declines. As suggested by the large measure of variation, the large mean percentage
changes in other categories such as public works, other public safety and police also stand in
contrast to the less dramatic median changes. Furthermore, total expenditures are basically flat in
median terms in the initial post-13 fiscal year while showing growth in mean terms. This
relationship between mean and median measures continues into the two-year period, with the
categories of health, libraries and contributions all continuing to decline. Overall, the relationship
between mean and median figures continues into the second post-Proposition 13 fiscal year,
indicating that the adjustment period continued at least through the period analyzed here.
Third, a comparison of the summary statistics presented in Table 7.2 with those in Table
7.3 reveals certain differences in magnitudes and even, on occasion, directions of change; but
certain consistencies emerge as well. During the initial year the decline in general government
expenditures seems fairly consistent, although this is much more dramatic on a per capita rather
than a percentage basis. Declines in the health and library expenditures also appear to be
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consistent during this initial year. Similarly, police and fire show consistent increases during fiscal
years one and two following the adoption of the Proposition. In the second period, most
categories show an increase in expenditures based on both measures of change. Again, the
exceptions to this pattern are familiar; health, libraries, general government and contributions all
display declines as indicated by at least one measure and usually both.
Based on general observations of the summary statistics, the passage of Proposition 13
ushered in a period of uncertainty for most municipalities. There appears to be somewhat
increased variation among municipalities in terms of most expenditure categories. Significant
distinctions between mean and median measures indicates the presence of extreme values in
certain cases. This seems to lessen somewhat for the two-year period, especially for total
expenditures. The turmoil and uncertainty is accompanied by unambiguous declines in general
government expenditures (according to most measures). While cities cut back on expenditure
categories differentially to meet new fiscal realities, many seemed to have agreed on general
expenditures as a common means of reduction.
Relative Magnitudes of Expenditure Changes
The previous discussion and data presented in Tables 7.1 through 7.3 suggest the presence
of certain expenditure trends in the post- 13 environment; however, the inherent limitations in this
type of data presentation leave certain important issues unanswered. One crucial question that
has escaped the method of analysis employed thus far is similar to the issue raised in the
investigation of revenues in Chapter 6: which expenditures bore most of the burden for
expenditure reductions in the initial post-13 fiscal years? Percentage changes cannot measure this
since they do not account for the relative importance of the expenditure category. Per capita
calculations similarly do not directly address the issue of which categories borne most of the
burden.
In order to measure the relative burden borne by each expenditure category a separate set
of calculations was made. The change in each expenditure category was computed as a
percentage of the overall expenditure change for the first two fiscal years after the passage of
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Proposition 13. Table 7.4 below shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the change in
each expenditure category as a percentage of the total expenditure change.
Table 7.4: Expenditure Change as Percent of Total, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Expenditure Mean Median Standard Deviation
Category FY78- 79 F-78-80 FY78- 79 P178-80 FY78- 79 F178-80
General 34.644 19.244 12.629 11.922 298.315 301.611
Police 15.327 16.692 5.108 14.526 96.420 140.683
Fire 5.698 -8.719 0.172 4.919 79.012 161.646
Other Public Safety 1.615 0.355 0.0 0.616 18.178 23.127
Public Works 24.683 73.801 34.744 43.011 164.317 285.039
Health -0.508 3.079 0.0 0.0 7.062 20.960
Library 3.977 1.477 0.0 0.0 37.142 33.092
Parks & Recreation 59.593 -4.110 4.693 4.697 431.567 186.637
Contributions -45.027 -1.818 0.0 0.0 401.027 124.224
Notes: Nominal dollars. Number of observations is 130.
On initial review, the data presented in Table 7.4 appears to be somewhat in conflict with
the data shown in the previous three tables. Those categories which appeared to be in decline in
the post-13 era, most notably general government, seem to be increasing according to the mean
figures shown in Table 7.3. This contradiction can be resolved by considering two distinct
features of the data shown above. First, the sharp distinctions between the mean and median
figures indicate that the mean measure of the first moment is strongly influenced by the presence
of outliers. This is shown most clearly by the figures for general government; the median share of
overall expenditure changes is far below that of the mean share. This wide variation is confirmed
by the standard deviation.
Second, the percentage of the total expenditure changes borne by each expenditure
category should be viewed in relationship to that particular category's contribution to overall
spending.3 For example, general government accounted for roughly 30% of spending for fiscal
year 1978, and accounted for approximately the same proportion (34.6%) of the total expenditure
change from 1978-79. For the second two-year period, however, its proportion of the
3 The composition of total expenditures for fiscal year 1978 was as follows: general (30.4%),
police (18.7%), fire (9.7%), other public safety (1.6%), public works (24.5%), health (0.4%),
libraries (1.9%), parks & recreation (10.3%), contributions (2.6%).
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expenditure increase was only 19.2%, indicating the lessening importance placed on this category
of expenditure. Given that expenditures in nominal dollars continued to expand in the initial post-
13 fiscal year as well as for the composite two-year period, the presence of negative signs
indicates an abrupt decline in the importance of that category.
During the initial post-13 fiscal year, on a mean basis, many expenditure categories
continued to receive a proportionate or greater part of the total expenditure change. This is true
for general government, police, other public safety, libraries, public works and parks & recreation.
A few categories, such as fire, received somewhat less than their current proportion, and two
categories, health and contributions, received much less. For the two-year composite period,
rather abrupt swings are evident according to mean values. General government expenditures
drop significantly along with parks & recreation and fire. Public works jumps dramatically with
regard to its proportion of the expenditure increase. The extreme values for several of the
categories should be viewed with suspicion, however, since the median figures make it clear that
the mean results are influenced heavily by outliers.
In fact, the leverage exercised by outliers is an issue in several of the important categories,
suggesting that the median measure of the first moment may be a more appropriate reflection of
dominant trends with respect to the composition of total expenditure changes. Not only do the
high standard deviations suggest the presence of this dynamic, but the median measures are also
much more consistent between time periods. It is difficult to say what is transpiring with regard
to health, library and contributions since a number of cities had no expenditures for these
categories. Nevertheless, the remaining five categories show some interesting patterns. Four of
the five -- general, police, fire, other public safety and parks & recreation -- received a lower
percentage of the increase than their overall proportion of total expenditures, sometimes
significantly less. General government, for example, received only 12% during both periods,
parks & recreation only four and five percent, and fire received zero and five percent -- rates of
increase all considerably below the respective category's proportion of total expenditures. The
difference is comprised almost entirely of the huge gains made by public works.
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What are the data from Table 7.4 generally saying about which categories bore the burden
of expenditure changes? Using the median figures for the two-year composite period, the data
suggest that general government and parks & recreation were used as a means of reducing overall
expenditures, with fire (surprisingly) also showing some decline. Only public works shows gains
in excess of its proportion of total expenditures. The public works dynamic may be due to the
high capital content of public works which is: (i) either budgeted in advance and financed through
debt; or, (ii) financed form outside grants and loans unaffected by any state or local tax measures.
Both of these features would work against it being used as an expedient source of expenditure
curtailment.
The disproportionate burdens borne by the general government, parks & recreation and
fire services categories, on the other hand, are due to both their relative budgetary importance and
their particular characteristics. Given their relative importance, percentage cuts in the growth of
these categories result in sizable savings, and it is their individual qualities that make such
reductions feasible. General government and parks & recreation may have been reduced in
relative terms due to their administrative or non-essential nature. While other non-essential
government activities, such as libraries and health, show relative declines, these categories are not
of sufficient size to absorb much of the total change. Fire services and parks & recreation may
have also lost relative importance due to their high capital outlay components. This quality would
allow for postponement or cancellation of capital expenditures without jeopardizing ongoing
services.
Variations in Expenditure Changes
Changes By Cohort
The data presented in the summary statistics suggest the degree of variation that occurred
in the reaction of municipalities to the curtailment of the property tax after the passage of
Proposition 13. One method by which to begin to further appreciate the divergence in
expenditure reactions is by dividing the sample of California municipalities into two groups based
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on the severity of property tax losses. The severity of property tax loss is represented by the ratio
of property tax change between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 to total fiscal 1978 revenue -- in other
words, the property tax loss as a percent of total revenues.
Table 7.5 below shows the expenditure reactions of municipalities in the sample based on
the magnitude of property tax reductions as a percent of total revenues. The mean property tax
loss as a percent of total fiscal year 1978 revenues for the sample of municipalities was -10.49%.
The sample was split into two groups: those that experienced property tax losses in excess of
10.49% and those that experienced property tax losses less than 10.49%. By dividing the sample
in this manner, it is possible to gauge the extent of total expenditure reactions following the
passage of the tax limit.
Table 7.5: Percent Change in Expenditures by Cohort, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Expenditure Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Category PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49% PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49%
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
General -1.058 -5.041 5.246 -0.637 6.351 3.334 16.904 4.371
Police 12.666 2.342 15.966 6.177 26.728 17.238 31.833 22.139
Fire -3.531 0.213 7.661 1.544 8.970 13.718 38.890 20.154
Other Public Safety 73.222 -1.511 28.786 8.183 222.877 11.336 55.070 19.551
Public Works 15.995 6.360 24.235 13.557 40.629 27.159 25.652 17.716
Health 36.919 3.981 -26.845 -15.024 22.944 -66.948 90.101 -13.464
Library -7.043 -15.944 -9.327 -6.100 -7.997 -5.824 -3.576 -1.241
Parks & Recreation 39.994 -4.560 8.025 4.026 202.84 18.460 31.627 5.704
Contributions 87.818 -87.947 1189.80 -68.713 1445.64 -100.00 1323.49 -100.00
Total -1.536 -1.256 10.120 5.985 13.020 10.251 14.989 12.938
Notes: Nominal dollars. Municipalities with property tax losses-> 10.49
0
ototaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.49ototaled 78.
In terms of percent change in total expenditures in the initial post-13 fiscal year, the data
shown in Table 7.5 confirm the expected response; those municipalities suffering property tax
losses in excess of the mean reduced total expenditures by an average of 1.2 - 1.5%, whereas
those cities with a less severe property tax reductions actually increased expenditures. For the
large loss cohort, the mean and median measures are quite close and suggest a rather
homogeneous response amongst this group. For the smaller loss cohort, there is more
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discrepancy between the mean and median measures, indicating that some cities may have been
more cautious in their response.
For responses of individual categories, reliance is placed primarily on the median measure
due to the presence of large outliers in several of the categories with small samples. In almost all
of the categories, the response of the large loss cohort is smaller in magnitude than the change for
the small loss cohort, and in some situations strongly negative. In the large loss cohort, for
example, general government expenditures unambiguously decline, whereas for the small loss
cohort, expenditures are basically stable. Both groups increase police and fire, although the rates
are quite different with greater expansion evident for the small loss cohort. The greater reduction
(or smaller increase) on the part of the large loss cohort is also evident for other public safety,
public works, library, parks & recreation and contributions. Only for health expenditures is this
dominant pattern broken.
The consistent pattern of the responses between the two groups is quite striking, with the
large loss group (with one exception) cutting expenditures more or increasing them less than the
small loss group. What is also notable is the similarity between the two groups as well. For
example, public safety seems to be a protected category for both groups, while general
government is either reduced or only increased very slightly for both groups. The category that,
for both cohorts, experiences the greatest increase is public works, which receives a large
proportion of its support from direct project grants and loans.
For the two-year period, the large loss cohort continues to lag the small loss cohort in all
but two categories, public works and parks & recreation. However, the relationship between the
changes in the two groups is generally much closer than in the initial post-13 fiscal year. Given
the fact that the second period is a composite of the first two post-13 fiscal years, the second
fiscal year alone must result in even less distinction in reactions between the two cohorts. The
similar magnitude of the reactions is most evident in the total expenditure change. While the large
loss group shows a gain of from 10 - 13 %, the small loss gain is virtually indistinguishable at 13 -
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15%. Although the large loss group is still on the low side in virtually all the categories, the
closeness, and narrowing, of the expenditure responses between the two groups is evident.
Part of the reason for this pattern of response is due to the effects of Proposition 13. For
the initial post-13 fiscal year, municipalities were affected very differently, depending largely upon
their reliance on the property tax as a revenue source. After this initial post-13 year, however,
municipalities' fiscal situations (at least with regard to property taxes) were much more similar: all
were constrained to a one percent levy, all properties had to be assessed at fair market value and
all were limited to a two percent per annum increase in assessed value. While clearly, continuing
economic and fiscal distinctions would affect expenditure decision-making, at least with regard to
property tax revenues, the effects of subsequent post-13 fiscal years were more uniform than the
initial post-13 fiscal year.
A second important reason for the expenditure dynamic described above relates to the
interrelationship of changes in revenues and changes in expenditures. Recall that in Chapter 6 it
was shown that there was more variation between the two cohorts in the second period than in
the first period. With respect to expenditures, the pattern is exactly the reverse, with greater
distinction apparent in the initial period than the second. This relates to the ease with which
expenditure adjustments could be made relative to revenue adjustments. It is a much more
arduous task to implement new or enhanced revenue streams than to furlough staff, defer
maintenance projects and stretch-out acquisition schedules.
In the initial year, time was short and municipalities hard hit by the tax limitation were
forced into making rapid cuts in expenditures; virtually no time was available for meaningful
revenue enhancements. In the second period, municipalities had more time to fashion revenue
adjustments in response to the property tax cuts. Further adjustments and fine-tuning of
expenditures could occur, of course, but these could be balanced with possible increases in
supporting revenue streams. This overall relationship is evidenced by the moderate growth in
both revenues and expenditures for municipalities in the large loss cohort.
185
Changes By Municipality
A few specific examples may help to illustrate some of the general observations made
here. The six municipalities used as examples in Chapter 6 are again examined in order to explore
various types of expenditure adjustments. Two of the three municipalities chosen from each
cohort approximate the median change in property taxes as a percentage of total fiscal year 1978
revenues for that cohort. The other municipality represents the extreme value for that group. For
the large loss group, the median property tax change was -13.45% of total revenues with a low
value of -43.33%. For the small loss cohort, the mean property tax change was -7.06% of total
revenues with a high value of +0.32%. The selected cities and their respective changes in
revenues are shown in Table 7.6 below.
Table 7.6: Percent Change in Expenditures for Selected Cities, Fiscal Years 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Expenditure Categorv PT Loss > 10.49% PT Loss < 10.49%
and Time Period Hayward Walnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
PT A as % of tot, rev. -13.552 -13.354 -43.328 -7.112 -7.009 0.325
1978-79
General -39.577 -7.966 -3.000 19.498 -8.313 5.500
Police 5.671 -7.163 1.112 4.178 2.988 7.145
Fire 3.176 - -0.161 -16.999 -46.862 6.220
Other Public Safety 14.089 -80.202 -45.215 11.803 42.490 -25.879
Public Works 8.230 -30.425 -48.953 -27.119 65.292 4.631
Health - - - - 16.170 -
Library -26.288 - -44.802 - -16.667 -
Parks & Recreation -3.296 11.752 -20.462 -46.023 -36.479 -34.101
Contributions 130.334 1.620 - -37.653 - -
Total -6.912 -8.531 -16.469 -14.814 8.616 -4.056
1978-80
General -32.726 43.716 -29.002 137.978 -4.106 37.768
Police 16.098 6.564 29.546 21.088 16.123 15.157
Fire 6.097 - 25.091 0.515 -53.325 0.0
Other Public Safety 26.041 -10.793 10.583 24.900 39.345 2.357
Public Works 61.910 18.239 94.134 -23.260 35.281 13.105
Health - - - - 16.807 -
Library -37.666 - -36.520 - 0.0 -
Parks & Recreation 57.254 9.267 -6.588 43.756 -62.468 -44.473
Contributions 134.894 137.240 - -76.250 - -
Total 7.109 20.293 18.950 17.154 0.509 3.221
Notes: Nominal dollars. Municipalities with property tax losses > 10.49% totaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.49% totaled 78. Blank cells
indicate that municipality had no spending for that category.
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Like the patterns shown by these cities with respect to revenue changes, there are not
abrupt differences between the cities representing each of the two cohorts, except for the two
cities representing extreme values. In the initial post-13 fiscal year, five of the six cities reduced
total expenditures, but not in a manner that suggests proportionality with the magnitude of the
property tax reduction. The steepest reduction is for Piedmont, which also suffered the sharpest
property tax decline, but after this the pattern is less predictable. Soledad, for example, increased
expenditures even though its property tax reduction was at the median of the small loss cohort;
Southgate decreased spending even though it experienced a slight increase in property taxes in the
initial post-13 fiscal year.
For the second period, the pattern suggests that year two represented a recovery year for
municipal expenditures. All six cities experienced an increase in expenditures for the composite
period, indicating that year two alone had an even higher rate of growth. Although some
variations occur, generally those cities that reduced spending the most in year one had the
sharpest recovery in the composite period. Piedmont, for example, which reduced total spending
by over 16% in the initial post-I 3 fiscal year, increased spending by almost 19% for the two-year
period. Fairfield, which reduced spending by almost 15% in year one, increased expenditures by
over 17% for the two-year period.
The explanation for the initial dip and subsequent recovery of expenditures has to do with
the lack of information regarding the severity of the tax limitation measure. In the initial year,
virtually all the six cities reduced spending (and simultaneously increased endogenous revenues to
a limited extent as was shown in Table 6.6) based on conservative estimates of revenues. State
aid was a relatively unknown and uncertain factor and endogenous revenues were constrained by
the short period of time between the passage of Proposition 13 and its implementation. By year
two, the parameters of the measure were better known. Cities realized the severity of measure,
had more time to increase locally-based revenues and were more certain of the scope and size of
state assistance programs. Thus, even though revenues for some municipalities continued to
decline (e.g. Piedmont), expenditures increased over the two year period to compensate for
187
exaggerated cuts made in the first year and because more complete information was available to
municipal decision-makers.
Which expenditure categories suffered decreases in funding and which were relatively
protected during this period of fiscal stress? Although there is some apparently idiosyncratic
behavior, the general patterns which prevail appear to confirm those observations made
previously. For four of the six cities, general government declined in the initial year, a trend
which was reversed in the composite period for only one of the cities. Steep declines in general
government for two of the large loss cities held for the two-year composite period. Police
services was a relatively well-protected category, suffering a decline only in the first year for one
of the cities. Fire services and other public safety did not fare as well in the initial post-13 fiscal
year but seemed to recover by year two. All those cities which provided funding libraries cut
expenditures for this category, and parks & recreation also suffered initial cuts, although some
were restored by year two.
The individual municipal expenditure responses clearly suggest that neither the passage of
Proposition 13 nor the magnitude of property tax losses were the sole factors in affecting
adjustments during the two periods. Just as revenue changes in these cities were tied to economic
and fiscal features associated with individual cities, it is likely that expenditure responses too were
linked to numerous influencing factors in the post-13 environment. As one small example,
consider that the cities which raised expenditures the most over the two year composite period
were the high income, high wealth municipalities from among the sample. Thus, it is likely that
not only did the relative severity of property tax cuts constitute an important determinant, but
individual socio-economic characteristics also played a vital role in the process of change.
The difficulty with the process of analysis undertaken above is that it does not separate the
effects of various factors on expenditure adjustments. For example, Piedmont shows quite
dramatic cuts in expenditures followed by rapid increases. But were these decreases and increases
due to the severity of the property tax cuts, the responsiveness of revenue enhancements or
features of the city's economic and fiscal character? These issues can only be addressed through
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the employment of econometric techniques which allow for variation in determining factors while
holding constant other variables.
Expenditure Adjustment Models
Empirical Proxies
This econometric analysis represents an attempt to, explain the diversity in municipal
reactions to the enactment of fiscal constraints as represented by the passage of Proposition 13.
In this section, I present an examination of the expenditure responses of cities to the property tax
limitation measure with respect to the severity of the revenue reductions. In addition, changes in
other revenue sources, the municipalities' own fiscal characteristics as well as their particular
social, economic and demographic profiles are incorporated into the expenditure models.
Earlier discussions of municipal reactions presented information that suggests that the
consistent balance of revenues and expenditures is, in fact, an over-simplification of a more multi-
faceted process. In the face of fiscal constraints, the municipal budget process may involve a
conscious balancing of expenditure reductions with such divergent alternatives as: increased
reliance on alternative revenue sources (including one-time sale of assets), issuance of debt and
utilization of surpluses, as well as reductions in spending. These alternative responses might
occur singly or simultaneously and affect both aggregate expenditures as well as particular
expenditure choices. These various alternative responses are incorporated in the expenditure
analysis.
The passage of Proposition 13 resulted not only in the reduction of property tax revenues
but also the substitution of these revenues with other sources of funds. The property tax is a quite
secure and dependable source of revenues, and municipalities may react to replacement funds in a
significantly different manner even though total revenues remain constant. State aid, for example,
may be considered an unreliable and uneven source of revenues. Local endogenous revenues such
as fees & charges or local taxes may be considered preferable to state aid but considerably less
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reliable than property taxes. This revenue uncertainty or reliability is explicitly incorporated in the
expenditure models and procedure of analysis.
The basic analytical technique I have selected to explain changes in total expenditures, as
well as the changes associated with different expenditure categories, is the use of cross-sectional
regression modeling. The dependent variables used in the regressions are: (i) the change
associated with expenditures in the year following the passage of Proposition 13 and, (ii) the
composite change in the first two years following the adoption of this Proposition. The concern
here is not with explaining how or why different municipalities have different expenditure
priorities, but rather on explaining how the enactment of a tax limitation measure results in
various adjustments in municipal spending patterns. Given the focus of this analysis, the
determinants-based technique I have selected suits the purposes of the investigation quite well.
This analysis employs several alternative specifications for the dependent variable,
expenditure change. The rationale for this approach is similar to that laid-out in the revenue
analysis. In the first alternative, aggregate change is used to express the expenditure dynamic.
Although typically, large cities which spend more would tend to reduce spending more than
smaller cities, this influence should be controlled for by various population-based variables
included in the model. A second alternative, percentage changes in expenditures, has the
advantage of introducing proportionality to the equation, but can also result in an overemphasis
on small expenditure categories. Nevertheless, this approach does capture important dynamics
involving magnitudes of change. A third alternative, per capita changes in spending, avoids using
previous spending levels as a base in calculating expenditure changes, but as a consequence
ignores the relative importance of the expenditure category. This method does facilitate
measuring other aspects of change based on marginal priorities of expenditure categories,
however. All three specifications are used in the expenditure adjustment models which follow.
Since the most direct affect of Proposition 13 was to reduce abruptly the amount of
revenue which could be raised through the property tax, the most important explanatory variable
is the change in property tax revenues between fiscal years 1978-79 and 1978-80. As in the
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revenue regressions conducted in Chapter 6, this important variable is expressed in terms of
aggregate change, percentage change, per capita change and based on the magnitude of the
reduction in relation to total revenues ('relative magnitude'). Municipalities uncertain of the
timing or origin of alternative sources of funding (such as debt, budget surpluses or other
revenues) could react by reducing expenditures in response to property tax cuts .4
As discussed, one alternative for municipalities faced with fiscal constraints imposed by
Proposition 13 was to resort to alternative revenues to compensate for any drop in property tax
revenues. In order to address this issue, a second explanatory variable employed in certain of the
regressions is the change in total revenues. If alternative revenues were readily made available
and were viewed with the same certitude as property taxes, there might exist a closer relationship
of expenditure change to total revenues than to property taxes. The comparative explanatory
importance of these two independent variables relates to the timing, certainty and future
expectations regarding other sources of funding. Total revenues are expressed in terms of
aggregate, percentage and per capita change.
Due to the uncertainty of particular revenue sources, alternative revenue compositions are
also employed as explanatory variables. It may be that municipalities discount certain revenue
streams based on the reliability and consistency of their receipt. Using this framework, total
revenues represents an extreme value which includes all offsets to property tax reductions. Three
alternative revenue formulations are also employed. They are, in increasing order of inclusion: (i)
endogenous revenues alone (as defined in Chapter 6); (ii) endogenous revenues plus property
taxes; and, (iii) endogenous revenues plus property taxes plus state funds (state aid and sales
4 Note that the reassessment of property was not an option for municipalities in California.
Previous law had required that all real property be assessed at 25.0% of fair market value.
According to the California State Board of Equalization, Annual Report: Statistical Appendix,
1976-77, the statewide average was 23.0%. In any event, Proposition 13 called for immediate
assessment of property to 100% of fair market value for fiscal year 1978. Subsequent
reassessment was allowed only for new construction or upon resale. Over the long term,
therefore, variations in the degree to which assessed value approximated real market value could
occur based on difference in real estate activity and growth rates. Such variation could not,
however, come as a result of direct local government reassessment action.
191
taxes). Because of the variation in the reliability of different revenue sources, the results of these
models may vary considerably.
Municipalities may also resort to the use of carry-over fund balances, or surpluses, during
times of fiscal stress. In fact, these surpluses are often referred to as 'rainy-day funds,' to be used
to maintain expenditure continuity during periods of economic contraction or fiscal retrenchment.
The available source of standardized financial information for cities does not track fund balances,
necessitating the construction of a suitable substitute measure. Employed as a proxy measure is
the difference between revenues and expenditures for the five fiscal years prior to the adoption of
Proposition 13, expressed as a percentage of total expenditures. This variable, as more fully
defined in Chapter 5, allows for the estimation of variations in expenditure changes with respect
to existing fund balances.
The last possible alternative for municipalities faced with fiscal stress relates to the
possibility of issuing additional debt. The strictures of Proposition 13 relating to general
obligation bonds (secured by unlimited property tax levies) make this particular vehicle
unavailable, theoretically, however, other alternatives such as special assessment bonds, revenue
bonds as well as non-bonded, long-term debt were still available.' By statute, the issuance of debt
is restricted to the funding of capital projects rather than operating expenses. Given the fungible
of moneys, however, some shift towards debt financing could occur, if due solely to a decrease in
pay-as-you-go projects in favor of long-term debt financing. While such response is possible, the
likelihood of increased debt in the initial years after the passage of the Proposition is unlikely due
to the lack of institutional support for such an immediate reaction. The environment in the post-
Proposition 13 era was, after all, unknown, and increasing municipal debt perhaps the riskiest of
all approaches to dealing with this uncertainty. To complete the analysis of fiscal options,
' For California municipalities, the most common form of long-term non-bonded debt is a lease.
The security provided the holder of the lease is the project being financed, whether a building or a
piece of equipment, and a covenant to annually appropriate sufficient funds to make principal and
interest payments. Leases may be non-securitized, and typically held by the portfolio department
of the originating or lending bank, or in securitized form, and underwritten and traded in the
municipal debt market.
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however, a test for the possibility of such a response is presented. The change in overall debt per
capita between fiscal years 1978-79 and 1979-80 is employed as a measure of this reaction.
Municipalities may also show variation in their responses to tax limitation measures based
on particular social, economic and demographic characteristics. These attributes may themselves
be related in some fashion to the fiscal characteristics identified and discussed above.
Consequently, particular socio-economic traits are included in the regressions in order to control
for the possible underlying relationships between fiscal and socio-economic characteristics. The
inclusion of these socio-economic variables is also carried-out because of a real interest in
estimating whether different 'types' of cities display patterned expenditure responses following
the enactment of Proposition 13.
The socio-economic explanatory variables included here have been discussed at some
length in conjunction with the revenue analysis presented in Chapter 6. Three variables
representing measures of economic well-being are included; residential property value as a percent
of the total, median household income and tax capacity. The following institutional and socio-
demographic variables have also been incorporated: population, population as a proportion of the
surrounding county, population growth rate over the previous decade and municipal tax rate for
the last pre- 13 fiscal year. Finally, a proxy representing the capital intensivity of each particular
expenditure category is used in the individual expenditure regressions
Specification of Expenditure Equations
The expenditure adjustment model I use in this analysis includes variables that can be assumed
to have a direct causal link to changes in expenditures -- specifically fiscal variables such as changes in
property taxes or total revenues. In addition, I have included independent variables whose actual
impact on expenditure change may be more indirect or exist only as a proxy for other factors, but
nevertheless represent socio-economic characteristics about which there is some concern. These are
included because they relate to underlying factors affecting local fiscal health and/or address equity
considerations important in allocating intergovernmental aid. The principal model used is based on
expenditure changes with respect to changes in fiscal factors and differences in socio-economic
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characteristics for the fiscal years 1978-79 and 1978-80. The general form of the equations for each of
the two periods is:
expA= f[rev A, pixAi, popi, growi, coun, incm, resd, trat,, endb, tcap, debtA,, capti] (7.1)
where: expA, = expenditure change forj' total and individual expenditure categories on
aggregate, percentage and per capita basis for i'" municipality;
revA41 = revenue change forj' total, endogenous, endogenous plus property tax,
and endogenous plus property tax plus state funds on aggregate, percentage and
per capita basis for 1'h municipality ;
pIxA = property tax change on aggregate, percentage, per capita and percent of
total revenues basis for /*' municipality,
popi= population in 1980 of Ith municipality ;
grow, = percent population change from 1970 to 1980 for 1 h municipality;
coun, = proportion of population of county represented by Ih municipality;
incm, = median household income in 1980 of /" municipality;
resd, = residential property as percent of total property value for i/ municipality;
trat, = equalized property tax rate in fiscal year 1978 of I" municipality;
endb, = ending balance of thmunicipality;
Icapi tax capacity of th municipality;
debti = percentage change in debt during period for i'h municipality;
capt = capital intensivity offt expenditure category for /" municipality.
Much of the reaction of municipal governments to the passage of Proposition 13 relates to
expectations and interpretations, particularly with regard to the severity and longevity of the tax limit as
well as the likelihood of receiving alternative revenues. These features add a significant amount of
ambiguity to speculating on the likely signs and magnitudes of the independent variables. Nevertheless,
some general observations can be made about many of the variables as discussed below. Generally, the
expected magnitudes and signs follow from the interpretations suggested in the analysis of revenue
changes.
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Changes in expenditures (expA) should be closely related in a positive fashion to changes in
revenues (rev4) in its various permutations, with the largest and most significant relationship depending
upon the certainty with which the municipality views particular sources of revenues. Changes in
property taxes (ptxA) too, should result in a positive relationship with expenditures. Changes in
property taxes would be expected to be significant since the reduction is potentially quite large and
since it may constitute a substantial proportion of the budget. To complete the discussion of fiscal
variables, the relationship between ending balance (endb) and changes in expenditures should also be
positive, i.e., large ending balances represent a cushion and would serve to mitigate possible reductions
in expenditures. The sign for changes in percentage debt change (debtA) should also be positive as this
represents an alternative means by which to finance expenditures.
Many of the included socio-economic variables also suggest certain relationships. It is
reasonable to expect that certain measures reflective of the economic resources available to cities
would be related in a positive way to expenditures. Although some ambiguity exists here because
measures such as wealth and income also influence demand, median household income (incm) clearly
addresses the availability of resources to fund public services and should be positively related to
expenditures. In addition, the value of residential property as a proportion of total (resd) should be
related to total expenditures as well as several categories of expenditures. Tax capacity (tcap) should
also exhibit a positive relationship with most expenditures. Like wealth, however, there is the
possibility that for particular categories, expenditures could decline as tax capacity increased and
private substitutes for particular public goods and services were embraced.
Turning to the remaining socio-economic variables, the relationships become much more
ambiguous and a priori analysis much more problematic. Population (pop) may be positively related to
expenditure change given the greater and more varied financial resources larger cities have available to
them which might be used to compensate for any revenue declines. On the other hand, larger cities are
typically older and poorer and more financially stretched; features which could work towards a
negative relationship with expenditures. Similarly, fast growing cities (grow) may have budgets
attenuated by ongoing expansion of services and capital investment, resulting in a negative relationship.
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If such municipalities have areas specializing in retail development, however, a positive growth-
expenditure dynamic is possible. The relationship between expenditures and proportion of county
comprised by the municipality (coun) would be expected to be positive since relative size would tend to
make it difficult to 'piggyback' on other municipalities' public services. Tax rate (trat) should normally
be positive as an increasing tax rate would reflect an increasing willingness to spend. However, a
higher rate may also reflect the increasing effort needed to expend the bare minimum on public goods
and result in a negative sign.
Correlation matrices for the variables used in the 1978-79 and 1978-80 regressions are
presented in Tables C4 and C5 in Appendix C. Most of the explanatory variables are not correlated to
such a degree as to suggest the possibility of multicollinearity in the regressions. Those that are
correlated to the extent that their inclusion in multiple regression model would raise multicollinearity
issues were identified. All of these problematic variables were tested in a sequential fashion with those
resulting in multicollinearity issues eliminated from the appropriate regressions. The resulting lacunae
have been noted in the presentation of the regression results.6
No strong a priori conviction is held regarding the functional form of the estimating equations.
The linear specification form used in most expenditure determinants studies is used to estimate the
parameters and separate multivariate regressions were run for each expenditure category and for total
6 It should be noted that in all of the aggregate change regressions, the variable for population has
been included despite the multicollinearity of this variable with all the permutations of the
independent variables for revenue change (ptxA endo4 enptA, enpsA, totrA). Population is
strongly related to aggregate changes in expenditures; consequently, its omission would lead to an
omitted variable bias for any slope parameters with a non-zero correlation. If such an omission
occurs, the least-squares slope estimator will be a biased estimator of the true slope parameter and
will also be inconsistent. Since population and aggregate revenue change have a non-zero
correlation, the included revenue change variable will include the effects of population and be
biased. The multivariate model includes the population variable and thus raises multicollinearity
issues; however, these are less problematic than omitted variable biases. In the presence of
multicollinearity, the least-squares estimated parameters will be unbiased although very high
standard errors for the regression parameter will occur. In most cases in the following regressions,
the estimated parameter for the revenue change variable is statistically significant even given the
presence of multicollinearity.
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expenditures. The multivariate regressions include the relevant principal fiscal revenue variable
together with the other fiscal and socio-economic variables.
The functional form of the multivariate models is:
expAo = a, + /3fiscal4, + Jpopi + Agrow; + 4coun, + l/sincmi + /resd + trat, + fendb, +
Jtcap, + /oebt Ai + /icapty + e (7.2)
where: expAg= total or] categorical expenditures for i municipality as defined in
equation 7.1;
a, = constant or intercept term;
fisca/1 =f/ fiscal variables revi or pIxA for Ih municipality as defined in equation
7.1,
6= random error term component;
all other variables are as defined in equation 7. 1.
For both the multivariate regressions for total and categorical expenditures, preliminary
regressions and graphical analysis suggested the presence of heteroscedasticity. The Cook-Weisberg
(1983) test for heteroscedasticity was used to estimate error variance based on fitted values for the
regressions. Based on the results of this test, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected at
the .05 or better for all regressions. White's (1980) method was subsequently used to correct for
heteroscedasticity in all expenditure regressions.
Total Expenditure Regressions
I have argued that in the wake of the passage of Proposition 13, municipalities may have
altered their total expenditures due to the rapid decrease in property tax revenues that virtually all cities
faced. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, for some cities, property tax losses accounted for as
much as 40% of the total budget of the prior fiscal year. Due to the severity of the property tax losses,
municipalities may have adjusted spending in proportion to these losses. To a large extent, however,
large property tax reductions generated substitute revenues from both state and local sources. In view
of the additional planned (in the case of local revenues) or anticipated (in the case of state aid) budget
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support from alternative sources, municipalities may have further altered their expenditure adjustments
in some fashion.
While state aid and local revenues may not have been viewed with the same surety that
property taxes were, clearly the expectation of their receipt would have served to mitigate any
expenditure-cutting activity set in motion by property tax losses. While the propensity of municipalities
to spend may have been affected by the source of the funding, the total size of the anticipated funding
or offsets was obviously of considerable importance as well. The reactions of cities to the revenue
variables would thus be influenced by the respective size of the anticipated funds, the relative certainty
of substitute funds and the relatively uncharted fiscal landscape which followed the passage of
Proposition 13.
The sensitivity of municipal expenditure changes is explored through a series of regressions
based on various permutations of municipal revenues. First, expenditure reactions to changes in
property taxes are investigated in order to gauge the relationship between the severity of property tax
reductions and expenditure adjustments. Given that municipalities could use endogenous funds to
compensate for property tax losses, changes in expenditures are then analyzed with respect to changes
in all endogenous revenues. Since property taxes were still a sizable component of total revenues even
after the passage of Proposition 13, expenditure changes are then regressed against all endogenous
revenues plus property taxes. State funds, comprising state aid and sales taxes, were also contributors
in the post-13 environment; therefore, in the next model, expenditure changes are regressed against all
endogenous revenues plus property taxes plus state funds. Finally, expenditure changes are regressed
against changes in total revenues.
As I discussed, in each of the models three formulations of total expenditure change are
employed: aggregate change, percentage change and per capita change. Their various strengths and
weaknesses have been discussed previously. For this series of equations, particular attention is paid to
the aggregate change model since it represents the most appropriate of the three measures in the short
run. Over the short-term, it would not be likely that population would be altered sufficiently to bias the
aggregate change results. Relying exclusively on the per capita models could result in overemphasis of
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large per capita changes in rather small expenditure categories. Furthermore, the percentage change
model would probably show increases in explanatory value as the revenue variable approached total
revenues, shedding little light on the sensitivity of municipalities to the different gradations of revenue
change.7 Despite the inherent weaknesses of the alternative measures, they are included for purposes
of completeness and in order to provide guidance in situations of ambiguous or inconsistent results.
Property Taxes
Table 7.7 below shows regression results for changes in total expenditures with respect to
changes in property taxes for the first two years after the passage of Proposition 13. Generally, the
regression results are quite acceptable (given the constrained nature of the model). The R2 for the
aggregate equation (1) indicates that it explains upwards of 80% to 90% of the variation in total
expenditures for each of the two periods. For the first post-13 fiscal year, the explanatory value
of the percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations explain between 1/7 and 1/4 of the
total variation; however, this improves to roughly 1/3 for the two-year composite period.
Turning initially to the results for changes in expenditures with respect to property tax
reductions, the estimated parameters are somewhat in conflict with a priori analysis. For the aggregate
change models, the ptrA variable is negative and highly significant for both periods. The negative sign
is somewhat counter-intuitive since it indicates that municipalities increased expenditures with respect
to decreases in property taxes. The variable ptxA possibly incorporates the increase in revenues
designed to substitute for property tax reductions (in other words, property tax losses are correlated
with other supplemental revenues). Note that the increase in spending is less than on a dollar for dollar
basis; i.e., for every dollar lost in property taxes, spending increased only $0.69. Either complete
substitution did not occur or municipalities were reluctant to commit such funds entirely.
7 Given the variation with municipalities relied on property taxes, endogenous revenues and state
funds, percentage changes in separate categories of these revenues would not necessarily result in
particularly precise slope estimates with respect to their impact on total expenditures. Only when
the 'base' of revenues and expenditures (i.e. total revenues and total expenditures) are equivalent
would a strong relationship be expected.
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Table 7.7: Total Expenditure Change (Property Taxes), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA (4)totxtA (1)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA (4)totxtA
-0.687785 0.421988 0.667083 1.819883 -1.831458 0.243021 0.452055 0.815409
*(- 1.909) **(2.000) (1.154) **(3.730) **(-3.45) **(1.991) *(1.827) *(1.741)
1701.155 -0.020900 -0.1486 -0.022900 27198.09 -0.008430 -0.0595 -0.000117
(0.097) (-1.017) (-1.072) (-1.053) (1.615) (-0.773) (-1.115) (-0.960)
466586.7 0.116837 51.30843 0.086485 251304.1 0.091398 14.56815 0.090609
(1.435) (1.581) (1.222) (1.221) (0.492) (1.635) (0.829) (1.623)
663219.2 0.571554 248.711 0.594454 -313851.3 0.110341 59.65763 0.259783
(0.183) (1.053) (0.936) (1.010) (-0.065) (0.358) (0.522) (0.766)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
-39258.45 -0.967000 -0.7375
(-1.426) **(-2 32) (-0.912)
-757432.3 -0.165846 -275.2037 -0.191439 -368029.5 -0.063578 -153.6013 -0.939399
(-0.929) (-0.748) (-1.345) (-0.727) (-0.406) (-0.536) **(-2.04) (-0.714)
-4.25e+08 -82.39763
**(-3 11) (-1.524)
1178454 0.075638
(1.375) (0.374)
524.6563 0.000168
(0.726) (0.887)
-47.15956 -4.22e+08 -58.39166
(-0.974) **(-3.24) **(-2.52)
0.034568 1694185 -0.046682
(0.188) (1.602) (-0.210)
0.000161 685.7763 0.000117
(1.168) (0.958) (0.609)
-39.97948
*(-1.785)
-0.074419
(-0.364)
0.000094
(0.546)
12315.29 0.004057 0.354060 0.000995 -1268.727 -0.004577 -1.467912 -0.007172
(1.004) **(2.080) (0.931) (0.584) (-0.081) **(-2.54) **(-2.86) **(-4.01)
-643586.5 -0.664828 -241.6279 -0.683162 -1024573 -1.157383 -393.3443 -1.097613
(-0.318) **(-2.20) *(-1.842) **(-2.29) (-0.435) **(-4.98) **(-3.40) **(-4.89)
2496554 1.090519 338.7561 0.656746 1603102 0.849625 238.1263 0.614864
*(1.732) **(2.345) *(1.726) *(1.758) (1.109) **(4.124) **(3.143) **(3.593)
0.8161 0.2731 0.1665 0.2449 0.9406 0.3269 0.3129 0.2749
0.7985 0.2036 0.1100 0.1798 0.9349 0.2625 0.2663 0.2124
Notes: totaA is aggregate dange in total expenditures; totxpA is percentage dange in total expenditures; totxcA is per capita dange in total
expenditures; torxtA is percent dange in total expenditures based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For totxaA, totxpA and
totxcA regressions, the variable ptrA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For toixtA regression, pcA is expressed
in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods. Variables pop and incmn
are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of
observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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-47087.51 -0.0157 -2.0789
*(-1.877) **(-2.75) **(-2.63)
trat
endh
tcap
debtiA
capt
a
R2
adi. R2
The aggregate results also indicate the conservatism in the initial post-13 fiscal year compared
to the two-year composite period. In year one, municipalities increased spending only $0.69 for every
$1.00 decrease in property taxes. For the two year period, however, municipalities increased spending
$1.83 for every $1.00 decrease in property taxes -- a much less conservative response. One
interpretation of this dynamic is that, given the receipt of substitute revenues, the loss in property taxes
in the initial year was not enough to deter municipalities from increasing spending. However, either
cities were reluctant to expend substitute revenues on a dollar for dollar basis and/or substitute
revenues were not sufficient to compensate completely for property tax losses. For the composite
period, however, cities were more likely to expend more new revenues despite property tax losses as
evidenced by the greater magnitude of the estimated parameter on pxA. This may be because the
response from alternative sources of funds (i.e. endogenous revenues and state aid) was greater than
anticipated or, alternatively, reducing expenditures was not a dominant response for large aggregate
loss municipalities.
The results with respect to the pxA variables are equally illuminating in the percentage (2), per
capita (3) and relative magnitude equations (4). In the initial post-13 fiscal year, the coefficient is
positive in all three cases and significant at a high level of confidence for the percentage change and
relative magnitude models. For the percentage change estimate, the coefficient indicates that a 25%
reduction in property taxes translates into a decline of 10% in total expenditures. For the relative
magnitude equation, the results indicate that an increase in property tax reduction equal to five percent
of total revenues (for example, from 20% to 25%) would result in an increase in expenditure
reductions of approximately 9.0%.
For the two-year composite period, the results for these three equations are quite similar. The
ptxA variable in the per capita equation also becomes statistically significant for this period as well. The
coefficients on ptxA in all three models indicate that the magnitude of the response of expenditures to
changes in property tax levels is lessened considerably for the two-year period. Using the percentage
equation as an example, a 25% reduction in property taxes for the two-year period results in a
reduction of only six percent in total expenditures as opposed to the initial year reduction of ten
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percent. Clearly, this indicates the lessening importance of the property tax reductions in the longer
term.
This decline in the magnitude of the expenditure response in these three particular equations fits
in quite nicely with notions of municipal fiscal behavior in periods of fiscal stress. Faced with
uncertainty in the initial post-13 fiscal year, municipalities reacted conservatively in making expenditure
reductions resulting in comparatively high magnitudes in the estimated coefficients. By the second
year, however, the fiscal landscape was more certain: clearly not sufficiently known or stable to result
in a reversal of the sign on ptxA, but enough to reduce the magnitude of the expenditure reductions.
Recall that revenue responses, particularly for endogenous revenues, were also more responsive to
property tax reductions by the two-year composite period. Municipalities thus benefited from
additional knowledge regarding the new fiscal realities, such as the parameters of state assistance
programs and the availability of locally-generated supplemental revenue streams.
Despite the general equivalence with regard to the estimated parameters for the pxA variable in
the percentage, per capita and relative magnitude model, the negative sign in the aggregate equation
clearly requires additional interpretive analysis. As I pointed-out, one explanation could be that the
ptxA acts as a proxy for supplemental revenues. An alternative, and more attractive explanation,
relates to measurement alternatives. Municipalities experiencing large aggregate losses in property
taxes may be quite different than those experiencing large percentage losses. The large aggregate loss
municipalities are also the larger and poorer municipalities. The nature of their budgetary constraints
may be such that reductions in expenditures was simply not a feasible option in response to property
tax reductions.
In moving from the one-year to the two-year period, the explanatory value of the entire
equation increases in all cases. This suggests the re-emergence of other factors in influencing changes
in expenditure levels. Many of the included socio-economic variables are significant in year one, but
they generally improve their statistical significance over the two-year period. With respect to the
variables relating to economic well-being, the results are somewhat mixed. Tax capacity (tcap), for
example, has an expected positive sign, but is statistically insignificant in both periods. Household
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income (incm), surprisingly, has a negative effect on expenditure change and is significant in five of the
six equations in which it is used. The magnitude of the effect, however, is generally quite small; for
example, for the one-year period, an increase in the median household income of $1,000 translates into
a reduction in expenditures of only 1.5%.
The negative sign on income conflicts with dominant notions of public expenditures and the
expenditure change variable used in the models presented here. What this measure of income may be
incorporating however, are more complex and interrelated factors at the local level. High income may
be difficult to translate into additional revenues in the short-term, particularly at the municipal level
where direct income-based revenues sources (such as the income tax) are not available. A longer
duration of time may be required for income to exercise its influence on spending. The weak results for
residential proportion of property value (resd) may also be due to this gradual readjustment process.
Here again the sign is negative (although not generally significant) which may indicate the difficulty of
raising alternative revenues in cities with a high proportion of residential property.
None of the population-based and demographic variables is statistically significant at a
reasonable level. The last post-13 tax rate (trat) has an expected negative sign, indicating that
municipalities with higher rates reduced expenditures more relative to lower rate municipalities. The
parameter estimates for debt change (debtA) indicate that increases in debt corresponded to decreases
in expenditures. While this initially seems counterintuitive, given the institutional constraints of
Proposition 13, the dynamic represents a reasonable response.' I have argued that the passage of
Proposition 13 virtually eliminated (at least temporarily) the issuance of debt as a fiscal response.
Approval of new general obligation debt was prohibited and alternative debt structures had not yet
' Additional debt could be issued and secured by property taxes as long as the debt service
payments did not result in exceeding the one percent tax limit. However, this would necessarily
reduce the amount of property taxes available for municipal operating expenses. In addition, such
debt would not qualify as a general obligation of the entity given that it would not be secured by
the unlimited taxing authority of the government.
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been developed.9 The only avenue open to some cities was the issuance of already approved but
unissued bonds. Given that general obligation bonds are typically approved as a group and issued in
subsequent traunches, many municipalities may have had pre-approved bonds as a fiscal resource.
Cities could have simultaneously reduced expenditures and issued previously-approved debt, implying
that the coexistence of debt increases and expenditure decreases is quite a reasonable dynamic.
Finally, the variable capt is statistically significant at a high or reasonable level in all equations.
The parameter estimates for this variable, which measures the percentage of total expenditures
comprised of capital outlay, as opposed to operating expenses, indicates that increases in the capital
outlay proportion correspond to decreases in expenditure levels. Municipalities with high proportion
of total expenditures comprised of capital outlay reduced expenditures more than other municipalities.
The capital portion of expenditures may been seen as more flexible or expendable than ongoing
operating expenses. This may represent a curtailment of maintenance efforts, or the suspension or
stretching-out of large capital projects.
Endogenous Revenues'
Presented in Table 7.8 below are the results of models where total expenditure changes are
regressed against changes in endogenous revenues and the series of economic and social variables for
each municipality. In periods of fiscal stress, municipalities may respond to changes in different
revenue combinations based on stability of the revenue source. Endogenous revenues, while they may
be susceptible to economic fluctuations, have the advantage of being under the direct control of
9 The possibility of municipalities issuing debt other than property tax-secured general obligation
bonds was tested to see if alternative debt financing mechanisms were responsive to the change in
property taxes. The results from the equations were virtually no different from the total debt
equations. Alternative debt instruments, such as securitized long-term leases, developed gradually
over a number of years. Such leases by statute are not debt, but rather require an annual
appropriation of lease payments in order to pay the holders of the lease. Such leases, typically
known as certificates of participation (in lease payments), were issued for a number of years
before wide acceptance by rating agencies and institutional investors.
'0 Endogenous revenues are considered for these purposes to be local non-property taxes, other
local income, fees & charges and local miscellaneous. All these revenue sources are established
and controlled by local authority and based on local economic activity and resources.
204
municipal decision-makers. For this reason, on a short-term basis they are a rather reliable and
predictable revenue source, within political limits.
The sole important difference between the property tax equations presented previously and the
endogenous revenue equations presented in Table 7.8 is the substitution of changes in endogenous
revenues for changes in property taxes for the two periods. Other changes are minor and are limited to
reintroduction of certain variables where multicollinearity has ceased to be an issue and, in the case of
one variable, its elimination for the same reason. The estimated coefficients for the various socio-
economic variables are quite consistent with the earlier total expenditure change model and their
inclusion here is merely for control purposes.
The variable endoA, representing the aggregate, percentage and per capita change in
endogenous revenues, differs in performance in the first post- 13 fiscal year and for the two-year
composite period. For the first period, it is significant in only one of the three equations and almost
significant in another. In the aggregate equation (1), however, it is negative and statistically
insignificant This indicates that adjustments in expenditures were made in the first post-13 fiscal year
irrespective of changes in endogenous revenues. While clearly endogenous revenues were an
important source of post-13 funds, recall from the previous chapter that there was, in fact, little
response in the initial post- 13 fiscal year.
In the two-year composite period, the performance of this variable improves dramatically in the
aggregate equation. The coefficient is significant at a reasonable level and the magnitude indicates that
a $1.00 increase in endogenous revenues corresponds to a $0.75 increase in total expenditures. The
increase in the t-statistic indicates the decrease in the variation of the estimate and its increasing
reliability. The increase in magnitude suggests that cities are spending more with respect to changes in
endogenous revenues. The response is still quite conservative as cities spend less than the full dollar
amount. The explanatory value of the equation improves as well, from an R2 of .78 to .92. In terms of
its overall performance, this improvement puts it on par with the property tax change equation.
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Table 7.8: Total Expenditure Change (Endogenous Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (J)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA (1)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA
endoA -0.0181846 0.2914537 2.610668 0.7498878 -0.0136856 0.1314969
*(1.962)
50021.97
**(2.866)
68641.03
(0.138)
-8851203
(-1.315)
-33636.62
(-0.808)
435876.4
(0.357)
(-0.249)
-0.0001120
(-0.931)
0.0994586
*(1.705)
0.2633466
(0.868)
-0.009930
**(-2.514)
(0.483)
-0.0526
(-0.991)
11.70651
(0.729)
123.688
(1.001)
-2.8553
**(-2.045)
(-0,037)
34223.01
**(3.607)
461192
(1.307)
-3110754
(-0.701)
-39.44678
(-1.255)
-578966.5
(-0.560)
-2.48e+08
(-1.448)
1216648
(1.277)
869.8
(1.191)
20275.85
(1.302)
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
(1.611)
-0.0001550
(-1.004)
0.1705221
*(1.656)
0.5247655
(1.246)
-0.0182
**(-2.597)
-0.131506
(-0.753)
-67.2031
**(-2.082)
-0.1506227
(-0.485)
0.0002331
(1.165)
0.0053954
(1.511)
-0.0915399
(-0.421)
0.0001334
(0.694)
21016.16 -0.0047127
(0.850) **(-2.833)
**(9.295)
-0.0403
(-1.017)
40.7927
(1.617)
23.94423
(0.210)
-3.7915
**(-2.159)
-41.33604
(-0.722)
-3595.632
(-0.417)
0.0363131
(0.380)
-0.8506595
*(-1.856)
-0.664792 -251.2515
*(-1.899) **(-2.200)
0.7141227
**(2.995
0.3555
0.2939
111.1481
*(1.765)
0.8163
0.8004
-270184.4
(-0.113)
-597488.2
(-0.323)
0.9235
0.9161
-1.085775 -373.8507
**(-4.852) **(-3.384)
0.7837133
**(3.909)
328.0585
**(3.053)
0.3013
0.2345
0.4082
0.3572
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-1.12e+08 -61.68933
(-0.507) **(-2.562)
-0.0699935 -130.8345
(-0.595) **(-2.148)
2807739
**(2.162)
707.3043
(0.890)
-24344.97
*(-1.940)
0.0564417
(0.659)
1.38347
(1.568)
capt
a
R2
adi. R2
3135.087
(0.002)
1138896
(0.710)
0.7830
0.7622
Notes: totxaA is aggregate change in total expenditures; totxpA is percentage dange in total expenditures; totxcA is per capita change in total
expenditures. For totxaA totxpA and totxcA regressions, the variable endoA representing endogenous revenues is expressed in aggregate, percentage
and per capita change respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better;
** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in
regression due to multicollinearity.
The similarity in explanatory value for the aggregate change models for both the property tax
change and the endogenous revenue change regressions are reflections of a similar dynamic. The two
equations more or less equally explain the variation in changes for the two year-period. In addition,
they both increase their explanatory value in moving from the one-year to the two-year composite
period. The property tax change does so because of the increasing confidence placed in substitute
revenues. The endogenous revenue equation does so because it, in fact, includes revenues which were
among the stable substitute revenues used by municipalities in the post- 13 environment.
For the percentage (2) and per capita models (3), the results are rather different. In only one of
the four models, per capita in year one, is the estimate on endoA significant The magnitude of the
coefficient and significance drop for both the percentage and per capita models from the one-year to
the two-year models, and the overall explanatory quotients for these models also decline from the first
to the second periods as well. Overall, the pattern is quite similar to what was seen in the property tax
change equation.
There are several dynamics occurring simultaneously during this period which complicates the
process enormously; revenues are changing based on endogenous and exogenous decision-making
while concurrently, municipalities' perspectives on the certitude of different revenues are in flux. If it is
assumed, for heuristic purposes, that all revenues are viewed by municipalities with the same degree of
confidence and generate the same expenditure response, the most complete revenue change variable
should result in the highest statistical significance and best explanatory value; total revenue change
should be the best predictor of municipal expenditure changes.
I have argued, however, that revenues are viewed differently by cities and that these
perspectives undergo mutation and change based on prior patterns of behavior and experience. As a
consequence of these dynamics, total revenue change may or may not be the best explanatory fiscal
variable of total expenditures. In non-turbulent fiscal times, it may be a useful predictor; in periods of
fiscal stress, it may lose some explanatory value. Its more complete expression of available revenues
competes with its simultaneous incorporation of comparatively less stable and more uncertain revenue
streams.
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According to the results here, endogenous revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year were not a
particularly good variable for explaining expenditure changes. The estimates in for the two-year
composite regressions are slightly improved, but the performance is well below that of the property tax
change regressions. Other permutations of revenues changes may prove better variables by which to
explain expenditure changes. In the next set of models, endogenous revenues are augmented to
estimate the performance of additional revenue permutations on total spending.
Endogenous Revenues Plus Property Taxes
The regression results shown below in Table 7.9, which relate changes in total expenditures to
changes in endogenous revenues plus property taxes, demonstrate the intricacies of the expenditure
process faced by municipalities in the post-13 environment. The results also pose certain interpretative
complications. It is worth restating and clarifying what is known regarding the variable enptA
representing the combined changes in endogenous revenues and property taxes. It has been shown that
endogenous revenues represented an expanding and certain source of revenues in the post-13 fiscal
year. Property taxes, on the other hand, represented a revenue source suffering an abrupt decline. The
dimensions of the decline were quite apparent, or readily available, to municipalities by the second
post-13 fiscal year. Property taxes thus possessed the rather paradoxical qualities of a shrinking but
certain revenue source.
Given the characteristics of the variable enptA, what should be expected from the results of the
estimation process? For the aggregate equations (1), the results suggest that the negative effect of the
property tax decline outweighed any increase in endogenous revenues in year one. Given the results
from both the property tax and the endogenous revenue models this comes as no surprise. Both
parameters were negative in the first post-13 fiscal year. Since almost all municipalities expanded
spending, this gave rise to the negative sign in year one. This pattern continues into the two-year
composite period as well. In fact, for both years expenditures changes occur irrespective of changes in
the variable enptA.
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Table 7.9: Total Expenditure Change (Endogenous Revenues Plus Property Taxes), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent FMscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (J)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA (1)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA
-0.3262212
(-0.903)
24640.68
**(2.219)
522140.7
(1.583)
-799473.9
(-0.201)
0.7876227
**(5.789)
-0.0001040
(-0.951)
0.1106348
(1.441)
0.1549966
(0.433)
enpIA
pop
grow
COUn
incm
resd
trat
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tcap
debtA
Capt
a
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-865398.6
(-0.916)
-3.53e+08
**(-2.109)
979371.7
(1.126)
869.781
(1.226)
15163.54
(1.108)
0.0295481
(0.248)
-5.910577
(-0.280)
-0.2051081
(-0.724)
0.0001359
(0.972)
0.0028454
**(2.240)
-288962.4 -0.8684197
(-0.141) **(-2.797)
1961853
(1.192)
0.7990
0.7798
0.3471814
**(2.649)
0.5972
0.5586
1.500871
**(2.193)
-0.0883
(-1.129)
101.4005
*(1.924)
23.61786
(0.156)
-1.4113
(-1.484)
-279.4962
**(-2.058)
0.488802
(1.012)
-338.0442
**(-2.658)
330.8518
**(2.781)
0.5789
0.5504
-0.151151
(-0.279)
86213.02
**(8.680)
248100.4
(0.484)
-8522611
(-1.625)
-24637.73
(-0.589)
-134610
(-0.097)
-1. 15e+08
(-0530)
2099478
(1.328)
1089.817
(1.232)
0.085938
(0.708)
-0.0001070
(-0.885)
0.0977824
(1.593)
0.2206515
(0.719)
-0.009900
**(-2.256)
0.2335656
**(2.272)
-0.0617
(-1.131)
16.17978
(0.982)
56.51216
(0.482)
-1.0298
(-1.334)
-0.0562348 -145.3258
(-0.458) **(-2.162)
-59.75691
**(-2.470)
-0.0872347
(-0.369)
0.0001446
(0.724)
13719.95 -0.0043044 -1.275117
(0.558) **(-2.398) **(-2.952)
210450.7
(0.081)
-766010
(-0.362)
0.9154
0.9073
-1.096711 -384.3577
**(-4.744) **(-3.370)
0.7513479
**(3.613)
0.3055
0.2390
225.7451
**(3.382)
0.3176
0.2713
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-42745.74 -0.006560
(-1.516) **(-2.173)
Notes: totxaA is aggregate change in total expenditures; totxpA is percentage dange in total expenditures; totxcA is per capita change in total
expenditures. For toixaA, totxpA and totxcA regressions, the variable enptA representing the change in endogenous revenues and property taxes is
expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates
significance at the .10 level or better: ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that
corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
The reason for this lack of significance may have to do with the change in the allocation of
property tax revenues among local governments by the state between the first and second post-13 fiscal
years. In addition, it may relate to the fact that virtually all municipalities raised endogenous revenues
(not just those suffering disproportionate property tax losses). As a result, the combination of property
taxes and endogenous revenues instead of reinforcing each other, served to dampen each other's
effects. The results are that parameters are estimated with insufficient precision as to be statistically
meaningful.
The results for the percentage (2) and per capita (3) change equations indicate a positive
relationship between enptA and changes in total expenditures for the initial post-13 fiscal year. The
variable is also significant per capita change model for the composite two-year period. In both models,
however, the magnitude of the response is sharply reduced in moving from the one-year to the two-
year period. For example, the per capita change model indicates that an increase in etptA of $1.00 in
the initial post- 13 fiscal year results in an increase in expenditures of $1.50; for the two-year composite
period an identical increase in the explanatory variable generates an increase of only $0.23.
The overall decline in the explanatory values for the percentage and per capita equations from
the one-year to the two-year models is quite similar to the pattern established in the endogenous
revenue change regressions. These results suggest that the spending response of municipalities was
more closely linked to variations in the change in endogenous revenues and property taxes in the initial
post- 13 fiscal year than in subsequent years. If these revenue sources began to lose their explanatory
power, what revenue sources asserted themselves as possible determinants of municipal spending?
This question is examined in the next models.
Endogenous Revenues Plus Property Taxes Plus State Funds
The regression results shown below indicate the response in total expenditures with respect to
changes in endogenous revenues, property taxes and state funds, as well as in relation to various socio-
economic characteristics. Generally, assuming that municipalities consider all revenue sources as being
equivalent in terms of reliability, adding additional revenue sources to the mix should result in greater
explanatory value with respect to total expenditures. Alternative arguments put forth previously,
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however, have suggested that due to different characteristics of revenue sources that this may not be
the case. The results of the regressions shown below in Table 7.10 lend support to this alternative
conjecture.
The results from the aggregate equations for the initial post-13 fiscal year, as well as for the
two-year composite period, indicate that the variable enpsA is not statistically significant at any
reasonable level of confidence. This stands in sharp contrast to two of the three revenue permutations
presented in prior regressions. The fiscal variables used in the property tax and endogenous revenues
models were all significant at the .05 level or better for at least one of the periods. The results of the
revenue mix with state funds added is not noticeably different from the model presented just previously.
Expenditure changes in aggregate seem to occur irrespective of changes in the enpsi variable.
Here again, the perceived nature of state aid must be an important part of the municipal
decision-making calculus which resulted in such expenditure behavior. By the second-year,
municipalities had more solid evidence regarding the state's intention with respect to local funding in
response to the tax limitation measure; however, this was clearly not enough to alter their behavior
toward it on a composite basis. The equation may also incorporate some of the offsetting dynamics
alluded in the previous model. Despite the lack of statistical significance of the estimated parameters
on the revenue change variable, the explanatory value of the aggregate equation (1) is quite high with
an R of .78. For the two-year period, the equation explains in excess of 90% of the expenditure
variation.
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Table 7.10: Total Expenditure Change (Endogenous Revenues Plus Property Taxes Plus State Funds), 1978-
79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (J)totxaA (2)tolxpA (3)totxcA (i)totxaA (2)totxp A (3)totxcA
enpsA
pop
grow
coun
incl
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
capt
a
R2
adi. R2
-0.1870696
(-0.469)
33708.54
**(8.980)
490936.2
(1.423)
-2052404
(-0.507)
-41826.29
(-1.319)
-740885.5
(-0.712)
-3.00e+08
*(-1.688)
1107075
(1.225)
915.9697
(1.276)
18505.51
(1.242)
1.547513
**(2.689)
-0.0971
(-1.360)
100.9971
**(2.032)
118.4444
(0.869)
-0.673
(-0.644)
-246.7742
**(2.014)
0.8598599
**(2.139)
-0.0002060
(-1.312)
0.1672191
*(1.662)
0.5369314
(1.370)
-0.006110
*(-1.875)
-0.1347651
(-0.789)
-12.38665
(-0.542)
-0.3237042
(-0.864)
0.0002017
(1.045)
0.0016171
(1.487)
-166741.1 -0.818875 -327.3569
(-0.080) **(-2.122) **(-2.493)
1532730
(0.857)
0.7874
0.7671
0.3605092
**(2.033)
0.4224
0.3672
252.2884
**(2.357)
0.6339
0.6091
-0.1158483
(-0.264)
87193.45
**(6.507)
262964.8
(0.496)
-8413532
(-1.611)
-25.35586
(-0.604)
-199201.4
(-0.132)
-1.3 1e+08
(-0.571)
2115352
(1.345)
1108.613
(1.266)
13195.82
(0.530)
133788.4
(0.051)
-618285.3
(-0.257)
0.9153
0.9072
0.5494758
**(3.276)
-0.00008820
(-0.771)
0.0445424
(0.688)
0.0914232
(0.296)
-0.007360
**(-1.991)
0.3336641
**(2.253)
-0.059
(-1.117)
25.65662
(1.437)
39.90151
(0.376)
-1.0247
(-1.415)
0.0194926 -146.6008
(0.160) **(-2.368)
-39.69755
(1.598)
0.0783804
(0.345)
0.0001437
(0.717)
-0.0032441 -1.178983
*(1.883) **(-2.896)
-1.016992 -381.1749
**(-4.608) **(-3.381)
0.4898598
**(2.437)
0.3720
0.3119
218.8947
**(3.602)
0.3790
0.3369
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0.1309991
(0.281)
Notes: totxaA is aggregate change in total expenditures; totpA is percentage change in total expenditures; toixcA is per capita change in total
expenditures. For totxaA toixpA and toxcA regressions, the variable enpsA representing the change in endogenous revenues, property taxes and state
funds is expressed in aggregate. percentage and per capita change respectively. Variables pop and inem are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. *
indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate
that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
In contrast to the aggregate equations, the revenue change variable is significant in all four
versions of the percentage (2) and per capita (3) models. Both models suggest rather conservative
behavior on the part of municipalities. Per capita increases in spending were a fraction of the increase
in revenues. Percentage increases were also less than the percent increase in revenues from all included
sources. In year one, expenditures increased 8.5% for every 10% increase in revenues; for the two
year period, the comparable figure was 5.5%. Again, as in previous model, the percentage and per
capita variations lose explanatory value from the one-year to the two-year period.
Total Revenues
The final permutation used to explain total expenditure change uses the total change in
revenues on an aggregate, percentage and per capita basis. The results of these regressions are
presented in Table 7.11 below. In all cases and for both periods, the estimated parameters for total
revenue change are statistically significant and show the expected positive sign; increases in total
revenues give rise to increases in total expenditures. This in and of itself is not terribly surprising, but
what is more interesting are the trends that are indicated by some of the results.
In the aggregate change equations (1), an increase in total revenues the first year of $1.00 gives
rise to a rather conservative increase of only $0.70. This less than dollar for dollar response is a
reasonable one given the amount of fiscal turmoil stemming from the passage of Proposition 13. In the
two-year composite model, however, instead of a further loosening of the propensity to spend, the
aggregate equations indicate that municipalities further tightened their budgets, expending only $0.40
for every additional dollar received. The variable is not measured as precisely as in year one, but still
retains its statistical significance.
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Table 7.11: Total Expenditure Change (Total Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA (1)totxaA (2)totxpA (3)totxcA
totrA 0.703417 0.3500704 0.6598678 0.3918366 0.9358985 0.5926512
**(6.184)
27646.08
**(6.152)
388485.6
(1.403)
-4646676
(-1.099)
*(1.771)
-0.0002200
(-1.415)
0.2228276
**(2.183)
0.4821376
(1.239)
-12503.0 -0.009560
(-0.556) **(-2.599)
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
Capt
a
R2
adi. R 2
-0.2151432
(-1.175)
-15.39301
(-0.609)
-0.5884837
(-1.495)
0.0002169
(1.053)
0.001427
(1.149)
**(5.953)
-0.0648
(-1.601)
55.60441
**(2.211)
158.439
(1.096)
-1.4851
(-1.611)
-124.8465
**(-2.062)
0.0845493
**(1.984)
0.2144452
(0.564)
-473211.7 -0.9286564 -335.6079
(-0.336) **(-2.533) **(-2.279)
-594068.1
(-0.574)
0.8489
0.8344
0.5498415
**(2.543)
0.4163
0.3604
152.9525
**(2.688)
0.8215
0.8077
**(2.226)
75179.27
**(7.909)
12228.84
(0.026)
-1.08e+08
*(-1.697)
-16046.55
(-0.348)
605177.4
(0.466)
5.21 e+08
(0.223)
2759890
**(2.092)
758.5216
(0.850)
23532.41
(0.869)
**(5.852)
-0.00003070
(-0.404)
-0.0107741
(-0.213)
-0.0955
(-0.482)
-0.003250
(-1.290)
0.0392983
(0.445)
-12.57851
(-0.703)
0.2884377
(1.563)
0.0000185
(0.101)
-0.0025192
**(1.998)
1833284 -0.4256836
(0.739) **(-2.043)
-2291563
(-1.068)
0.9218
0.9143
0.2284797
(1.605)
0.5739
0.5331
214
**(2.908)
-0.0382
(-1.062)
29.4262
(1.485)
-10.36665
(-0.162)
-1.8083
**(-2.123)
-103.9313
*(- 1.788)
-167613.8
(-0.234)
9.05e+08
(0.675)
361449.3
(0.424)
408.1042
(0.728)
15195.3
(1.330)
0.1022484
(0.847)
-0.7153567
*(-1.725)
-239.6297
**(-2.325)
158.5375
**(2.528)
0.5705
0.5374
Notes: totxaA is aggregate dange in total expenditures; totxpA is percentage dange in total expenditures; totxcA is per capita dange in total
expenditures. For totxaA totxpA and totxcA regressions, the variable totrA representing the dange in total revenues is expressed in aggregate.
percentage and per capita dange respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level
or better ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not
included in regression due to multicollinearity.
What has caused this decrease in the expenditure response? The abrupt increase in
conservatism may well be due to the timing of the implementation of the property tax reductions as
well as the view cities held of supplemental revenues in the current fiscal year and in the future. The
property tax cuts may have been enacted at such a rapid pace as to limit even the expenditure
responses of municipalities in the first year. Recall from the discussion in Chapter 2 that Proposition 13
was passed mere weeks prior to the beginning of a new fiscal year for California cities (July 1). While
foresighted municipalities may have prepared alternative budgets -- based on both approval and
rejection of the Proposition -- other cities may have simply carried-on with the usual budgeting
procedures. The indication of increased fiscal conservatism in the two-year period may simply be
reflective of the increased time allowed to scale-back expenditures in view of the new fiscal constraints.
By the second post-I 3 fiscal year (as reflected in the composite regressions), municipalities had more
time to deliberate over possible expenditure changes and made what they saw as the appropriate
adjustments.
The decrease in the propensity to expend additional revenues may also have in reaction to a
new appreciation of the fiscal realities faced by municipalities in the post-13 environment. If new
revenue sources, whether endogenous revenues or state aid, were viewed as being unreliable,
dependent on political decision-making or subject to reduction or curtailment at any time, municipal
officials would be reluctant to include such funds in any continuing budgetary fashion. Instead, such
additional revenues may have been used for replenishing fund balances. This is not necessarily in
conflict with the property tax change results; municipalities might react increasingly aggressively with
respect to property tax cuts while maintaining conservatism with respect to total revenues.
The pattern for the per capita change model (3) is quite similar to that of aggregate change.
Again the response the first year is conservative, with municipalities expending only $0.66 for every
additional $1.00 received on a per capita basis. For the two-year composite regression, this propensity
to spend also decreases to $0.59 for every $1.00 increase in revenues. For the percentage change
models (2), a somewhat different relationship holds. Again, fiscal conservatism prevails in the initial
post-13 fiscal year with only a 3.5% increase in expenditures for every 10% increase in total revenues;
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but the two-year regressions indicate an increase in expenditures to almost on parity with percentage
increases in revenues.
The reason for this slight divergence in results may be due to ongoing differences between
revenues and expenditures that exist due to the use of fund balances and debt issuance. While it would
be expected that over the medium and long term municipal revenues and expenditures would move in
tandem, short term dislocations can occur with considerable regularity. The slight aberration of the
results of the percentage model from the aggregate and per capita change models is most likely due to
such a discontinuity. Such distinctions may also stem from the divergent methods of measurement.
Analysis of Total Expenditure Regressions
For all of the different revenue change combinations, the aggregate models perform equally
well based on their overall explanatory value. In the initial post-13 fiscal year, all explain upwards of
78% of the variation in total expenditures with the total revenue model having the highest R2 at 0.85.
For the second period, all models improve in explanatory value such that each explains over 90% of the
variation in total expenditures. This is due, in part, to the improved performance of the socio-
economic variables but also in some cases because of better performing revenue change variables. As
suspected, the percentage models generally increase in explanatory value as the revenue combinations
approach the total basis.
Despite the high R2 for all of the aggregate models, in only two of the models is the revenue
change variable statistically significant: property tax change and total revenue change. In each of the
other three models which incorporate various endogenous and state revenues, the revenue change
variable is quite small in magnitude and without statistical significance. This indicates that there was so
much movement in these revenue sources as to prevent the accurate measurement of any precise
relationship between these revenue sources and total expenditures. Property tax changes and total
revenue changes, on the other hand, have a more regularly patterned response, and retain this for both
periods. The models explain variations in expenditures equally well, indicating that municipalities
reacted to changes in both of these revenue measures by adjusting total expenditures. The property tax
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change parameters indicate that, contrary to having a negative effect on spending, property tax
reductions led to increases in spending. Why would this relationship hold?
As I indicated, one reason for this dynamic is that property tax change may be acting as a proxy
for increases in other types of revenues. Given that the revenue and expenditure data represent actual
revenues and expenditures (as opposed to budgeted revenues and expenditure appropriations),
municipalities must have been either in receipt of such revenues or be assured of their receipt before
committing funds. The second year results in even a greater expenditure increase for every dollar
decrease in property taxes. This could stem from municipalities suffering severe property tax losses
benefiting from increases in both endogenous revenues and state aid.
The dynamic may also reflect the relative budgetary inflexibility of municipalities experiencing
large aggregate losses in property taxes. Recall that aggregate changes in property taxes did have a
positive relationship to aggregate revenues -- property tax losses led to total revenue losses. The
results here indicate that larger aggregate property tax losses were not reflected in aggregate
expenditure declines, in fact, the reverse occurred. These larger aggregate property tax loss
municipalities may have experienced the revenue declines but were unable to reduce expenditures to
the extent that they otherwise might have been inclined, due to budgetary rigidity.
Overall, the property tax change regressions indicate that expenditure reductions were not very
closely tied to variations in the severity of property tax losses. On an aggregate basis, reductions in
property taxes led to increases in expenditures. The percentage, per capita and relative magnitude of
impact regressions indicate that reductions in expenditures linked to reductions in property taxes were
very slight or non-existent, especially for the two-year composite regressions. Furthermore, whatever
proportionate effect the property tax losses did have on municipal spending attenuated quite rapidly.
For the two-year composite regressions, the magnitudes of the coefficients for all three equations are
sliced by between 30-55%. Given the composite construction of the two-year regressions, this
suggests that in the second year alone, expenditures were even less affected by property tax reductions.
If the property tax regressions suggest that the passage of Proposition 13 did not result in
wholesale reductions in total expenditures, the Proposition's impact may well have been much more
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diffuse and in a sense, more profound. The total revenue regressions indicate that municipalities may
have become much more conservative in terms of committing additional revenues after the approval of
this restrictive tax limit. While the severity of property tax reductions themselves may not have
resulted in serious or widespread expenditure reductions, the atmosphere surrounding the passage of
the Proposition 13 may have impressed upon all municipalities the precariousness of their fiscal future.
They chose to commit the expenditure of additional revenues in a conservative fashion and, as reflected
in the decreased magnitude on the total revenue coefficient in the second period, did so on an
increasingly chary basis.
Expenditure Allocation Regressions
The abrupt break with the fiscal past represented by the passage of Proposition 13 could result
not only in changes in the total expenditure levels by municipalities, but also in adjustments in the
allocation of those expenditures among various goods and services. The summary statistics discussed
earlier in this chapter reveal increases in certain categories over the two-year period (e.g., for police
and public works) and decreases in other categories (e.g., general and parks & recreation). The mean
and median measures incorporated in these summary statistics, however, do not relate such changes
either to the magnitude of property tax losses or to changes in the levels of total revenues.
Shifts in the levels of expenditures on different categories of goods and services can occur for a
multitude of reasons. Reductions in the level of total revenues may not cause proportionate reductions
in the expenditures on various categories but rather differential shifts in expenditure reductions (or even
increases). Such reductions could occur because of the relative value municipalities place on different
types of expenditures. A certain level of public safety services, for example, is likely to be more highly
valued than additional recreation facilities. Increases in certain categories could even occur with a
reduction in revenues if other categorical decreases compensate for such increases."
" As discussed in Chapter 3, differential shifts may not be related to expenditure category's
relative essentiality but rather with respect to its reproducibility in the private arena. Certain
expenditures might be deemed essential (e.g., police) but reduced in times of fiscal stress since
private sector equivalents are readily available. Other types of expenditures (e.g., public works
maintenance) might be considered less essential yet with few, if any, private sector counterparts.
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Differential changes in expenditure categories may also be a result of expenditure requirements
of various goods and services requirements. For example, certain categories of expenditures may not
be based on monotonic functions, but rather on unit changes due to the characteristics of the particular
goods and services. The mix of operating (recurring expenses) and capital (asset provision)
expenditures may be one reason for such unevenness, but it is far from the only explanation. If such
non-monotonicity occurs, expenditure reactions in these categories to total revenue reductions may be
either resistant or seemingly over-reactive.
Differential shifts in expenditure categories may occur even if total revenues remain constant.
As an example, suppose property taxes are greatly reduced but new revenues from a mixture of state
aid and endogenous revenues are sufficient to compensate for the decline. Although total revenues
remain constant, municipalities may view such compensating revenues as more susceptible to
interruption and curtailment than property taxes. As a result, only non-recurrent projects or relatively
less essential goods and service might be funded through such additional revenues. Paradoxically,
goods and services viewed as being more essential might not seem as favorably treated as less highly
valued expenditure categories.
In addition, even though the majority of local government revenues are fungible, with few
explicit ties between revenues types and particular expenditures, municipal finance officials may make
implicit connections between types of revenues received and expenditure categories. For example,
implicit connections might be drawn between property taxes and goods and services that relate directly
to property values. When this source of funding is reduced or withdrawn, shifts in spending might
occur that benefit to more diffuse or generalized government activities.
Based on the numerous factors discussed above, it is readily apparent that shifts in expenditure
categories are unlikely to be based on simple proportionality with revenue changes. Not only are there
likely to be various relationships with revenue changes, it is unlikely that any similarity in reaction will
be found among and between the expenditure categories. The factors discussed above, and their
numerous subsets and variations, are quite complex in construction. Their affect on expenditure
changes in various categories are likely to be equally complex. This is due not only to the nuances of
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the factors themselves, but the potential for offsetting dynamics or more complex interrelationships that
serve to cloud the possibility of definitive conclusions.
Thus far, this discussion has been limited to relating potential expenditure changes to
alterations in the magnitude and composition of revenue changes. Obviously, changes in expenditures
may also be due to changes in the socio-economic variables in a community. Municipalities may
undergo flux and change quite rapidly; consequently, there is no particular reason why changes in
expenditures might relate to numerous socio-economic characteristics. Nevertheless, while the model
employed here is far from a complete representation of expenditure determination, it does include
proxies for a number of essential influencing factors. The inclusion of the socio-economic variables is
an attempt to control for such influences. 12
General Government
Table 7.12 shows regression results for changes in general government expenditures with
property tax change as a regressor. The results of the property tax change model show the
dynamic response of changes in general government which was obscured in the total expenditure
regression results. In the initial period, in three of the four models, the coefficient on ptxA is
significant at a high level of confidence. The signs on the coefficients are somewhat inconsistent,
with the aggregate equation (1) indicating that general expenditures increased with a decrease in
property taxes and the per capita equation (3) and relative magnitude equation (4) suggesting the
opposite. In all cases, however, the response is rather conservative.
12 The expenditure allocation analysis here is limited to the five major categories of expenditures:
general government, police services, fire services, public works and parks & recreation. The
remaining categories of expenditures are all quite minor portions of the budget. In addition, only
some cities choose to fund these activities any level. Of the 130 municipalities, those choosing to
fund other activities are: other public safety -- 124, health -- 34, libraries -- 62, contributions --
68. The contributions category also suffers from huge variations due to the differences in the
treatment of this expenditure category by cities. As a result of this truncation, the analysis can not
be considered complete, yet it does shed considerable light on the major expenditures made by
municipalities in California.
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Table 7.12: General Government Change (Property Tax), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)genlaA (2)genipA (3)genicA (4)genitA (1)genlaA (2)genipA (3)genicA (4)genItA
0.057315 0.099238 0.738376 2.396327
(0.501) **(2.741) **(2.056) **(5.017)
0.035289 0.433455 1.677619
(0.223) **(6.077) **(3.175)
-4541.466 0.000034 0.001360 0.000028 40276.32 -0.000176 -0.0269 -0.000166
(-0.309) (0.366) (0.128) (0.295) **(2.581) (-1.550) *(-1.848) (-1.518)
89855.37 0.026680 1.012221 0.016329 122926.3 0.079878 -7.546424 0.056708
(0.386) (0.431) (0.218) (0.256) (0.308) (1.029) (-0.981) (0.790)
-1348706 0.575512 58.01651 0.578564 -3469596 0.492859 46.73768 0.371494
(-0.405) (1.392) (1.311) (1.384) (-1.193) (1.017) (0.935) (0.764)
ptxA
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1833.306 -0.0118 -0.000467
(0.153) **(-2.16) (0.002)
494126.5 0.144586 -1.80377 0.120856 -90353.29 0.499152 24,1527 0.540498
(0.829) (1.119) (-0.121) (0.893) (-0.148) **(3.149) (0.971) **(3.771)
-1.96e+08 -14.14095
**(-2.24) (-0.741)
1722591 0.188392
**(2.282) (0.916)
-0.000014
(-0.142)
-0.000421
(-0.372)
4.663883 9.18e+07 -34.93762
(0.245) (0.891) (-1.192)
0.197181 1056802 0 190795
(0.987) (0.893) (1.025)
-0.000049 100.9922 -0.000083
(-0.460) (0.202) (-0.607)
-0.107441 -0.002345
(-0.776) **(-2.00)
-0.753865 -111.2189 -0.757171
**(-4.78) **(2.268) **(-4.69)
0.164154
(1.310)
-5.919719
(-0.238)
0.174362
(1.034)
-0.000046
(-0.412)
-3651.747 -0.007301 -0.649199 -0.007984
(-0.528) **(-2.36) **(-3.08) **(-3.01)
-3382052 -1.421616 -174.107 -1.473961
**(-3.18) **(8.837) **(-2.46) **(-8.69)
10.36012 -0.001679 147878.5
(0.666) (-0.015) (0.160)
0.231497
(0.915)
6.650848
(0.262)
0.037712
(0.211)
0.8716 0.2328 0.2499 0.2188 0.8133 0.3669 0.4061 0.3886
0.8593 0.1594 0.1991 0.1515 0.7955 0.3063 0.3658 0.3359
Notes: genlaA is aggregate dange in general expenditures; genipA is percentage dange in general expenditures; genicA is per capita change in
general expenditures; genitA is percent change in general expenditures based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For genlaA,
genlpA and genicA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For gentA regression.
pxA is expressed in terms of the property tax redudion as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods.
Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better, ** indicates significance at the .05
level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to
multicollinearity.
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-0.871307
**(-2.77)
-20448.89 -0.008650 -0.1518
(0.829) **(-3.60) (-0.697)
-238.8117
(-0.327)
6643.896
(0.631)
-1020116
(-1.241)
123336.7
(0.153)
For the two-year composite period, the relationship between property tax change and
general government expenditures changes quite substantially. For the two-year period, the
coefficient on ptxA is again significant in the same three versions of the regression model.
Furthermore, there is much more consistency in the results; for all three cases, the estimated
parameter indicates a decline in general government expenditures coinciding with decreases in the
property tax. The two-year results also show a change in magnitudes. For the aggregate
equation, a $1.00 decrease in property taxes results in a decrease of $2.40 in general government
spending. The relative magnitude equation indicates that a reduction in the property tax equal to
ten percent of the budget translates into a decline of 16% in general government spending.
The reversal in the sign on ptxA in the aggregate equation and the increase in magnitude of
the coefficient for the per capita and magnitude of change equations remove any ambiguity from
the regression results. Clearly, general government expenditures were not a favored category in
the aftermath of the passage of Proposition 13, regardless of the manner of measurement.
Furthermore, reductions in expenditures on these activities seemed to correspond with the size of
property tax cuts on both an aggregate, per capita and magnitude of property tax reduction basis.
Two important issues are raised with respect to these results; first, why did such changes
occur and second, why are the results for the two-year period more consistent, more statistically
significant and of greater magnitude than in year-one. Several interrelated characteristics of
general government expenditures explain the first of these issues. First, if any category of local
government spending is relatively unprotected, it is general government expenditures. The
description of this category in Chapter 2 reveals it to be primarily administrative and overhead
costs. General government activities have no apparent effects or outputs. As a result, the
benefits attributable to general government are diffuse in nature with no clearly identifiable
constituency.
In addition, these expenditures are associated with government waste and excess
bureaucracy. The reality is that, while this may have been true in some cities, it was certainly not
a universal occurrence. Nevertheless, in the context of the anti-government atmosphere that
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dominated the Proposition 13 era, reality was only of secondary concern; the perception of excess
government spending was much more important. The existence of government spending which
was not linked to particular programs became suspect and prima facie evidence of excessive
expenditures.
Finally, general government expenditures may also be a category wherein a certain degree
of administratively induced fluctuation can occur. In this regard, the passage of Proposition 13
may have led to an increased tendency to attribute what were formerly considered general
government expenses, to particular identifiable activities and services. In the extreme case, this
would have left only the most basic expenditures (e.g., city manager salary, city hall maintenance,
etc.) in the general category. Given these intermingling characteristics, it is likely that the
response of general government expenditures is the result of both real reductions as well as re-
classification of expenditures. "
The difference in response of general government expenditures in the first and second
periods, in the aggregate equation especially, is most like the result of the inflexibility of budgeting
in the initial post-13 fiscal year. Given the rapid implementation of the Proposition 13 mandated
cuts, municipalities may have been simply unable to respond in the aggregate with the alacrity
which was called for. Municipalities may have simply relied on existing fund balances or, more
likely given the rapid legislative response, anticipated state support which would allow cities to
avoid the impact of large cuts in expenditures, if only on a temporary basis.
As shown in Table 7.13, the response of general government expenditures to changes in
total revenues indicates a slightly different dynamic. While the parameter on totrA is statistically
insignificant in the per capita equation (3), it is significant in both the aggregate (1) and
percentage (2) equations and indicates a conservative response on the part of municipal
governments for the fiscal year 1978-79 period. The aggregate equation indicates an increase in
" It is also possible that municipal governments might simply have apportioned general
government expenses on a pro rata basis across the range of budgetary activities, resulting in a
decrease in general government accompanied by proportionate increases in expenditure
categones.
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spending of only $0.42 for every dollar received whereas the percentage equation indicates an
actual decrease in spending in response to additional revenues. This relationship changes for the
second period, with increases in revenues corresponding to increases in general government
spending on both an aggregate and percentage basis. The per capita equation confirms this
dynamic as well.
The variation in the responses portrayed in the property tax change and total revenue
change models relates to the divergent impact of Proposition 13. All municipalities were aware
that their budgets would be somehow affected negatively by the passage of the tax limitation, but
were unaware of the net effect given the unknown parameters of the state response. As a
consequence, all cities took this uncertainty into account and reacted conservatively in response to
total revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year. Because the magnitude of the net impact on
individual municipal budgets was unknown, however, or because cities more seriously affected
were simply unable to make commensurate budget adjustments, the response to actual property
tax changes was not as readily apparent or ambiguous.
In the second period, however, municipalities were quite aware of both the property tax
cuts as well as general scope of state aid policies. Municipalities hard hit by the tax limitation
measure now reduced expenditures, with such reductions strongly linked to the magnitude of
property tax losses, according to three measures of change. On the other hand, all municipalities
also were more aware of the scope of the Proposition and based on this additional knowledge
were more likely to commit a larger share of overall revenues to general government spending.
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Table 7.13: General Government Change (Total Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-79
Variable (J)genlaA (2)genlpA (3)genIcA (I)genlaA (2)genipA (3)genicA
totrA 0.4150278 -0.0770643 0.0129034 0.9676644 0.5125178 0.2064186
**(2.463)
32530.29
**(6.443)
-10056.49
(-0.042)
-6865965
*(-1.688)
*(-1.685)
0.00002340
(0.263)
0.000689
(0.013)
0.656454
*(1.694)
5099.601 -0.0105
(0.219) **(-3.985)
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
capt
a
R2
adj. R!
-339429.9
(-0.389)
-2653953
**(-2.903)
0.8430
0.8279
0.1475053
(1.213)
-30.23192
(-1.371)
0.3092117
*(1.804)
-0.0000167
(-0.164)
-0.0001215
(-0.109)
(0.844)
0.002300
(0.230)
-0.0110784
(-0.002)
58.69252
(1.356)
-0.0903
(-0.368)
1.383858
(0.088)
-0.014531
(-1.368)
-0.1335367
(-0.892)
-0.70794 -111.2995
**(-4.927) **(-2.269)
0.2282132
*(1.910)
0.2430
0.1706
6.200578
(0.390)
0.2522
0.1947
**(5.224)
-56206.34
**(-9.897)
-354534
(-0.991)
4893094
(1.271)
-90.4199
(-0.004)
1098588
(1.235)
1.34e+07
(0.101)
1291337
(1.421)
-940.7277
(-1.583)
-6131.543
(-0.542)
*(1.912) *(1.965)
-0.0001670
(-1.395)
0.0161407
(0.190)
0.4323872
(0.934)
-0.009020
*(- 1.744)
0.5762927
**(3.490)
-8.712249
(-0.283)
0.349356
*(1.776)
-0.0001197
(-0.894)
-0.0058839
*(-1.699)
-0.0271
*(-1.679)
-7.82354
(-0.885)
52.14488
(1.075)
-0.2891
(-0.789)
44.77309
**(2.182)
-0.007932
(-0.398)
-0.3490244
*(-1.822)
-142.9014
**(-2.799)
-16.0615
(-0.861)
0.4782
0.4380
-2170461 -1.227838
**(-2.808) **(-7.632)
274698
(0.211)
0.8061
0.7875
-0.0425166
(-0.177)
0.3978
0.3402
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1008813
(1.479)
2.28e+08
*(1.789)
1148611
(1.215)
29.50358
(0.036)
13781.36
(1.150)
Notes: genlaA is aggregate dange in general expenditures; genipA is percentage dange in general expenditures; genicA is per capita dange in
general expenditures. For genlaA, genipA and genicA regressions, the variable totrA representing the dange in total revenues is expressed in
aggregate. percentage and per capita dange respedively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at
the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding
variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
The estimated parameters of many of the socio-economic variables indicates that these
factors continued to play a role in expenditure adjustments in the context of overall changes due
to the passage of Proposition 13. Generally municipalities with higher incomes (incm) show a
greater tendency to reduce general government expenditures, while interestingly, those with a
higher proportion of residential property wealth (resd) showed increased tendency to expend
funds on such activities. Debt change (debtA) continues to show its continuing negative
relationship, with increases in debt corresponding to decreases in general government
expenditures. Like the total expenditure regressions, municipalities with higher capital cost to
operating expense ratio (capt) cut-back general government expenditures more than those with
smaller ratios.
In each of the models and for each of the time periods, the explanatory value of the
equations is remarkably similar. The aggregate equations each explain roughly 80% of the
variation in general government expenditures while the percentage and per capita versions explain
between one-quarter and two-fifths of the variation. This is reassuring both from the point of
view of the validity of the model and with regard to the appropriateness of municipal fiscal
responses to changes in total revenues, property taxes and uncertainty.
Police Services
Table 7.14 shows the results of the regression models for changes in police services
expenditures in response to property tax changes. The results for the one-year property tax change
regressions are rather different from the general government regressions and appear, at least initially, to
conflict with the notions of police services as a protected category of public spending supported by a
strong and identifiable constituency. The trend for the two-year post-13 period is also different from
the general government regressions.
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Table 7.14: Police Services Change (Property Tax), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)poliaA (2)polipA (3)policA (4)politA (1)poliaA (2)polipA (3)policA (4)politA
0.119648
**(3.506)
7700.246
**(4.640)
0.785937
(1.552)
0.000095
(1.078)
0.000593 1.668971 -1.130952
(0.049) **(1.996) **(-6.25)
0.000389 0.000060
(0.248) (0.705)
5777.879
(1.096)
0.538927 -0.107998
(1.485) **(-4.18)
0.000118 0.004070
(1.162) (0.924)
0.941790
(1.553)
0.000055
(0.557)
95518.26 0.025404 -1.535332 -0.009748 53021.26 -0.047820 -3.575153 -0.040238
(1.520) (0.315) (-0.606) (-0.109) (0.269) (-0.703) *(-1.965) (-0.692)
-245392.7 -1.482168 -23.41161 -1.359777 -767473 -0.797164 7.297877 -0.501522
(-0.568) (-1.619) *(1.690) (-1.605) (-0.463) (-1.025) (0.701) (-0.823)
ptxA
pop
grow
COW?7
incmn
resd
trat
endh
tcap
debtA
Capt
a
R2
adj. R2
-14191.24 -0.005730 -0.0331
(-1.090) (-1.142) (-0.324)
-182650.6 -0.010283 -7.959962 -0.075125 200414.4 -0.216315 -17.10923 -0.204732
*(-1.855) (-0.052) *(-1.897) (-0.429) (0.631) (-1.178) **(-3.15) (-1.212)
7278119 -60.71004
(0.359) (-1.029)
-279414.8 -0.460577
(-1.348) (-1.106)
186.4173 0.000491
**(2.095) (0.904)
-29.97647 -9.63e+07 -9.445112
(-0.608) *(-1.781) (-0.235)
-0.537496 346526 0.000197
(-1.250) (0.979) (0.001)
0.000467 -46.35858 0.000264
(0.923) (-0.158) (0.587)
0.345481
(0.010)
-0.112508
(-0.282)
0.000315
(0.712)
-561.067 0.002726 0.038709 -0.001232 3925.441 -0.005350 -0.243837 -0.005739
(-0.537) (0.825) (0.515) (-0.380) (0.464) **(-2.67) **(-3.77) **(-3.08)
-473666.5 0.057096 7.14343 0.303230 1856289 -0.214790 -24.35742 -0.041752
(-1.083) (0.092) (0.549) (0.405) *(1.854) (-0.581) (-1.105) (-0.090)
126669.5 1.178288 18.76596 0.602943 -55656.53 0.828525 22.02631 0.581063
(1.108) *(1.957) **(3.929) (1.853) (-0.142) **(2.419) **(4.041) **(2.528)
0.5489 0.0836 0.1417 0.0603 0.9674 0.0890 0.4384 0.0603
0.5058 -0.0041 0.0835 -0.0208 0.9643 0.0018 0.4003 -0.0207
Notes: polaA is aggregate change in police expenditures; polipA is percentage dange in police expenditures; policA is per capita change in police
expenditures; politA is percent dange in police expenditures based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For polhaA, polipA and
policA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. For politA regression, ptxA is
expressed in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for both periods. Variables
pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates sigificance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or
better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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-1485.49 -0.0143 -0.3166
(-0.816) **(-2.03) *(-1.709)
Before analyzing the police service results, it is worth reviewing briefly the characteristics
of police services expenditures. As alluded to, public safety expenditures, while not sacrosanct,
are largely considered an essential government expenditure. Compared with recreation or cultural
expenditures, they are placed in a more protected category. On the other hand, they may also be
among the easily replicable by private concerns. Fixed costs are relatively low and recipients of
services are relatively easily limited, although some spillover benefits are obviously present in
most cases. Costs of police service are driven largely by salaries with capital costs a mere three to
four percent of total expenditures.
In the initial post-13 fiscal year, Table 7.14 indicates that the parameter on ptxA is
significant in only the aggregate change (1) and relative magnitude (4) equations. In both cases,
the sign is positive, indicating that decreases in police services occurred in tandem with decreases
in property taxes. This dynamic conflicts with the protected notion of police services detailed
above. Although in the long-term, the replicability of police services by the private sector could
explain this dynamic, it is unlikely, indeed highly improbable, that this characteristic could explain
a short-term response. However, it should be noted that despite the rather disconcerting positive
sign, the magnitude of change indicated by the aggregate model shows a quite conservative
response; a $1.00 decrease in property taxes corresponds to a decrease in police services of only
$0.11.
While this initial post-13 reaction may simply be due to factors which are not controlled
for in the equation, they may also be the result of postponing certain expenditures. I have argued
that general government expenditures increased along with decreases in property taxes simply
because municipalities had inadequate preparation time to revamp expenditure patterns in the first
year. While this argument should also extend to police services, actions such as postponing
simple capital acquisitions (as opposed to more complex multi-phased capital expenditures or
even more intricate staffing decisions) are relatively easy to implement in a short period of time.
Capital needs for police services largely consists of vehicles and communication, command and
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control systems (C3), the acquisition of both of which are easily postponed by extending the
operating life of existing systems.
The two-year composite period results in strikingly different dynamics between property
tax losses and police service expenditures. Again, two of the four models result in statistically
significant estimates for the coefficient on ptxA (aggregate and per capita) and, equally important,
show a sign change. In both cases, a decrease in property taxes results in increases in police
services expenditures; viz, an aggregate decrease in property taxes of $1.00 results in an increase
of $1.13 in police services expenditures. The ptxA variable in the relative magnitude equation is
still positive, but a change in response is evident here too, with a decline in the magnitude and
statistical significance of the coefficient.
Clearly, some of the shift in response must be due to the additional period of time for
municipalities to adjust expenditure patterns in view of the new fiscal constraints. Police services
were favored disproportionately after the passage of Proposition 13 and funded by cuts in other
expenditures, such as general government. Part of the shift may also be explained by a 'bounce-
back' from the expenditure cuts in the initial post-13 fiscal year. Finally, recall that state aid was
contingent on a maintenance of effort requirement by municipal governments with regard to
public safety expenditures. A strong counter-response by the very cities experiencing steep
property tax reductions may have occurred to ensure the continued flow of state aid.
The results of the police services equations based on changes in total revenues, shown
below in Tables 7.15, tell a slightly different tale. In the initial post-13 fiscal year, police service
expenditures are largely unresponsive to changes in the level of overall revenues. Although the
coefficient on ptxA is significant at an acceptable level in the per capita equation (3), the
magnitude is quite small, indicating an increase of $0.005 for every $1.00 increase in total
revenues. For the two-year composite period, the results are not much different for two of the
models, although the aggregate equation (1) does indicate decreases in expenditures
corresponding to increases in total revenues.
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Table 7.15: Police Services Change (Total Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (])poliaA (2)polipA (3)policA (J)poliaA (2)polipA (3)policA
totrA 0.0275871 -0.0156925 0.0046959 -0.1896369 0.1042833 -00096257
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
capt
a
R2
adj. R2
(1.304)
1861.866
**(3.461)
94678.35
(1.618)
339691.6
(0.692)
-1310.72
(-0.518)
-202405.8
*(-1.773)
-1. 1Oe+07
(-0.473)
-216109.9
(-1.560)
124.621
(1.277)
-2261.18
(-1.536)
-722349
*(-1.823)
277995.4 0.8815607
*(1.683) **(2.094)
0.4453
0.3923
0.0616
-0.0281
*(1.760) **(-2.479)(-0.228)
0.00006090
(0.642)
0.0081758
(0.099)
-1.278846
(-1.538)
-0.0165
**(-2.057)
-0.0723881
(-0.394)
-69.74608
(-1.147)
-0.5208275
(-1.065)
0.0004783
(0.902)
0.001266
(0.412)
0.4925488
(0.632)
0.001040
(0.651)
-2.672533
(-0.970)
-21.50858
(-1.581)
-0.3972
**(-2.034)
-2. 199441
(-0.461)
0.0102393
*(1.728)
0.0656602
(0.864)
2.758909
(0.252)
13.64279
**(2.196)
0.1894
0.1270
(0.646)
0.00005280
(0.523)
-0.0364337
(-0.662)
-0.461161
(-0.791)
-0.006890
(-1.211)
(-0.392)
0.005090
(1.205)
-1.506669
(-0.593)
1.496491
(0.148)
-0.005950
(-0.036)
45219.53
**(10. 121)
101729.3
(0.464)
-5552005
**(-1.986)
-9437.163
(-0.437)
107856.1
(0.170)
3.92e+07
(0.365)
443438.4
(0.650)
274.6561
(0.578)
0.0002787
(0.613)
0.0083839
(0.464)
11228.02 -0.0046594 -0.2782967
(0.838) **(-2.396) **(-3.618)
2928316
**(2.040)
-978575.2
(-1.074)
0.1028243
(0.204)
0.6511783
**(2.260)
-26.75423
(-1.323)
25.45198
**(3.212)
0.9322 0.0578 0.3725
0.9258 -0.0323 0.3242
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-0.2086988 -21.77734
(-1.223) **(-2.396)
-11.5203
(-0.256)
-0.0674178
(-0.166)
Notes: poliaA is aggregate dange in police expenditures; polipA is percentage dange in police expenditures; policA is per capita change in police
expenditures. For poliaA polipA and policA regressions, the variable totrA representing the dange in total revenues is expressed in aggregate.
percentage and per capita change respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level
or better, ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not
included in regression due to multicollinearity.
Based on the results from the property tax and total revenue equations, it appears as
though municipalities may not have been in the position to exercise a strong response in the initial
post-13 fiscal year. With respect to property taxes there is a slight positive response in police
expenditures, according to some measures, but no real response with respect to total revenue
change. In the second period, there is a strong negative response to property tax changes and a
slight negative one to total revenues. Municipalities with sizable property tax losses probably
adjusted police service in response to state aid policies, and after weighing the impact of
reductions in other categories. Clearly, such dynamics did not carry into the total revenue
response.
The trends regarding the explanatory power of both the property tax change and the total
revenue change equations are quite similar. With respect to the aggregate equations, by which it
would be expected that the largest proportion of the variation can be explained, neither model
explains more than slightly over one-half of the variation in the initial post-13 fiscal year. This
indicates that, in the initial year, much of the change in police service expenditures is not
accounted for by the models. For the second period, however, the explanatory power of the
aggregate models for both the property tax and total revenue change explain in excess of 90% of
the variation. The trends for the per capita models are similar.
Why are unexplained factors more of an issue in the initial post-13 fiscal year than in
subsequent years? The reason may relate to the fiscal turmoil that the passage of Proposition 13
wrought. The property tax change variable, after all, captures only part of the effect of the tax
limitation measure. Proposition 13 not only led to dramatic reductions in property taxes for most
cities, it also ushered in a period of fiscal uncertainty for all cities. Since uncertainty would be
expected to decline with the passage of time, to the extent the unexplained variation stems from
such uncertainty, the overall explanatory power of the models should also increase from period
one to period two.
Only a few of the socio-economic characteristics are significant with any degree of
consistency. However, the ones that are statistically significant indicate the continued importance
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of these variables in making expenditure changes. Population size (pop) appears to have a
positive influence on police services expenditures, with larger cities spending more than smaller
cities, although the magnitude of the effect is almost nugatory. Higher incomes (mcm) and higher
residential proportion (resd) have negative effects on police services spending. Debt change
(debtA) continues to have a negative effect on spending, with increases in debt and decreases in
spending occurring concurrently.
Fire Services
The regression results for changes in fire services expenditures with respect to changes in
property taxes and total revenues are shown below in Tables 7.16 and 7.17. The similarities of both
sets of regressions with the police services regressions presented in the previous section are quite
striking. While given the parallel purpose of police and fire services some similarities would be
expected, the budget trends implied by the results suggest almost uniformity in the treatment of public
safety expenditures in the aftermath of Proposition 13.
The property tax change regressions in the initial post-13 fiscal year show rather mixed
results, but overall imply that expenditures on fire services were either stable with respect to
property tax reductions or suffered a slight decrease. In all four of the models, the sign on ptxA is
positive indicating decreases in fire services expenditures along with property tax declines. In the
aggregate equation (1) and the relative magnitude equation (4) the coefficient is insignificant. For
the other two equations, the reaction of fire expenditures reflect a moderate responsiveness; for
example a ten percent decline in property taxes results in a 12% decline in fire expenditures.
Like police services, fire expenditures represent vital public services which should be
largely protected from large reductions. Unlike police services, however, fire protection is not a
service which is easily replaced by market activities. In addition, fire expenditures tend to be
much more capital intensive than police services. As a percent of total expenditures, capital
outlay is on the order of nine to ten percent of total expenditures per annum. These
characteristics can affect the dynamic of short-term change even for protected expenditures.
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Table 7.16: Fire Services Change (Property Tax), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)JIreaA (2)prepA (3)firecA (4)firetA (1)fireaA (2)firepA (3)firecA (4)fretA
0.020124 1.270903 0.029358 0.963476 -0.843596 0.878103 0.044474 0.369347
(0.641) **(3.218) **(2.279) (1.486) **(-10.5) (1.363) (1.483) (0.226)
-928.504 -0.000373 -0.003590 -0.000427 -5161.748 0.000281 0.005800 0.000147
(-0.691) (-1.538) (-1.020) (-1.463) **(-2.12) (0.728) **(2.625) (0.327)
-202.1078 0.020864 1.387919 0.000886 271463.5 1.122598 2.629444 1.198836
(-0.003) (0.211) (0.749) (0.008) **(2.906) (1.539) (0.813) (1.628)
580933.2 1.508847 15,33611 1.637548 414086.7 0.489249 -7.945645 1.029552
(1.310) **(2.271) (1.212) **(2.144) (0.620) (0.407) (-0.813) (0.787)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endh
tcap
debtA
capt
a
R2
adi, R2
-7279.368 -0.008680 0.0458
(-0.865) (-0.441) (0.199)
-280188.9 -0.424671 -6.706206 -0.360535 -7100.67 -0.434688 -15.5326 -0.391528
**(-2.26) (-1.599) **(-2.34) (-1.042) (-0.039) (-0.673) *(-1.825) (-0.600)
2.44e+07 -61.07407
(1.221) (-0.904)
-165234.1 0.278301
(-1.141) (1.271)
-158.7196 -2.23e-06
*(-1.800) (-0.11)
-47.76535 -8.91e+07 -308.5829
(-0.761) **(-2.67) **(-2.07)
0.060798 -6656.59 2.044967
(0.307) (-0.033) *(1.838)
0.000081 -122.3473 -0.000467
(0.453) (-0.957) (-0.997)
-303.2035
**(-2.06)
1.864123
*(1.756)
-0.000483
(-1.167)
-357.5553 0.008085 0.196453 0.006380 2985.517 0.011792 0.146752 0.005590
(-0.174) **(2.040) *(1.848) **(2.320) (0.534) (1.233) (0.963) (0.779)
-239065.1 -0.833979 -16.48335 -0.903476 -96229.07 -0.648086 -11.42218 -0.757473
**(-2.46) **(-5.38) **(-3.56) **(-6.63) (-0.501) (-1.598) *(-1.767) *(-1.892)
158354.6 1.211055 7.092441 0.563228 304401.3 1.889661 15.61812 1.451541
(1.050) *(1.850) **(2.267) (1.162) (1.220) *(1.713) **(2.141) *(1.763)
0.4026 0.4311
0.3376 0.3692
0.2509 0.3415 0.9730 0.3972 0.1539 0.3818
0.1933 0.2769 0.9701 0.3315 0.0888 0.3212
Notes: fireaA is aggregate change in fire expenditures; firepA is percentage change in fire expenditures; firecA is per capita change in fire
expenditures; firetA is percent change in fire expenditures based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For fireaA firepA and
firecA regressions. the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. For firetA regression, pixA is expressed
in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 change for both periods. Variables pop and mncm
are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of
observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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4006.402 -0.000628 -0.0799
(0.994) (-0.066) (-0.520)
Given the rather low explanatory power of the property tax change regressions in the
initial post-13 fiscal year, it is apparent that much of the dynamic of changes in fire services
expenditures is unaccounted for. On the other hand, as with police services, municipalities may
simply have combed through expenditures in every category seeking to reduce spending through
the least disruptive manner. Postponing or restructuring capital acquisitions in fire services was
certainly one of the possible options. Again, however, depending on the model used as a
reference, the reaction was either very slight or non-existent.
For the two-year composite period, the results undergo a change, very much like the
police services expenditure regressions. The coefficient on ptxA in the aggregate equation now
shows a strong negative response. The estimated parameter indicates that a decrease of $1.00 in
property taxes corresponds to an increase of $0.84 in expenditures on fire services. This change
in direction is not of sufficient scope to affect the estimated ptxA coefficient in the other three
models in the second period, but for the aggregate equation, the parameter is significant at a very
high level of confidence.
The change in the behavior of fire expenditures in relation to aggregate changes in
property taxes is quite similar to that of police services. Given the similarities between the two
categories this is not too surprising and may be due, in part, to similar dynamics. The lack of
response or slight cuts in the first year may stem from the inability of cities to engage in budgetary
maneuvers the first year given the short time frame imposed by the Proposition, although minor
cuts in capital acquisitions may have been a possibility. Alternatively, the relationship may result
from across the board reductions by many cities, making the link to property tax reductions quite
tenuous.
The increase in expenditures on an aggregate basis in the second period, despite
reductions in property taxes, was due to a combination of the protected nature of public safety
and the result of state aid mandates regarding maintenance of effort. The additional year gave
municipalities added time to reposition themselves with regard to expenditures in different
categories. Again, the measured response is apparent only on an aggregate basis. The other
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measures of change show no statistical significance, although there does appear to be some
recovery from the initial cuts.
The results of the total revenue regressions shown below in Table 7.17 indicate that
changes in fire services expenditures in the initial post- 13 fiscal year were not at all responsive to
changes in total revenues on an aggregate or per capita basis. On a percentage basis, the response
was positive, but quite small, with a 10% increase in revenues corresponding to a 3.8% increase
in fire services expenditures. This conservative response may have been due to the uncertainty
that all municipalities felt in the initial period.
In the second period, the results indicate a positive percentage response but a negative one
with respect to the aggregate change. The differing results from the two models relates to the
definition of the explanatory variables. Using the aggregate change model as basis of change,
increases in total revenues led to very slight declines in fire services expenditures, with a $1.00
increase leading to a $0.13 decrease. The pattern is similar to police services, and may be a result
of a more careful review by all municipalities of budgets in the post-13 era.
Both the property tax change and total revenue change leave much of the variation in fire
services expenditures unexplained in the initial post-13 fiscal year. Each of the models explain
between 25% and 40% of the total variation in the changes in fire services expenditures. For the
second period, however, many of the R2 values increase; most notably, the R2 for the aggregate
equations for both property tax change and total revenue change increase to over .90 even though
many of the socio-economic variable decline in significance.
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Table 7.17: Fire Services Change (Total Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (J)fireaA (2)firepA (3)firecA (1)fireaA (2)firepA (3)firecA
totrA -0.0148324 0.3849468 -0.0020436 -0.1324226 1.33775 0.0099548
*(1.799)
-0.0004100
*(-1.659)
0.1410627
(0.916)
1.522005
**(2.097)
0.0104
*(1.910)
-0.5690135
*(-1.918)
(-0.577) **(-2.262)
-0.004500
(-1.146)
2.548721
(1.234)
14.53908
(1.150)
0.0875
(1.006)
-12.2006
**(-2.947)
24039.11
**(9.059)
110821.1
(0.748)
-3101251
*(-1.775)
-17033.28
(-0.715)
-124823.1
(-0.301)
pop
grow
coun
incinf
resd
trat
endb
tcap
0.0013565
(0.576)
0.1182137
**(2.557)
-0.6971468 -16.87321
*(-5.059) **(-4.311)
0.022533
(0.096)
0.4318
0.3700
10.68138
**(2.423)
0.3952
0.3423
*(1.824)
0.0001740
(0.434)
1.079803
(1.645)
0.5828234
(0.483)
-0.0132
(-0.690)
0.0227293
(0.039)
3.26c+07 -241.7581
(0.472) **(-2.036)
160995.7
(0.327)
213.597
(0.731)
2.257735
**(2.186)
-0.0005259
(-1.076)
19620.7 0.0194527
(1.255) *(1.744)
304602.4
(0.980)
-196639.5
(-0.295)
0.9031
0.8925
-1.032509
**(-2.695)
1.074745
(1.255)
0.4243
0.3616
236
(0.429)
0.005260
**(2.423)
4.530672
(1.388)
-9.712045
(-0.906)
0.2038
(1.145)
-19.46756
**(-2.008)
39.35634
(1.179)
-0.7018206
(-1.353)
0.000053 -0.0153613
(0.211) **(-2.349)
debtA
capt
a
R2
adi. R 2
(-0.432)
-1736.896
**(-3.356)
7218.399
(0.118)
715788
*(1.819)
3318.645
(0.788)
-288241.9
**(-2.402)
1.02e+07
(0.405)
-144966.9
(-0.923)
-159.953
*(-1.958)
-650.7421
(-0.297)
-261778.1
**(-2.545)
237471.5
(1.414)
0.4027
0.3377
-0.0142901
(-0.899)
0.076899
(0.882)
-12.12024
**(2.188)
17.76976
**(2.165)
0.2537
0.1885
Notes: fireaA is aggregate change in fire expenditures; firepA is percentage change in fire expenditures; firecA is per capita change in fire
expenditures. For fireaA, firepA and firecA regressions, the variable totrA representing the change in total revenues is expressed in aggregate.
percentage and per capita change respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level
or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not
included in regression due to multicollinearity.
In the second period, much more of the variation is captured by the fiscal variables. It is
quite possible that the reason for this is that in the initial period, to the extent municipalities could
react at, they reacted to the 'threat' of Proposition 13 rather than the effect. In other words, since
the magnitude of fiscal impact was largely unknown in year one, some cities may have cut
expenditures where possible, others may have acted to shore-up essential services such as police
and fire and others may have reacted in more idiosyncratic fashion. As a result, the
responsiveness to actual property tax reductions or total revenue changes, as represented by the
variables ptxA and totrA may have been washed out.
In the second period, the parameters of the property tax cuts for individual municipalities
were more firmly grasped. As a result the variables representing revenue changes became more
important in explaining the overall variation in fire services expenditures. With respect to
aggregate change in this second period, municipalities experiencing the steepest drop in property
taxes, increased fire services the most. This was due at least partially to state aid policies,
although sensitivity to local taxpayers perceptions of necessary and wasteful government spending
cannot be overlooked. The response with respect to changes in total revenues indicates an overall
conservative reaction given the new fiscal environment. Thus, municipalities responded
conservatively to overall revenues but increased spending in this area despite declines in property
taxes.
Public Works
Table 7.18 below shows regression results for change in public works expenditures in
relation to changes in property taxes for the first two years following the passage of Proposition
13. Regressions modeling changes in public works expenditures with respect to changes in total
revenues are shown in Table 7.19. As with the prior expenditure categories, the focus here is on
changes in expenditures with respect to changes in the fiscal variables, with the socio-economic
variables being of secondary concern.
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Table 7.18: Public Works Change (Property Tax), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)pubaA (2)pubpA (3)pubcA (4)pubtA (1)pubaA (2)pubpA (3)pubcA (4)pubtA
0.085635
(0.671)
-0.303113
(-0.604)
2579.86 -0.000483
(0.407) (-0.840)
0.683343 2.089931 -0.338689 -0.300299 0.248785
(1.251) *(1.799) **(-2.87) (-0.752) (1.146)
-0.108923
(-0.110)
-0.114 -0.000500 3300.74 -0.000195 -0.0343 -0.000214
(-0.938) (-0.831) (0.908) (-0.767) (-0.795) (-0.795)
234197.2 0.460600 51.68908 0.439349 108297.3 0.09792 18.22875 0.102794
(1.288) (1.505) (1.213) (1.469) (0.653) (0.724) (1.102) (0.753)
-225290.8 1.245957 137.8089 1.244446 -839145.4 -0.021698 -13.81887 0.052789
(-0.094) (0.840) (0.649) (0.752) (-0.380) (-0.032) (-0.167) (0.070)
ptxA
pop
grow
COui?
incmf
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
capt
a
R2 2
adi. R 2
-16.79479 -0.021 0.0983
(-1.496) *(-1.898) (0.191)
-690675.6 -0.662848 -246.0552 -0.795779 -729236.4 -0.626735 -140.9514 -0.852129
(-1.284) (-0.827) (-1.192) (-0.851) *(-1.825) (-1.562) *(-1.842) **(-2.03)
-2.26e+08 -292.3935
**(-2.17) (-1.529)
-559690.2 -0.721518
(-0.853) (-0.811)
643.6592 0.000707
(0.960) (0.0961)
-218.4701 -2.18e+08 -166.3876
(-1.330) **(-3.25) **(-1.99)
-0.584902 15030.09 -0.264903
(-0.709) (0.025) (-0.423)
0.000462 320.684 0.000427
(0.789) (0.810) (0.839)
-126.1156
*(-1.715)
-0.066724
(-0.125)
0.000081
(0.222)
3188.532 0.000896 -0.259512 -0.007941 -1865.138 -0.008297 -0.645563 -0.019746
(0.680) (0.160) (-0.523) (-1.531) (-0.285) *(-1. 779) (-1.380) **(-3.85)
93349.77 -0.069630 96.62169 -0.054344 -1389888 -0.856506 -40.97701 -0.817492
(0.130) (-0.184) (1.352) (-0.137) **(-2.54) **(-3.61) (-1.197) **(-2.99)
2240700 2.249313 224.1649 1.797848 2103376 1.967167 141.0697 1.689628
**(2.545) (1.465) (1.276) (1.435) **(3.554) **(3.032) **(2.194) **(3.089)
0.1147 0.2192 0.1413 0.1864 0.6644 0.2478 0.1714 0.2043
0.0300 0.1445 0.0831 0.1163 0.6323 0.1759 0.1181 0.1358
Notes: pubaA is aggregate change in public works expenditures; pubpA is percentage dange in public works expenditures; pubcA is per capita
dange in public works expenditures: pubtA is percent dange in public works expenditures based on dange in property tax as a percent of total
revenues. For pubaA, pubpA and pubcA regressions, the variable pixA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For
pubtA regression. ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the initial 1978-79 dange for
both periods. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates sigificance at the .10 level or better: ** indicates
significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression
due to multicollinearity.
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-32721.76 -0.0351 -0.5507
**(-2.44) *(-1.757) (-0.682)
The pattern shown by the public works regressions is distinctly different from those of the
previous categories. Before discussing the differences in these relationships, however, it is worth
reviewing briefly the characteristics of public works expenditures. For purposes of state data collection
efforts, the category includes engineering and administration, streets, storm drains, street lighting,
parking facilities, sewage collection and disposal, waste collection and disposal, and shops and
corporation yards. Clearly, the expenditure category is comprised of both ongoing maintenance and
capital projects. In addition, the expenditure category encompasses both short-term and long-term
capital projects.
Among all expenditure categories, public works has the highest mean capital outlay/total
expenditures ratio at 0.26. I have argued that capital expenses, as opposed to ongoing expenses,
provide municipalities with flexibility in making temporary cuts in periods of fiscal stress. The ability to
reduce capital outlays by postponing or stretching-out projects is a less tortured path than staff layoffs,
reducing fixed costs or reordering priorities. Ordinarily then, due to its high capital/total ratio, public
works would seem to be a prime candidate to absorb much of the fiscal retrenchment following the
passage of Proposition 13.
A fundamental difference in the manner in which a large portion of public works are funded
runs counter to this dynamic, however. While maintenance and minor projects tend to be funded
through recurring revenues, major capital expenditures tend to funded by revenues raised or provided
strictly for that purpose. Thus, major capital improvements are either funded locally through the
issuance of debt or externally through the receipt of state or federal grants. As a consequence, it would
not be expected that changes in public works expenditures would display sensitivity to changes in levels
of other revenues, except to the extent that the effect of maintenance efforts outweighed those of
capital acquisition.
The results from the property tax change equations seem to bear out this funding difference.
In the initial post-13 fiscal year, the aggregate, percentage and per capita change equations all indicate
that changes in public works expenditures are virtually unrelated to changes in property taxes. The
magnitude equation (4) does indicate that public works expenditures decline as the impact of the
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property tax reduction increases but the magnitude of the parameter is rather slight. The coefficients
onptxA in the other three equations are not significant at any reasonable level. This relationship can be
contrasted with fire and police expenditures, which show a rather strong positive relationship with
property tax changes.
For the second composite period, the relationship of public works expenditures to property tax
changes undergoes an abrupt switch. For this period, the aggregate equation indicates public
expenditures increase $0.33 for every $1.00 decrease in property taxes. Other models for this time
period do not produce significant parameters for ptxA. This change is probably not the result of a
'bounce-back' effect, as might be the case with police and fire, but rather the result of the receipt of
new state and federal funds which happen to be correlated with property tax losses.
The results of the total revenue change equations shown in Tables 7.19 also seem to bear out
the independence of movements in public works expenditures from property tax losses. Total revenues
include those revenue sources, such as state and federal grants, which are typically linked to capital
projects. Thus, the strong and positive relationship between public works expenditures and total
revenue changes in both the initial post-13 fiscal year and the composite two-year period should come
as no surprise. The coefficient on totrA is positive in all six of the equations and significant in four of
the six equations estimated.
To have validity, the hypothesis regarding public works expenditures put forth above
should be reflected in the overall explanatory value of the equations. In the expenditure
categories explored previously, the overall explanatory values of the property tax change and total
revenue change equations have been generally equivalent. Neither model seems to dominate the
other in either period, and both improve from the one-year to the two-year period. The results for
the public works equations are quite different. Here the total revenue equation has a significantly
higher R2 in all cases but the aggregate equation for the two-year period, where they are roughly
equivalent. These results again suggest the independence of movements in public works
expenditures from movements in property taxes, and the correspondingly strong link to changes in
total revenues.
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Table 7.19: Public Works Change (Total Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)pubaA (2)pubpA (3)pubcA (1)pubaA (2)pubpA (3)pubcA
totrA 0.2543446 0.88198 0.6441557 0.1196609 1.533575 0.4000614
(1.137) **(4.375) **(3.148)
-0.0001230
(-0.610)
-0.0523264
(-0.396)
-0.653397
(-1.185)
-0.013
(-1.629)
**(2.019)
-0.0324
(-0.925)
32.16236
*(1.791)
-27.33264
(-0.430)
-1.1409
(-1.417)
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
trat
endb
tcap
debtAz
capt
a
R2
adi. R2
**(2.296)
-3660.105
**(-3.432)
198801.2
(1.149)
-335881.6
(-0.138)
-22935.69
**(-2.347)
-580575.5
(-1.278)
-1.27e+08
(-1.587)
-882219.6
(-1.206)
448.4425
(0.718)
255.7058
(0.071)
56867.83
(0.095)
1746264
**(2.977)
0.2375
0.1646
(1.260)
11050.58
**(4.170)
72621.51
(0.444)
-2931614
(-1.186)
-14072.27
(-1.343)
-439595
(-0.985)
-1. 12e+08
(-1.366)
307467.2
(0.516)
261.6429
(0.743)
3482.116
(0.587)
-0.0003600
(-1.011)
0.7012119
*(1.816)
0.5216775
(0.587)
-0.0135
(-1.204)
-0.7122796
(-0.952)
-113.2724
*(-1.913)
-2.251398
(-1.550)
0.0008418
(0.942)
-0.0032523
(-0.858)
-0.1556617
(-0.552)
1.298133
**(2.154)
0.3474
0.2849
1.308824
**(3.032)
0.3816
0.3225
-0.0253
(-1.331)
53.16243
**(2.196)
39.42056
(0.433)
0.5682
(0.400)
-111.9381
(-1.531)
-0.004757
*(-1.683)
0.0370128
(0.100)
-48.05079
*(-1.835)
108.6914
**(2.590)
0.2197
0.2136
-1191379 -0.6947408
**(-2.134) **(-2.882)
-0.4018865 -101.2049
(-1.239) **(-2.089)
-79.12322
(-1.315)
0.4289996
(0.827)
0.0001629 0.0793557
(0.363) (1.152)
0.0636789
(1.281)
-0.4494203
(-0.705)
74.05888
(1.500)
36.03269
(1.204)
0.8004
0.7851
1308651
*(1.814)
0.6584
0.6258
Notes: pubaA is aggregate change in public works expenditures; pubpA is percentage change in public works expenditures; pubcA is per capita
change in public works expenditures. For pubaA pubpA and pubcA regressions, the variable totrA representing the change in total revenues is
expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates
significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that
corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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Some of the variation in public works expenditures is explained by the socio-economic
variables. The significant variables are typically those which have been of some importance in the
previous expenditure categories. Income (incm) and residential proportion (resd) both are negatively
related to public works expenditures. Debt change (debtA) and capital intensity (capt) also exercise a
negative influence on public works expenditures. Given the results from the regressions, however, the
socio-economic variables do not dominate in explaining variations in public works expenditures.
Parks & Recreation
The results of the property tax change regressions for parks & recreation shown in Table
7.20 below show yet another pattern of reaction. Regression results for total revenue change
models follow in Table 7.21. As with the previous categorical regressions, the focus here is on
results of the aggregate change models, supplemented by results from the other model variations.
Overall, the parks & recreation budget category is almost as capital intensive as public
works, with a capital outlay/total expenditures ratio of approximately 0.24. The funding is quite
different than public works, however; few exogenous funds are available specifically for park &
recreation activities. Rather, these activities are funded directly by locally raised revenues. In
addition, these expenditures are not in the sacrosanct or protected category such as public safety.
There are also numerous private substitutes, although less prevalent on the capital side than the
operating side. Because of these characteristics, we would be expect that changes in park &
recreation would show conservative reactions to both changes in property taxes and total
revenues.
Table 7.20 reveals that based on the aggregate model (1), changes in property taxes
resulted in positive changes in expenditures on parks & recreation in the initial post-13 fiscal year.
A $1.00 decrease in property taxes resulted in a $0.15 decrease in expenditures on parks &
recreation. In this initial year, neither the percentage change (2) and the magnitude of change (4)
equations result in significant coefficients on ptxA. The per capita change equation (3) indicates a
negative relationship between the two, but as discussed this formulation of measurement may be
misleading.
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Table 7.20: Parks & Recreation Change (Property Tax), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
Variable (1)pkrcaA (2)pkrcpA (3)pkrccA (4)pkrctA ()pkrcaA (2)pkrcpA (3)pkrccA (4)pkrctA
0.152204 0.370595 -0.329559 -1.037639 0.240177 -2.930432 -0.144290 -10.41479
**(2.364) (0.292) **(-6.65) (-0.308) (1.568) (-0.706) **(-2.66) (-1.047)
6891.634 0.000881 0.004020 0.000932 11.28445 0.002370 0.003300 0.003000
**(2.678) (1.629) (0.699) (1.649) **(2.264) (1.227) (0.676) (1.427)
27839.89 2.255964 1.369299 2.251798 20955.56 8.935211 3.316007 8.878669
(0.356) (1.422) (0.410) (1.386) (0.228) (1.588) (0.662) (1.555)
1157892 -2.525498 -13.11859 -2.720562 274321.6 -6.886443 -53.83501 -9.554676
*(1.705) (-1.232) (-0.818) (-1.312) (0.342) (-1.249) *(-1.866) (-1.569)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
-781.3191 0.1666 -0.041
(-0.176) (1.147) (-0.185)
244991.1 3.469176 14.42856 3.708377 200353.1 10.54177 -3.528108 11.40224
(1.300) *(1.852) (1,438) *(1.816) (0.732) (1.630) (-0.286) (1.593)
-4.04e+07
(-1.283)
-169.2162
(-1.015)
648141.1 1.538158
*(1.687) (0.977)
176.6933 0.000420
(1.586) (0.554)
-238.3566 -2.20e+07 -546.2201
(-1.183) (-0.552) (-0.915)
1.330335 349251.7 0.180583
(0.810) (0.966) (0.036)
0.000815 251.9524 0.000027
(0.892) (1.415) (0.000)
-868.6513
(-1.260)
0.258294
(0.052)
0.001022
(0.362)
1392.274 -0.031542 0.030322 -0.019545 -1556.124 -0.182762 -0.326619 -0.126030
(0.973) (-1.163) (0.345) (-1.211) (-0.551) (-1.451) **(-2.23) (-1.560)
-127072.8 -1.035497 -0.261861 -1.022668 -106385.9 -2.878598 -2.557534 -2.897626
(-1.283) *(-1.761) (-0.136) *(-1.759) (-1.049) (-1.443) (-0.951) (-1.424)
-397411.6 -2.750033 -17.63409 -2.328645 -246700.6 -10.54999 10.60639 -6.979337
*(-1.816) (-1.360) **(-2.04) (-1.608) (-0.620) (-1.487) (0.763) (-1.349)
0.0933 0.4136 0.6254 0.4081 0.3181 0.4285 0.1857 0.4175
0.0065 0.3575 0.6000 0.3571 0.2529 0.3738 0.1305 0.3673
Notes: pkrcaA is aggregate dange in parks & recreation expenditures; pkrcpA is percentage dange in parks & recreation expenditures; pkrccA is
per capita dange in parks & recreation expenditures: pkrctA is percent dange in parks & recreation expenditures based on dange in property tax as
a percent of total revenues. For pkrcaA, pkrcpA and pkrccA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita
dange respectively. For pkrctA regression. ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction as a percent of total revenues and uses only the
initial 1978-79 change for both periods. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significant at the .10 level or
better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not
included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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3845.812 0.0355 -0.2834
(1.093) (0.865) (-1.505)
trat
endb
tcap
debtA
capt
a
R2
adj. R2
The general relationship of property tax changes to changes in parks & recreation
expenditures continues its pattern into the two-year composite period. In particular, the
aggregate equation is still positive, although it drops in validity to the .12 level of significance.
The two-year composite reaction of parks & recreation expenditures to changes in property taxes
are distinctly different from those of police, fire and public works. Each of these three categories
witnessed a considerable 'bounce-back' in aggregate from initial year reductions, although for
quite different reasons.
In contrast, the continuation of reductions in park & recreation into the two year
composite period indicates that the initial reductions were not regretted and compensated for by
subsequent actions. Rather than being ill-considered and taken in haste, they appear to have been
reinforced by later actions It has been argued that in the initial year, municipalities were either
unable to react or reacted by cutting capital expenditures or other easily eliminated categories.
This may have been the case with parks & recreation, where capital was reduced initially and
other minor expenses reduced in the following year.
Given the conservative reaction on municipalities to property tax reductions in their
treatment of park & recreation expenditures, it would not be surprising to have this carry-through
to changes in total revenues. As revealed in the regression results below, the municipal response
to increases in total revenues was quite conservative as well as displaying considerable variance.
The aggregate and percentage changes in park & recreation expenditures in response to changes
in total revenues are not estimated with statistical significance in the initial post-13 fiscal year and
the magnitudes are quite small. The per capita change model indicates that parks & recreation
expenditures actually declined despite increases in total revenues.
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Table 7.21: Parks & Recreation Change (Total Revenues), 1978-79 and 1978-80.
Independent Fiscal Years 1978-79 Fiscal Years 1978-80
J ariable (1)pkrcaA (2)pkrcpA (3)pkrccA (J)pkrcaA (2)pkrcpA (3)pkrccA
totrA 0.0064885 -0.2819837 -0.4058796 -0.0562897 3919438 -01496079
(-0.619) **(-5.681)
0.0008200
(1.601)
2.176664
(1.398)
-2.191809
(-1.203)
0.0276
(0.666)
3.470723
*(1.866)
0.003170
(0.603)
1.107923
(0.323)
-11.77906
(-0.751)
-0.2027
(-1.172)
12.29088
(1.339)
(0.064)
-271.8854
(-0.447)
21278.69
(0.248)
1948043
*(1.974)
2886.738
(0.658)
207319.9
(1.188)
-7.96e+07
(-1.017)
654245.4
(1.225)
97.1083
(0.798)
-0.0023895
(-0.030)
-0.1111287
(-0.056)
-15.8691
**(-2.001)
0.6391
0.6113
-681.7918 -0.0308249
(-0.377) (-1.168)
-1.076736
*(-1.791)
-2.520987
(-1.312)
0.4148
0.3588
pop
grow
coun
incm
resd
tral
endb
tcap
(-0.358)
5.148844
*(1.671)
35741.11
(0.346)
1564935
(1.145)
-2429.675
(-0.611)
57541.03
(0.191)
-8.95e+07
(-1.021))
240315.1
(0.837)
250.7541
(1.163)
-5578.779
(-1.089)
-145932.2
(-1.376)
219063.4
(0.457)
0.2838
0.2153
(-1.108)
0.003230
(0.680)
3.291588
(0.657)
-53.69094
*(-1.805)
-0.0346
(-0.158)
-3.68606
(-0.306)
(0.943)
0.002810
(1.388)
8.438848
(1.574)
-9.703529
*(-1.676)
0.1938
(1.284)
11.09807
*(1.667)
-285.0675
(-0.612)
2.196133
(0.410)
-0.0007997
(-0.322)
-0.1725183 -0.3276762
(-1.382) **(-2.270)
-2.782812
(-1.456)
-11.67274
(-1.552)
0.4298
0.3753
-2.554705
(-0.948)
10.75849
(0.796)
0.1857
0.1231
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-232.2631
(-1.156)
2.014996
(1.091)
0.000376 -0.018771
(0.507) **(-2.398)
-0.00118
(-0.050)
debtA
capt
a
R2
adj. R2
-160453.7
(-1.283)
-123825.4
(-0.486)
0.0427
-0.0488
Notes: pkrcaA is aggregate dange in parks & recreation expenditures: pkrcpA is percentage change in parks & recreation expenditures; pkrccA is
per capita dange in parks & recreation expenditures. For pkrca, pkrcpA and pkrccA regressions, the variable totrA representing the change in total
revenues is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. *
indicates significance at the .10 level or better- ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127. Blank cells indicate
that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
These trends continue into the two-year composite period. In this period, none of the
parameters on totrA are estimated with any reasonable degree of statistical significance. Overall,
the regression models indicate that there was not an patterned response in expenditures on parks
& recreation to changes in total revenues. Normative theory would suggest that as total revenues
increase, expenditures on normal goods would also increase. The lack of a systematic response in
this regard indicates a conservative attitude on the part of municipalities to committing additional
funds to parks & recreation. This conservatism is due to the lack of protected status for parks &
recreation, coupled with the changed and less secure composition of revenues and the uncertain
fiscal future.
Analysis of Expenditure Allocation Regressions
The forgoing has been a rather detailed discussion of changes in the funding decisions of
municipalities in the wake of Proposition 13. Clearly, the expenditure allocation responses of
municipalities have varied depending upon their circumstances and the characteristics of the
expenditure category. The changes in expenditure categories have been demonstrated to be quite
different from changes in total expenditures and also quite different from each other. What remains is
place these changes more securely in the context of changes in overall expenditures trends and
alterations in the funding of municipalities, both endogenous and exogenous.
To help explain the changes in the five expenditure categories analyzed, the partial results of
additional regressions are presented in Table 7.22 below, together with a restatement, in abbreviated
form, of the property tax change and total revenue change presented previously. These multivariate
equations represent the results when aggregate changes in each of the categories listed on the
horizontal were regressed against the revenue sources listed on the vertical. For ease of presentation,
only the estimated coefficients for the revenue variable are presented. The regressions which provide
the greatest explanatory power of expenditure change and where the estimated fiscal parameter is
statistically significant are in bold.
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Table 7.22: Summary of Aggregate Expenditure Allocation Models, 1978-79 and 1979-80.
Independent V'ariable General Police Fire Public Parks &
and Time Penod Government Services Services Works Recreation
1978-79
ptxA -0.871307 0.1196475 0.0201241 0.0856352 0.1522038
**(-2.773) **(3.5%6) (0.641) (0.671) **(2.364)
R2= 0.8716 R2= 0.5489 R= 0.4026 R2= 0.1147 R2=0.0933
endoA -0.2542882 0.035735 0.0586839 0.1208825 -0.0187441
(-0.671) *(1 .923) **(2.004) (0.803) (-0.090)
R= 0.8253 R2 =0.4428 R2= 0.4345 R2=0.1207 R2 = 0.0433
enptA -0.5095026 0.0702362 0.0335514 0.0894808 0.0627147
*(-1.883) **(2.603) **(2.557) (0.878) (0.886)
R2=0.8584 R2 =0.5193 R2=0.4268 R2 =0.1252 R2 =0.0612
enpsA -0.4871552 0.0763905 0.0464417 0.163582 0.0475254
(-1.584) **(2.523) **(3.064) (1.145) (0.508)
R2 =0.8498 R2=0.5190 R2=0.4448 R2 =0.1582 R2 =0.0515
exogA 0.9335807 -0.0500066 -0.0477508 0.1702693 -0.0623038
* *(10.957) **(-2.817) * *(-2.282) * *(2.553) *(-1.927)
R2= 0.9348 R2= 0.4734 R2= 0.4500 R2 = 0.1678 R2 =0.0594
totrA 0.4150278 0.0275871 -0.0148324 0.2543446 0.0064885
**(2.463) (1.3(A) (-0.432) **(2.296) (0.064)
R2= 0.8430 R2 =0.4453 R2 = 0.4027 R2 = 0.2375 R2 = 0.0427
1978-80
ptXA 2.396327 -1.13095 -0.843596 -0.338689 0.2401771
**(5.017) **(-6.254) **(-10.48) * *(-2.871) (1.568)
R2= 0.8133 R2= 0.9674 R2=0.9730 R 2=0.6644 R2 =0.3181
endoi 0.4071191 -0.0132072 0.038058 0.1703275 -0.1387692
(0.777) (-0.071) (0.287) (0.933) (-0.697)
R2 =0.6372 R2 =0.9252 R2 =0.8910 R2 =0.6531 R2 =0.3008
enptA 1.389171 -0.5002206 -0.3233917 -0.0017153 -0.0148611
**(3.890) **(3.210) **(-2.910) (-0.011) (-0.086)
R2=0.7711 R2= 0.9443 R2= 0.9193 R2 = 0.6420 R2 = 0.2675
enpsA 1.106586 -0.4233712 -0.26493 0.0634176 -0.0074599
**(3.934) **(-3.584) **(-3.161) (0.438) (-0.056)
R2 =0.7746 R2=0.9472 R2=0.9215 R2 =0.6449 R2 =0.2672
exogA 0.9415653 -0.0155944 -0.0246209 0.2688256 -0.0962288
**(2.566) (-0.078) (-0.196) **(2.581) (-0.459)
R2 = 0.7069 R2 = 0.9252 R2 = 0.8909 R2= 0.6816 R2 =0.2905
totrA 0.9676644 -0.1896369 -0.1324226 0.1196609 -0.0562897
**(5.224) **(-2.479) **(-2.262) (1.260) (-0.358)
R 2=0.8061 R2=0.9322 R2=0.9031 R 2 =0.6584 R 2 =0.2838
Notes: ptcA represents aggregte dange in property taxes; endoA represents aggregate change in endognous revenues: enptA represents aguegate dange in
endogenous revenues plus property taxes: enpsA represents aggregate cange in endogenous revenues plus property taxes plus state funds; erogA represents
aggregate dange in exogenous revenues; totrA represents aggregate change in total revenues. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10
level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 127.
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As was discussed earlier, the data in Table 7.3 indicate that general government expenditures
rose over 2% between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 and over 12% between fiscal years 1978 and 1980
based on mean calculations. The median changes were somewhat different, with changes of -3.3% and
3.8% for each of the two periods. The difference in the measures in the first period indicates the
variation with which municipalities treated this category of expenditures. This variation, in fact,
expands between the two periods, as shown in Table 7.3, despite the fact that both measures of the first
moment indicate an increase in expenditures.
The regression results discussed previously, and shown above in Table 7.22, help explain this
result. In the initial year, municipalities altered general government expenditures with respect to
changes in property taxes, exogenous revenues and total revenues. There was no sensitivity shown
with respect to changes in other revenue sources. As was discussed, the negative relation with
property tax changes is puzzling since it would be expected that an 'unprotected' category such as
general government would be among the first cut. The property tax equation indicates that a decrease
in property taxes of $1.00 results in an increase in general government expenditures of $0.87. This was
explained previously by the theory that municipalities had no time to react because of the brief time
span between the adoption and implementation of Proposition 13. As a consequence, the results
simply indicate a continuation of existing patterns of expenditure by municipal governments.14
While this may be a partial explanation, the results from the other regressions in the first period
suggest an additional explanation. The ptIx variable may be acting as a proxy for other revenues --
state aid in particular. Municipalities may have been under the impression that reductions in property
taxes were to made up on nearly a one-to-one basis by other revenues and expended funds accordingly.
The complementary results from the exogenous revenue regression bolster this view, with nearly dollar
for dollar expenditures. The results from the total revenue regression, the remaining significant model
14 This theory is weakened by the fact that the data reflect actual expenditures rather than
appropriations. Municipalities amend budgets at least quarterly throughout the fiscal year and
larger cities may undertake such revisions on a more frequent basis. As a result, expenditures can
be meshed quite closely with existing and expected revenues.
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of the six, indicate that expenditures on general government continued to increase along with total
revenues irrespective of the funding mix.
The results from the two-year regressions show roughly the same relationship between revenue
changes and general government expenditures for the exogA and totrA models. In addition, the enpIA
and enpsA models also indicate a positive relationship between revenue change and general
government expenditures. The big difference between the two periods is the dramatic shift in the
coefficient on pxA. In the composite period, the parameter indicates that a $1.00 decrease in property
taxes leads to a $2.40 decrease in general government expenditures. This dramatic change could result
from municipalities being given the opportunity and time to reposition themselves with respect to
budget alternatives.
The results from the various models and the explanatory values indicate that municipalities
committed funds to general government without particular regard to source, with the exception of
property taxes and endogenous revenues. All models, with the exception of the endoA model explain
roughly the same amount of variation and the estimated parameters are of the same general magnitude.
The results suggest that many municipalities may have reduced general government expenditures in
response to property tax reductions in the second post-13 fiscal year when they could, and then
increased expenditures in response to increases in other revenues.
Table 7.3 indicates that expenditures on police and fire services expanded in percentage terms
for both the one-year and two-year periods. The increase for police was fairly consistent for both
periods with a rather constant degree of variance. For fire, on the other hand, the increase in the first
year was quite slight in both mean and median terms, while for the two-year period it shows a rather
dramatic increase in percentage terms. The relative variance also increases substantially from the one-
year to the two-year composite period.
The pattern of response of expenditures on police and fire services are remarkably similar. The
regression results indicate that such increases are not necessarily the result of changes in property taxes
or even total revenues. In the initial year, the explanatory value of the equations and the magnitude of
the estimated parameters are similar with the exception of the property tax change equation. For the
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pixA equation, the results indicate that declines in property taxes are associated with declines in police,
whereas no general trend is discernible for fire services. Expenditure responses are positive and
generally significant for all other sources of revenue with the exception of exogenous revenues, which
has a negative sign. There is only a nugatory response to changes in total revenues for both categories.
The response of police services to property tax reductions in the first year may be due to initial
cuts in capital acquisition. Both fire and police received increased expenditures in response to the
increase in other types of endogenous and state revenues. The negative sign for the exogenous
equation may be related to the presence of overwhelming federal and state grants associated with
public works and capital acquisition programs. Finally, the lack of a discernible response to changes in
total revenues is probably due to fiscal conservatism in the face of uncertainty. Alternatively, all
municipalities may have increased spending on these services to the extent that any separate influence
of increasing revenue was overwhelmed.
Expenditures for both police and fire experience an abrupt change in their relationship with
changes in property taxes in the second time period. For the two-year composite period they both
increase dramatically in response to decreases in the property tax. This may be due both to a 'bounce-
back' affect from prior reductions (or stability in the case of fire services) for these 'protected'
categories, and the presence of the maintenance of effort requirement for state aid. The responsiveness
to state aid may not be apparent from the exogenous regression due to the presence of federal revenues
and non-bail-out state revenues
While the change police and fire expenditures in response to changes in the property tax in the
composite regressions can be explained by a combination of reinforcing factors, the response of these
categories to changes in other revenues is perplexing. The similarity in responses between these two
public safety activities is reassuring from a methodological perspective, but the dynamics of the
responses are not what would be expected. In the enptA, enpsA and totrA equations, increases in these
revenues are associated with decreases in police and fire services. In addition, all explain the variation
in expenditures equally well in terms of R2 value.
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Why would municipalities react to decreases in property taxes by increasing expenditures on
public safety activities while decreasing expenditures on these activities in responses increases in total
revenues? Fiscal conservatism may be a possible explanation, but does not address why very different
responses seem to prevail in other expenditure categories, most notably general government. Again,
the answer may lie in the posture all cities took in the after math of Proposition 13. Given that public
safety expenditures increased in percentage terms based on mean and median measures, these
expenditures may have increased in the aggregate among all cities such that changes in total revenues
had a di minimis effect the first year and negative effect the second.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the increased expenditures that went to public works in the post-13
fiscal years. They also indicate the wide variations that occurred in both percentage and per capita
terms. These characteristics mesh with what is known about the lumpiness of public works
expenditures and the type of funding available for large public works projects. To the extent that
public works includes regular maintenance, it might be expected that this category would show some
sensitivity to property tax reduction. To the extent that large public works projects are funded from
outside sources, however, they should be relatively immune from changes in local funding, including
property tax cuts.
The model with the most consistent performance with regard to public works expenditures is,
in fact, the exogA model, which indicates increasing public works expenditures with the receipt of state
and federal funds. This is a quite reasonable response given the fact that large public works projects
may be funded directly from these sources. Expenditures on public works are also positively related to
total revenues in the initial year; an effect that is lost in the two-year composite regressions. They also
are negatively related to changes in the property tax in year two, giving further evidence that, in this
case, property tax changes may be acting as a proxy for state revenues.
Parks & recreation expenditures stand alone as the category most difficult to explain. Tables
7.2 and 7.3 display the huge difference between mean and median measures of change on both a
percentage and per capita basis. As a result, the variances are quite large. Despite the differences, the
statistical synopses generally seem to indicate a dip in the initial post- 13 fiscal year followed by a slight
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recovery. This fits in well with the view of parks & recreation being both unprotected and easily
replicable to some degree.
The evasive nature of the characteristics of this category are borne out in the regression results.
In only one of the twelve models presented in Table 7.22 is the fiscal variable representing revenue
change statistically significant at the .05 level or better. In the initial year, decreases in the property tax
were associated with decreases in funding for this category. This trend continues for the two-year
composite period, but at a lessened level of significance. While this response is interesting, it is not
terribly surprising given the characteristics of the category. What is more striking is the lack of
responsiveness to increases in any other revenues. In fact, funding for parks & recreation was not only
flat with respect to all revenue changes (even negative with respect to exogenous revenues in year
one), but in addition, only a small portion of the variation was explained by any of the models.
Movements in this category are not explained well by any of the fiscal variables or socio-economic
variables employed.
In order to be complete, some of the overall trends exposed by the percentage change and
relative magnitude models should be discussed as well. Like the aggregate change equations, in the
initial post-13 fiscal year the relative magnitude models show a statistical significance for ptrA for three
of the five expenditure categories examined: general government, police services and public works. In
each case, increases in the relative property tax loss corresponds to declines in expenditures for these
categories. For the two-year composite period, however, only general government retained its
statistical significance, indicating that municipalities with larger relative losses were able to compensate
by the second period. In the percentage change models, only in the first year is a significant
relationship between categorical expenditures and property tax change found (fire services). The
results for the models based on these measures continue to demonstrate the variations among cities
depending on the definition of change.
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Summary and Interpretation
In this chapter, I have examined in detail the pattern of total municipal expenditures and
allocation of expenditures by broad budget category. These expenditure patterns have been analyzed in
relation both to fiscal changes which occurred in reaction to the passage of Proposition 13 and with
respect to particular socio-economic characteristics of the individual municipalities. The results that
have been obtained through this analysis hold important information regarding the behavior of local
governments in times of abrupt policy changes and fiscal stress.
Certain patterns of change are evident in the summary data on expenditures presented in Tables
7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. The statistics presented in these initial tables in this chapter indicate that a substantial
increase in variation occurred among cities in the initial post-13 fiscal year. For the 1978-80 composite
period, however, this variation had declined, with substantially more conformity among municipalities
regarding total expenditures and for separate expenditure categories. These results suggest that the
initial post-13 fiscal year was characterized by considerable confusion as municipalities sought through
a variety of means to adjust to the exigencies imposed by the tax limitation measure. By the second
year, reactions were typified by more conformity among municipalities as the strictures of Proposition
13 became more discernible. On a mean and median basis, total expenditures show increases on a
percentage and per capita basis.
The summary statistics also reveal certain universal trends regarding expenditures on particular
publicly-provided goods and services. The variations among municipalities carry-over to specific
expenditures and indicate that municipalities may have cut where expedient rather than carefully
weighing appropriate reductions. Again, these variations lessened somewhat by the second composite
period. The general trends for all cities in the study group show that general government, health,
libraries, parks & recreation and contributions all show negative or slow percentage growth over the
two-year post-13 period. Those categories experiencing higher rates of expenditure increases were
police services, fire services, other public safety and public works. The burden borne by each
expenditure category (as shown in Table 7.4) confirms these expenditure trends.
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One of the most important dynamics illuminated by this analysis is the how a detailed
expenditure analysis reveals patterns that are masked by more aggregate analysis. These vast
divergence that occurred in municipalities during this period of time are only hinted at by the summary
statistics. The changes in the standard deviations revealed in these tables make a suggestion of the
varied reactions but say nothing regarding the pattern of these changes. To add more muscle definition
to this skeleton of data, the sample of municipalities was divided into two cohorts: one with property
tax cuts greater than the mean and one with property tax reductions less than the mean.
This procedure reveals that in the initial year, large loss municipalities had sharper expenditure
reductions or slower growth than the small loss municipalities, but by the second year they had
recovered. The two-year composite period reveals that both groups had moderate increases in
expenditures, suggesting that the large loss municipalities reinstated previous cuts. Furthermore, the
cohorts were similar in their treatment of particular expenditure categories: those which had a
protected status and those suffering from the budget-cutters wrath were the same for each of the
cohorts. Thus, while property tax reductions resulted in differential effects on expenditure categories,
these effects did not vary much with regard to the severity of the tax reductions.
A finer-toothed comb was run through the data to investigate the reactions of particular cities
to the imposition of Proposition 13. The results of this investigation reveal a certain similarity between
municipalities close to the mean property tax loss for each cohort, although there was some variation
with respect to those cities with either extreme losses or little or no reduction. All municipalities
seemed to reduce expenditures the first year. For the composite period, all municipalities had
expenditure growth. The recovery of growth did not vary based on property tax losses, however;
rather it appears more directly linked to the ability to raise substitute revenues. In other words, those
cities with slower recovery in the post-13 period generally had less favorable socio-economic
characteristics than those with faster post-13 growth. Notably, for the cities selected, those with
slower post-13 growth also had property tax reductions less than the mean.
The total expenditure regressions represent an effort to link expenditure changes with the
magnitude of Proposition 13 induced property tax reductions. While all the permutations of revenue
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change explained the variation in total expenditures equally well, only the property tax change and total
revenue change also had consistently significant results for the revenue change variable as well (ptrA
and totrA, respectively). The total revenue change model indicates a general conservatism on the part
of municipalities in reaction to total revenue increases. While some inconsistency appears in the
property tax change model, three of the four permutations indicate decreases in expenditures in
reaction to decreases in property taxes. Municipalities are more inclined to decrease spending in
response to percentage declines in property taxes or based on large relative magnitude declines in total
budget than in response to aggregate changes. The aggregate model, in fact, indicates increases in
spending in response to decreases in property taxes. The inconsistency may be caused by the lack of
budget flexibility of the larger aggregate loss municipalities compared to those with higher relative
magnitude or percentage losses.
I conjectured that those specific municipalities referenced above, despite suffering deeper than
average magnitude property tax cuts, were able to increase expenditures in the second post-13 period
due to their favorable socio-economic characteristics. The total revenue regressions, however, offer
mixed corroborating evidence of this. Increasing income is either unimportant or exercises a negative
effect on expenditures. Tax capacity is positively related to increasing expenditures, but the
coefficients are often not statistically significant. Ending balance also appears to have a positive
relationship with expenditure change. The elimination of wealth, as represented by assessed value per
capita, handicaps efforts to define relationships between expenditures and key economic characteristics;
however, the previous examples suggest that this may also have a positive effect on expenditure
increases. "
On the other hand, the differences in total expenditure response based on the different methods
of measurement indicate that differences in the socio-economic profiles of, for example, municipalities
" When the small property tax loss and large property tax loss cohorts were examined, those
municipalities in both groups which had the greatest post-13 expenditure recovery were also those
with the most favorable socio-economic conditions. While this does not constitute independent
verification due to possible incorporation of other factors, it is suggestive of the theory of
expenditure increases being linked to wealth and income.
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experiencing larger aggregate losses in property taxes and those experiencing larger relative magnitude
losses, may be important factors in explaining the results. The municipalities with large relative
magnitude losses experienced declines in total expenditures in year one, but by the two-year composite
period these losses had lessened considerably. A similar dynamic was noted with respect to revenue
changes. This pattern is quite compatible with the responses of the large loss cohort as well as
individual cities.
Results from the regressions which include socio-economic characteristics indicate that these
are important not only in revealing which types of cities are most affected by the passage of tax
limitation measures but also in informing the appropriate state responses. In view of these features, it
becomes important in the determination of intergovernmental aid policy to sort out the equity affects of
the tax limit in advance and in some fashion signal the state's intent with regard to aid.
The regressions undertaken to investigate the expenditure allocation response of municipal
governments to the passage of Proposition 13 attest to the complexity of choices and factors faced by
decision-makers during this period of fiscal turmoil. If broad lessons can be drawn from the
expenditure allocation models tested above, it seems that expenditure decision-making for
municipalities in times of fiscal uncertainty can be seen through a prism of priority-setting. Yet, the
decision-making process of how to change expenditures in a time of fiscal stress also appears to
involve a complex balance of several additional factors rather than a simple determination of which
municipal goods and services are most highly valued.
The process of expenditure re-allocation also seems to involve issues related to how particular
expenditures are funded, whether such activities can be self-supporting and how the budget activity is
perceived by the taxpayers in an anti-tax, anti-government setting. Timing becomes a factor as cities
faced with a certain budget inflexibility in the short-term are increasingly able to adjust funding as time
elapses. In addition, adjustments may relate to the nature of the expenditure categories themselves.
Certain categories may possess a lumpiness in funding which would may cause 'stickiness' in reaction
to funding cuts. Finally, the ratio of capital expense/total expense can also affect the nature of budget
adjustments.
256
Using these criteria, the allocation reactions to cuts in the property tax outlined above become
more understandable, however, such criteria do not significantly assist in the construction of general
rules regarding budget adjustment in times of fiscal stress. Indeed, the criteria emphasize the
importance of isolating individual categories in order to examine the interrelationship of various
influencing factors and their collective impact on the dynamic of change. Each of the categories
examined displays its own set of factors of varying magnitudes and biases. While explaining changes in
general government expenditures and police services is rather straightforward, changes in pubic works
and parks & recreation appear to be the result of more intricate and subtle forces.
In conclusion, the results suggest several tendencies of local government behavior. The first is
the relative fixity of municipal budgets. In the aggregate change models, the coefficients indicate that
many categories are fairly fixed the first year but show greater movement over the two-year period.
The general increase in the magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical significance as well as
improvements in the R2 from period one to period two for the large aggregate loss cities (particularly
for those parameters which had statistical significance in either period) is a reflection of the increased
opportunities for municipalities to reorder their spending priorities. Given the 24-day period between
the adoption of Proposition 13 and its implementation, municipalities had little time to adjust spending,
reduce programs and staff or put into place new sources of revenue. The generally greater effect of the
explanatory variables in period two can be interpreted as a result of municipalities being given ample
time to react and adjust their fiscal affairs in accordance with the new constraints.
The exception to this rule is apparent for the municipalities with larger relative magnitude
losses, where there was greater response in the first period than in the second. The municipalities with
larger relative magnitude losses, in contrast, reduced expenditures in response to the severity of the
property tax losses the first year. Thus, while large aggregate loss municipalities were unable to
fashion a unified response to property tax reductions, municipalities with larger relative magnitude
losses were forced to reduce expenditures based on the severity of their losses. Such divergence based
on different measures is borne out by the increase in variance in expenditures between fiscal years 1978
and 1979.
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Second, when municipalities do respond, they seem to respond in a conservative fashion. In
most cases, changes in revenues generated a fraction of the change in total expenditures and in budget
categories. Two of the three measures of total expenditure change in response to total revenue change
show increased conservatism in the second period. But while cities maintained such conservative
posture toward expenditures with respect to total revenue change, they curtailed their reactions to
property tax reductions during the second period. This may be due to the increased confidence in (and
presence of) compensating revenues. Within the context of such conservatism then, it is apparent that
there was some 'bounce-back' in categories which had seen steep cuts in year one; this is the case for
municipalities with larger aggregate and relative magnitude property tax losses.
Third, general government expenditures appear to be expendable regardless of how property
tax losses are measured. For the two-year composite period, general government expenditures were
reduced in response to the severity of property tax losses irrespective of the measure of change (except
for percentage). Although the aggregate change model is negative the initial post-13 fiscal year, it is
strongly positive for the second period. The other measures improve their performance as well and are
also strongly positive. Finally, the evidence from the summary statistics suggests that general
government is an unprotected category of expenditures, suffering declines not only in relation to
property tax reductions but for all municipalities regardless of the severity of such losses.
One final issue should be considered regarding the effect on municipal expenditures of the
institutional and political environment accompanying the passage of Proposition 13. Including
explanatory variables which might serve as proxy measures for the political and social milieu are
beyond the scope of this study, but there are alternative means by which to appreciate the affect of
these factors on local government finance in times of fiscal stress. In Chapter 4, the expenditure
responses of municipalities to changes in their uncollected taxes was examined and it was argued that
this ex ante methodology is one means by which to measure how municipalities would alter
expenditures (or budget shares as the model was structured) in the face of fiscal stress generated by tax
limits. Tax limits, if binding, increase the amount of uncollected taxes of local governments and may in
turn affect the budgetary choices of municipal decision-makers.
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Generally, what emerged from that investigation was the finding that a rather sizable movement
in the tax capacity of municipalities is required to generate discernible changes in the expenditure shares
of various budget categories. For example, as I discussed in Chapter 4, a fifty percent increase in
uncollected taxes would result in an approximately two and one-half percent increase in the share of
the budget devoted to fire services. More dramatically, the budget share devoted to general
government is apparently immune from changes in the level of uncollected taxes. The coefficient was
roughly half that for fire services and, more importantly, statistically insignificant.
It is instructive to compare the changes generated by shifts in uncollected taxes with the mean
budget shares before and after the passage of Proposition 13. While such a comparison should be
undertaken with caution due to relevant factors which are unmeasured in the regressions, the difference
in the magnitudes of change are quite striking. Using the information in Table 5. 1, between fiscal years
1978 and 1980, the budget share of police increased from 17.3% to 19.0% and the budget share of
general government dropped from 31.6% to 27.0%. In view of the estimation of the de minimis effect
of changes in uncollected taxes on general government, the shifts on the order of 1.7% and 4.6%
respectively, is rather surprising.
Certainly, the limitation of the proxy for uncollected taxes is one reason for this divergence as
is the presence of other unmeasured factors that affected budget choices between fiscal years 1978 and
1980. Surely, however, an additional reason for the divergence between these two analyses is the lack
of social and political context for the budget share model and its implicit incorporation in the data
presented in this chapter. As has been pointed out by a number of observers, Proposition 13 was
approved by the voters in an atmosphere attended by rising property values, increasing property taxes,
incidence of corruption in assessment practices, anti-government fervor, fiscal uncertainty and a
growing state government surplus.16
16 See, for example, Frank Levy, "On Understanding Proposition 13," The Public Interest 56
(Summer 1979): 66-89, or William H. Oakland, "Proposition 13 -- Genesis and Consequences,"
National Tax Journal 32 Supplement (June 1979): 387-407, for a discussion of the events and
circumstances leading to the passage of Proposition 13.
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In point of fact, municipalities were not just reacting to a change in the level of uncollected
taxes, but rather the entire socio-political milieu that surrounded the tax limits movement. Because of
this complexity of interwoven factors, California municipalities in the Proposition 13 era reacted not
only to fiscal stress but the entire gestalt of the tax limit movement. Based on this analysis, it is likely
that changes in expenditures patterns are as much related to legislative decrees and the socio-political
context as they are to changes in uncollected taxes. The widespread reduction in general government
among all cities, not just those severely affected by property tax reductions, is but one piece of
evidence of this dynamic.
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Chapter 8
Long-Term Changes in Revenues and Expenditures
Overview
In Chapters 6 and 7, I investigated the role of Proposition 13 with respect to short-term
changes in municipal revenues and expenditures. It has been argued in this analysis, as well as by
municipal officials, that the adoption of Proposition 13 did not result solely in a one-time financial
'shock', (although that surely was one of its component effects), but also ushered in a new fiscal
regime for local governments across the state. The issues that arise in response to the imposition
of this new fiscal regime pertain to the longer-term or more lasting impacts of the Proposition as
opposed to the short-term initial reactions.
The purpose of this chapter is to apply some of the same models employed in the
investigation of the short-term effects of the Proposition to the longer-term arena. The effect of
other influencing factors during the time period required to analyze longer-term effects make it
difficult to formulate explicit causal models linked to Proposition 13. However, it is possible to
construct more descriptive models that relate expenditure and revenue changes to the severity of
property tax reductions stemming from the passage of the tax limitation measure. Accordingly,
the determinants model employed previously is used here in analyzing the lasting impacts of the
Proposition.
Municipal Revenues and Expenditures
General Revenue Trends
The data sources for this portion of the investigation into municipal revenue and
expenditure movements are discussed in previous chapters. Presented below in tables 8.1 and 8.2
are summary statistics for revenues covering the decade elapsed since the passage of Proposition
13. In the short-term analysis, it was argued that municipal decision-makers (and consumer-
voters) react on the basis of nominal dollars in making expenditure decisions and raising revenues.
Over the long term, however, it would be expected that such behavior would be altered by
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implicit incorporation of inflationary dynamics.' Given the period of time elapsed between the
two data end-points, therefore, the summary statistics have been computed on both a constant and
nominal dollar basis.
Table 8.1 presents per capita summary data for revenue sources for the sample of
California municipalities. As shown in the table, for most categories of income, standard
deviations are rather large, especially for locally-based income. State aid shows the smallest
relative standard deviation with a standard deviation/mean ratio of 0.25. Endogenous revenues
(all local revenues excluding property taxes) have ratios ranging from 0.75 for local taxes up to
1.64 for local miscellaneous revenues. For total per capita revenues, the standard deviation/mean
ratio was 0.47.
Table 8.1: Per Capita Revenues, Fiscal Year 1988.
Revenue Constant Dollars (1982-84 S) Nominal Dollars
Source Alean Aledian St. Deviation Aean Median St. Deviation
Property Tax 62.858 54.834 44.551 72.251 63.028 51.209
Sales Tax 86.024 75.506 73.258 98.879 86.789 84.204
Local Taxes 65.533 46.913 49.334 75.326 53.923 56.706
Other Local 59.206 43.537 62.229 68.053 50.043 71.527
State Aid 55.839 51.853 14.251 64.183 59.601 16.380
Federal Aid 25.160 11.332 48.718 28.919 13.025 55.998
Fees & Charges 96.828 73.817 96.817 111.270 84.847 111.283
Local Misc. 19.234 8.647 31.637 22.108 9.939 36.364
Total 470.683 420.123 221.538 541.014 482.900 254.641
Notes: Number of observations is 130.
In Table 8.2, the mean and median per capita changes in revenues are presented along
with the standard deviation for each revenue category. The data clearly reflect the emphasis that
municipalities have placed on endogenous revenues in the post-13 environment. Three of the four
endogenous revenue sources (local taxes, other local and fees & charges) show an increase in real
1 One explanation for this shift might be related to what is used as a basis for comparison by
municipal officials and consumer-voters. Over the short-term, comparisons between consecutive
years are frequently used. Over the longer term, however, consumer-voters base revenue and
expenditure expectations on personal income or other expenditures. More objectively, of course,
in the longer-term revenues and expenditures are driven up by costs of goods and labor purchased
by the municipalities.
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per capita terms. Among endogenous revenue sources, only local miscellaneous revenues shows
a real decline during the ten-year period. Among exogenous sources, only the sales tax displays a
slight increase. Federal aid, state aid and property taxes all show rather steep declines in per
capita revenues during the period. The decline for federal aid is sharp enough to be manifest even
in nominal dollar terms. The standard deviations indicate the rather broad spread of the per capita
change observations.
Table 8.2: Per Capita Change in Revenues, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Revenue Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Source Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
Property Tax -29.486 -21.744 67.825 14.894 15.407 45.006
Sales Tax 2.166 -0.330 35.335 46.793 36.820 55.914
Local Taxes 30.418 19.933 37.845 53.515 38.327 46.696
Other Local 18.463 11.154 37.189 42.747 29.363 40.012
State Aid -12.901 -10.367 23.620 21.487 20.410 19.476
Federal Aid -71.267 -54.636 88.668 -30.973 -27.748 68,925
Fees & Charges 53.735 29.760 87.455 84.531 58.700 104.029
Local Misc. -10.506 -0.756 104.404 3.636 3.020 70.567
Total -19.377 -11.495 247.919 236.629 204.204 211.063
Notes: Number of observations is 130.
Table 8.3 below indicates percentage changes in per capita revenues over the ten-year
post-13 period.2 The data presented in Table 8.3 generally bear out the impressions conveyed by
the per capita change calculations. Declines in revenues are somewhat less apparent here,
however, and (in terms of both mean and median measures) limited to the quite steep decreases in
property taxes, state aid and federal aid. Based on mean and median calculations, huge
percentage increases are evident for local taxes and fees & charges. More limited increases are
evident for other local income sources (the exception is local miscellaneous which is inordinately
influenced by a few outliers). The overall impression regarding revenue changes during the 1978-
2 In contrast to earlier presentation of data, which relied on percentage changes in aggregate
revenues, the data in this section is based on percentage changes in per capita data. While
aggregate analysis is appropriate in the short-term, the elapsed time between the two data points
and the concomitant population growth during this time period would render percentage
calculations based on aggregate revenue misleading.
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88 decade is a situation involving increased reliance on specific local sources of revenue and
precipitous declines in intergovernmental aid.
Table 8.3: Percentage Change in Revenues, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Revenue Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Source Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
Property Tax -32.122 -29.285 26.479 25.614 30.863 49.001
Sales Tax 4.929 -0.461 35.577 94.178 84.204 65.839
Local Taxes 159.603 73.226 330.051 380.414 220.568 610.783
Other Local 74.714 44.845 111.293 223.322 168.047 205.956
State Aid -14.817 -17.437 25.004 57.638 52.789 46.271
Federal Aid -64.785 -82.818 114.564 -34.832 -68.203 212.009
Fees & Charges 263.008 101.811 720.239 571.777 273.465 1332.856
Local Misc. 450.408 -15.111 3326.053 918.571 57.094 6155.110
Total 2.170 -3.237 40.063 89.073 79.067 74.140
Notes: Percentage change is based on per capita data. Number of observations is 130.
Revenue Changes By Cohort
The aggregate data presented above may obscure many of the dynamics that occurred
among municipalities differentially affected by the passage of Proposition 13. This particular issue
was experienced in the previous examination of short-term revenue reactions to the passage of the
tax limitation measure. To assist in analyzing some of these differential effects, the sample of
cities has been bifurcated into cohorts based on the relative severity of the property tax reductions
brought on by Proposition 13. Table 8.4 below shows total, endogenous and exogenous revenue
reactions of municipalities according to the relative severity (in terms of percent of total revenues)
of property tax losses between fiscal years 1978 and 1979.
Table 8.4: Change in Revenues by Cohort, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Revenue Category Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
and PT Loss >11.18% PT Loss <11.18% PT Loss >10.49% PT Loss <10.49%
Measurement Basis Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
% A total revenues 5.587 2.305 -0.182 -9.031 93.252 83.630 86.706 68.411
% A endogenous rev. 113.789 73.195 98.795 44.153 294.447 220.511 270.564 182.055
% A exogenous rev. -23.666 -24.470 -30.851 -35.652 39.576 36.192 29.881 20.884
per capita A total rev. -17.224 8.763 -20.859 -34.786 232.789 239.116 239.190 194.270
per capita A endog. rev. 81.271 71.879 99.571 63.434 175.298 137.322 190.516 142.854
per capita A exog. rev. -53.482 -38.586 -101.63 -85.511 42.597 46.589 33.779 30.905
Notes: Percentage change is based on per capita data. In constant $, municipalities with property tax losses > 11.18% totaled 53; those with property
tax losses < 11.18% totaled 77. In nominal $. municipalities with property tax losses > 10.49% totaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.490o
totaled 78. Endogenous revenues are local taxes, other local. fees & charges and local miscellaneous; exogenous revenues are sales taxes, state aid and
federal aid.
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In the short-term analysis, it was detected that cities more severely affected by property
tax reductions, benefited from exogenous revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year and raised
compensating endogenous revenues in the subsequent year. Generally, it appeared that on
balance, such dynamics had a nugatory effect on total revenues -- that is, total revenues were
relatively static as a result of intergovernmental aid and own-source revenue efforts. The results
shown in the table above indicate that municipalities suffering disproportionately from property
tax reductions continued their efforts at endogenous revenue raising such that their revenue gains
outstrip the gains of the municipalities less-severely affected by Proposition 13.
Using the percentage change data based on constant dollar calculations, large loss cities
experienced a mean (median) gain of 5.6% (2.3%) over the ten-year period compared to a mean
(median) decrease for the small municipalities of 0.2% (9.0%). The reasons for this more positive
revenue result for the large loss municipalities are based on both smaller (relative to the small loss
cohort) decreases in exogenous revenues coupled with larger increases in endogenous revenues.
The per capita data indicates some of the same fiscal dynamics; however, with this measurement
the salutary performance of the large loss cities is more dependent on smaller exogenous revenue
losses. The measures of central tendency for endogenous revenues are somewhat in conflict;
however the more robust of the two measures for this non-parametric sample (the median)
indicates that large loss cities increased endogenous revenues more than small loss cities.
In the short-term, greater endogenous revenue gains by the large loss municipalities can be
partially explained by the compensating response to property tax cuts. In the long-term, however,
the endogenous revenue gains continued such that real total revenue gains were greater for the
large loss cities than the small loss cities. Brief reflection on the nature of the tax limitation may
suggest certain reasons for the more salutary response of the large loss cities. The cohorts shown
above are not only distinguished by the severity of the property tax reductions but also by their
socio-economic characteristics. Those municipalities suffering from steeper property tax
reductions were wealthier (in terms of assessed value), had higher median home values, higher tax
capacities and higher household incomes than the small loss cities. These characteristics are the
very qualities that facilitate increasing endogenous revenues.
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The revenue streams used in lieu of property taxes may also have been more buoyant than
property taxes, showing greater response to increases in income and economic activity. Thus,
municipalities required to use a greater amount of revenue substitution based on steeper than
average revenue losses would benefit from this buoyancy to a greater degree than the small loss
municipalities. The large loss municipalities than could consequently have benefited not only from
their more salutary socio-economic characteristics but also from the positive interaction of the
particular substitute revenue streams with these particular socio-economic qualities.
Revenue Changes By Municipality
A closer look at revenue reactions of particular cities may add a certain verisimilitude to
the investigation of the ten-year period. Table 8.5 below presents data indicating the percentage
changes in per capita revenues on a total, endogenous and exogenous basis for the six
municipalities analyzed in previous chapters. The short-term revenue responses of these cities
were somewhat varied as, based on their different needs and fiscal abilities, the municipalities
reacted in different ways to the exigencies imposed by the passage of Proposition 13. The longer-
term results as shown below seem to indicate more regularly patterned responses.
Table 8.5: Percent Change in Revenues by Category for Selected Cities, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Revenue PT Loss > Aean PT Loss < Mean
Categorv Havward Walnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
PT A as % of tot. rev. -13.552 -13.354 -43.328 -7.112 -7.009 0.325
Constant S
total revenues -8.094 5.599 33.719 -12.651 -33.158 -9.031
endogenous revenues 90.038 52.280 519.194 62.198 39.658 10.267
exogenous revenues -34.835 -10.812 -8.364 -36.209 -57.369 -15.809
Nominal S
total revenues 70.079 95.419 147.457 61.646 23.697 68.346
endogenous revenues 251.680 181.806 1045.865 200.160 158.449 104.058
exogenous revenues 20.592 65.049 69.579 18.050 -21.109 55.802
Notes: Percetage dange is based on per capita data. In constant S, municipalities with property tax losses > 11.18% totaled 53; those with property
tax losses < 11.18% totaled 77. In nominal $. municipalities with property tax losses > 10.49% totaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.49%
totaled 78. Endogenous revenues are local taxes, other local, fees & darges and local miscellaneous; exogenous revenues are sales taxes, state aid and
federal aid.
The trends shown in Table 8.5 strongly suggest that revenue changes over the ten-year
period after the passage of Proposition 13 were based more on the socio-economic characteristics
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of the municipalities than on the severity of the effects of Proposition 13. Due to the sudden
nature of the tax limitation measure, municipalities were required to adopt immediate reactions to
the curtailment of property taxes and the resulting fiscal stress. The ten-year period, on the other
hand, allowed municipalities the opportunity to incorporate these new factors in a more
systematic and planned fashion. As a result, the long-term post-13 trends may not be shaped as
much by the tax limitation measure but rather by more basic socio-economic characteristics of
municipalities and the interaction of these with the supply and demand of publicly-provided goods
and services.
These trends are borne out by the specific examples shown in Table 8.5. Based on
constant dollars, two of the three cities suffering from property tax reductions in excess of the
mean show percentage total revenue gains while those three cities with property tax losses less
severe than the mean all show percentage declines in total revenues. In fact, Piedmont, the
municipality with the greatest percentage decline in total revenues due to the property tax
limitation, shows the greatest percentage gain in total revenues. The endogenous revenue gains
show expected patterns, with the large loss cities all gaining more in endogenous revenues than
the small loss cities. The exogenous revenue responses are more mixed, with all cities receiving
percentage reductions of varying degrees, but seemingly independent of the 1978 property tax
loss.
What types of endogenous revenues were used by these municipalities in the ten years
following the passage of Proposition 13? Table 8.6 gives an indication the surprising divergence
represented by just the small sample of six municipalities.3 Among the large property tax loss
municipalities, Hayward relied most heavily on local taxes during the post-13 years. Walnut
Creek relied primarily on a mix of other local and fees & charges, while Piedmont relied heavily
on local taxes with additional income from fees & charges. This pattern is rather different from
3 For purposes of comparison, the category of other miscellaneous is ignored due to its relative
unimportance and highly erratic behavior. To this extent, the percentage change data can lead to
misleading conclusions, although no more so than per capita comparisons. The advantages and
disadvantages of various types of measurements were discussed earlier. The primary purpose here
is simply to demonstrate the divergence among the municipalities.
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the short-term percentage increases shown in Table 6.8. In that situation, other local income
which could be fairly rapidly increased, was the preference of two of the three large loss
municipalities.
Table 8.6: Percent Change in Revenues by Source for Selected Cities, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Revenue PT Loss > Mean PT Loss < Mean
Source Hayward Walnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
PT A as % of tot. rev. -13.552 -13.354 -43.328 -7.112 -7.009 0.325
Constant $
Local Taxes 30.682 52.205 1731.458 122.271 58.283 15.804
Other Local 3.638 98.118 152.138 3.763 73.882 10.979
Fees & Charges 760.724 54.350 267.730 48.676 55.435 -4.551
Local Misc. 107.950 -87.599 2034.004 238.949 -18.054 266.431
State Aid -25.082 -16.400 -16.834 -3.873 -44.242 -5.639
Nominal S
Local Taxes 141.837 181.667 3289.249 311.330 192.914 114.304
Other Local 91.789 266.632 366.600 92.022 221.781 105.376
Fees & Charges 1492.835 185.636 580.511 175.136 187.644 76.635
Local Misc. 284.828 -77.050 3849.134 527.250 51.648 578.108
State Aid 38.641 54.708 53.904 77.890 3.185 74.622
Notes: Percentage change is based on per capita data. In constant S, municipalities with property tax losses > 11.180o totaled 53: those with property
tax losses I 1.180o totaled 77. In nominal S. municipalities with property tax losses > 10.4900 totaled 52: those with property tax losses < 10.49O
totaled 78.
The responses of the small loss municipalities are equally varied. Revenue increases in
Fairfield were dependent almost solely on local taxes. In contrast, Soledad relied primarily on
increases in other local and Southgate experienced very little in the way of percentage increases in
any revenue source. These results present quite a contrast with the percentage increases in the
first two fiscal years after the passage of Proposition 13. Although the basis of measurement is
different, in the short-term, the three small loss municipalities seemed to draw on several sources
of replacement revenues rather than concentrating on one particular type as the ten-year trend
indicates.
General Expenditure Trends
Table 8.7 indicates per capita expenditures for fiscal year 1988. Expenditures are
presented in nominal dollars as well as adjusted to constant 1982-84 dollars and expressed in per
capita terms. The data presented indicate that the standard deviations are fairly uniform for most
categories. Standard deviation/mean ratios for five of the eight categories of expenditures range
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from 1.00 for parks & recreation to 0.69 for general government. The category with an unusually
low ratio (0.39) is police, while those with unusually high ratios are library (1.33) and health
(7.46). The reason for such disparities may relate what municipal decision-makers view as the
degree of essentiality of the particular public good or service.
Table 8.7: Per Capita Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1988.
Expenditure Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Category Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
General 93.513 73.747 64.838 107.486 84.706 74.527
Police 100.043 94.094 39.965 114.992 108.154 45.937
Fire 47.709 48.041 39.422 54.838 55.220 45.312
Other Public Safety 13.635 9.714 10.563 15.672 11.166 12.142
Public Works 125.383 102.566 98.510 144.118 117.892 113.229
Library 9.678 0.360 12.823 11.124 0.414 14.739
Health 8.456 0,000 63.083 9.720 0.00 72.509
Parks & Recreation 53.609 39.371 53.678 61.619 45.254 61.699
Total 452.025 388.588 228.212 519.569 446.653 262.318
Notes: As of fiscal year 1982, due to format changes in the colledion and categorization of expenditures, the State of California Controller's Office no
longer tracks the contributions category. Number of observations is 130.
Table 8.8 below indicates the per capita changes that occurred in each of the expenditure
categories between fiscal years 1978 and 1988. The mean and median measures of central
tendency of the distribution of per capita expenditure change are in approximate agreement, or at
least of the same order of magnitude. In each category, however, the mean is larger in absolute
terms, indicating the presence of extreme values for certain municipalities. This is reflected in the
figures reported indicating the standard deviations for the per capita change calculations. The
largest variations are for those types of expenditures associated with large and fluctuating capital
expenditures such as public works and parks & recreation.
With the exception of general government and the mean figure for library, all expenditures
show an increase in real terms based on mean and median estimates of the first moment. Per
capita expenditures for police increased the most over the ten-year period, rising in real terms by
$24.17 ($20.46) based on mean (median) calculations. All other categories show much more
gradual increases in expenditures. The second largest increase is shown by public works, but as
was indicated earlier, this finding should be interpreted with caution due to the historical pattern
of lumpiness in expenditures associated with this category.
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Table 8.8: Per Capita Change in Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Expenditure Constant Dollars (1982-84 S) Nominal Dollars
Category Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
General -45.026 -30.709 96.472 21.437 18.833 69.707
Police 24.165 20.459 27.284 67.863 64.075 34.993
Fire 4.063 1.703 18.325 27.729 25.750 27.611
Other Public Safety 6.978 4.724 10.074 11.538 7.923 11.501
Public Works 16.217 10.634 111.209 76.314 54.928 113.608
Library -0.036 0.000 11.341 5.090 0.000 10.578
Health 6.710 0.000 63.126 8.635 0.000 72.428
Parks & Recreation 9.336 3.586 46.310 34.121 22.446 54.587
Total 13.969 -5.437 178.769 247.485 191.617 203.705
Notes: As of fiscal year 1982, due to format dianges in the collection and categorization of expeditures, the State of California Controller's Office no
longer tracks the contributions category. Number of observations is 130.
The more robust measure of the first moment, the median, indicates that total per capita
expenditures declined in real terms over the ten-year post-13 period. The mean indicates a
moderate increase of $13.97 per capita over the same period. The median decline heightens the
importance of the increases in various expenditure categories as well as lessening the dramatic
decline in general government expenditures. The standard deviation indicates the considerable
variation in total expenditure change by municipalities during this period. The standard
deviation/mean ratio is 12.80 for total expenditures.
Table 8.9, indicating percentage changes occurring in the ten-year period, generally bears
out much of the trend evident from the per capita change calculations. The data indicate that
(with the exception of both mean and median measures of general government and the median
measure for health) all expenditure categories experienced percentage increases in real terms. Not
surprisingly, considering both measures of center and spread, the general government category
seems to have fared the worst during the ten-year period. The overall decline in the importance
given to expenditures on general government overhead and administrative expenses is apparent in
both measures of change. As with the per capita data, the statistics for total expenditures are
ambiguous, with the mean indicating a slight uptick and the median suggesting a slight decrease
during the decade.
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Table 8.9: Percent Change in Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Expenditure Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Category Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
General -15.895 -28.701 61.393 55.643 31.944 113.612
Police 42.923 30.582 80.031 164,490 141.652 148.103
Fire 15.541 8.918 85.265 113.165 101.560 157.788
Other Public Safety 620.219 81.256 3690.857 1232.819 235.428 68.302
Public Works 36.781 13.098 103.651 153.123 109.296 191.813
Library 58.823 1.472 480.620 193.914 87.782 889.423
Health 105.596 -81.610 528.198 280.471 -65.967 977.470
Parks & Recreation 161.329 11.176 998.657 383,608 105.631 1848.089
Total 7.98 -2.528 42.143 99.825 80.378 77.988
Notes: Percentage change is based on per capita data. As of fiscal year 1982, due to format changes in the collection and categorization of
expenditures. the State of California Controller's Office no longer tracks the contributions category. Number of observations is 130.
Expenditure Changes By Cohort
As with revenues, the aggregate data presented above does not facilitate the detection of
the degree of differentiation among the municipalities in the sample. In order to reveal some of
the differences among the municipalities, the data presented below in Table 8.10 display the
percentage changes in expenditures for the two cohorts -- those which experienced property tax
losses in excess of the mean and those with losses less than the mean. The results are shown in
both constant and nominal dollars.
The data shown in Table 8. 10 represent a sharp contrast from the short-term results
discussed in Chapter 7. Recall that in the initial post- 13 fiscal year large loss municipalities
generally reduced expenditures more (or had slower rates of growth) than small loss
municipalities in virtually all spending categories. For the two-year period, however, the data
indicated that the growth rates for the two cohorts were virtually indistinguishable. In other
words, the large loss municipalities were able to tap resources such that they caught up with those
municipalities which had not been as severely affected by the tax limitation measure.
The data shown above indicate that large loss municipalities were not only able to catch-
up to the small loss cities, but surpass them in expenditures in most cases. For all the categories
of expenditures, both mean and median measures (except for mean fire services expenditures)
indicate a growth rate for the large loss cohort that is greater than that of the small loss cohort. In
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the case of general government, the reduction in expenditures is smaller for the large loss
municipalities than the small loss municipalities.
Table 8.10: Percent Change in Expenditures by Cohort, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Expenditure Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Categorv PT Loss >11.18% PT Loss <11.18% PT Loss >10.49% PT Loss <10. 49%
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
General -14.577 -26.248 -16.802 -38.211 52.962 35.530 57.430 15.171
Police 53.315 36.978 35.770 27.786 185.132 158.912 150.729 136.313
Fire 8.605 16.390 19.779 8.571 101.375 120.385 121.145 100.700
Other Public Safety 1306.199 73.219 172.046 99.800 2544.742 217.342 404.237 278.084
Public Works 42.022 17.722 33.173 8.338 166.404 119.348 144.270 94.844
Library 158.694 8.276 -8.656 -1.967 378.732 100.372 69.038 81.417
Health 50.713 -38.620 144.014 -100.00 178.907 13.589 351.566 -100.00
Parks & Recreation 328.282 19.805 46.413 7.173 697.931 120.100 174.060 98.927
Total 11.638 3.913 5.462 -5.822 106.873 92.651 95.127 74.990
Notes: Percentage change is based on per capita data. In constant $, municipalities with property tax losses 11.18% totaled 53; those with property
tax losses - 11.1800 totaled 77. In nominal $, municipalities with property tax losses > 10.490o totaled 52: those with property tax losses < 10.490o
totaled 78.
The explanation for this paradoxical result cannot be discerned by summary statistics such
as those presented above, but the reasons are probably similar to those discussed in the section
above pertaining to revenues. The municipalities suffering large property tax losses were
wealthier and higher income than those suffering smaller property tax losses. Thus, these
wealthier communities had the resources to raise additional revenues which more than
compensated for the property tax losses. These attributes allowed them to increase expenditures
at a relatively high rate. In addition, these wealthier large loss communities continued to generate
demand for high levels of public goods and services.
Expenditure Changes By Municipality
The expenditure changes for the six specific municipalities generally confirm the overall
changes in total expenditures discussed above. As shown in Table 8.11 below, in constant dollars,
the three small property tax loss municipalities had the steepest expenditure reductions of the six
cities. The three large loss municipalities either had smaller reductions or, in the case of
Piedmont, actually experienced a substantial increase in total expenditures. These results are
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similar, to a certain extent, to the two-year statistics presented in Chapter 7. That is, after an
initial shock, cities recovered to the extent that substitute revenues allowed such a rebound.
Table 8.11: Percent C ange in Expenditures for Selected Cities, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Expenditure PT Loss A lean PT Loss < Mean
Category Havward Wf"alnut Creek Piedmont Fairfield Soledad Southgate
PT A as % of tot. rev. -13.552 -13.354 -43.328 -7.112 -7.009 0.325
Constant S
General -30.092 -17.230 -27.807 -21.460 -62.566 157.918
Police 20.556 -3.050 60.190 61.605 3.590 -8.427
Fire 4.277 - 31.820 1.470 -33.586 -
Other Public Safetv -43.759 -4.939 1833.452 270.438 486.541 186.207
Public Works 48.569 -2.029 79.676 -40.790 26.536 -71.169
Libran -61.926 - 99.287 - - -
Health - - - - -91.816 -
Parks & Recreation -55.471 16.485 71.514 -63.142 -85.127 -52.485
Total -9.022 -3.191 41.421 -21.399 -19.568 -13.608
Nominal S
General 29.370 53.043 33.598 45.344 -30.725 377.296
Police 123.099 79.413 196.444 199.062 91.702 69.464
Fire 92.972 - 143.942 87.778 22.905 -
Other Public Safety 4.079 75.918 3477.998 585.523 985.437 429.647
Public Works 174.938 81.302 232.504 9.572 134.165 -46.646
Librar -29.542 - 268.795 - - -
Health - - - - -84.856 -
Parks & Recreation -17.596 115.564 217.399 -31.792 -72.476 -12.069
Total 68.361 79.141 161.710 45.457 48.845 59.875
Notes: Percentage change based on per capita data. In constant S. municipalities with property tax losses > 11.180o totaled 53; those with property tax
losses < 11.180% totaled 77. In nominal S. municipalities with property tax losses > 10.490o totaled 52; those with property tax losses < 10.490
totaled 78.
Again, according to these data, it seems that in the long run the severity of the impact of
Proposition alone did not make much of a difference on total expenditures. Rather, the
differential impact of the tax limitation was a result not just of the severity of the property tax
reductions, but the interaction of these reductions with the varying social and economic conditions
of the municipalities. Wealthier municipalities increased expenditures (or decreased them at a
lower rate) despite the relative severity of Proposition 13, while poorer, lower income
municipalities were affected to a greater degree by the property tax reductions despite
experiencing less severe property tax reductions. Obviously, controlling for other factors is
necessary before making such a sweeping conclusion; however, the data shown above are
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suggestive of such an effect. In the second portion of this chapter, various other influencing
factors are controlled for through regression analysis.
With regard to constant dollar changes in expenditures for various categories, the results
for the selected cities are quite disparate. With exception of Southgate, all six cities reduced
expenditures on general government in percentage terms; however, the range was quite large,
from -17% to -63%. Similarly, most of the cities increased expenditures on police, fire and other
public safety but the pattern of responses was also quite varied. Other expenditure categories
show changes which are even less generalizable, with positive and negative changes occurring
with equal frequency across both large and small loss municipalities. These results seem to
suggest that municipalities reacted in terms of expenditure changes less in response to the effects
of Proposition 13 than with respect to their own needs and requirements.
Differences in Expenditure Shares
In Chapter 4, 1 analyzed the expenditures shares of each of the various categories using
the tax capacity regression model. It was estimated that rather large movements in tax capacity
and uncollected taxes were necessary in order to generate movements in budget shares. The data
presented below in Table 8.12 generally indicate that the passage of Proposition 13 did not result
in an immediate dramatic change in expenditure shares. There is, however, some indication of a
downward movement in general government, library and parks & recreation in the first two post-
13 fiscal years and a upward movement in the shares for police and public works.4
The shares for other expenditures are rather stable in the first two years. In addition, the
downward movement for library and parks & recreation seem to be reversed in the longer term;
by fiscal year 1988, they had regained their previous share. In the long-term, according to the
data above, general government continued to decline in relative importance while police and
public works appear to increase their overall share of the budget. What is not clear is whether the
4 The data shown in Table 8.12 do not control for tax capacity or uncollected taxes which are the
bases of the tax capacity model. The regression analyses presented in previous chapters indicates
shifts in expenditures of much larger magnitudes in response to property tax declines than
indicated by the data presented here.
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passage of Proposition 13 was at least partially responsible for the change in budget shares or
whether such movements largely reflect ongoing trends and responses to other factors.
Table 8.12: Expenditure Shares, Fiscal Years 1978, 1979 1980 and 1988.
Expenditure Fiscal Year 1978 Fiscal Year 1979 Fiscal Year 1980 Fiscal Year 1988
Category Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
General 30.366 29.243 28.881 27.289 27.660 26.733 21.380 19.583
Police 18.691 18.753 19.579 19.689 20.618 20.625 24.129 23.955
Fire 9.732 11.201 9.900 10.937 9.881 11.046 9.881 11.083
Oth. Pub. Safety 1.602 1.426 1.561 1.439 1.690 1.466 3.187 2.725
Public Works 24.502 22.463 26.517 25.061 25.898 24.549 27.127 25.222
Health 0.359 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.361 0.000 1.003 0.000
Library 1.889 0.000 1.580 0.000 1.520 0.000 1.857 0.097
Parks & Rec. 10.255 9.815 9.741 9.089 10.923 10.366 11.436 9.803
Notes: Number of observations is 130.
Smith's (1991) work indicates that trends for the various expenditure categories,
particularly with respect to general government and police, were already in effect prior to the
passage of Proposition 13. The tax limitation measure may not have set these trends in motion;
however, the severity of the trends does appear to undergo a detectable change after the passage
of Proposition 13. Rather than cause an instantaneous expenditure shift, the tax limitation
measure may have augmented existing forces which led to a acceleration of pre-existing
undercurrents, i.e., a move away from general government expenditures and toward certain direct
services such as police and public works.
What the data above suggest is that the budget movements appear to based more on long-
term trends rather than decreases in tax capacity (or property taxes), although the latter may
accelerate the process. How does this interpretation mesh with the estimation of changes in
expenditures in the first two years after the passage of Proposition 13? In Chapter 7, the severity
of the impact of property tax cuts did seem to have an effect on expenditures on certain
categories. Obviously, depending on changes in other categories, this can result in alterations in
budget shares. A nuanced interpretation of the data suggests that shifts in budget shares occurred
as a result of the passage of Proposition 13 in the short-term, but within the context of continuing
275
long-term budget share trends. In the next section, evidence of long-term shifts in relation to the
tax limitation measure is examined.
Revenue and Expenditure Adjustment Regression Models
Empirical Proxies
The data presented in the previous section are strongly suggestive of overall trends in
revenue and expenditures in the ten years since Proposition 13. Presented in the aggregate
fashion that they are, however, nothing definitive can be inferred regarding individual city
responses or possible ties to the tax limitations imposed by Proposition 13. The purpose of this
portion of the analysis is to relate changes in revenues and expenditures over the longer-term to
particular socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities and the severity of Proposition 13's
property tax curtailment. In essence, this analysis applies to long-term trends many of the same
techniques used in Chapters 6 and 7 in exploring short-term changes.
In a manner similar to the revenue and expenditure investigations in Chapters 6 and 7, the
basic analytical technique selected to explain longer-term changes in revenues is through cross-
sectional regression modeling. Like the earlier portions of the analysis, the cross-sectional models
incorporate socio-economic and fiscal control variables. The principal fiscal characteristic
variable used in all revenue equations is the change in property tax revenues from fiscal year 1978
to 1979. Through the use of this variable, I explore the relationship between a change in property
tax revenues, and total revenues and revenue composition. Similarly, this technique will also be
used to explain movements in total expenditures and expenditure allocation.
It has also been argued that municipalities may also show variations in revenue and
expenditure changes based on socio-economic and demographic characteristics. These
characteristics or traits may themselves be related in some fashion to the fiscal characteristics
identified and discussed above. Certain socio-economic variables are included in the multivariate
regressions in order to control for these particular influences. In addition, a number of these
factors will be of particular interest in classifying municipalities, particularly those variables that
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pertain to a municipality's ability to provide an adequate level of funding for public goods and
services.
In order to gauge a municipality's level of economic well-being, median household income
is used in most of the regressions. Ordinarily, an attempt would be made to incorporate some
measurement of wealth in the models as well, since this factor is clearly related to the ability to
pay for public goods and services. The most readily available measure -- assessed property value
-- was not employed in prior regressions due to multicollinearity issues. Under the present
circumstances, however, this variable is not even available for consideration. Recall that
Proposition 13 not only adjusted assessments back to 1975 levels but also allows reassessment of
property only upon sale. As a consequence, the assessed value is related to underlying market
value only immediately after a property has been sold. This circumstance necessitates the use of
the employment/population ratio as an independent variable. This variable, while highly
correlated with assessed value and thus linked to a municipality's economic well-being, avoids
multicollinearity issues.
Several other variables which capture important characteristics of municipalities are also
included. Population has been included to control for variations in revenues and expenditures
based on size. Population growth of the municipality, and the population of the municipality as a
percent of the surrounding county, have also been included in the multivariate regressions to
control for these effects. In addition, the 1978 municipal tax rate, a measure of tax capacity and
the relative size of the municipality's ending balance are also employed. These variables relate to
the municipalities' demographic, social and fiscal characteristics and the rationale for their
inclusion is discussed more thoroughly in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The revenue models are presented with increasing specificity in order to analyze the effect
of both property tax changes and socio-economic characteristics at various levels of detail. First,
regression models based on total revenue changes are presented. Next, regression models
pertaining to endogenous and exogenous revenues are presented. Finally a micro-analysis of
individual revenue sources is then presented in order to isolate the sensitivity of separate revenue
streams. As with the short-term methodology, all regression equations are formulated based on
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aggregate, percentage and per capita change and relative magnitude basis. This format facilitates
the identification of the differential effects of fiscal and economic characteristics based on various
types and sources of revenues. A similar approach in presenting the regression models is used in
the long-term expenditure analysis.
Specification of Revenue and Expenditure Equations
In Chapters 6 and 7, I explored short-term changes in revenues and expenditures
occurring in the wake of Proposition 13 by relying on a variation of the determinants procedure.
This approach will continue to be employed in investigating the longer-term effects of Proposition
13 on revenues and expenditures. The explanatory variables included encompass factors directly
related to a municipality's ability to raise revenue. As with the earlier portions of the study, these
determinants models should continue to be viewed as descriptive rather than causal
The general form for the expenditure and revenue equations is:
fis4 =f[ptxA, popi, grow,, coun, incm,, empi,, trat,, endb, tcap, capt ,J (8.1)
where: fis4,1 = change injth revenues (total and by source) or expenditures (total and
categorical) on aggregate, percentage and per capita basis for
i4' municipality;
ptxA, = property tax change from fiscal year 1978 to 1979 on aggregate,
percentage, per capita and percent of total revenue basis for i'h municipality;
pop = population in 1990 of ith municipality,
grow, = percent population change from 1980 to 1990 of ih municipality;
coun, = proportion of population of county represented by i'h municipality,
incmi= median household income in 1990 of ith municipality,
emp/, = total employment as percent of population for i municipality;
trati = equalized municipal tax rate in fiscal year 1978 of i'h municipality,
endb, = ending balance of ith municipality;
tcap,= tax capacity of ith municipality;
captl, = capital intensivity ofjth expenditure category for it municipality.
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The regressions are performed using both nominal and constant dollar changes in revenues
and expenditures between 1978 and 1988. For revenue regressions, changes with respect to total
revenues, endogenous revenues, exogenous revenues and state aid, as well as four local sources
(local taxes, other local, fees & charges and local miscellaneous) are investigated. For the
expenditure regressions, total expenditure change and expenditure changes for five separate major
categories are analyzed (general, police, fire, public works and parks & recreation). The primary
fiscal explanatory variable used is the change (based on four measures) in property tax revenues
between the last pre- 13 fiscal year and the first post-13 fiscal year, i.e., between fiscal year 1978
and 1979. This represents an effort to link changes in expenditures and revenues to variations in
the severity of the tax losses. Normative analysis would hold that changes in property tax
revenues would be expected to have a negative relationship to changes in other local revenues if
substitution is possible, and have a positive relationship to expenditure changes.
The other explanatory variables are quite similar to those used in previous portions of the
thesis. Regarding measures of economic well-being, median household income (incm) and
employment proportion (emp/), would be expected to have positive relationships to both local
revenues and expenditures. Their relationship to state aid is more ambiguous and hinges on the
nature of changes in the state aid formula during the ten year period. The demographic measures
employed in the regressions -- population (pop), growth rate (grow) and the municipal population
as a proportion of the surrounding county (coun) -- are used primarily as control variables and
their expected signs and magnitudes are not readily apparent on an a priori basis. Additional
variables include tax rate (trat), ending balance (endb), tax capacity (tcap) and capital intensivity
(capt).
With the particular methodology employed, several problems can arise in interpreting the
data and the regression results. The lack of a clear theoretical paradigm and the inability to infer
direct causal explanations has been discussed. This is an issue regardless of whether models are
estimated over a short-term basis or over a much longer period. The period of time encompassed
by the current model adds additional complications, however. While it is unlikely that
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municipalities could influence their socio-economic attributes in the short-term, such dynamics are
more likely to occur over a longer duration.
Many of these issues can be manifest in the form of simple correlation between variables
increasing over time. In order to control for these factors, a careful analysis of variable
interrelationships was conducted. The correlation matrices for the revenue and expenditure
regressions are shown in Appendix C. Tables C6 and C7 present the correlation matrices for the
explanatory variables used in the revenue and expenditure regressions based on constant dollars
and nominal dollars respectively. Those variables whose high simple correlation resulted in
multicollinearity issues have been eliminated from the appropriate regressions.
Given the absence of a theoretically-grounded functional form for investigating
expenditure and revenue change relationships, a linear approximation is used in the regressions.
Multivariate regressions were run which include the previously described socio-econonic
variables in addition to the fiscal variable ptxA. These regressions were conducted for the various
revenue permutations discussed earlier. They were also conducted for five major expenditure
categories as well as total expenditures. The functional form for the multivariate equations is:
fisA,, = a, +,-plpxA, - 2popi + /J3grow1 -;+4coun, 4 8incm, - 86empl, - 87trat, I sendb, -
/J9tcapi - 61ocapt ,+ (8.2)
where: a, = constant or intercept term,
c= random error term component;
all other variables are as identified in equation 8.1.
The multivariate regressions for both expenditures and revenues gave indications of
heteroscedasticity. The presence of heteroscedasticity was inferred through both graphical
analysis of error variance as well as through trial regressions. The Cook-Weisberg (1983) test for
heteroscedasticity was used to estimate error variance based on fitted values for the regressions.
Based on the results of this test, the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity was rejected at the .05
level or better for all regressions. White's (1980) method was used to correct for
heteroscedasticity in all expenditure and revenue regressions.
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Results and Analysis of Revenue Regressions
The explanatory results for the revenue equations should generally be better than those
obtained for the expenditures regressions. After all, Proposition 13 was not a limitation on
expenditures either in total or with respect to different categories. Effects of tax limits on
expenditures will only be indirectly affected as specific revenue sources or total revenues are
curtailed. In contrast, Proposition 13 had a direct affect on revenues and consequently there is
some expectation that the variation in revenue changes should be captured more readily by simple
cross-sectional regressions. Revenues are analyzed in terms of the broadest categories before
turning to more specific sources.
Total Revenue Regressions
The regression results shown in Table 8.13 represent an effort to describe one of the most
important aspects of the tax limitation measures -- its long-term impact on the ability and
willingness of municipalities to raise additional revenues to replace property tax losses. The
results are shown for both constant and nominal dollars and based on aggregate (1), percentage
(2), per capita (3) and relative magnitude of property tax change (4). Generally, the results of the
constant and nominal dollar regressions are quite similar and, as a consequence, the following
discussion refers to constant dollar regression results.
Given the duration of time elapsed, the explanatory power of the various equations is
generally quite good, ranging from an R2 of .29 for the percentage change equation up to .68 for
the aggregate change equation. The coefficients on the important fiscal variable representing the
1978-79 change in property taxes lend themselves to some interesting interpretations. For two of
the models, aggregate and per capita change, the coefficient on property tax change is positive
and significant. Using the aggregate model as an example, a $1.00 reduction in property taxes
from fiscal year 1978 to 1979 would result in decline of $2.51 in total revenues. The per capita
response would be of slightly greater magnitude.
Compare these results to the short-term total revenue changes in Table 6.9. In that case,
changes in property taxes were also positively related to changes in total revenues and statistically
significant. In the initial year and for the composite two-year equations, coefficients in both short-
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term models were of lesser magnitude than in the long-term model The independent effects of
property tax reductions, according to these measures, had long-term repercussions. In addition,
instead of attenuating as time passed, the effects grew even sharper. Cities hard hit by
Proposition 13 appear less able to compensate for property tax reductions as time passed than in
the initial two years, ceteris paribus.
Table 8.13: Total Revenue Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (1) totraA (2) totrpA (3) totrcA (4) totrtA (1) totraA (2) totrpA (3) totrcA (4) totrtA
2.513596 -0.038027 3.237712
**(4.420) (-0.116) **(6.918)
-1.922192
**(-2.04)
0.358897
(0.333)
-0.064690
(-0.116)
3.854867 -3.523971
**(5.394) *(-1.974)
212622.3 0.000071 0.0622 0.000101 342917.6 0.000132 0.0345 0.000190
**(5.033) (0.539) (0.978) (0.731) **(7.500) (0.539) (0.589) (0.745)
-978094.2 0.852286 -230.0715 0.934281
(-0.333) **(2.572) **(-2.20) **(2.920)
-1556793 0.314368 -40.02285 0.354847
(-0.171) (0.574) (-0.156) (0.628)
64693.46 0.008120 4.7555
**(2. 101) (1.361) **(2.150)
-3021838 1.577219 -160.3018 1.708038
(-0.957) **(2.572) *(-1.768) **(2.875)
4197401
(0.422)
39221.7
(1.373)
3502888 -0.007292 136.4601 -0.089609 5977901
*(1.674) (-0.052) **(2,770) (-0.571) **(2.292)
ptxA
POP
grow
coun
incm
empl
trat
endb
0.581761
(0.574)
108.9873 0.640970
(0.407) (0.611)
0.015 2.5779
(1.361) (1.466)
-0.013494 264.2699
(-0.052) **(4.968)
-230.9244 -6.65e+07 -267.1952
**(-4.55) (-0.134) **(-3.68)
0.518645 471097.2 0.682152
(1.231) (0.106) (0.985)
0.041885 -0.000296
(0.404) (-0.945)
2724.6 -0.000712
(1.040) (-1.234)
0.318604
**(2.679)
-0.180898
(-0.629)
-426.3606
**(-4.53)
0.940542
(1.203)
-0.000508
(-0.894)
-5239047 0.281835 -29.0717 0.722519 -5078233 1.377814 141.4902 2.216621
*(-1.956) (0.716) (-0.304) **(2.732) *(-1.746) *(1.984) *(1.706) **(4.578)
R2
adi R' 1 .3 .
0.6756
0 6510)
0.2787 0.7315
02236 0.7161
0.3059 0.9771 0.2787 0.4639 0.3031
0.2596 0.9754 0.2236 0.4332 0.2567
Notes: totraA is aggregate change in total revenues: totrpA is percentage change in total revenues; totrcA is per capita change in total revenues.
totrtA is percent change in total revenues based on change in property tax as a percent oftotal revenues. For totraA totrpA and totrcA regressions, the
variable pixA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respeudively. For totrtA regression, pxA is expressed in terms of the
property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. *
indicates significance at the .10 level or better: ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129
for equations 1. 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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9.41e+07 -144.385
(0.217) **(-3.68)
1094046 0.368616
(0.292) (0.985)
1044.332 -0.000385
(0.474) (-1.234)
tcap
The estimated parameters on ptxA in the aggregate and per capita change models appear
to be in conflict with those of the relative magnitude model (4). In the relative magnitude model,
the estimated parameter indicates that those cities experiencing steep declines in property taxes
relative to the budget were able to compensate for such declines -- in fact, the coefficient indicates
an increase of 19% in total revenues if property tax declines constituted 10% of total revenues.
These results are in direct opposition to the short-term results shown in Chapter 6. Table 6.9
indicates that larger relative magnitude declines in property taxes resulted in declines in total
revenues in the initial year although not for the two-year composite period.
In Chapter 5, it was estimated that those cities suffering the most dramatic reductions in
property taxes relative to total revenues tended to be higher income and wealthier cities.
Municipalities experiencing the sharpest declines in property taxes relative to total revenues were
those municipalities most able to compensate for such declines based on greater wealth and
income, making it both easier, and (in view of the likelihood of relatively static demand functions)
more necessary to raise replacement revenues. While these municipalities were negatively
affected with respect to total revenues in the initial post-13 fiscal year, they were unaffected for
the 1978-80 composite period and in the long-term, they more than compensated for the property
tax declines.
In contrast, aggregate and per capita change models indicate that even after controlling for
the effects of population, changes in aggregate and per capita property taxes had immediate and
continuing effects. For both models, reductions in property taxes resulted in decreases in total
revenues in the immediate post-13 fiscal year, for the composite two-year period and over the
long-term. Thus, the interpretation must be that municipalities suffering large aggregate and per
capita reductions in property taxes were unable and/or unwilling to make up for such losses using
alternative revenues. Based on these estimates, in the long-term, it was not the relative severity of
the property tax reductions that proved to be important in terms of total revenue effect. Rather, it
was cities that utilized property taxes to a large extent on an aggregate and per capita basis that
suffered lasting effects. Large cities with large budgets suffered large aggregate reductions in
property taxes and total revenues. These losses continued to have a long-term effect.
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The control variables representing various socio-economic characteristics show no real
surprises. The grow variable indicates that increasing rates of population growth correspond to
increasing percentage changes in total revenues but, as might be expected, decreased total
revenues on a per capita basis. Clearly, there must be some time lag for budget adjustments on a
per capita basis in fast growing municipalities. These results are similar to those estimated in the
short-term regressions. The last pre-13 tax rate (trat) continues to exercise a negative influence
on total revenues in most of the models, the exception being aggregate change where it is
insignificant. Ending balance (endb) and tax capacity (tcap) are statistically insignificant.
The two variables which relate directly to a municipality's economic well-being, income
(incm) and employment proportion (empi), show a positive relationship with total revenues in the
aggregate and per capita change equations. Although the estimates are statistically insignificant
(when included) in the percentage change and relative magnitude equations, the results indicate
that both increases in income and the increased presence of employment resulted in greater
revenues over the ten-year period. The results for the short-term regressions indicate a much
more ambiguous, or even negative, relationship between total revenues and these variables.
Overall, the tax limitation measure appears to have had a continuing impact on total
revenues of certain municipalities based on the severity of the property tax reductions. While
certain socio-economic characteristics had a positive effect on the ability of cities to raise
alternative revenues, the impact of property tax losses continued to exercise its influence in the
decade after the passage of the tax limitation measure. The measure had a lasting effect on
municipalities suffering large aggregate and per capita losses, while those experiencing large
relative magnitude reductions in total revenues due to property tax reductions were able to
compensate for these declines in the long run.
Exogenous Revenue Regressions
Long-term changes are next viewed from the perspective of exogenous revenues --
revenues received from the state and federal governments as well as sales taxes. Table 8.14
below, presents changes in the three exogenous revenue sources on an aggregate, percentage and
per capita basis. As in the previous model, exogenous revenue change is regressed against
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property tax changes and the series of selected socio-economic determining variables. As with the
total revenues regressions in Table 8.12, in this situation the best models in terms of explanatory
value continue to be the aggregate (1) and per capita change (3) variations.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting all the revenues included in these regressions
as being purely 'exogenous.' While in the short-term, these sources of revenues can be
unambiguously viewed as exogenous and out of the control of local governments, in the medium
to long term, some questions do arise. The possibility of entrepreneurial municipalities engaging
in 'grantsmanship' to garner more than their 'share' of state and federal dollars has already been
mentioned. In the longer term, however, a potentially more serious issue arises. In reaction to
restrictions on property taxes, some municipalities may have engaged in zoning and economic
development practices designed to encourage commercial growth in order to benefit from sales
taxes which stem from such growth. As a result, the calculus used in interpreting the results of
the regressions below changes since municipalities may not be entirely passive entities with
respect the receipt of these revenues but rather agents playing an active role in revenue
determination.
Even with such a caveat, the estimates in Table 8.14 reveal some interesting patterns.
With respect to property tax changes, the variable ptxA is statistically significant only in the
aggregate change (1) and relative magnitude (4) equations. The aggregate equation indicates that
declines in property taxes were related to declines in exogenous revenues. In other words, as
property tax losses increased in aggregate so did losses in exogenous revenues, even after
controlling for population size. In contrast, the relative magnitude equation indicates that as
property tax increased (relative to total revenues), there came a counteracting increase in
exogenous revenues.
These results provide a distinct contrast to the short-term exogenous revenue results
reported in Table 6. 10. In that case, property tax changes were negatively related to exogenous
revenues in the aggregate but positively related to them on a relative magnitude basis. In the
short-term then, exogenous revenues compensated for large aggregate losses in property taxes,
even after correcting for population. This compensating dynamic, however, occurred only in the
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initial post-13 fiscal year. For the composite period, the compensating feature of exogenous
revenues on an aggregate basis disappeared. On a relative magnitude basis, exogenous revenues
were not significant for either the initial post-13 fiscal year or for the composite period.
Table 8.14: Exogenous Revenue Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (1)exogaA (2)exogpA (3)exogcA (4)exogtA (1)exogaA (2)exogpA (3)exogcA (4)exogtA
2.178954 -0.025663
**(6.935) (-0.141)
-0.074485
(-0.350)
-1.272972
**(-2.66)
2.630461
**(4.507)
-0.043657
(-0.141)
0.450181 -2.330478
*(1.936) **(-2.52)
68321.37 -0.00005 0.0273 -0.000072 136098.2 -0.000098 -0.001890 -0.000130
**(2.968) (-0.339) (0.619) (-0.408) **(5.482) (-0.339) (-0.055) (-0.401)
-1575395 0.138550 -105.258 0.238306 -3598024
(-0.987) (0.556) (-1.448) (1.056) **(-2.26)
-1.02e+07 0.289545 -155.3641 0.467701 -5641238
*(-1.857) (0.680) (-1.169) (0.973) (-1.350)
20635.63 0.001220 1.7334 6850.43
(1.456) (0.295) **(1.983) (0.556)
0.256397 -108.8859 0.426860
(0.556) **(-2.08) (1.021)
0.535824 -17.03216
(0.680) (-0.165)
0.002260 0.3795
(0.295) (0.554)
0.854509
(0.962)
1559300 0.181555 96.29889 0.230602 3752134 0.335981 192.3316 0.416590
*(1.812) (1.171) **(3.374) (1.352) **(3.703) (1.171) **(11.86) (1.330)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
empl
trat
endb
tcap
a
-95.63854 61600000 -151.4789
**(-5.02) (0.302) **(-2.89)
-0.180254 661346.8 -0.362891
(-0.445) (0.463) (-0.454)
-176.3159
**(-4.98)
-0.351483
(-0.459)
2056.505 0.000038 -0.068645 -0.000076 1376.386 0.000071 0.006570 -0.000113
*(1.722) (0.216) (-1.115) (-0.282) (1.135) (0.216) (0.172) (-0.230)
-1405630 0.056944 -136.1774 -0.000782 -1091627 0.959788 9.611606 0.868668
(-1.099) (0.149) **(-2.34) (-0.005) (-0.884) (1.374) (0.190) **(3.125)
0.9421 0.0755 0.2169 0.1001 0.8412 0.0755 0.2972 0.0982
0.9377 0.0050 0.1719 0.0401 0.8392 0.0050 0.2568 0.0381
Notes: exogaA is aggregate dange in exogenous revenues; exogpA is percentage change in exogenous revenues; exogcA is per capita change in
exogenous revenues; exogtA is percent change in exogenous revenues based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For exogaA,
exogpA and exogcA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. For exogtA regression,
ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in
000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates sigificance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of
observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in
regression due to multicollinearity.
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7213741 -81.85506
(0.034) **(-2.89)
1250669 -0.196096
(0.811) (-0.454)
R2
adi. R2
What happened in the long-term represents a shift in various cities' fortunes. Those with
large aggregate losses did not benefit from compensating exogenous revenues. For those large
aggregate loss cities, population becomes the important variable but large property tax losses
from Proposition 13 result in fewer exogenous dollars. This dynamic is partially responsible for
the positive econometric relationship between total aggregate revenues and property tax losses
shown in Table 8.14, where declines in property taxes from 1978-79 are related to declines in
total revenues.
On the other hand, in the long run, cities suffering large property tax losses as a percent of
total revenues were able to reverse their fortunes. For the ten-year period, larger relative
magnitude property tax losses resulted in increases in exogenous revenues. Based on the
estimated parameter shown in Table 8.14, a loss in property taxes between 1978 and 1979 equal
to 10% of total revenues resulted in an increase in exogenous revenues of 13%. Given the
heterogeneous nature of exogenous revenues, it is difficult to say why this might occur. Clearly,
post-13 bailout funds would comprise a small portion of exogenous revenues, however, the
possibility of city efforts to generate additional exogenous moneys through 'entrepreneurial'
efforts cannot be completely discounted. Although some overlap must occur between cities
experiencing large aggregate declines in property taxes and large relative magnitude property tax
losses, clearly enough differences exist between the two groups to result in quite distinctive
coefficients.
No particular striking patterns emerge from an examination of the estimated coefficients
for the socio-economic control variables. Of particular note is the fact that the two variables
which reflect a municipality's ability to raise revenue -- incm and empi -- are positively related to
exogenous revenues, although Incm is significant in only one of the models. With exception of
the pop and coun variables in the aggregate change equation, none of the other population-based
variables are significant. The estimated parameter for last pre-13 municipal tax rate (trat) is
negative, indicating that increases in the rate correspond to decreases in exogenous revenues.
Other variables represent rather inconsistent results.
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Overall, the results from the exogenous revenue regressions hint at the long-term impact
of the passage of Proposition 13 on municipalities. The mechanism for the relationship revealed
by the regressions is not obvious. Indeed, given the nature of the descriptive econometric model
used and the time between the sample points, the ptxA variable may incorporate a host of factors
other than property tax decreases between fiscal years 1978-79. The exogenous revenue
regressions provide a partial answer to the total revenue regressions results shown in Table 8.13.
For an additional piece of the puzzle, endogenous revenues are next analyzed.
Endogenous Revenue Regressions
Shown in Table 8.15 below are the regression results for endogenous revenues. These
regressions represent an effort to explain variations in the change in endogenous revenues based
on variations in property tax losses as well as socio-economic characteristics. The possibility that
state aid was also related to endogenous revenues was investigated by including the state aid
variable in a series of preliminary regressions; no significant parameter differences were
observed The results of the regressions indicate that the aggregate change (1) and per capita
change (3) models have the highest explanatory value of the four measures, with an R2 of from
.65 to .96. The two versions of percentage change (2 and 4) explain roughly one-fifth of the
variation in endogenous revenues.
Of the three long-term models examined thus far, the parameters on the property tax
change variable in the endogenous revenue change regressions most closely resemble the short-
term results, at least with respect to the two-year composite period. The signs on all four of the
property tax change coefficients are the same in each of the two periods, most of the measures of
statistical significance are similar and the magnitudes of the coefficients are generally comparable.
' The estimated coefficients (t-statistics) on property tax change (ptxA) in the alternative
regressions in the aggregate, percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations were
respectively: -1.038697 (-2.353), -1.526075 (-1.497), 2.093363 (6.030) and -4.069313 (-1.105).
The parameter estimates (t-statistics) for state aid change (statA) in the alternative regressions in
the aggregate, percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations were respectively:
0.5144538 (1.964), -0.3356019 (-0.705), 0.195893 (0.378) and -0.3772031 (-0.833).
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This similarity would tend to suggest that early trends in the wake of Proposition 13 remained, for
the most part, relatively consistent over the subsequent ten-year period.
Table 8.15: Endogenous Revenue Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (J)endoaA (2)endopA (3)endocA (4)endotA (1)endoaA (2)endopA (3)endocA (4)endotA
-U.576iU -1.)4419 L.U9 -3.653/4
**(-2.50) (-1.525) **(6.003) (-0.977)
-2.4 / /91
**(-5.36)
-2.2 924
(-1.525)
2.197489 -. 971611
**(3.873) (-0987)
114230.1 0.000082 0.0317 0.000197 165672.3 0.000152 0.0308 0.000366
**(6.836) (0.174) (0.783) (0.413) **(8.651) (0.174) (0.685) (0.415)
1354706 0.664909 -64.92703 0.795216 1425045 1.230472 18.74271 1.454965
(0.862) (0.557) (-1.060) (0.672) (0.796) (0.557) (0.309) (0.666)
8107136
(1.203)
37463.62
**(2.058)
0.110631
(0.050)
94.2446 -0.070016 9468579 0.204691 90.72524 -0.110268
(0.441) (-0.031) (1.205) (0.050) (0.386) (-0.027)
0.0141 2.3568
(0.943) *(1. 750)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
empl
26530.28 0.026 1.4745
(1.411) (0.943) (1.261)
43.13152 -0.737892
(1.429) (-1.378)
2145837 -1.165574 78.8867 -1.380182
(1.271) (-1.068) *(1.790) (-1.406)
-5 53e+07
(-0.185)
-188.1891
(-1.075)
357554 4.241037
(0.133) (1.367)
-389.7998 -2.52e+08 -348.2554
**(-2.28) (-0.716) (-1.075)
5.004944 217069.1 7.848339
*(1.737) (0.065) (1.367)
-721.0852
**(-2.28)
9.227767
*(1.727)
-1404.647 -0.002749 0.068066 -0.002738 675.8653 -0.005086 0.221051 -0.005024
(-0.887) *(-1.863) (0.929) *(-1.918) (0.402) *(-1.863) **(2.019) *(-1.911)
-2986362 1.061719 90.75576 2.837489 -2933725 3.046184 108.32 6.128233
**(-1.79) (0.827) (1.556) **(2.709) (-1.490) (1.297) *(1.957) **(3.203)
0.9643 0.2108 0.6576 0.2243 0.9791 0.2108 0.2200 0.2243
0.9616 0.1506 0.6380 0.1726 0.9775 0.1506 0.1752 0.1726
Notes: endoaA is aggregate dange in endogenous revenues; exogpA is percentage dange in endogenous revenues; exogcA is per capita dange in
endogenous revenues; exogtA is percent dange in endogenous revenues based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For endoaA,
endopA and endocA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For endotA regression.
pIxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in
000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of
observations is 129. 128. 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in
regression due to multicollinearity.
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1735203 -0.629841
(1.334) (-1.068)
trat
endb
tcap
a
R2
adi. R2
In the aggregate change (1), percentage change (2) and relative magnitude (4) models, the
ptxA variable takes on the expected negative sign, indicating that decreases in property taxes
between 1978 and 1979 result in increases in endogenous revenues. Only in the case of the
aggregate equation, however, is the estimated parameter statistically significant. While the
property tax reductions still had an impact over the ten-year period, on an aggregate basis,
intervening factors attenuated the response on a percentage and relative magnitude basis. The
aggregate equation indicates that a $1.00 decline in property taxes during this period results in an
increase of $0.58 in endogenous revenues.
The per capita change equation (3) shows the same paradoxical positive relationship
between property tax reductions and endogenous revenue change as it did in the short-term
regressions shown in Table 6.11. The reason for this rather counterintuitive result is not clear
from the regressions, but may simply be due to the inability for cities to compensate at a rate
sufficient for per capita equivalence. The aggregate equation, for example, indicates a
compensation rate less than dollar for dollar. Had the coefficient on ptxA in the aggregate
equation indicated a unitary relationship, it would be expected that the per capita ptxA coefficient
would decline or even change signs, ceeris paribus.
The estimated parameters on ptxA in the aggregate change model for the exogenous
revenues regressions, Table 8.14, and endogenous revenues regressions, Table 8.15, provide an
interesting contrast. Based on the results of these estimates, those municipalities suffering larger
aggregate property tax declines experienced exogenous revenue declines, but increases in
endogenous revenues. Given this, and the long duration between sample endpoints, endogenous
revenues could be linked to on-going changes in exogenous revenues as well as reductions in
property taxes between fiscal years 1978 and 1979.
This possibility was tested by including the exogenous revenue change variable (in each of
its permutations) in the regressions. The estimated coefficients on the property tax change
variable did not change magnitude to any significant degree, nor was the statistical significance of
any of the explanatory variables measurably altered. While simultaneity is a possible issue here,
with exogenous and endogenous revenues being mutually co-determined, this is likely only to be
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the case with respect to state aid. The other contributors to exogenous revenues -- federal aid
and sales taxes -- are not affected by locally raised funds. The issue of simultaneity with respect
to state revenues is addressed below when state aid alone is examined.
The population-based variables are not statistically significant in any of the equations
except for pop in the aggregate change equation. Income (incm) shows the expected positive
relationship with endogenous revenue change. The results for employment proportion (empi),
however, are more mixed, with increasing employment/population ratios leading to endogenous
revenues which are larger in the aggregate and per capita but smaller on a percentage basis. None
of the estimated parameters are significant, however. The variable representing municipal tax rate
(trat) displays the expected negative sign.
The results of the endogenous revenue regressions indicate a general sustaining of the
effects of the Proposition 13 mandated property tax reductions. The coefficients on the property
tax change variable are generally equivalent to those estimated in the short-term regressions,
although for some of the models the statistical significance of the parameter declined in the long-
term regressions. Again, the descriptive nature of the model rules out making any cause and
effect relationships, but the results are suggestive of the tax limit's impact. Based on some
measures, specifically aggregate and percentage change, municipalities continued to raise
endogenous revenues in some relation to the severity of the property tax cuts. Based on the
aggregate model, in constant dollars these were insufficient to compensate for property tax losses,
but did serve to mitigate their effect.
Specific Revenue Sources Regressions
Local Taxes. Table 8.16 below indicates the regression results for the change in local
taxes with respect to changes in property taxes on an aggregate, per capita and percentage basis.
With the exception of the aggregate equation, the explanatory values are somewhat lower than for
the previous regressions which analyze broader measures of revenues. Considering the fact that
cities which increased endogenous revenue spread these increases among a range of sources, each
influenced by a variety of factors unaccounted for in the regressions, this general decline in the R2
value makes some intuitive sense.
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Table 8.16: Local Taxes Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 S) Nominal Dollars
Variable (1)loclaA (2)locIpA (3)loclcA (4)locltA (J)loclaA (2)locIpA (3)locIcA (4)loclt A
ptxA **-1.9392 -1.908331 -0.082557 -4.064286 -3.261499 -3.246357 0.017381 -8.11623
(-13.304) (-0.991) (-0.842) (-0.508) **(-9.99) (-0.991) (0.085) (-0.530)
pop 2040.541 0.000273 0.0212 0.000230 9223.846 0.000505 0.0377 0.000419
(0.356) (0.564) **(3.979) (0.475) (0.735) (0.564) **(4.521) (0.470)
grow 2245230 -1.324479 -22.55614 -1.02245 2671623 -2.451048 -29.5483 -1.877681
**(2.575) (-0.585) (-1.123) (-0.423) **(2.283) (-0.585) (-1.338) (-0.420)
coun -2006347 -5.097361 -35.95802 -4.769645 -1978151 -9.433048 -35.93763 -8.735992
(-0.915) *(-1.913) (-1.360) *(-1.704) (-0.570) *(-1.913) (-1.126) *(-1.696)
incm -3465.022 -0.002130 0.0556 -10757.31 -0.003940 0.001660
(-0.561) (-0.087) (0.251) (-1.154) (-0.087) (0.006)
empi -145842.8 -0.919293 8.809972 -0.559772 -542106.1 -1.70122 18.25946 -1.032152
(-0.406) (-1.007) (0.943) (-0.702) (-1.124) (-1.007) (1.497) (-0.703)
trat -3.24e+08 145.0606 147.2394 -5.37e+08 268.4455 270.5076
**(-3.20) (0.391) (0.544) **(-3.46) (0.391) (0.541)
endh -654920.1 4.720179 5.026007 -410739.8 8.735044 9.266899
(-0.664) (0.752) (0.789) (-0.304) (0.752) (0.783)
tcap -194.6931 -0.003011 -0.026733 -0.003720 193.6899 -0.005571 0.012691 -0.006881
(-0.371) *(-1.678) (-1.228) *(-1.774) (0.271) *(-1.678) (0.382) *(-1.759)
a 486593 1.896645 30.65897 2.329767 894955.9 4.645611 48.39604 5.151033
(1.009) (0.769 **(2.033) (1.284) (1.173) (1.032) **(2.840) (1.551)
R2  0.9815 0.0815 0.0587 0.0817 0.9842 0.0815 0.0934 0.0823
adj. R 0.9802 0.0114 0.0046 0.0205 0.9830 0.0114 0.0414 0.0211
Notes: loclaA is aggregate change in local taxes: locIpA is percentage change in local taxes; locicA is per capita change in local taxes; locitA is
percent change local taxes in based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For loclaA locipA and loclcA regressions, the variable
ptrxA is expressed in aggregate. percentage and per capita change respectively. For locitA regression. ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax
reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates
significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for
equations 1, 2. 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
As shown in the table, only in the aggregate equation (1) is the ptxA variable significant.
The estimated parameter indicates that a decline in property taxes of $1.00 between fiscal years
1978 and 1979 results in an increase in local taxes of $1.94. Thus, municipalities experiencing
large aggregate losses in the immediate post-13 period used additional local taxes as a means of
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compensating for this reduction. While in each of the three remaining model permutations, the
property tax change variable takes on the expected negative sign, the statistical significance in
each case is quite low indicating the lack a strong pattern of responses based on the different
measures of the severity of property tax reductions. A comparison of these results to those
obtained in the short-term regressions for local taxes indicates that the patterns of change for the
two periods are quite similar, especially with respect to the property tax change variable for the
two-year composite period. Whatever reactions were set into motion by the property tax
reductions with respect to local tax increases remained consistent over the ten-year period.
Municipalities did not change their orientation regarding local tax increases, at least to a degree
sufficient to overcome the initial reaction shown for the composite two-year period.
The relationship between local taxes and property tax reductions does show some
inconsistency based on the different measures of change. In the short-term, it was argued that the
lack of responsiveness in the percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations might be
due to the pervasive anti-tax, anti-government atmosphere in California and/or the legal limbo
regarding local taxes pending the State Supreme Court decision as to their legality. Given the
increase in significance the ptxA variable in the aggregate equation, whatever effect these factors
had, it had lessened, at least with respect to large aggregate loss cities, over the course of the ten-
year period.
On the other hand, cities with large percentage or relative magnitude property tax
reductions showed little change from the short-term regressions. While differential effects of the
restraining factors is one possible explanation, it is more likely that the revenue responses of
municipalities with higher percentage and relative magnitude property tax losses simply relied on a
variety of substitute revenues rather than looking towards any specific source such as local taxes.
Larger aggregate loss municipalities may have relied on this source simply because they had
access to a deeper pool of local tax resources coupled with the ability to export a portion of the
burden.
The differing responses to the severity of property tax changes lend complications to the
interpretation of the results. Nevertheless, the reactions of municipalities to property tax
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reductions based on the four measures show variations which have occurred in other contexts as
well. The results shown in Table 8.16 indicate that large aggregate loss municipalities raised local
taxes in response, but those with large percentage losses (2) and relative magnitude losses (4) did
not respond in a proportionate fashion. This suggests that among the large aggregate loss cities,
which also tend to be those with the largest populations, enough uniformity of responses occurred
to result in statistical significance. For the high percentage and relative magnitude loss cities,
however, the response was more heterogeneous, resulting in an imprecise measurement; these
cities' reliance on local taxes was not at all uniform to the same degree as the large aggregate loss
cities.
Other Local. Table 8.17 below shows the regression results for the change in other local
revenues in response to property tax changes and socio-economic variables. In terms of
explanatory values, the regressions take on the same general pattern as those of the short-term
two-year composite equations, although the aggregate change (1) and per capita change (3)
equations have slightly decreased R2s. At best, the other local income models explain only half of
the variation in this revenue source, and the percentage-based models are much lower than that.
Most noticeable in the regression results is the lack of meaningful coefficients for the
property tax change variable in three of the four models. In fact, the estimated parameters are all
positive, indicating that property tax declines and declines in other local income occurred in
tandem. Only in the aggregate equation is the parameter estimated with sufficient statistical
significance to draw any interpretations. These results are quite different from those of the local
taxes shown above, clearly indicating different treatment of these sources by municipalities.
The reasons for the lack of response by other local revenue to declines in the property tax
could be due to one or several features. First, as was discussed in the short-term regressions, the
ease with which these sources of revenues could be raised may have made them the first line of
defense against out-right budget cuts. The initial post-13 fiscal year short-term regressions, in
fact, estimated a negative relationship between the two revenue sources according to three of the
four models. The resources of other local revenue may have been quickly exhausted, however,
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leading to less meaningful parameters in both the two-year composite regressions and the long-
term regressions.
Table 8.17: Other Local Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable I (J)othraA (2)othrpA (3)othrcA (4)othrtA (1)othraA (2)othrpA (3)othrcA (4)othrtA
0.274476
**(2.894)
0.488916
(0.361)
0.088092
(0.827)
0.424262
(0.149)
0.418906
(1.486)
0.831717
(0.361)
-0.470931
**(-2.35)
1.062206
(0.193)
30225.6 0.000464 0.0102 0.000528 45486.87 0.000858 0.006920 0.000982
**(5.292) *(1.937) (1.347) **(2.107) **(4.464) *(1.937) (0.765) **(2.108)
321471.8 1.295414 -6.893047 1.184758 10441.7 2.397261 20.71116 2.172014
(0.566) (1.108) (-0.390) (0.962) (0.144) (1.108) (1.069) (0.956)
-957336.7 -2.310518 -24.82312 -2.575049 -900104.7 -4.275786 -47.18146 -4.814787
(-0.440) *(-1.951) (-0.831) **(-2.02) (-0.313) *(-1.951) (-1.521) **(-2.01)
9.695174 0.008240 0.6539
(1.349) (0.694) **(2.456)
8698.613 0.0152 0.3278
(0.998) (0.694) (1.457)
ptxA
pop
grow
counl
incm)
empl
6.84e+07 -298.9278
(0.766) (-1.597)
-760390.5 1.781836
(-0.866) (0.939)
-373.0017 7.44e+07 -553.1883
**(-2.00) (0.657) (-1.597)
1.816882 -875121.8 3.297421
(1.091) (-0.724) (0.939)
-688.7541
**(-2.00)
3.363704
(1.088)
-147.7215 -0.001364 -0.120992 -0.000938 656.2696 -0.002525 -0.039093 -0.001710
(-0.174) **(-2.07) **(-2 70) *(-1.662) (0.593) **(-2.07) (-0.803) (-1.644)
-541049.4 2.205525 11.11006 2.62686 -617746.2 4.859007 4.065862 5.736255
(-1.093) (1.473) (0.949) **(2.473) (-0.962) *(1.868) (0.388) **(2.922)
0.5142 0.1609 0.5419 0.1774 0.7487 0.1609 0.4314 0.1775
0.4774 0.0969 0.5156 0.1225 0.7297 0.0969 0.3987 0.1227
Notes: othraA is aggregate dange in other local taxes; othrpA is percentage dange in other local; othrcA is per capita change in other local; othrtA
is percent change in other local based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For othraA othrpA and othrcA regressions, the
variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For othrtA regression, pIxA is expressed in terms of the
property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. *
indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129
for equations 1, 2. 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
Second, as was pointed-out in the local taxes regressions, other local income could have
been a source of new revenue for all cities, not just those suffering large losses (by any of the four
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1075552 0.019703 42.75881 -0.219918 1334356 0.036461 51.16171 -0.418876
(1.595) (0.049) **(3.490) (-0.438) (1.587) (0.049) **(3.120) (-0.452)
trat
endb
tcap
a
R2
adi. R2
measures) in property taxes after Proposition 13. The result of wide-spread use of other local
income by all municipalities could have the effect of lessening any tie to the severity of the
property tax cuts and instead relating it more directly to the budget structures of cities. This
dynamic would not necessarily be picked-up by other explanatory variables since it is more a
function of budgeting and cost-recovery systems than socio-economic characteristics.
Third, a review of the components of other local income reveals it to be a fairly shallow
pool of potential revenues. Unlike local taxes, which relate revenues to a dynamic economic base,
other local income is largely based on cost recovery of specific municipal services. Once cost-
recovery is achieved, there is no opportunity for additional expansion. Unlike taxes, which stem
from a deeper and more dynamic base, these cost recovery charges are also less visible than taxes.
These features feed into the dynamics described above. The alacrity with which they can be
increased coupled with their lack of visibility make them easily accessible to all municipalities.
Their comparative shallowness as a revenue resource make them easily and quickly depleatable.
Fees & Charges. The results of the long-term regressions for fees & charges are shown in
Table 8.18 below. The results, in terms of explanatory values, show a distinct improvement over
the short-term regressions as reported in Table 6.14. The R2s for the aggregate change (1) and
per capita change (3) equations are roughly the same as in the short-term regressions, but the for
the percentage change (2) and relative magnitude (4) equations they improve substantially, and
indicate that they explain upwards of one-third of the variation.
In terms of the estimated parameters for the ptxA variable, however, the long-term
regression results display a distinct deterioration from the short-term regression results. In the
short-term regressions, the property tax change variables was negative in all four models in both
time periods, although only in the aggregate model was it statistically significant. In the analysis
of those results, it was suggested that in the short-term, fees & charges were used by these large
aggregate loss municipalities to lessen some of the budgetary impact wrought by the passage of
Proposition 13.
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Table 8.18: Fees & Charges Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 S) Nominal Dollars
Tariable (J)feesaA (2)feespA (3)feescA (4)feestA (1)feesaA (2)feespA (3)feescA (4)feestA
ptxA 0.131680 -7.035649 0.352340 18.15842 0.168577 -11.96877 0.774441 34.22615
(0.676) (-1.080) **(2.072) (1.087) (0.479) (-1.080) **(2.366) (1.072)
66195.1 0.000959 -0.0239 0.001030 88495.41 0.001780 -0.0318 0.001880
**(4.639) (0.697) (-0.635) (0.720) **(6.141) (0.697) (-0.742) (0.715)
42321.87 -9.002772 58.10644 -9.75281 -122847.8 -16.66027 85.55515 -17.93325
(0.035) (-1.147) (1.202) (-1.166) (-0.090) (-1.147) (1.539) (-1.163)
10400000 2.334671 133.3401 1.076354 12700000 4.320358 177.5682 1.965811
*(1.839) (0.438) (0.716) (0.183) *(1.933) (0.438) (0.839) (0.180)
25353.91 -0.0868 0.4778
**(2.091) (-1.362) (0.770)
26458.5 -0.1606 0.4243
*(1.870) (-1.362) (0.611)
778068.6 -6.836966 -2.373924 -5.924538 1184329 -12.65234 0.482769 -10.87158
(0.942) *(-1.691) (-0.131) (-1.656) (1.072) *(-1.691) (0.022) (-1.655)
2.07e+08 -2083.707
(0.872) **(-2.09)
627913.4 38.57472
(0.352) (1.538)
-1638.626 2.54e+08 -3856.046
**(-2.44) (0.902) **(-2.09)
40.61367 -64560.16 71.38534
(1.652) (-0.030) (1.538)
-3035.974
**(-2.44)
75.33115
(1.651)
110.535 -0.005077 0.160576 -0.006942 543.0343 -0.009396 0.204493 -0.013105
(0.099) (-0.582) **(3.400) (-0.791) (0.433) (-0.582) **(3.641) (-0.803)
-2897812 13.59066 0.70172 14.77643 -3260761 27.05238 19.10115 28.02343
**(-2.54) (1.606) (0.023) **(2.236) **(-2.45) *(1.741) (0.578) **(2.310)
0.8804 0.3288 0.0978 0.3372 0.9061 0.3288 0.1240 0.3369
0.8713 0.2776 0.0460 0.2930 0.8990 0.2776 0.0737 0.2927
Notes:feesaA is aggregate change in fees & charges; feespA is percentage change in fees & charges; feescA is per capita change in fees & charges;
feestA is percent change in fees & darges based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For feesaA, feespA and feescA regressions.
the variable ptvA is expressed in aggregate. percentage and per capita change respectively. For feestA regression, ptxA is expressed in terms of the
property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. *
indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates sigiificance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129
for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
The long-term regressions indicate that the effect of the property tax losses largely
declined over the ten-year period. None of the estimated parameters is negative, and the only
significant coefficient indicates a positive relationship between property tax losses and fees &
charges. Given the rather restrictive nature of fees & charges, described in Chapter 6, the loss of
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impact for the property tax loss variable may be caused by the same factors that were outlined
above regarding other local income, they are limited to cost of service rather than representing a
deeper source of ongoing revenues. Given this, the usefulness of fees & charges may have been
exhausted in the years soon after the passage of Proposition 13. In addition, given their smaller
political impact relative to new taxes, they may have used by a broad spectrum of municipalities
irrespective of property tax losses.
Intuitively, it would seem that municipalities faced with fiscal stress and uncertainty
coupled with anti-tax sentiment would gravitate to less politically visible sources of revenues.
The paths of least resistance would seem to be those offered by other local revenues and fees &
charges rather than local taxes. For large aggregate loss cities, however, this was apparently not
the long-term trend. These cities may have been faced with the offsetting factor of an already
exhausted reservoir with regard to cost recovery possibilities. Given that large aggregate loss
cities were also larger more sophisticated municipalities, there is the likelihood that either these
charges were already collected prior to Proposition 13 or put into place shortly thereafter,
lessening their availability for additional increases.
Local Miscellaneous. The results of the miscellaneous revenue regressions relating
changes in this source of revenue to property tax changes and socio-economic factors are shown
below in Table 8.19. With the exception of the per capita equation, the explanatory value of the
equations is rather poor. This is in keeping with the results from the short-term regressions,
whose R2 values were also quite low.
In the short-term regressions, it was argued that the results indicated no apparent
compensating response on the part of miscellaneous revenues to property tax reductions after the
passage of Proposition 13. In fact, based on the regression results, an argument can be made that
the two revenue sources had a positive relationship, with declines in property taxes related to
declines in miscellaneous revenues. The same dynamic appears to be operating over the long-
term. The results in Table 8.19 indicate while both the aggregate change (1) and per capita
change (3) models show a positive relationship between miscellaneous revenue and property
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taxes, the percentage change (2) and relative magnitude (4) equations show no definitive
relationship at all.
Table 8.19: Local Miscellaneous Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (J)miscaA (2)miscpA (3)misccA (4)misctA (J)miscaA (2)miscpA (3)misccA (4)misctA
ptxA 0.211463 43.66693 1.745118 51.22372 0.176225 74.28396 1.876598 110.632
**(2.336) (1.003) **(6.940) (0.682) (1.084) (1.003) **(7.657)
15768.91 -0.002480 0.0242 -0.002910 22466.15 -0.004590
**(2.360) (-0.475) *(1.852) (-0.514) **(3.282) (-0.475)
0.018
**(2.171)
(0.722)
-0.005120
(-0.499)
-1254318 -36.1986 -93.58427 -38.04093 -1228172 -66.98822 -57.9753 -71.2985
**(-2.03) (-1.044) **(-3.16) (-1.009) *(-1.902) (-1.044) **(-2.56) (-1.011)
660215.3 -52.32921 21.6856 -48.45452 -376855.9 -96.83912 -3.723819 -92.34486
(0.432) (-1.0141) (0.419) (-1.117) (-0.219) (-1.141) (-0.101) (-1.115)
5879.558 -0.0251 1.1695
(1.016) (-0.108) *(1.883)
2130.49 -0.0465 0.7207
(0.420) (-0.108) *(1.741)
27425.43 4.6096 -6.063337 0.251778 169257.4 8.530412 8.984733 -0.025902
(0.066) (0.312) (-0.350) (0.019) (0.432) (0.312) (0.825) (-0.001)
-6991668 -1720.223
(-0.079) (-0.651)
1144952 -1.44266
(0.986) (-0.068)
-1738.233 -4.23e+07 -3183.403
(-0.992) (-0.446) (-0.651)
-6.957003 1567491 -2.669753
(-0.305) (1.239) (-0.068)
-3144.002
(-0.974)
-12.52497
(-0.295)
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-34094.17
(-0.060)
50.81357
(1.014)
48.285 31.71444 49825.92 88.35995 36.75697 60.58371
*(1. 884) (1.107) (0.090) (1.020) **(2.026) (1.127)
0.2241 0.0674 0.8742 0.0592 0.7531 0.0674 0.8236 0.0603
0.1655 -0.0043 0.8670 -0.0040 0.7344 -0.0043 0.8134 -0.0029
Notes: miscaA is aggregate change in miscellaneous revenues; miscpA is percentage change in miscellaneous revenues- misccA is per capita change
in miscellaneous revenues; misctA is percent change in miscellaneous revenues based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For
nscaA miscpA and misccA regressions. the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. For misctA
regression, ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and
incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better, ** indicates sigiificance at the .05 level or better.
Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not
included in regression due to multicollinearity.
299
-1172.767 0.022013 0.055214 0.029474 -717.1286 0.040738 0.042960 0.055527
(-1.449) (0.598) (0.804) (0.707) (-1.198) (0.598) (1.304) (0.713)
Reflecting on the composition of this revenue category should suggest certain reasons for
the lack of a compensating relationship in both the short and long-term. Unlike recurring local
taxes, and to a lesser extent other local income and fees & charges, miscellaneous revenues are
largely one-time irreplaceable assets. No municipal action can create these in a short period of
time; rather once they are used, they are gone. Furthermore, nothing in particular relates
municipalities with a large amount of potential miscellaneous revenues to large property tax
losses. While those municipalities with large property tax losses may have a greater propensity to
generate miscellaneous revenues than cities less severely affected, there is nothing to suggest that
these hard-hit municipalities owned a disproportionate share of these assets in the first place.
A somewhat closer reading of the various results suggests that those cities which suffered
the largest aggregate losses in property taxes between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 were the larger
and poorer cities. These municipalities were the very cities that experienced a strong positive
relationship between property tax losses and miscellaneous revenues. That is, municipalities
which experienced large aggregate losses in property taxes also lacked the resources to
compensate for such declines through the use of miscellaneous revenues.
State Aid The regressions shown below in Table 8.20 represent the change in state aid
with respect to changes in property taxes following the adoption of Proposition 13 and the socio-
economic variables. In order to control for the possibility that changes state aid was partially
affected by changes in endogenous revenues as well as those variables shown in Table 8.20,
changes in endogenous revenues was also included in the regressions.6 No significant alteration
occurred in the ptxA variable, although the endogenous revenue change variable was significant
6 In order to examine the possibility of simultaneity in the relationship between state aid and
endogenous revenues, a two-stage least squares methodology was used. A two-equation system
was used whereby both state aid and endogenous revenues were estimated endogenously with
property tax changes and all socio-economic variables estimated exogenously. None of the fiscal
variables of concern were statistically significant and the explanatory value of all model versions
dropped dramatically. While the simultaneity of the two revenue sources is theoretically
appealing, it may be only applicable to the estimation of revenue levels rather than to the
descriptive estimation of changes embodied by this study.
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and positive in the aggregate equation. This relationship is not unexpected in the aggregate
change case.
In terms of explanatory value, the long term regressions are similar to the two-year, short-
term regression results reported in Table 6.16. The aggregate equation (1) shown in Table 8.20
has, in fact, an R2 substantially above that of its short-term counterpart. The range of the R2
values indicates that the models explain anywhere from one-half the variation in state aid for the
aggregate change model to fifteen percent for the per capita change model.
The variable representing the post- 13 property tax change does not appear to have altered
substantially from the short-term, two-year regressions, particularly with respect to the sign on the
coefficient. In the aggregate equation, the relationship is positive between the two variables, with
decreases in property taxes leading to decreases in state aid in the aggregate. The magnitude of
the coefficient has increased substantially however, representing a worsening of the situation for
large aggregate loss cities. In the long-term, state aid did not provide a source in the aggregate of
countervailing funds to compensate for property tax losses.
The property tax variable is statistically insignificant in both the percentage change (2) and
the per capita change (3) models; however, in the relative magnitude model (4) it is negative and
statistically significant at a high level of confidence. The coefficient has also grown in magnitude
from the results shown in the short-term regressions. In the long-term regressions, a 10%
reduction in property taxes between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 results in an increase of 10% in
state aid, ceteris paribus. Again, the municipalities suffering high property tax losses as a
proportion of the total budget seem to fare better with respect to state than those experiencing
large aggregate losses.
7 The parameter estimates (t-statistics) on property tax change (ptxA) in the alternative
regressions in the aggregate, percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations were
respectively: 0.9694464 (2.300), 0.040416 (0.216), 0.0327318 (0.627) and -1.059652 (-2.340).
The parameter estimates (t-statistics) for endogenous revenue change (endoA) in the alternative
regressions in the aggregate, percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations were
respectively: 0.1225851 (1.791), -0.0099149 (-0.781), 0.0078112 (0.365) and -0.0091903 (-
0.884).
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Table 8.20: State Aid Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
V'ariable (1)stataA (2)statpA (3)statcA (4)stattA (J)stataA (2)statpA (3)statcA (4)stattA
0.898800
**(2.233)
0.055732
(0.299)
0.049159
(1.266)
-1.02581
**(-2.21)
1.491009
*(1.927)
0.094809
(0.299)
0.058899 -1.865715
(1.085) **(-2.09)
63479.82 0.000162 0.0208 0.000161 88961.5 0.000300 0.0129 0.000300
**(2.111) (0.943) (1.111) (0.977) **(2.696) (0.943) (0.957) (0.982)
-1984480 0.741085 -0.953825 0.792333 -2941852 1.371433 -9.624086 1.453792
(-1.252) **(3.820) (-0.076) **(4.020) (-1.646) **(3.820) (-1.007) **(3.985)
ptxA
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-645033.3 -0.152307
(-1.482) (-1.494)
2.21e+08 -52.45813
(1.218) **(-2.03)
1852203 -0.624252
(1.505) **(-2.49)
0.372053
(0.978)
-2089296
(-0.721)
0.577207
(0.807)
3.585646
(0.103)
0.677358
(0.960)
3141.842 0.006130 0.2309
(0.348) (1.558) **(2.030)
-12.40856 -0.163513
(-0.882) *(-1.769)
-335987.1 -0.281855
(-0.734) (-1.494)
-3.9879 -0.311434
(-0.375) *(-1.834)
-75.48551 2.93e+07 -97.0777
**(-3.27) (1.425) **(-2.03)
-0.641596 2007443 -1.155225
**(-2.80) (1.490) **(-2.49)
-139.0767
**(-3.26)
-1.197742
**(-2.80)
1121.705 0.000120 0.006461 0.000134 1031.094 0.000221 0.008796 0.000272
(1.622) (0.865) (0.535) (1.213) (1.352) (0.865) (0.730) (1.314)
-1674532 -0.023922 -28.14641 0.031285 -1678572 0.797977 11.29724 0.925549
(-1.515) (-0.146) **(-2.70) (0.346) (-1.390) **(2.740) (1.483) **(5.532)
0.5274 0.2821 0.1555 0.2975 0.8258 0.2821 0.1224 0.2943
0.4917 0.2274 0.1071 0.2506 0.8126 0.2274 0.0720 0.2472
Notes: stataA is aggregate change in state aid: statpA is percentage change in state aid statcA is per capita diange in state aid; stattA is percent
change in state aid based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For stataA statpA and statcA regressions. the variable ptxA is
expressed in aggregate. percentage and per capita change respecively. For stattA regression, ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction
between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent oftotal revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at
the .10 level or better: ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and
4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
Given the fact that state aid sources comprised much more than simply bail-out funds
allocated in the immediate post-13 fiscal years, the results should be interpreted with caution.
With the passage of ten-years since the approval of the tax limitation measure, it would be
expected that the effect of moneys intended to ameliorate the impact of the measure would
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-2100154 0.311907 -23.47154
(-0.809) (0.807) (-0.431)
4686.677 0.003310 0.3906
(0.583) (1.558) **(2.482)
become even more watered-down. Nevertheless, the estimates speak for themselves and suggest
that the long-term impacts of state aid seem to assist the same cities that were able to raise
endogenous revenues rather the large aggregate loss municipalities.
Analysis of Revenue Regressions
The revenue analysis using summary statistics and regression methodology has provided
rather surprising results regarding the long-term effects of Proposition 13. With regard to certain
factors, these results are quite distinctive when compared to the short-term analysis conducted in
Chapter 6. In some cases, particular short-term trends seem to continue, or at least are
reasonably consistent with long-term results. In other cases, long-term and short-term effects
contrast rather noticeably.
In the long-term, total revenues were fairly stable in real percentage terms, increasing
2.2% based on mean changes and decreasing 3.2% based on median measures. Per capita
measures also indicate a slight decrease. The cohort changes indicate the spread of the revenue
response, with cities suffering a greater proportionate loss in total revenues due to the tax
limitation measure actually outgaining those cities whose property tax reductions were less
severe. Both mean and median measures indicate that the large loss municipalities benefited more
from rising revenues than the small loss municipalities. These results are consistent in both
percentage and per capita terms.
While these results initially may cause some bewilderment, they are in fact the result of the
different profiles of cities in the large loss and small loss cohorts, respectively. If there are
significant distinctions between the two groups, then increases in revenues may occur irrespective
of the property tax losses or (more likely) despite the severity of the property tax losses. If this is
the case, the different measures of property tax loss (i.e., aggregate, percentage, per capita and
magnitude of change) could logically result in differing parameter estimates and/or even sign
changes.
The econometric analysis bears out these findings. In the initial post-13 fiscal year, both
municipalities with large aggregate losses and large relative magnitude losses experienced a drag
on total revenues. By the two-year composite regressions, some division between these two
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measures had occurred. Large aggregate loss cities still experienced declining revenues in tandem
with the fiscal year 1979 property tax reduction, but cities with larger relative magnitude losses
experienced very little, if any, residual effect. By the long-term, this gap had widened further,
with large aggregate loss municipalities continuing to suffer total revenue declines and relative
magnitude loss cities actually experiencing increases.
Were these total revenue changes due to endogenous or exogenous revenue changes or
both? Based on the statistical summaries and the regression modeling, both endogenous and
exogenous played a role in the disparity among the cities. While all municipalities experienced
declines in exogenous revenues, the cohort analysis indicates that the large loss municipalities
suffered less of a decline in these sources than did the small loss municipalities. If this trend were
consistent across all measures of change, it might represent a preferable outcome since those
suffering disproportion property tax reductions received more exogenous income.
An examination of the econometric results indicates the lack of consistency across the
measures of property tax change, however. Larger aggregate losses in property taxes led to
larger aggregate losses in exogenous revenues, exacerbating the effects of Proposition 13. On the
other hand, as the relative magnitude of property tax losses increased, exogenous revenues also
increased. Based on the independent effects of property tax declines, exogenous revenues appear
to have responded in a compensating manner according to certain measures but not others. This
reinforces the theory that the profiles of municipality groups based on different measures of
property tax change is quite different.
The endogenous revenue results are equally interesting. Here again, the cohort analysis
indicates that the municipalities losing a proportionately larger amount of property gained more in
endogenous revenues. Given that the wealthier, richer municipalities had larger percentage
property tax losses, this may indicate that these communities had the ability and the will to raise
internal revenues to supplant property taxes. And, in fact, based on the relative magnitude of
property tax reductions, the independent effects of property tax losses, while important in the
short-term, were not significant in the long-term. Municipalities experiencing large aggregate
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losses, on the other hand, did continue to compensate in the long-term with growth in
endogenous revenues.
What types of revenues were raised by what types of cities in the ten years following the
adoption of Proposition 13? Based on the summary statistics of per capita and percentage per
capita change, local taxes, other local and fees & charges were those revenue sources which
increased the most during this post-13 period. The independent effect of Proposition 13-induced
property tax losses was very mixed, however. For example, for large aggregate loss
municipalities, only local taxes displays a compensating response to property tax declines. Other
income sources declined in tandem with the 1979 decline in property taxes: other local, local
miscellaneous and state aid. Fees & charges show insignificant changes in relation to property tax
losses.
The differences in the results based on different measurements of property tax change are
evident here as well. Neither the percentage change nor the relative magnitude measure of the
property tax variable was statistically significant in any of the specific endogenous revenue
equations (only in the state aid equation was a compensating response estimated. The lack of any
single revenue source to show significance in this regard indicates that municipalities used a
variety of individual revenue sources. Based on these measures, none of the endogenous revenue
sources experienced a broad enough usage by municipalities to result in statistical significance.
Results and Analysis of Expenditure Regressions
In the analysis of expenditure reactions to property tax and fiscal changes in the short-term
aftermath of Proposition 13, a series of regressions were performed in order to sort out the
budget responsiveness to various fiscal stimuli. For example, changes in total expenditures were
regressed against property tax changes, total revenue changes, endogenous revenue changes, etc.
While some patterns in responses set in motion by the tax limitation might continue to exist in the
long term, it is likely that the secondary effects (i.e., reactions to revenue sources other than
property tax declines) would be lessened considerably. As a result, the long-term expenditure
analysis has been limited to an examination of expenditure reactions to changes in property taxes
between fiscal years 1978 to 1979.
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Total Expenditure Regressions
The results of the total expenditure regressions are shown below in Table 8.21. The
change in total expenditures between 1978 and 1988 has been expressed as a function of various
measures of the change in property taxes between 1978 and 1979 as well as a series of socio-
economic variables. In terms of the explanatory power of the equations, they roughly parallel the
results from the short-term regressions discussed in Chapter 7. The aggregate change equation
explains approximately 90% of the variation in total expenditures while the other versions explain
somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter.
The property tax change parameter displays a distinctly different character than in the
short-term regressions, especially for the percentage change (2), per capita change (3) and relative
magnitude (4) equations. In the short-term analysis, the estimated parameter was positive,
statistically significant and greater than unity in all three cases. That is, a decline in property taxes
corresponded with a greater than unit decrease in total expenditures. For example, a one percent
decline in property taxes elicited a 1.9% decline in total expenditures. In the long-term
regressions, however, this dynamic has been erased. The estimated parameter is insignificant in all
three cases. Those municipalities disproportionately affected by declines in property taxes,
according to these three measures, were unaffected by the decline in the long term.
The property tax change variable takes on a quite different characteristic in the aggregate
change equation (1). The estimated parameter is negative and indicates that larger aggregate
property tax losses resulted in larger increases in expenditures in the long-term. In fact, this is
quite similar to the results obtained in the short-term regressions, although the magnitude of the
estimate has declined in the long-term. Even after controlling for population, municipalities with
larger aggregate losses were unable to control expenditures in a manner designed to
accommodate the severity of the property tax declines.
The reasons behind such a result are likely related less to the impact of the property tax
reductions and more to variables which are correlated to the aggregate change in property taxes
but not included in the regressions. The large aggregate property tax loss municipalities are the
larger, older and poorer cities in the state. Stresses and strains placed on these cities due to failing
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infrastructure, increasing crime rates, burgeoning demands for public services or diseconomies of
scale would not necessarily be captured with the existing econometric model.
Table 8.21: Total Expenditure Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (1)totxaA (2)totxp A (3)totxcA (4)totxtA (J)totxaA (2)totxp.A (3)totxcA (4)totxtA
tx-A -1056921 0178969 -0213672 -0978627 -549942 0304453 -0249287 -1665185
*(-1.882) (0.458) (-0.636) (-0.931) **(-5.77) (0.458) (-0.372) (-0.823)
90566.11 -0.000116 -0.0306 -0.000138 219498.2 -0.000299 -0.0337 -0.000255
**(2.314) (-0.554) (-0.403) (-0.450) **(5.803) (-0.554) (-0.423) (-0.451)
7352129 0.842790 -100.7771 0.887782 5263552 1.559646 -80.09777 1.624608
**(2.325) **(2.542) (-1.204) **(2.648) *(1.794) **(2.542) (-0.994) **(2.625)
-2326138 0.895417 19.146 0.938175 911799.9 1.657033 223.454 1.718015
(-0.192) (1.185) (0.074) (1.178) (0.076) (1.185) (0.829) (1.166)
26310.56 0.003540 1.4979
(0.923) (0.614) (1.112)
4940.483 0.006560 0.2025
(0.162) (0.614) (0.164)
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-1.08e+09 -129.9066
**(-2.73) **(-2.75)
4290261 1.071068
(1.119) **(2.556)
-171.8131 -1.16e+09 -240.4016
**(-4.32) **(-2.74) **(-2.75)
1.118927 1211929 1.982092
**(2.872) (0.320) **(2.556)
-316.6162
**(-4.28)
2.060286
**(2.847)
592.0584 -0.000361 -0.140347 -0.000321 2751.579 -0.000668 0.189194 -0.000561
(0.231) (-1.107) (-1.228) (-0.933) (1.129) (-1.107) (1.182) (-0.890)
-399410.8 -1.856222 -524.6547 -1.677789
(-0.064) *(-1.846) (-1.834) *(-1.723)
4240429 -3.435077 -404.0749 -3.147284
(0.676) *(-1.846) (-1.530) *(-1.747)
-1463241
(-0.471)
0.915937
(1.346)
65.11579 0.962268 -2447331 2.518839 208.3565 2.666882
(0.570) **(2.585) (-0.745) **(2.053) *(1.867) **(3.901)
0.9099 0.2532 0.2230 0.2679 0.9850 0.2532 0.3462 0.2664
0.9022 0.1894 0.1716 0.2125 0.9837 0.1894 0.3029 0.2110
Notes: totxaA is aggregate dange in total expenditures; totxpA is percentage dange in total expenditures; totxcA is per capita dange in total
expenditures; totxtA is percent dange in total expenditures based on dange in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For toxaA, totxpA and
totxcA regressions. the variable pxA is expressed in aggregate. percentage and per capita dange respectively. For totA regression, pxA is expressed
in terns of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in
parenthesis. * indicates sigificance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128.
130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to
multicollinearity.
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1074116 -0.120940 118.8723 -0.149233 3363080 -0.223808 233.7954 -0.292909
(0.849) (-0.853) **(2.805) (-1.152) **(2.121) (-0.853) **(4.912) (-1.233)
R2
adi. R2
For example, the income variable would capture household median income for an entire
city, but would not account for variation in income levels. Los Angeles has a relatively high mean
and median household income, yet large tracts of the city are comprised of low-income
households, a characteristic that can substantially alter demand for public goods and services.
Nor do the measures used account for significant differences in the cost of living between urban
areas and rural areas, factors which could significantly affect the outcome. As a consequence of
these and other similar influences, the negative ptxA coefficient may be capturing a host of
different effects.
The parameter estimates for the socio-economic variables contain few surprises.
Increased population growth is related to increases in expenditures as is an increase in the
municipality's ending balance. On the other hand, a larger pre-13 municipal tax rate results in
declines in total expenditures based on all three measures in which this variable is employed. The
capital intensivity variable takes on the characteristic found in the short-term regressions, with
greater capital intensivity related to lower expenditures, ceterisparibus.
Expenditure Allocation Regressions
General Government. General government expenditures is the category where the most
dramatic response to the severity of property tax reduction was detected in the short-term. Table
8.22 below shows the long-term estimates for changes in general government in relation to
changes in property taxes and socio-economic characteristics. Overall, the explanatory factors in
the regressions show an improvement over the short-term versions. The aggregate equation
explains roughly 90% of the variation while the other versions explain between one-third and two-
fifths of the variation.
A comparison of the short-term and long-term regressions with respect to general
government expenditures reveals a distinct change in the pattern. In the short-term, general
government expenditures were reduced in the two-year period based on aggregate, per capita and
relative magnitude measures of the property tax reductions. The statistical significance of the
estimated coefficient was quite high in each of the three cases. In the long-term regressions, by
way of contrast, only the aggregate change equation (1) indicates a continuation of this
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relationship. The other models display no significant change in general government expenditures
with respect to property tax change.
Table 8.22: General Government Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (1)genlaA (2)genIpA (3)genicA (4)genitA (J)genlaA (2)genipA (3)genIcA (4)genitA
1.849478 -0.226586 0.315617 -0.606328
**(6.949) (-0.483) (1.468) (-0.426)
1.302734
**(3.516)
-0.385457
(-0.483)
-0.044578
(-0.163)
-1.186849
(-0.443)
72686.68 0.000270 0.004340 0.000317 80331.42 0.000499 0.006390 0.000585
**(3.706) **(2.481) (0.228) **(3.014) **(5.194) **(2.481) (0.420) **(3.014)
-2753072 1.187851
*(-1.954) **(2.424)
-73.50985 1.210721 -2236996 2.198207
(-0.960) **(2.515) *(-1.971) **(2.424)
-4863200 -0.696845 -116.8917 -0.824427 -4043457
(-1.121) (-1.525) (-1.452) (-1.584) (-1.195)
17476.18 0.006400 0.8617
(1.356) (0.914) (1.238)
-1.289564
(-1.525)
-38.29369
(-0.663)
-95.22773
(-1.454)
2.240222
**(2.527)
-1.516727
(-1.573)
7.399011 0.0118 0.3743
(0.768) (0.914) (0.719)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
emp/
trat
endb
tcap
capt
a
1.24e+08 -228.1999
(0.602) **(-4.44)
4334711 1.280134
**(2.527) **(2.521)
-325.3224 2.54e+07 422.3009
**(4.02) (0.160) **(4.44)
1.650346 2557388 2.368983
**(2.804) **(2.019) **(2.521)
-602.187
**(-4.02)
3.048169
**(2.792)
817.7829 -0.000322 -0.032374 -0.000204 1081.074 -0.000596 0.023807 -0.000373
(0.960) (-0.652) (-0.660) (-0.480) (1.381) (-0.652) (0.664) (-0.480)
-3251712 -0.812017 -146.7024 -1.04833 -1458190 -1.502699 -64.52044 -1.937399
*(-1.914) **(-2,02) (-1.181) **(-2.27) (-1.138) **(-2.02) (-0.668) **(-2.27)
-1058112 0.375333 -10.95238 1.113439 -673446.7 1.579014 13.86149 2.9117
(-0.940) (0.898) (-0.236) **(2.574) (-0.742) **(2.150) (0.414) **(3.680)
0.8928 0.4202 0.3373 0.4091 0.7741 0.4202 0.2184 0.4092
0.8837 0.3706 0.2934 0.3645 0.7549 0.3706 0.1667 0.3646
Notes: genlaA is aggregate change in general government expenditures; genipA is percentage dange in general government expenditures; genIcA is
per capita dange in general government expenditures; genItA is percent dange in general government expenditures based on dange in property tax
as a percent of total revenues. For genlaA genipA and genIcA regressions. the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita
dange respectively. For genitA regression. ptxA is expressed in terms of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total
revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at
the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that
corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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404675 -0.260946 19.06333 -0.415475 930364.9 -0.482900 52.54692 -0.769409
(0.881) (-1.365) *(1.694) *(-1.816) **(2.115) (-1.365) **(4.423) *(-1.826)
R2
adj. R2
,I
The interpretation of these results must be that those municipalities initially experiencing
sensitivity to high per capita or relative magnitude losses in property taxes reversed this trend
over the long-term. For municipalities experiencing large aggregate losses, however, the trend
was quite different. These large aggregate loss cities continue to display the reductions in general
government which appeared in the short-term. For these cities, while total expenditures increased
as property taxes decreased, these large aggregate loss municipalities continued to decrease
spending on general government in relation to property tax losses. This is a striking result,
indicating that relationship between property tax cuts and cuts in general government was not
simply an immediate or ephemeral reaction, but rather had robust enough characteristics to extend
for a decade. The parameters for the accompanying socio-economic variables are very similar to
the estimates in the total revenue change equation.
Police Services. Table 8.23 below presents the regression results for change in police
expenditures between fiscal years 1978 and 1988. The R2 values for the percentage change (2)
and relative magnitude (4) equations are quite low -- even lower than was obtained in the short-
term regressions. However, the explanatory values of the aggregate change (1) and per capita
change (3) equations are actually quite a bit higher than in the short-term regressions, indicating
that these measures explain over ninety and forty percent of the variation in the change in police
expenditures respectively.
The estimated parameters on the variable ptxA provide an interesting contrast with the
results for general government expenditure presented just previously. While coefficients for the
percentage, per capita and relative magnitude equations are all statistically insignificant, the
estimated parameter in the aggregate equation is significant and negative. The estimate indicates
that as the aggregate losses in property taxes grew, police expenditures increased; a decline of
$1.00 in property taxes from 1978 to 1979, corresponds to an increase of $0.83 in expenditures
on police between 1978 and 1988 in constant dollars.
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Table 8.23: Police Services Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
V'ariable (1)poliaA (2)polipA (3)policA (4)politA (J)poliaA (2)polipA (3)policA (4)politA
-0.827126 0.701458 0.015122 -0.229291 -2.536523 1.193285 0.298311 -0.105989
**(-4.23) (0.849) (0.230) (-0.143) **(-7.30) (0.849) **(2.697) (-0.033)
18204.04 -0.000008 0.005200 0.000033 38866.66 -0.000014 0.0189 0.000066
(1.350) (-0.062) (1.097) (0.264) **(2.927) (-0.062) **(4.216) (0.290)
1602436 -0.152444 -42.18241 -0.168777 1510295 -0.282110 -38.58745 -0.340470
*(1.928) (-0.219) **(-2.22) (-0.228) *(1.682) (-0.219) **(-2.08) (-0.248)
-4451140 -0.345810 29.03206 -0.301162 -5318932 -0.639946 29.12539 -0.614571
(-1.337) (-0.306) (0.978) (-0.282) (-1.413) (-0.306) (0.977) (-0.306)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incm
empi
trat
endb
tcap
capt
-15373.81 0.007650 0.4538
(-1.394) (0.603) **(2.122)
-207499.6 0.244807 28.79459 0.147189 -228217.6 0.453033 32.54639 0.252156
(-0.743) (0.764) **(3.540) (0.483) (-0.635) (0.764) **(4.546) (0.450)
-2.92e+08 -44.85668
**(-2.48) (-0.791)
-327458.7 0.338278
(-0.384) (0.655)
-96.37619 -3.86e+08 -83.01065
(-1.640) **(-2.72) (-0.791)
0.341658 -916501.1 0.626009
(0.621) (-0.893) (0.655)
-176.6034
(-1.627)
0.628557
(0.620)
226.7998 0.000146 0.029149 0.000276 494.138 0.000270 0.115962 0.000555
(0.393) (0.263) (1.336) (0.451) (0.713) (0.263) **(6.022) (0.483)
2765028 0.189268 -9.927777 1.032267 4676373 0.350254 -17.02153 1.860251
(1.651) (0.161) (-0.265) (0.758) **(2.382) (0.161) (-0.483) (0.746)
597796.6 1.167735 4.254626 1.083024
(0.866) (1.309) (0.345) **(2.369)
869784.6 2.90674 30.87711 2.895117
(1.081) *(1.883) **(2.484) **(3.382)
0.9696 0.0375 0.4110 0.0398 0.9880 0.0375 0.6043 0.0396
0.9670 -0.0448 0.3720 -0.0328 0.9870 -0.0448 0.5781 -0.0330
Notes: polhaA is aggregate change in police expenditures; polipA is percentage dange in police expenditures; policA is per capita dange in police
expenditures; politA is percent change in police expenditures based on change in property tax as a percent of total revenues. For polaA, polipA and
policA regressions, the variable pIxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively. For politA regression. ptxA is
expressed in terms of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incrn are in 000's. t-
statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is
129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to
multicollinearity.
Thus, larger cities with larger aggregate property tax losses, responded over the ten-year
period with decreases in financial commitment to general government expenditures but with
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-8243.812 0.004130 0.3771
(-1.062) (0.603) (1.576)
a
R2
adi. R2
increases in police expenditures. The response is less dramatic than the two-year response shown
in Table 7.14, but it is a significant response nevertheless, both statistically and in terms of
magnitude. Again, the causal relationship between Proposition 13 and police expenditures is not
the point; rather that municipalities with large aggregate property tax losses were also
experiencing conditions which led to increased police expenditures perhaps because they were
deemed essential for these cities' social health.
Fire Services. The regression results for fire expenditures presented below are quite
similar to the police expenditure results. The explanatory values in all cases are reasonably high,
with the aggregate change equation (1) explaining roughly ninety percent of the variation in
changes in fire expenditures between 1978 and 1988, while the per capita change equation (3)
explains roughly forty percent of the variation during this period. The results are also similar to
the short-term two-year composite regression results shown in Table 7.16.
While the percentage change (2) and the relative magnitude (4) equations do not shown
any statistical significance for the property tax change variable, both the aggregate and per capita
change regressions suggest that expenditures on fire service expanded for those cities
experiencing larger losses in property taxes between 1978 and 1979. Again, the message is that
larger cities with larger losses had different expenditure responses with respect to the severity of
property tax losses.
The responses of police and fire to changes in property taxes in the short and long-term
may speak to the role of public safety expenditures in municipal government. Based on some
property tax change measures, these declined as property tax losses grew in the initial post-13
fiscal year. For the two-year period, however, most measures indicated an increase in
expenditures. In the long-term, another transition occurred; except for cities experiencing the
larger aggregate losses (and per capita losses for fire), property tax changes had no effect. With
regard to some measures of change then, public safety expenditures comprised a relatively
protected category
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Table 8.24: Fire Services Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
Variable (J)JireaA (2)firep A (3)firecA (4)firetA (J)fireaA (2)Jlrep A (3)firecA (4)firetA
-0.323946 0.780761 -0.166956 -0.049349 -0.923817 1.326786 -0.064266
**(-4.21) (0.965) **(-3.13) (-0.028) *(-8.65) (0.965) (-0.852)
-0.095016
(-0.029)
698.5828 -0.000126 -0.003820 -0.000113 14165.74 -0.000230 -0.001540 -0.000205
(0.134) (-0.325) (-0.635) (-0.269) **(3.256) (-0.323) (-0.361) (-0.264)
1114068 1.002266 -6.178452 1.041292 418968.7 1.855114 -19.49471 1.922794
**(2.463) (1.628) (-0.848) (1.621) (0.779) (1.630) *(-1.802) (1.628)
-500706.1 2.050857 9.064774 2.033596 734898.3 3.783465 37.45113 3.742628
(-0.312) **(2.000) (0.607) *(1.861) (0.589) **(2.000) **(2.482) *(1.855)
ptxA
pop
grow
coun
incml
empl
2655.831 0.007960 0.6914
(0.449) (0.292) **(4.729)
46927.45 -1.004483 16.72979 -1.160613 776437.5 -1.852141 50.72094 -2.144768
(0.196) *(-1. 748) **(3.245) **(-2.12) **(2.562) *(-1.746) **(5.353) **(-2.12)
-1.80e+08 -437.563
**(-2.60) **(-2.08)
645617.2 3.786679
(1.173) (1.524)
-530.8701
(-1.655)
-55037.25
(-0.155)
-494.5242 -1.60e+08 -806.3882
**(-2.86) **(-2.17) **(-2.08)
3.851239 -50759.87 7.008175
(1.600) (-0.107) (1.525)
-0.000094 -0.071182
(-0.096) **(-3.08)
-1.111919
(-1.525)
-31.13518
**(-3.41)
0.000044 -273.2525 -0.000190 -0.008669
(0.062) (-0 868) (-0.105) (-0.552)
-1.254025
**(-2.11)
-320764.2
(-0.686)
-912.7184
**(-2.86)
7.126645
(1.600)
0.000075
(0.058)
-2.048412 -24.24307 -2.315938
(-1.522) **(-4.34) **(-2.12)
185941.5 2.270199 -6.42207 2.258713 198961.6 4.910474 -5.879154 5.02195
(0.463) *(1.735) (-0.949) **(2.757) (0.464) **(2.071) (-0.761) **(3.350)
0.9291 0.3136 0.4526 0.3496 0.9867 0.3135 0.6588 0.3496
0.9223 0.2470 0.4117 0.2939 0.9855 0.2469 0.6332 0.2938
Notes: fireaA is aggregate change in fire expenditures; firepA is percentage change in fire expenditures; firecA is per capita change in fire
expenditures; firetA is percent change in fire expenditures based on change in property tax as a percent oftotal revenues. For fireaA, firepA and firecA
regressions, the variable pIxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita change respectively. For firetA regression, pixA is expressed in
terms of the property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in
parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128.
130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was not included in regression due to
multicollinearity.
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6646.157 0.004160 0.4757
(1.204) (0.281) **(3.327)
trat
endb
tcap
capt
a
R2
adi. R2
Public Works. The regression results for public works expenditure changes with respect
to changes in property taxes and various socio-economic variables are shown in Table 8.25. In
terms of the explanatory values, the equations show quite a bit of improvement over the short-
term regressions. This dynamic suggests that in the short-term, public works expenditures are
responsive to factors other than the fiscal and socio-economic variables included (such as specific
projects revenues) but in the longer-term, socio-economic factors are fundamental. For example,
in the short-term regressions, even the variable representing population size is not significant,
however, in the long-term this variable became statistically significant and positive.
For this reason, it is not surprising that the variable representing the change in property
taxes between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 is not significant in any of the public works equations.
It was argued previously that this category depends disproportionately on outside funding and the
fiscal stress wrought by the passage of Proposition 13 would have only a minor effect on these
types of expenditures. The 'lumpy' quality of the funding for this category rather than level
funding means that its tie to property taxes (or other variables) will be less direct. It was for these
characteristics of the category that, in the short-term, changes in expenditures displayed a more
direct relationship to changes in revenue categories other than property taxes.
314
Table 8.25: Public Works Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 $) Nominal Dollars
1Variable (J)pubwaA (2)pubwpA (3)pubwcA (4)pubwtA (J)pubwaA (2)pubwpA (3)pubwcA (4)pubwtA
ptxA 0.320515 0.257911 -0.014315 -2.168179 0.283704 0.438746 0.023405 -3.825067
(0.692) (0.324) (-0.719) (-0.902) (0.393) (0.324) (0.070) (-0.849)
pop 68760.5 -0.000564 -0.0239 -0.000588 112609.9 -0.001040 -0.0443 -0.001080
**(1.991) (-0.886) (-0.519) (-0.864) **(3.673) (-0.886) (-0.839) (-0.860)
growy 991424.1 1.201183 -48.48231 1.328376 897751.1 2.22288 -33.46373 2.42077
(0.371) (1.015) (-0.707) (1.118) (0.363) (1.015) (-0.467) (1.104)
coun 3398854 2.986508 122.4065 3.132232 6183615 5.526757 214.5995 5.760616
(0.703) (1.347) (0.764) (1.302) (1.273) (1.347) (1.199) (1.297)
incm 9702.59 0.005030 -0.2416 7798.909 0.009300 -0.7783
(0.673) (0.349) (-0.271) (0.538) (0.349) (-0.779)
empl -259879.2 -0.035211 3.870229 0.000697 272893 -0.06516 23.08698 -0.024345
(-0.317) (-0.115) (0,104) (0.000) (0.311) (-0.115) (0.582) (-0.033)
trat -5.32e+07 -142.2704 -148.1481 -9.40e+07 -263.282 -272.0755
(-0.206) (-1.500) (-1.433) (-0.367) (-1.500) (-1.423)
endb 2086830 -0.076804 -0.272194 1513647 -0.142131 -0.530473
(0.834) (-0.102) (-0.384) (0.629) (-0.102) (-0.401)
Icap 554.223 -0.000425 -0.063794 -0.000460 1290.078 -0.000787 0.021657 -0.000789
(0.429) (-0.965) (-1.104) (-0.784) (1.033) (-0.965) (0.308) (-0.724)
capt -3881922 -3.125831 -285.0548 -3.055412 -3407000 -5.784584 -261.8771 -5.666527
**(-2. 10) *(-1.784) **(-2.22) *(- 1.879) *(-1.861) *(-1. 784) *(-1.832) *(-1. 884)
a -904387.9 1.738385 112.3306 1.50394 -1305835 4.029048 166.5587 3.685089
(-0.554) (1.154) (1.331) **(2.039) (-0.805) (1.473) *(1.746) **(2.703)
R2 0.7505 0.1653 0.1701 0.1593 0.9304 0.1653 0.1252 0.1583
adj. R2  0.7294 0.0940 0.1152 0.0957 0.9245 0.0940 0.0673 0.0947
Notes: pubwaA is aggregate dange in public works expenditures; pubwpA is percentage dange in public works expenditures; pubwcA is per capita
dange in public works expenditures; pubwtA is percent change in public works expenditures based on dange in property tax as a percent of total
revenues. For pubwaA pubupA and pubwcA regressions, the variable ptxA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita dange respectively.
For pubwtA regression, ptxA is expressed in terms ofthe property tax reduction between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent of total revenues. Variables
pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better, ** indicates significance at the .05 level or
better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Blank cells indicate that corresponding variable was
not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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Parks & Recreation. The results of the long-term regressions for parks & recreation are
presented below in Table 8.26. Like their short-term counterparts, the explanatory values of all
the equations are rather low, indicating that changes in this revenue category seem to be largely
uncaptured by the variables included in the regressions. Only the per capita change regression
explains more than half of the variation in the change in these expenditures.
In the short-term, there was some variation of park & recreation expenditures to changes
in property taxes according to certain measurement of change. For the aggregate equation,
expenditures declined along with property taxes in the initial post-13 fiscal year, although the
significance of this reaction was reduced in the two-year composite regressions. On a per capita
basis, a negative relationship is noted for both short-term time periods. In the long-term, the per
capita (3) measurement maintains its significant and negative relationship. For all other measures
of property tax change, however, there is no statistical significance noted in the relationship to
parks & recreation expenditures
Public works and parks & recreation comprise two categories of expenditures which, it
was argued in Chapter 7, have quite different qualities than the previous three categories of
general government, police and fire. They are much higher in capital intensivity and tend to
funded more frequently by one-time grants or loans received on a project by project basis than
other categories of expenditures. These qualities make their responsiveness to changes in the
property tax less significant, particularly in the longer term.
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Table 8.26: Parks & Recreation Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88.
Independent Constant Dollars (1982-84 S) Nominal Dollars
V ariable (1)pkrcaA (2)pkrcpA (3)pkrccA (4)pkrctA (J)pkrcaA (2)pkrcpA (3)pkrccA (4)pkrctA
ptxA 0.022216 -15.7973 -0.264654 -4.552316 0.102532 -26.87358 -0.451679 -10.77712
(0.175) (-1.447) **(-2.82) (-0.512) (0.398) (-1.447) *(-1.892) (-0.617)
pop 11030.46 0.001820 0.002420 0.001940 32468.92 0.003360 -0.001580 0.003560
(1.253) (1.560) (0.304) (1.441) **(3.121) (1.560) (-0.246) (1.444)
grow 1468786 0.105877 22.15447 0.013654 662035.6 0.195934 17.55462 0.196317
*(1.787) (0.039) *(1.690) (0.005) (0.768) (0.039) (1.225) (0.036)
coun 1674308 -5.09103 -68.79524 -7.185225 2784748 -9.421331 -36.17425 -12.88812
(0.736) (-1.646) **(-2.14) *(-1.860) (1.079) (-1.646) (-1.072) *(-1.874)
incn 2037.63 -0.0337 -0.023 0.916121 -0.0624 -0.2185
(0.213) (-0.801) (-0.132) (0.084) (-0.801) (-1.024)
empl 785494.5 -3.312241 42.96522 -1.7062 1170792 -6.129551 55.83068 -3.054636
(1.638) (-1.435) **(4.388) (-1.069) *(1.832) (-1.435) **(4.394) (-1.038)
trat -2.16e+08 -1283.935 -972.1367 -1.51c+08 -2376.018 -1807.772
*(-1.695) **(-2.52) **(-2.62) (-1.162) **(-2.52) **(-2.64)
endb -447097.7 14.8125 17.05054 -849614.2 27.41163 31.49552
(-0.314) **(2.242) **(2.406) (-0.552) **(2.242) **(2.378)
tcap 884.5433 -0.002616 0.001425 -0.005456 1474.16 -0.004841 0.037713 -0.010288
(0.769) (-0.863) (0.035) (-1.531) (0.944) (-0.863) (0.572) (-1.525)
capt -203389.2 -0.272254 5.571141 -0.804487 -89342.06 -0.503827 5.362391 -1.439404
(-0.796) (-0.269) (1.062) (-0.629) (-0.443) (-0.269) (1.353) (4).609)
a 16749.22 0.137709 -19.28671 6.137888 -237176 3.465929 0.187714 11.98324
(0.025) (0.037) (-1.616) **(2.056) (-0.290) (0.587) (0.014) **(2.211)
R2  0.2550 0.1947 0.5064 0.1222 0.7496 0.1947 0.5855 0.1229
adj. R2 0.1918 0.1259 0.4737 0.0558 0.7284 0.1259 0.5581 0.0566
Notes: pkrcaA is aggregate change in parks & recreation expenditures; pkrcpA is percentage change in parks & recreation expenditures; pkrccA is
per capita dange in parks & recreation expenditures; pkrctA is percent change in parks & recreation expenditures based on change in property tax as
a percent of total revenues. For pkrcaA, pkrcpA and pkrccA regressions, the variable ptrA is expressed in aggregate, percentage and per capita
dange respectively. For pkrctA regression, ptrA is expressed in terms ofthe property tax redudion between fiscal years 1978-79 as a percent oftotal
revenues. Variables pop and incm are in 000's. t-statistics in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the .10 level or better; ** indicates significance at
the .05 level or better. Number of observations is 129, 128, 130 and 129 for equations 1. 2, 3 and 4 respedively. Blank cells indicate that
corresponding variable was not included in regression due to multicollinearity.
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Analysis of Expenditure Regressions
In a manner similar to the revenue changes in the ten-years after the passage of
Proposition 13, the expenditure analysis reveals a number of interesting changes in expenditure
patterns. Some of these resemble the short-term results, indicating that dominant trends were set
early on and subsequent changes were not inconsistent with these early patterns. Other results
indicate that expenditure patterns took on a different type of response in the long-term than in the
short-term.
The summary statistics indicate that total expenditures increased in percentage and per
capita terms according to mean measures, while displaying a slight decrease in median terms. The
cohort analysis indicates trends quite similar to those displayed in the revenue regressions. The
municipalities with larger proportionate declines in property taxes display greater gains in total
expenditures than those municipalities with proportionately smaller property tax losses. These
results are also consistent with the more detailed analysis of the six cities shown in Table 8.11;
five of the six cities show declines in constant dollars, but expenditure declines were less
pronounced for the large loss cities.
The econometric measurements indicate that the independent effects of larger relative
magnitude reductions in property taxes had no long-term relationship to total expenditures. In
fact, percentage, per capita and relative magnitude measures of property tax losses were all
insignificant. In contrast, municipalities suffering large aggregate property tax losses did
experience, paradoxically, long-term increases in total expenditures. The proportionate severity
of the property tax losses were not important in the long-term. Municipalities with large
aggregate losses did not experience a long-term decline, either tied to the drop in property taxes
or other influencing factors unmeasured in the regression equations.
With respect to expenditure categories, differences between the short and long-term and
among types of municipalities are equally apparent. Mean and median measures of percentage
and per capita changes over the ten-year period show certain unequivocal trends. There is a
definite and sharp decline in general government expenditures coupled with increases in police and
public works. These per capita and percentage increases are also reflected in equivalent
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adjustments in the budget shares attributable to each. Other expenditure categories show much
less rapid growth and general stability in their budget shares over the ten-year period.
Within these general trends, the cohort analysis indicates the presence of differences
between the cities with large relative property tax losses and those experiencing declines of a
lesser magnitude with respect to total revenues. Again, the results are contrary to what might be
expected based on initial review. The municipalities experiencing proportionately larger property
tax declines display smaller reductions in general government and greater growth in police and
public works than the small loss cohort. In fact, in every expenditure category, with the exception
of other public safety, the large loss cities show greater percentage growth.
Again, the issue as to whether these differences are due to property tax reductions or
artifacts of socio-economic characteristics presents itself. The econometric analysis begins to
address this question. As it turns out, in the relative magnitude equations, the 1978-79 reduction
in property taxes has no independent effect on expenditures in any of the categories, nor are many
of the socio-economic variables significant in these equations. To the extent that variations exist
in the expenditures, they are largely unexplained by movements in the included variables. It is
possible, however, that since household income is not included in the relative magnitude equation,
the effects of this particular characteristic explain some of the variation in expenditures.
For the aggregate change equations, however, the results are quite different, as was
explained previously. Total expenditures, police and fire all show a paradoxical increase
corresponding to decreases in property taxes from 1978 to 1979. In addition, general government
shows a significant decline in conjunction with decreases in property taxes. For the large
aggregate loss cities then, the passage of Proposition 13 did seem to have lasting effects. While
no direct causal relationship can be inferred from the model due to its structure and the time
period under study, it does appear that municipalities with larger aggregate losses also
experienced various expenditure changes away from general government and towards direct
public safety expenditures.
Clearly, the first impression one gets from the regression results is the overall lack of
explanatory power for most of the expenditure equations. Upon further reflection, however, even
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this rather poor showing is significant. The ten-year period saw significant changes in the
economic structure of the state and the fiscal environment of local governments. Such effects
clearly washed-out many of the initial effects of the Proposition. What is surprising is the
presence of some residual effects of the tax limitation measure, or their coincidental and
reinforcing relationship with intervening factors.
While the descriptive rather than causal features of the regression model used have been
identified and discussed, such limitations bear repeating here. Despite the strong relation of tax
cuts and general government, it is clearly not possible to adduce that Proposition 13 in any way
'caused' a decline in expenditures on general government in the long-term, despite how tempting
such an interpretation is. No mechanism which clearly relates property tax losses with general
government has been theoretically developed or has been incorporated into the empirical models
used here. Nor has any attempt been made to control for long-term trends.
Despite this limitation, it is possible to see the strong relationship between property tax
losses and reductions in general government expenditures in the sense that cities which had
steeper aggregate losses in property taxes reduced general government expenditures
commensurately. Although this interpretation lacks the cause and effect notion that results in a
more complete statement regarding local government fiscal dynamics, it does incorporate the
subtlety of the magnitude of effect of the tax limitation. Instead of being limited to interpretations
stemming from the use of a binary variable, the importance of the degree of ensuing property tax
reductions -- as opposed to the mere presence of a tax limit -- is clearly identified.
The absence of a cause and effect link in the regression modeling is certainly a concern in
the short-term equations. In the longer-term equations estimated here, the distinction between
causal and descriptive modeling takes on an even greater importance due to the increased
likelihood of intervening factors. Property tax reductions may be correlated with other influences
which lead to curtailment of certain expenditures and increases in others. Certainly, the relatively
low R2s indicate that relevant factors have been excluded from the model. In addition, however,
the ptxA variable may correlated with certain omitted variables. If ptxA is correlated with an
omitted variable, the coefficient on ptxA will be both biased and inconsistent. The only situation
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in which bias and inconsistency would not pose a problem is in the unlikely event that no
correlation occurs between included and excluded variables.
One possible omitted variable which immediately suggests itself is a characteristic which
may be termed 'political sentiment.' Suppose that those municipalities which suffered the greatest
reductions in property taxes also exhibited a greater suspicion of government, particularly with
regard to general government expenditures unlinked to specific governmental services. This
situation might occur, for example, because municipalities with greater property tax reductions
after the passage of Proposition 13 were those with greater tax rates prior to the passage of the
measure. Suspending, for heuristic purposes, conflicts with median voter paradigm of public
decision-making, a political sentiment hostile towards general government or bureaucracy could
arise from the presence of disproportionately high property taxes. Given this situation, the
coefficient on ptxA will incorporate the effects of 'political sentiment' variable and would be
biased.
Omitted variables are a common issue in empirical social science. As a practical matter,
however, it is the magnitude of the specification error which is important. All models are false; it
is the degree of their divergence from actual fiscal dynamics that should be the focus of attempts
to arrive at a suitable and useful methodology. In this analysis, the likely existence of correlated
omitted variables should give pause to an precise interpretation of the coefficient on ptxA.
However, a comparison of the coefficients on ptxA in the short and the long-term regressions
shows a remarkable similarity. This consistency over time serves to bolster the interpretation of
the validity of the sign and general magnitude of the estimate of the parameter.
Based on the similar results of the short-term and long-term expenditure change
regressions, it can be argued that municipalities reacted fairly swiftly in terms of spending
adjustments to the abrupt reduction in property tax revenues. The apparent shifting that occurred
in the aftermath of the passage of Proposition 13, with decreases in general government and
increases in police and fire, seems to have gelled by the second post-13 fiscal year. The one-year
short-term regression captured some of the property tax reduction effect. The two-year, short-
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term models captured most of the remained of the total adjustment. Based on the results
presented here, little further adjustment occurred in the ensuing years.
Summary and Interpretation
In this chapter, I have focused on discovering and elucidating some of the long-term
relationships between the severity of property tax losses incurred by municipalities as a
consequence of Proposition 13 and changes in revenues and expenditures. While the use of a
cross-sectional determinants-based model suffers from some theoretical short-comings that the
use of a longitudinal model might not, it has advantages as well. Most important of these
advantages is the ability to incorporate the magnitude of property tax losses experienced in the
1978-79 period into the model and relate these losses to changes in expenditures and revenues
over a ten-year time span. While the ability to make explicit causal interpretations of such
relationships is lost, what is gained is an opportunity to link magnitudes of tax losses with
magnitudes of response using a straightforward cross-sectional approach.
The empirical investigation of long-term expenditure trends indicates that the link between
property tax losses and expenditures occurred in the early years after the passage of Proposition
13. In the long-term regressions for large aggregate loss municipalities, property tax losses were
positively related to changes in general government and negatively to total expenditures, police
and fire, and were not significantly tied to any other categorical expenditure. These results are
very similar to results obtained in the two-year, short-term expenditure models. On the other
hand, other measures of property tax and expenditure change indicate that the two had little, if
any, lasting relationship. This dynamic is quite different from the short-term result.
Concentrating on the previously identified categories of general government, police and
fire, the behavior of large aggregate loss municipalities seem to have been consistent over time.
Small changes are seen in the first post- 13 year. In the two year regressions, the coefficients on
property tax changes increase in magnitude and significance but work in the same direction as in
the one-year model. The results for the long-term model are very similar to those of the two-year,
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short-term model, and even display an increase in statistical significance in some cases. No other
expenditure categories show any significant relationship to property tax reductions.
Based on an analysis of the expenditure change models for the three categories, it appears
as though large aggregate loss cities altered their behavior early on in the post-13 years.
Expenditure changes came as early as possible after the passage of Proposition 13 and
municipalities appear to have adhered to these changes through the next decade. Municipalities
most affected by Proposition 13 oriented themselves away from general government expenditures
and towards goods and services with direct connections to consumer/voters -- specifically police
services and parks & recreation.
On the other hand, cities which experienced high percentage losses in property taxes or
losses comprising a large proportion of total revenues display a different dynamic response. They
reduced total expenditures and expenditures in certain categories in the initial post-13 period.
The long-term relationship between the severity of property tax losses and expenditures
represents a reversal of this response, however. These cities recovered and, in fact, increased
expenditures in relation to decreases in property taxes. In the long-term, property tax reductions
based on these measures appear to lack a uniform effect.
Unlike the fairly rapid and consistent adjustment of expenditure patterns for large
aggregate loss cities, the results of the short and long-term revenue estimations suggest that
municipal reactions in raising funds from alternative sources were comprised of both initial
responses and those of a more extended duration. The temporal nature of adjustment patterns is
as important as the types of replacement revenues that were used, since it gives an indication of
the flexibility of municipal fiscal characteristics as well as the need and timing required for
appropriate intergovernmental assistance.
In the short-term endogenous revenue models, the results indicate that as the severity of
the effects of the Proposition 13 cutbacks increased, municipalities increased their reliance on
various mixtures of other local taxes, fees & charges, local income, local miscellaneous revenues
and state aid. The mixed impacts of the specific revenue sources is apparent based on three of the
four measures of change for the endogenous revenue change regressions. Because of the mixture
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of responses among the affected municipalities, however, only the aggregate change model
displays any consistent and statistically significant responses in the specific revenue regressions.
As I discussed in Chapter 5, the later three endogenous revenue sources listed above are
characterized by at least two of the following features, they; (i) require increasing or adjusting
existing established fiscal patterns, (ii) are comprised of one-time revenues, (iii) stem from
external funding decisions, and (iv) are relatively 'shallow' and are unlikely to result in a stable
source of funding. As a result of these characteristics, they would be unlikely to represent a
sustainable source of funding sufficient to compensate for severe reductions property taxes
experienced in the aftermath of Proposition 13.
In fact, for the two-year, composite short-term regressions, the results indicate that
municipalities suffering the steepest aggregate declines in revenues relied increasingly on local
taxes and fees & charges. Other local income and state aid were apparently rather inconsequential
(or at least uneven) as a source of replacement revenues. While municipalities continued to rely
on the relatively minor one-time revenues contributed by local miscellaneous sources, they also
started to tap the much deeper reservoir of user charges. The increase in the importance of this
source of revenues is borne out by the summary data; its importance to municipalities
experiencing steep property tax cuts is suggested by the econometric results.
Finally, the results from the long-term regression models indicate that far from relying on a
host of supplementary revenues, cities most affected by aggregate property tax cuts used only
local taxes disproportionately more than other cities. While these hard-hit municipalities also
relied on other sources, so did all cities. In fact, the long-term regressions indicate that increasing
cuts in property taxes are related to declines in these other sources of revenue. On the other
hand, cities with larger percentage and relative magnitude property tax losses relied on a host of
supplementary revenues with no one source seemingly dominant,
Whether municipalities gravitated towards particular revenue sources by choice or
necessity is unclear but probably both factors were involved. Eschewing the use of the category
local taxes early on may have been partially matter of choice (at least in the period between the
determination of their constitutionality and the passage of Proposition 62 which further restricted
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local taxes) in order to minimize taxpayer wrath and make revenue-raising less visible. But it is
also quite possible that those cities suffering from property tax reductions also experienced
conditions over the post- 13 decade that made other types of revenue more difficult to raise than
for municipalities less affected by the property tax cuts.
In comparing the results of the expenditure and revenue regressions, a rather distinctive
feature comes to light. The total revenues of municipalities seem quite responsive to changes in
property taxes, with declines in property taxes in the initial post-13 fiscal year corresponding to
declines in total revenues. However, municipalities seem immune to such property tax changes
with respect to total expenditures. Furthermore, this phenomenon is not simply an ephemeral
reaction, rather the dynamic continues into the long-term. This suggests that cities may be using
other forms of debt financing or using existing fund balances.
Based on the results presented in this chapter as well as previous chapters, it is difficult to
adhere to the belief that municipalities have been universally rendered in extremis by the passage
of Proposition 13 Municipalities largely appear to have reacted with suitable expenditure
adjustment in a rather short period of time. Revenue compensation developments also occurred,
although of less consistent nature and over a more extended period of time. Yet the longer term
regressions indicate some troubling patterns among those municipalities hardest hit by property
tax reductions in terms of aggregate change. Faced with these reductions, they seem unwilling or
unable to take sufficient compensating steps to ensure a prudent revenue and expenditure
relationship.
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Chapter 9
Summary, Policy Issues and Conclusions
Overview
In this thesis, I conducted an extensive investigation into the revenue and expenditure
responses of municipalities to the passage of a severe property tax limitation measure, California's
Proposition 13. The study involved the use of competing models and several measures of revenue and
expenditure change in an effort to better understand the types of impacts -- both short-term and long-
term -- stemming from the enactment of the tax restriction. This chapter places the results of the
analysis in a broader context. First, I briefly summarize the major empirical findings and consider the
significance of the effects of Proposition 13 on the state and local public sector, with particular
emphasis on public finance issues. I then review the institutional responses of municipalities and state
government and discuss possible policy alternatives regarding state-local fiscal relations. This
discussion also considers the distinguishing features of tax limitations and their relationship to the
broader notion of fiscal stress.
Revenue and Expenditure Changes Revisited
The passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 presented both a fiscal and political challenge to
municipal governments throughout the State of California. In response to this tax limitation,
municipalities enacted a multitude of revenue and expenditure changes in an effort to adjust to new
fiscal realities. These fiscal reactions were quite varied and complex and demonstrate the flexibility and
responsiveness of the municipal budgeting process. The responses varied, not only in magnitude and
over time, but also in relation to numerous fiscal and socio-economic characteristics of the
municipalities. My use of both descriptive statistics and econometric methods in analyzing municipal
fiscal responses resulted in somewhat divergent interpretations, as explained in the following brief
summary.
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Municipal Revenue Changes
The character of municipal revenue collection underwent numerous transformations following
the passage of Proposition 13. These changes may have occurred as a result of the severity of property
tax losses stemming from the tax limitation measure, the atmosphere of uncertainty generated by the
Proposition or the presence of ongoing revenue trends. This study suggests that revenue alterations for
most cities took place due to some combination of all three factors. The long-term trends and short-
term disruption in municipal revenue sources due to the passage of Proposition 13 are depicted in
Table 9.1 below, which shows per capita revenues in constant dollar terms for all California
municipalities during the period 1969 through 1988.
Table 9.1: Per Capita Revenues for California Cities, Fiscal Years 1969 - 1988 (constant $).
Fiscal Property Sales Local Other State & Fees & Local Enterprise Total
Year Tax Tax Taxes Local Federal Charges Misc. Revenue Revenues
1969 124.11 63.71 30.03 35.40 78.20 35.21 21.22 139.64 527.53
1970 120.34 63.62 28.21 36.31 85.27 35.45 21.13 137.89 528.23
1971 124.22 61.16 37.58 37.81 95.38 38.37 20.74 145.39 560.65
1972 123.25 63.82 43.37 35.49 104.58 40.05 22.95 152.25 585.76
1973 126.97 70.53 47.41 34.49 137.73 42.79 23.87 161.86 645.63
1974 115.34 73.28 46.16 41.90 130.50 42.27 23.07 165.07 637.60
1975 111.49 71.62 45.96 39.05 126.45 41.49 22.48 168.97 627.51
1976 116.58 73.44 49.49 35.20 146.37 41.56 25.99 185.22 673.84
1977 122.06 79.37 54.48 35.19 153.38 44.32 24.41 190.24 703.45
1978 122.02 85.65 56.98 37.49 185.12 45.83 24.16 201.92 759.16
1979 54.15 88.12 61.61 44.92 188.56 46.80 27.39 215.43 726.98
1980 66.72 86.95 61.74 48.98 141.66 45.12 23.81 207.86 682.84
1981 65.04 80.04 60.57 51.12 130.31 47.44 19.24 228.82 682.57
1982 50.53 73.10 60.88 57.91 90.34 50.63 25.29 172.33 581.02
1983 53.40 67.85 64.61 52.80 80.65 53.86 28.34 162.22 563.72
1984 54.33 75.08 79.08 53.23 81.07 60.16 37.93 172.74 613.61
1985 55.79 79.08 86.01 58.21 91.17 62.12 33.96 182.17 648.50
1986 57.40 79.09 88.47 58.14 95.33 65.70 45.65 177.69 667.49
1987 60.91 79.05 90.56 59.49 81.55 71.07 34.07 178.74 655.45
1988 62.43 80.19 93.65 56.55 78.16 75.67 49.60 183.14 679.39
Notes: Includes all revenues. Due to data reconciliation based on category dianges, figures are not directly comparable to previous presentations.
Initial post-13 fiscal year is 1979.
Sources: State of California Controller's Annual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
The data in Table 9.1 indicate that there was a gradual movement away from property taxes
and toward other forms of local own-source revenues during the ten years prior to Proposition 13.
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Ongoing declines in state and federal aid during this span of time are also apparent from the data. The
passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 ushered in a period of major adjustment for cities, precipitated by
the sharp reduction in property taxes. Further declines in state and federal aid occurred a short time
after the tax limitation measure was approved, with decreased enterprise income evident during
this period as well. Local own-source revenues, on the other hand, experienced a steady increase
over the twenty-year period. Over the span of ten years since the adoption of the tax limitation
measure, revenue decreases and increases seem to generally offset one another. As a result, total
revenues were at approximately the same level in fiscal year 1988 as during the years leading up to
Proposition 13, although not as high as their pre-13 peak. Overall revenue trends are depicted
graphically in Figure 9.1 below.'
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Figure 9.1: Per Capita Revenues
In this thesis, I examined the underlying causes of the numerous municipal revenue changes, as
described above, which occurred following the adoption of Proposition 13. I found considerable
1 Revenue profiles of the six cities analyzed in previous chapters are presented in Appendix D.
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variation in municipal revenue behavior depending on the types of measurements used and the time
period under study, but also discovered some clear patterns in municipalities' post-13 revenue
behavior. For all cities, the advent of the tax limitation environment seemed to affect revenue changes.
These changes were, however, sensitive to the severity of property tax reductions and not due simply
to existing trends, with greater total revenue declines for cities suffering larger property tax losses.
After this initial adjustment, the results are more mixed, indicating that cities were willing and able, to
some degree and in various ways, to compensate for Proposition 13-induced declines in property taxes.
These recovery actions continued into the longer-term as well.
The contribution of state aid to this recovery was generally limited to the initial post-13 fiscal
year. Local own-source revenues, although generally unresponsive in the first post-13 fiscal year,
displayed strong, but varied, compensating reactions to property tax reductions in subsequent years.
The revenue trends from the summary statistics indicate that several revenue categories increased after
the passage of Proposition 13. The regressions indicate, however, more mixed and less conclusive
results; certain revenue sources increased in response to property tax declines while other sources were
unaffected by such changes.2
I also examined the relationship between socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities
and their post-13 revenue behavior. These characteristics were not as dominant a determinant of
revenue change during this period as were the fiscal variables, but it is clear that cities most affected by
the Proposition also suffered the greatest declines in total revenues. Beyond this, the property tax
reductions were quite varied and were not consistently related to socio-econonic characteristics.
2 The reasons for these varied results are twofold. First, certain revenue trends were in effect prior to
the adoption of Proposition 13, such as general increases in fees & charges and local taxes. As a
consequence of this, the passage of Proposition 13 may not have induced increases in at least some
revenue sources more than would have occurred anyway. Second, cities may have responded as much
to the threat of the tax limitation measure as they did to the actual severity of property tax reductions.
Revenue reactions based on a perception of severe property tax reductions would serve to weaken the
measured effects of actual reductions in property taxes.
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Clearly, not all cities with similar characteristics were willing or pressured to compensate for
Proposition 13-induced losses to the same degree.
Municipal Expenditure Changes
My analysis indicates that the expenditure responses were generally more complex and varied
than revenue responses. As with revenues, alterations in municipal expenditure patterns may have
transpired as a result of the severity of property tax losses stemming from Proposition 13, the
uncertainty caused by the adoption of the tax limitation measure or the continuation of existing
expenditure trends. The trends and short-term adjustments in municipal expenditures due to the
passage of Proposition 13 are depicted in Table 9.2 below.
Table 9.2: Per Capita Expenditures for California Cities, Fiscal Years 1969 - 1988 (constant $).
Fiscal General Police Fire Public Parks & Enterprise Total
Year Government Services Services Works Recreation Expenses Expenditures
1969 122.02 59.12 38.93 88.81 35.19 110.03 483.07
1970 127.46 63.35 40.17 90.21 36.09 110.63 498.73
1971 139.63 70.42 44.02 89.50 39.05 118.17 532.10
1972 148.78 74.34 44.50 92.08 37.31 125.84 553.72
1973 155.47 78.87 45.59 95.98 38.30 134.49 581.53
1974 154.41 80.53 45.61 94.70 41.19 132.62 583.95
1975 152.51 82.53 46.59 99.96 41.34 142.53 604.70
1976 168.21 84.37 47.81 98.16 44.20 154.62 636.12
1977 167.44 86.93 48.69 94.65 43.02 167.05 648.64
1978 177.11 89.51 50.23 104.31 47.55 177.27 692.32
1979 160.37 88.57 48.68 98.71 44.66 172.59 652.17
1980 122.14 102.15 52.36 95.67 46.81 169.02 632.31
1981 101.50 99.31 50.99 90.76 44.57 192.05 624.73
1982 85.61 97.59 47.22 95.71 40.65 180.45 572.69
1983 84.60 96.62 45.69 95.62 40.30 172.30 560.65
1984 84.27 99.81 46.51 101.69 40.19 176.70 575.39
1985 87.19 105.08 47.63 107.21 41.84 180.58 595.60
1986 86.62 105.38 49.26 111.80 41.76 183.86 611.00
1987 96.35 112.30 51.24 124.03 45.87 179.10 637.58
1988 101.97 110.20 49.45 123.98 48.10 183.26 645.02
Notes: Includes only major expenditure categories; total expenditures represents all expenditures, not just those listed here. Due to data reconciliation
based on category dianges, data is not directly comparable to previous presentation. Initial post-13 fiscal year is 1979. After fiscal year 1981, debt
service was attributed to functional category; prior to that date it was attributed to general government. Based on 1981 data, debt service was
approximately 8.5% of general government, thus general government would be roughly 8.5%higher than indicated in the table.
Sources: State of California Controller's AnnualReport ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCalifornia, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
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Expenditure trends prior to the adoption of Proposition 13 displayed several discernible
patterns, favoring public safety and other direct services with less emphasis on general government and
other similar categories. As with revenues, the passage of Proposition 13 can be perceived as an
inflection point rather than the initiation of an entirely new regime. There was a drop in total
expenditures after Proposition 13, but then a recovery by the mid-1980s. By fiscal year 1988, total
expenditures were approximately at the same level as during the years leading up to Proposition 13, but
somewhat below their pre-13 peak. Overall expenditure trends are shown graphically in Figure 9.1.3
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Figure 9.2: Per Capita Expenditures
Over the span of ten years since the adoption of the tax limitation measure, expenditures for
most categories show steady increases, but there is considerable variation. The analysis of
expenditures for all cities in the sample depict a trend away from non-essential public goods and
services in the initial post-13 fiscal year and recovery for many of these categories over the two-year
post-13 period. Expenditures on general government, health, libraries and parks & recreation declined
in the initial post-13 fiscal year. For the two-year post-13 period, general government and libraries
3 The expenditure profiles of the six cities previously analyzed are presented in Appendix D.
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continued to show declines, with some recovery evident for parks & recreation. The long-term trends
indicate a sharp reduction in expenditures on general government, rather rapid increases for
expenditures on police services and moderate increases for parks & recreation and public works.
My investigation of expenditure shifts indicates that total municipal expenditures initially
declined with property taxes; however, the magnitude of this reduction diminished over time, indicating
a partial recovery. For particular categories, municipalities initially altered existing expenditure
patterns, but there was much heterogeniety in the responses. Over the two-year period, however, there
were more discernible patterns in expenditure reactions. General government spending declined with
property taxes in the majority of the models for the initial post-13 period. Police services declined
some in response to property tax declines in year one, but this generally reversed over the two-year
period. Fire services expenditures showed a pattern similar to police, while changes in public works
and parks & recreation were quite idiosyncratic.4
Assessment of Fiscal Adjustments
The ability of cities to adapt to new fiscal circumstances is one of the dynamics highlighted in
this study. My analysis indicates that municipalities, together with policy makers at the state level,
demonstrated revenue and expenditure flexibility and resiliency in response to fiscal stress imposed by
Proposition 13. This flexibility was manifested both in the types of revenue and expenditure changes as
well as the timing of such changes. After Proposition 13 was passed, municipalities compensated by
decreasing expenditures while benefiting from increases in state aid. Municipalities then rationalized
expenditures and concurrently increased their reliance on certain local own-source revenues. With
respect to both revenues and expenditures, municipalities reacted in a haphazard and desperate manner
at first, ignorant of the real effects of the measure. They subsequently displayed more conformity as
the parameters of the fiscal impacts of Proposition 13 were more clearly revealed.
' The differences between the expenditure changes depicted by the summary statistics and the
econometric analysis is partially explained by the fiscal and political effects of the tax limitation
measure, discussed further below. The explanation relates to the tendency of all cities in aggregate to
reduce spending on perceived non-essential goods and services and bolster expenditures on the
essential goods and services.
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In terms of the types of revenues raised, it is clear that no one local own-revenue was dominant
during this process. On the contrary, municipalities appeared to raise own-source revenues depending
upon their particular strengths and characteristics. Budgetary flexibility was no less apparent on the
expenditure side. The variability among cities suggests that reductions were made based on a series of
concerns, including past expenditure patterns, the essentiality and replicability of the good or service,
the perceived permanence of replacement revenues, the funding available for the expenditure category
and the characteristics of the city.
Although expenditures and revenues did generally return to the pre-13 trend for most cities, the
adoption of the tax limitation represented a sharp break in established patterns. The significance of this
discontinuity is that a subsequent return to trend does not necessary indicate a complete recovery of
previous fiscal patterns. By breaking the original trend line, Proposition 13-induced revenue losses
may have depressed future revenues and expenditures depending on the trajectory of the prior pattern.
Despite the overall degree of budgetary flexibility, not all cities were equal in their ability to
accommodate the rapid change in the fiscal environment. In the initial post-13 fiscal year, the large loss
cities suffered total revenue declines, whereas the small loss municipalities did not. After this initial
shock, however, the large loss cities caught up and experienced total revenue gains virtually
indistinguishable from those of the small loss cities. The analysis on the expenditure side indicates quite
similar patterns. The general recovery of those municipalities with proportionately larger property tax
losses occurred due to both their more favorable socio-economic characteristics as well as the more
buoyant nature of new revenue sources.
Municipalities which had large relative magnitude revenue losses did not appear to suffer
lasting revenue and expenditure effects; however, those experiencing large aggregate losses had quite a
different experience. The econometric results generally indicate that the independent effect of property
tax reductions lessened over the ten-year period after the adoption of Proposition 13; however,
municipalities suffering large aggregate losses in property taxes continued to experience overall
revenue declines in relation to the severity of the tax losses even ten years after the passage of the
Proposition. To compound the problem, large aggregate loss municipalities experienced expenditure
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increases relative to property tax losses, indicating that large loss cities were either unable or unwilling
to curtail spending in accordance with property tax losses.5
Cities with larger aggregate losses were larger cities with generally less salutary economic
conditions coupled with greater expenditure needs. They may have had declining economies, with
greater rates of poverty and income and wealth measures inadequate to generate local own-source
revenues. In addition, their increases in expenditures relative to property tax declines may have been
due to their greater budget fixity stemming from existing labor contracts, high debt load or other
immutable factors. Indications are that these larger cities, the very ones experiencing on-going stresses
and strains associated with urban decline, were the ones to bear the more permanent effects of
Proposition 13. For these cities, declines in property taxes were associated with long-term decreases in
total revenues and long-term increases in expenditures.6
Before completing this review of the empirical results of my study, a brief note regarding the
assumptions of the principal econometric approach is in order. One concern is that the limitations of
the revenue/expenditure adjustment model may obscure a full understanding of the causes of some of
the long-term results. While the similarity of the short and long-term regression results provide some
confirmation regarding the validity of the estimates, there is clearly potential for intervening factors to
influence the results during the ten-year post-13 period. On the expenditure side, the
revenue/expenditure adjustment model does not control for such factors as input prices and production
technology, nor is the level or quality of public goods and services explicitly measured. Thus, my
5 The socio-economic characteristics of municipalities with large relative magnitude losses and those
with large aggregate losses are shown in Appendices E and F, respectively. The disparity in fiscal and
economic conditions between these two groups had an important influence on the ability of these cities
to raise new revenues. A perusal of the data indicates what has been shown through other methods:
that the cities suffering the largest relative magnitude losses were wealthier than most and objectively in
a better position to raise supplemental revenues. Cities with larger aggregate losses were in a less
advantageous position.
6 Note that although the independent effect of property tax declines for the large aggregate loss
municipalities was to decrease total revenues and increase total expenditures, this does not imply
a budget chronically out of balance given the possible compensating effect of other independent
influences.
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approach assumes that the relationship of input prices, costs of delivery and production technology
(i.e., the relationship between expenditures and output) remains static.
My analysis also assumes that the relationship between inputs and outputs remains the same
among cities. This is a fairly safe assumption for the initial period following the adoption of
Proposition 13; however, in the long-term regressions changes in the relationships between
municipalities would be very likely to occur.7 Similar intervening influences may have come to bear on
the revenue side. There may have been factors which served to restrain the ability of municipalities to
raise certain types of compensating revenues, and these restraints probably had disproportionate
impacts on the large aggregate loss municipalities.'
Significance of Revenue and Expenditure Shifts
Analysis of Revenue Changes
Based on the above review, cities appeared to recover much of their revenue strength in
the post-13 decade. This is true, however, only with regard to the most basic measure of revenue
performance. While in constant dollars per capita, total revenues appear quite similar to levels
that prevailed in the pre-13 period, there was a dramatic change over the twenty-year period in
the composition of municipal revenues. The municipal revenue portfolio substantially shifted from
one dominated by the property tax to one in which the property tax was simply another source --
no more important, in dollar terms, than other local income. Taking the two endpoints as an
7 If, for example, cities with larger aggregate property tax losses suffered from greater declines in the
urban condition than those with smaller aggregate losses, this could be manifested as pressure for
additional expenditures. Some of this effect would be picked up by the control variables, but a portion
would be falsely attributed to the property tax loss variable. Additional interpretive difficulties could
arise should differentials have occurred in input prices, productivity changes, alterations in production
technology and physical conditions.
' For example, additional revenue restrictions passed by subsequent proposition may have had a greater
impact on larger cities with more fully-developed revenue systems than on smaller cities. Some of the
effect of this situation would have been attributed to the property tax loss variable in my analysis.
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example, in fiscal year 1969, the property tax contributed one-quarter of all revenues; by 1988 it
constituted less than ten percent.
Given the alternative revenue-raising reactions of many of the municipalities to the property
tax limitation, it is instructive to conceive of municipal budgeting as somewhat like a balloon. If a
balloon is squeezed by hand, a portion of it pops out in another direction. Similarly, as a portion of
municipal revenue flow (property taxes) is constrained, revenue needs push out the budget balloon in
another direction. Even if such a process leaves the total volume of the balloon unaffected, its shape as
well as other more subtle characteristics is likely to be changed dramatically. The same phenomenon
occurs with respect to municipal budgets. Demand will not been appreciably altered by the tax
limitation, only the means of financing such demand.
Uncertainty and Elasticity
The change wrought by Proposition 13 basically ripped out from underneath local governments
one of their most stable and non-volatile taxes. In its place, cities spliced together various types of fees,
charges, local taxes and other income. The behavior of these taxes is substantially different from the
property tax. Although property taxes had been rising quite rapidly in the years just prior to
Proposition 13, this dynamic was much more closely linked to the localized phenomenon of rising
property values than to broader measures of economic activity, such as income or economic growth.
In fact, most studies have concluded that the property tax is unit elastic with respect to changes in
income and economic growth.
In large part, substitute revenues used by California cities, including fees & charges, local taxes,
other income and enterprise income, have qualities substantially different from those of the property
tax. Not only is their receipt more uncertain, but they are more reactive to economic expansion and
contraction. Although cities may benefit from this elastic characteristic in times of economic growth,
the advantage may be more than offset by greater than unit contraction during economic downturns.
In a sense, Proposition 13 brought about increased turmoil and uncertainty due not only to its inherent
ambiguities, but also as a result of the nature of the substitute revenue streams upon which
municipalities were forced to rely.
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The instability and uncertainty of most of the locally-based revenues on which California
municipalities are increasingly relying make them less suitable than the property tax for the deliberate
nature of municipal budgeting. Revenue uncertainty can have a considerable effect on municipal
governments with regard to budget choices, long-term planning and capital financing. For reasons laid-
out in Chapter 1, the focus in this study has been on municipal governments. Because cities, as
opposed to school districts, counties or special districts, were relatively favored by the state in the
allocation of the property tax following the passage of Proposition 13, it is likely that these negative
repercussions are even more apparent for other local government entities.
Equity Concerns
Proposition 13-induced changes in the property tax may have caused an undesirable shift in the
vertical equity of the tax. The incidence of the property tax is an issue which will likely never be
definitively resolved. Whether it is judged to be regressive or progressive in nature depends, in part, on
the use of current or permanent income as a basis of comparison and the decision to rely on the
traditional view (land and improvements tax) or the new view (capital tax) as a theoretical
underpinning. Generally, empirical studies based on the traditional view come to the conclusion that
property tax incidence is U-shaped with respect to income. Studies based on the new view, which sees
the tax as a national tax with local excise tax effects, generally conclude that it is progressive in effect.
Two studies based on differing assumptions about property tax incidence conclude that
Proposition 13 was progressive in its effects. Chernick and Reschovsky (1982) argue that the tax
limitation measure resulted in U-shaped vertical distribution of reductions with greater decreases for
low and high income and lower reductions for middle income. Compared to other alternative tax
reductions, they see Proposition 13 as broadly progressive. Detray and Fernandez (1986) looked at
four California cities and came to similar conclusions. Their view that the net effect of Proposition 13
on state and local taxes was a progressive one is strongly linked to supplemental revenues generated by
the highly-progressive state income tax.
These two studies base the net effect of property tax reductions on either alternative tax cuts or
progressive replacement revenues. Each of these rationales were justified at the time of the study, but
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they have since lost validity. The heterogeneous nature of municipal revenue responses makes it
difficult to issue blanket proclamations regarding the incidence of the net effects of Proposition 13;
nevertheless, based on the supplemental revenues upon which municipalities relied, it would be hard to
argue that local revenues increased vertical equity. User charges, fees and other revenues linked to
costs of service are more efficient but certainly more regressive. Other local taxes are not likely to be
either more efficient or more equitable than the property tax. On balance, for most municipalities,
revenue changes most likely resulted in revenue systems somewhat more efficient but more regressive
as well.
On the other hand, one of the major criticisms of the tax limitation measure -- its negative
impact on the horizontal equity of the property tax -- may be misplaced. Using current income as a
basis for measurement, the property tax has become much less equitable to the extent that owners of
identical properties pay vastly different taxes due to differentials in move-in dates. If, however, life-
time income is used, the horizontal equity of the property tax improves considerably. Overall,
assuming individuals with similar incomes relocate within the state at approximately the same rate, the
horizontal equity of the tax will not have declined. 9
Efficiency Issues
Proposition 13 almost certainly generated inefficiencies in a Tiebout sense. First, the
Proposition arguably made it more difficult for municipalities to differentiate themselves in terms of
public goods. To the extent that a major revenue source was constrained, cities may be less able to
offer the extra distinguishing features that make a community unique. Many cities may be property rich
but simply not have access to the revenue bases necessary to generate alternative revenues. This
characteristic would create inefficiencies as demand for publicly-provided goods and services go unmet
despite the willingness and, absent the tax limitation, the ability to pay. Second, the measure effectively
penalizes movers and favors those who stay put. The market value re-assessment triggered by
9 However, there are likely to be more significant departures from the norm than under the pre-13
system. The reassessment of property only upon resale results in an increasing dispersion between full
market and assessed value. Therefore, significant differences in property tax burdens will exist between
frequent and infrequent movers.
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property sale creates an artificial tax-induced incentive for locational fixity. This would discourage the
self-sorting mechanism upon which Tiebout's theory is premised.
On the positive side, to the extent that the passage of the property tax limitation resulted in
more equalized property tax rates (unequal only to the extent of outstanding debt service
requirements), the tax limitation is likely to have reduced intra-state movement of capital based simply
on tax differentials. Holding all other locally-controlled taxes constant, capital would tend to flow to
the area where the highest return is available. To the extent that economic activity reacts to real
differences in the return to capital as opposed to tax-induced movement, increased economic efficiency
results. This characteristic would militate for reduced intra-metropolitan movements, in particular.
Such efficiency increases, of course, need to be balanced against the counter dynamic discussed above,
as well as any efficiency differentials between municipalities stemming from increases in compensating
taxes.
Land usage decisions by local governments would also be affected by the passage of the
measure. Zoning decisions in favor of residential housing would be likely to have fallen into disfavor
due to the passage of Proposition 13. Municipalities would tilt towards commercial or industrial
development that generates either additional sales tax revenues or facilitates access to a range of other
business linked taxes. Changes in land-use patterns would also be related to differences in the ratio of
tax generation to public goods consumption. In the best of fiscal times, local governments are apt to
favor those with higher ratios at the expense of those with lower ratios; fiscal stress and uncertainty
would be very likely to exacerbate this tendency. To the extent that most commercial activities result
in higher ratios than residential usage, these latter activities would be encouraged at the expense of the
latter. It is difficult to evaluate such likely changes in land patterns in terms of efficiency, since pre-
existing zoning and land use regulations would already conflict with the theory of highest and best use.
In the context of housing, however, this bias can have serious ramifications on supply and affordability.
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Analysis of Expenditure Changes
Some patterns of expenditure change under conditions of fiscal stress have been identified in
the process of this analysis. It is worth considering whether these patterns can be understood through
the application of public goods theory. Unfortunately, invoking standard definitions of public goods is
not terribly helpful in sorting out municipal expenditure reactions, as few, if any, of local government
goods and services square with the textbook definition of public goods. At best, locally provided
goods and services qualify as quasi-public goods, possessing attributes of both public and private
goods. The concepts of non-excludability and non-rivalness generally apply only very weakly to local
government goods and services; those provided by California municipalities are no exception to this
rule.
Most local goods and services are excludable to a large degree, including police services, fire
services, health and libraries. Even parks & recreation, where a large portion of expenditures go to
park acquisition and maintenance, includes expenditures on programs available only to residents.
While spillovers or external benefits to neighboring communities certainly occur with respect to public
safety and other expenditures, the major portion of benefits extend only to property owners and other
taxpayers. Many of these activities are, in fact, widely produced in the private market. Most, if not all,
of these goods and services are rival as well, to the extent that additional users result in the dilution of
either the quantity or quality provided. Parks & recreation comes closest to a non-rival good, but in
extreme cases is bounded by the limits of congestion factors.
Essentiality of Expenditures
Although normative models would suggest that goods most closely resembling public goods
would be more sheltered from reductions, this is not the case with respect to post-13 expenditure
patterns. Instead of relying on the theoretical notion of public goods, more practical guidelines are
useful in illuminating the actions of local governments in times of fiscal stress. The essentiality of the
good or service is one practical guideline which has been mentioned previously as a means of
classifying expenditure changes. Thus, although police and fire services showed some evidence of
negative trends during the initial post-13 fiscal year, they recovered by the second year and seemed
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exceptionally favored in the long-term. Clearly, these are both goods which epitomize what
municipalities governments should be providing to local residents and are strongly reflective of public
priorities during that period. There is also some indication of declines in libraries and health in the
short-term, both of which are considered less essential activities. As I mentioned in the revenue
section, this squeeze on non-essential goods and services can interfere with Tiebout differentiation. In
the flight to essential services, the ability to offer special complements of public goods is lost.
It is dificult to classify the category 'general government' in the spectrum of essentiality. Since
these expenditures largely consist of costs that are incurred in the administration and coordination of
direct services, one view is that they are quite necessary, up to a degree, for local governments.
Clearly, however, general government may also be perceived as a category which might grow
unnecessarily large at the expense of either taxpayers or other local services. In times of fiscal stress,
the latter perception may hold more sway than the former, not only among taxpayers but municipal
decision-makers as well. While some of the decline in this category may stem from 'real' reductions, it
may also stem from actions on the part of officials that 'apportioned' such general expenses to other
expenditure categories. Reductions in general government occurred not only in all cities but also in
response to the magnitude of property tax losses. This suggests that changes may have occurred in the
long run due to the perception of this category as the essence of bureaucratic excess.
Availability of Funding
The recovery of certain expenditures in both the second post-13 fiscal year and the long-term
may be due to another factor mentioned earlier. This relates to the type of funding available for such
activities: an explanation that may be particularly applicable to the parks & recreation and public works
categories. The response of expenditure categories to particular revenue sources irrespective of either
property tax losses or total revenue attests to the importance of specific revenue streams. Parks &
recreation, for example, benefits from the ability to collect user fees to fund its various activities.
Similarly, public works is responsive to intergovernmental grants for particular projects. This
phenomenon could also occur with respect to non-earmarked revenues, with changes in revenue
sources leading to subtle changes in particular expenditures.
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Capital Proportions and Scale Economies
My analysis indicates that the relative amounts of capital intensivity seemed to play some role
in expenditure changes. Reductions and increases within particular categories did not seem related to
the average capital intensivity for those expenditures; rather such influence was exercised in an intra-
category fashion. Municipalities' reactions seemed to occur in a highly individualized fashion.
Decision-makers may have simply combed through various expenditures and determined which capital
expenses could be delayed or even canceled while preserving more immediate service requirements.
An increase in fiscal stress would be expected to result in increased incentives for consolidation
in the production and delivery of goods and services. I found scant evidence that the passage of the tax
limitation measure generated any intra-metropolitan cooperation, however. If there were scale
economies to be realized in municipally-provided goods and services, this would be one method by
which to capitalize on these efficiencies. The lack of any such movement is the result of the benefits of
scale being realized at a fairly moderate level. Scale economies for fire services, for example, are likely
to be achieved at the station level with few savings after that point. Diseconomies might even occur
due to the additional costs of coordination across political boundaries. In addition, to a large extent,
locally delivered goods and services are labor intensive and relatively unaffected by scale.
Revenue and Expenditure Summary
A general rule of public finance is that levels of government should utilize revenue sources that
they can effectively and efficiently handle and no others. Using this criteria, the property tax
curtailment in California represents a very mixed result. The passage of Proposition 13 largely
removed from local control an appropriate local revenue source and increased the tendency toward
fiscal centralization in California. To the extent that the tax limitation resulted in movement toward
benefit taxes and fees & charges, an increase in efficiency and possibly administrative effectiveness
resulted. To the extent that more intensive use of local taxes occurred, however, it is hard to argue
that these would be fairer or more efficient. As has been discussed above, the effect of increases in or
the imposition of new local taxes would be expected to be quite varied, but generally result in a less
equitable outcome.
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The result of the complex interplay of the host of influences on fiscal adjustments among
municipalities in the wake of Proposition 13 is a mosaic. Both expenditure and revenue adjustments
occurred among all cities. Expenditure adjustments occurred first with revenue adjustments occurring
as timing allowed. Expenditure changes transpired in response to local needs and desires and the
characteristics of the specific category. Further changes occurred based on the analysis of new
revenues and real or perceived service needs. Changes in revenues took place as cities weighed
different alternatives based on availability and burden. Although there are clear changes in revenue and
expenditure trends in the long-term, according to most of the measures, total revenues and expenditure
changes overtime did not seem to relate directly to the severity of the property tax losses. With the
exception of those with large aggregate losses, municipalities were able to raise alternative revenues
sufficient to fund total expenditures irrespective of the property tax losses.'1
Institutional Challenges and Responses
Proposition 13 and Fiscal Stress
In this analysis, I have often referred to the fiscal stress stemming from the passage of
Proposition 13. What has become clear in the course of this study is that Proposition 13 resulted not
only in fiscal stress but also political stress manifested most clearly in an increase in uncertainty about
the fiscal future. Fiscal stress stemming from economic stagnation or more localized urban decline
certainly presents serious challenges for municipal governments; however, the parameters of the
financial ramifications are generally known to municipal officials and can be addressed with familiar
approaches. Tax limitations, on the other hand, encompass all the challenges associated with more
10 This statement is not meant to imply that the restrictions on property taxes had no effect on
total revenues of local governments. Counties and school districts are not explored in this analysis
and several studies have indicated the rather dramatic decline in fiscal conditions of those public
agencies since 1978. Municipalities were favored by the state in the allocation of the one-percent
property tax at the expense of school districts in particular. In exchange, the state took over a
large portion of the funding for K-12 schooling with generally unfavorable results over the long
term. Freeing schools from local support has made them reliant on a source of funding more
susceptible to political whims and the state's fiscal condition.
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common notions of fiscal stress, together with perhaps a more profound challenge of political stress
and uncertainty.
One means of appreciating the complimentary yet separate dynamics embodied in these two
phenomena is to reflect on the results of the two principal modeling techniques that were used in this
study. A striking finding to emerge from this investigation is the quite different estimates of the effect
of Proposition 13 which emerged from the two principal econometric approaches described in Chapter
3: the models that I have termed 'tax capacity' and 'revenue/expenditure adjustment', respectively.
Although both of these methods represent legitimate approaches to analyzing the impact of tax
limitation measures, in actuality they measure different effects. The tax capacity model estimates shifts
in expenditure shares and revenue composition in response to changes in tax capacity. The
revenue/expenditure adjustment model, on the other hand, looks at several measures of revenue and
expenditure change based on data prior to and after the adoption of the tax limitation measure.
These dissimilar methods allow for the decomposition of the tax limitation into two component
parts: the 'fiscal effects' and the 'political/economic effects'. Fiscal effects are those aspects of the
Proposition actually written into the State Constitution with applications to tax rate and assessment
limits. The political/economic effects of the Proposition are those attendant effects which accompanied
its passage. This is not the place to exhaustively identify particular attributes associated with this latter
aspect of the Proposition, but generally they include anti-tax sentiment, anti-spending beliefs and a
hostility to government bureaucracy. In effect, the tax capacity model measures only changes that
might occur in association with fiscal stress, while the revenue/expenditure adjustment model takes into
account both fiscal and political stress.
Using the tax capacity methodology, I found that rather large changes were required in the size
of uncollected taxes in order to generate discernible shifts in expenditure composition. These shifts, for
the most part, were limited to decreases in only three expenditure categories with two others being
nearly significant. Changes in revenue composition were somewhat more responsive, with significant
estimates in three of the four local own-source revenues. While the changes are measurable, their
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magnitudes are far less than might be expected, based on normative models of local government
behavior.
Although the measurement of change in the revenue/expenditure adjustment model is not based
on shares but rather on aggregate, percentage and per capita measures, the scale of budget adjustment
is much greater than would have been expected according to the tax capacity model. While the
weaknesses of the tax capacity model are clear, I believe it would be incorrect to attribute the different
estimates of the magnitude of the tax limitation's effect solely to the inadequacies of the model."
Instead, the distinctive results between the two models highlight the importance of the
political/economic effects of the Proposition.
Municipalities were not just reacting to the severity of property tax losses, although this
response is clear from the regression analysis; instead, municipalities were reacting to the entire anti-
government, anti-tax milieu which surrounded the passage of Proposition 13. Two examples of
spending serve to illustrate this point. General government displayed share declines in the aftermath of
Proposition 13 while police services showed increases based on several measures of changes. Yet,
according to the tax capacity model, neither of these showed any sensitivity to increases in uncollected
taxes. The immutability of general government, a category which saw dramatic reduction in the post-
13 years, is particularly noteworthy.
An objection to this interpretation can be raised based on the rather dramatic differences in the
apparent magnitude of the fiscal effects, on the one hand, and the political/economic effects, on the
other, of the tax limitation. The fiscal effects are based on severity of tax reductions on specific
municipalities. The political/economic effects, in contrast, are more generalized and applied to all
cities, although perhaps not with equal intensity. The generalized nature of the political/economic
" The major issues, as discussed in Chapter 4, relate to the model's circumscribed notion of tax
capacity and its static basis of measurement. With respect to the former, I used alternative
formulations of local tax capacity in trial tax capacity model regressions. Differences did occur in
the estimated coefficients, but none was of comparable magnitude to those obtained using the
revenue/expenditure adjustment model. Similarly, while the issues raised in applying static cross-
sectional models to a dynamic situation are well-recognized, these again are not sufficient, in and
of themselves, to explain the difference in the estimated parameters.
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aspects of the Proposition are suggested by the shift in revenues and expenditures following the
adoption of Proposition 13, as shown in the summary statistics. In addition, the importance of the tax
limitation en toto, has been verified by numerous time-series studies.
If, however, such shifts were largely due to the anti-tax fervor as opposed to actual property
tax reductions, it would not be expected that the econometric results would show such clear
relationships between the severity of property tax reductions and increases and decreases in various
budget categories. The answer to this paradox may lie in the fact that cities with higher initial property
tax burdens, larger property tax reductions and certain levels of expenditures and/or expenditures in
particular categories were particularly sensitive to anti-tax criticism and thus reduced expenditures
accordingly. Their larger property tax reductions ensured that they 'got the message'. These cities, in
other words, reacted not based just on property tax reductions but also in accordance with their greater
sensitivity to anti-government sentiment.
The revenue changes estimated by the two modeling approaches are somewhat more
compatible. The tax capacity model resulted in estimated increases in local taxes and other local
income in response to increases in uncollected taxes. Local taxes did in fact increase in response to
property tax reductions according to the revenue adjustment models based on a number of measures.
The response of other local income is a bit more erratic, although there is some sensitivity in the short-
term. Notably, the tax capacity model shows a paradoxical relationship between uncollected taxes and
fees & charges, with decreases occurring in this source as uncollected taxes increased. This is quite
compatible with the very mixed effects property tax reductions had on fees & charges according to the
revenue adjustment models.
The approach I have taken in this analysis has facilitated the discrete analysis of the fiscal and
political/economic effects of Proposition 13. Based on the results of my analysis, it is reasonable to
argue that the total effect of tax curtailments on local governments will vary based on the sensitivity of
individual local governments to the two different components. The significance of this is clear. By
examining only the fiscal effects of such measures, analysts may either vastly understate the overall
impact of tax limitations or mistakenly attribute too much of the total measured effect to its fiscal
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impacts. The political and social context surrounding the adoption of such measures clearly can have a
significant reinforcing effect on local government actions.
State Policy Options
The changes coinciding with the passage of Proposition 13 resulted in programmatic burdens
increasingly being placed on lower levels of government while at the same time local government
revenue accessibility was being curtailed. While one could argue that pushing down programs to more
local levels can improve their efficiency and design characteristics, clearly the restrictions on funding
would hamper efforts in this regard. Given the nature of the tax limitation, there are few steps that
cities could take to deal with the added financial strain that were not already being undertaken.
Initiatives involving revenue diversification, coordination with other jurisdictions in service production
and delivery, advance planning for investment -- laudable goals all -- were already in place. While the
passage of the tax limitation measure might result in more urgency regarding these efforts, it would not
result in fundamentally new policies.
Because of the tax limitation's structure, most of the responsibility for fashioning a response to
Proposition 13 lay with the state government. Action (or inaction) by the State of California prior to
and after the adoption of Proposition 13 can serve as a valuable lesson in designing appropriate fiscal
approaches to tax limitations. The years just prior to the adoption of Proposition 13 presented a
scenario which was highly conducive to the passage of a tax limitation measure. In the face of rising
property values, increasing assessments and, as a result, steep increases in property taxes, the state
more or less did nothing to further property tax relief In the context of general anti-tax and anti-
government sentiment that was pervasive throughout California, the state continued to accumulate vast
reserves far in excess of prudent fiscal requirements. Even documented instances of political influence
over the assessment process elicited no fundamental statewide response to ensure the fairness of the
property tax system.
Resentment regarding the property tax should hardly have come as a shock to state officials.
The first modern day protests regarding high property taxes occurred in Los Angeles County in the
1950's. A proposition restricting the use of property taxes was first placed on the ballot in 1968.
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Proposition 9, as it was called, would have abolished the use of the property tax entirely had it been
approved.12 Tax protests and further tax limitation initiatives occurred throughout the 1960's and
1970's; Proposition 13 did not materialize out of thin air. Given the fact that property tax limitations
had been proposed numerous times in the past, there are a number of anticipatory steps the state could
have taken in order to ease the transition to a new fiscal environment.
Given similar situations, policy-makers in other states or locales would be well-advised to
formulate a standby response to a tax curtailment's effect on local governments. Although the exact
parameters of tax limitations cannot be known until they are actually approved, the general scope of
such fiscal limits might be gleaned from recent tax curtailment efforts. The disadvantages of
broadcasting such fiscal intentions would be more than compensated by the clarity such an advanced
formulation would lend to the discussion of the understanding of the measure. Obviously,
promulgation of general guidelines would not prevent further adjustment to state policies and fiscal
institutions as situations changed and the repercussions of the measure became more fully realized.
For local governments, some before-hand knowledge of the parameters of state assistance
would take much of the guesswork out of budgeting and revenue decision-making. As has been
indicated in this analysis, the initial post-13 fiscal year was characterized by wide disparities in
expenditure and revenue effects. The second post-13 period, was marked by occasions of deep
reductions as well, with bounce-back dynamics stemming from earlier precipitous reductions. If states
established the parameters of intergovernmental assistance early on, much of the initial turmoil and
uncertainty could be obviated, facilitating a smoother transition to a new fiscal regime.
Prior determination of tax limitation-related policy responses would not only facilitate the
transition to a new fiscal environment for local governments; such efforts could also be blended with
rationalization of fiscal institutions relating to state and local governments. This might entail a
realignment of responsibilities for the production and distribution of goods and services, as well as the
reallocation of revenue-raising responsibilities. Such efforts would be appropriately focused on
1 Lo, Small Property Versus Big Government, p. 125.
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achieving fiscal equivalency and fiscal adequacy. This would ensure that the political boundaries of
governments coincided with the distribution of benefits, with the level of government fully capable of
collecting the revenues required to deliver the good or service.
State of California policies regarding intergovernmental assistance after the passage of
Proposition 13 encompassed the realignment of property taxes as well as direct state aid. As a general
rule, favoring municipalities in the allocation of property taxes over counties and school districts makes
economic sense. Property is most closely tied to the direct public services typically provided by
municipal governments. The services provided by counties and school districts, on the other hand, are
much more diffuse in nature. However, the state's decision to base the post-13 property tax allocation
on historic collections is open to some criticism.
Certainly history is important, as it reflects the choice of various communities to rely on this
particular revenue source. But it also reflects the requirement of certain municipalities to rely on the
property tax because of the absence or inadequacy of other sources of revenues. To rely solely on
historical trends as the deciding factor basically freezes past relationships without providing the
opportunity to evolve given changing circumstances. As an extreme example of this, certain
municipalities which levied no property taxes in the pre-13 era were left out of the property tax
allocation process altogether, although this issue was addressed at a later date.
California altered the allocation process in the second post-13 fiscal year to address the issue of
existing reserves, but the system was still based on historic property tax collections. The ability of
certain cities to recover rapidly from severe property tax reductions while the effects of the tax cuts
lingered on for other municipalities suggests opportunities for alternative methods of property tax
allocation and state aid. Other states in similar situations might, for example, measure the burden of the
property tax reduction not in per capita or percentage terms or even relative to the total budget, but
rather in relation to the tax capacity of the municipality.
Under such a system, those cities which relied to a large degree on the property tax but
possessed social characteristics or economic features that resulted in higher tax capacity would not
receive as much aid as those municipalities relying less on the property tax but also having lower tax
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capacities. The resulting system of property tax allocation would thus be based on the relative ease of
adjustment given city attributes. State actions would then consist of property tax allocations based on
tax and revenue raising ability together with a system of equity-based and optimizing grants. Finally,
instead of pushing down responsibilities for additional goods and services delivery to local
governments, the state could have used the opportunity to restructure intergovernmental fiscal relations
and realign service responsibilities that rationally incorporated taxing authority and revenue availability.
Conclusions
The subject of tax limitations is a polarizing one. Those generally in favor of such external
constraints on the revenue raising abilities of independent local governmental entities see the need to
curtail government growth, regulate and restrain unfair taxes and restrict local revenues. Those
opposed to such measures aver that such external restraints will inhibit the ability of local governments
to deliver adequate levels of goods and services and result in severe fiscal stress. While some of the
distinctions between the opposing camps stem from their respective underlying views of government
(e.g. leviathan versus median-voter) they are also a product of social influences tied to the immediate
context of the moment.
I believe that the weight of evidence suggests that neither of these two views was realized in
the case of Proposition 13. If the primary goal of the Proposition was to curtail the property tax, then
ample evidence is available to suggest that this goal was achieved. In addition, to the extent that
advocates of the meat-ax approach desired a realignment of municipal spending priorities away from
administrative and in favor of direct services, this objective was also realized to some degree. The
passage of the Proposition did result in some alterations in spending patterns.
On the other hand, if the real motivation for the tax limitation was to limit the total revenues
and expenditures of municipal governments, there are mixed results. The overwhelming evidence
suggests that most cities were able to compensate eventually for the decline in property taxes through
the use of substitute revenues. There are, however, two significant caveats to this. First, such recovery
from tax curtailment was partially dependent on the advantageous treatment accorded municipalities,
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relative to other local governments, in the allocation of the one percent property tax levy. Second,
there is evidence that cities with large aggregate property tax reductions were unable to recover from
such reductions in the long-term.
My analysis has shown that there is no simple answer to the question, "What happens to
revenues and expenditures of municipal governments when a highly restrictive tax limitation is
implemented?" One of the leitmotifs of this analysis has been the heterogeneity of municipal fiscal
reactions to a tax limitation. Municipal reactions have not necessarily conformed to theoretical models
of government behavior. Revenues raised in response to the property tax curtailment varied across
municipalities as well as over time. Some expenditure patterns were broken only to be reestablished at
a later date. Instead of a clear pattern of response, the passage of the Proposition instead set in motion
a series of fiscal dynamics that altered the chemistry between fiscal institutions and the social and
economic characteristics of individual municipalities. The examination of the characteristics of this
interaction of fiscal institutions and municipal characteristics in this analysis should prove useful in
considering how to measure local government responses to future restrictions on revenues and
expenditures.
Although Proposition 13 is almost a score of years old, it continues to exercise decisive effects
on local fiscal activity. In addition, tax limitations in various guises continue to be a factor which will
affect local governments in the indefinite future. The effects of such measures are vital to
understanding the ability of local governments to respond in an appropriate and prudent manner. As
the curtailment of local fiscal options continues, it is being met head-on by a rising call for
decentralization. Thus, just as more localized governments are being called upon to exercise a greater
influence, they find their ability to do so increasingly constrained. The clash of these two dynamic
forces presents a distinct challenge for policy-makers and municipal officials.
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Appendix A
Text of Article XLI A of the State of California Constitution (Proposition 13)
Section 1
(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent
(1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties
and apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or special
assessments to pay for the interest and redemption charges on any indebtedness approved by the voters
prior to the time this section becomes effective.
Section 2
(a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of real property as shown on the
1975-76 tax bill under 'full cash value' or, thereafter, the appraised value of real property when
purchased, newly constructed , or a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All
real property not already assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to reflect that
valuation.
(b) The fair market value base may reflect from year to year the inflation rate not to exceed two
percent (2%) for any given year or reduction as shown in the consumer price index or comparable data
for the area under taxing jurisdiction.
Section 3
From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in State taxes enacted for the
purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto whether by increasing rates or changes in
methods of computations must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem taxes on real
property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real property may be imposed.
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Section 4
Cities, counties and special districts by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such
district, may impose special taxes on such district except ad valorem taxes on real property or a
transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such city county or special district.
Section 5
This article shall take effect for the tax year beginning on July 1 following the passage of this
Amendment, except Section 3 which shall become effective upon the passage of this article.
Section 6
If any section, part, clause or phrase hereof is for any reason held to be invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be affected but will remain in full force and effect.
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Appendix B
Data Sources and Computation of Variables
The principal source of fiscal data for this investigation is Financial Transactions
Concerning Cities of California, published annually by the State of California Controller's Office.
This publication provides detailed information regarding the revenues and expenditures for all
California municipal governments. Data regarding revenues and expenditures is submitted by
municipalities following the close of each fiscal year. This information is then audited by the State
Controller's Office before the data is compiled and distributed. This source was used for the
calculation of all permutations of revenue and expenditure changes including aggregate,
percentage, per capita and relative magnitude. Specific sources and procedures are described
below.
Chapter 4
The calculation of tax capacity shown in equation 4.1 was based on data from the
following sources and derived through the following procedures:
mv (market value of property in municipality): Assessed value of all property, based on grand
value subject to property tax net of exemptions, was divided by 0.25 (given the state's 25%
assessment ratio at the time) and divided by the 1978 municipal population (Financial
Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978). This was then adjusted by the CPI (US.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1988).
tr (local tax rate of municipality): The tax rate of the municipality was adjusted based on the state
assessment ratio in place at the time (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California,
1978; California State Board of Equalization, Annual Report: Statistical Appendix, 1976-77 and
1977-78).
oi (other municipal revenue of municipality): Other municipal revenue was obtained by summing
all other non-property tax (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978).
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exp (municipal expenditures for each municipality): Total municipal expenditures were obtained
by summing all categorical expenditures (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of
Calfornia, 1978).
The variables used in the expenditure and revenue regressions (equations 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5)
were obtained from the following sources and derived through the following procedures:
es (expenditure share): Each expenditure category was expressed as a percent of total
expenditures (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of Cahfornia, 1978).
ts (total expenditures): (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978).
rs (revenue shares): Each revenue source was expressed as a percent of total revenues (Financial
Transactions Concerning Cities of Cahfornia, 1978).
area (geographic area of municipality): (The California Planners'Book of Lists, 1978).
dens (density of the municipality): This was obtained by dividing the municipal population
(Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978) by the area of the municipality
(The California Planners' Book of Lists, 1978).
glaw (governing law of municipality): (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California,
1978).
unem (unemployment in the municipality): Constructed through state and federal data as
described in footnote 8, Chapter 4 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Census of the Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1980; State of
California, Department of Economic Development, State Unemployment Statistics, 1978).
pop (population of municipality): (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California,
1978).
ln(untx) (ln of uncollected taxes of municipality): The source of this variable is the natural log of
uncollected taxes, as calculated based on equation 4.2.
tcap (tax capacity of municipality): This was obtained by using equation 4.1.
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Chapter 5
The variables for equations 5.1 and 5.2 were obtained from the following sources using
the following procedures:
ptxA (property tax change): This represents the change in property taxes from fiscal years 1978 to
1979 (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978, 1979).
pop (population of municipality): (US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census
of the Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1980).
grow (population growth rate of municipality): This was obtained by using the 1970 and 1980
population data (US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the
Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970, 1980).
coun (municipal population/county population): This was obtained by using the 1980 population
data (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, General Social and Economic
Characteristics, 1980).
incm (median household income for municipality): This was obtained by using the 1980
household income (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, General Social and
Economic Characteristics, 1980).
resd (residential property value as percent of total municipal property value): Calculating the
percent residential value involved several steps: (i) owner-occupied housing units in 1980 were
multiplied by the median value of owner-occupied housing units (U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing, General Housing Characteristics: Cahfornia, 1980);
(ii) this result was adjusted by the percent of owner-occupied housing in 1980 (U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing, General Housing Characteristics:
Cahfornia, 1980); (iii) this in turn was adjusted by the coefficient of dispersion in the state's
assessment procedure, otherwise know as the collier coefficient (State of Cahfornia, California
State Board of Equalization, Annual Report: Statistical Appendix, 1977-78); (iv) this result was
divided by the total assessed value as reported by the State of California for each municipality
(Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of Cahfornia, 1978).
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trat (equalized tax rate for municipality): This was obtained by taking the assessed value as
reported to the state by the municipality and adjusting it to full value based on the assessment
ratio of 0.25 (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of Cahfornia, 1978).
endb (ending balance or surplus for municipality): Obtained by taking the excess (shortfall) of
revenues over (under) expenditures for the five fiscal years prior to the adoption of Proposition
13. This was expressed as the average percent for the five-year period (Financial Transactions
Concerning Cities of Calfornia, 1974-1978).
tcap (tax capacity of municipality): This was calculated by taking the quantity of all endogenous
revenues of the municipality (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978)
divided by the mean 1978 per capita income for the entire 130 municipality sample multiplied by
the per capita income for each municipality. Per capita income was obtained by taking the 1980
per capita income (US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, General Social and
Economic Characteristics, 1980) and adjusting for inflation using the CPI (U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1988). Further details are provided in footnote 8, Chapter 5.
Chapter 6
The variables for equations 6.1 and 6.2 were obtained from the following sources using
the following procedures:
revA (revenue change): Change various revenues between fiscal years 1978-79 and 1978-80
(Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of Cahfornia, 1978-1980).
All other variables used in equations 6.1 and 6.2 were introduced previously; the sources
and calculations may be found above.
Chapter 7
The variables for equations 7.1 and 7.2 were obtained from the following sources using
the following procedures:
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expA (expenditure change): Change in various expenditures between fiscal years 1978-79 and
1978-80 (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978-1980).
debtA (change in debt outstanding for municipality): This represents the percent change in total
outstanding debt for each municipality for each of the two periods, 1978-79 and 1978-80
(Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, 1978-1980).
capt (capital intensivity of expenditure category): This was calculated by dividing capital outlay
by total expenditures in fiscal year 1978 for each expenditure category (Financial Transactions
Concerning Cities of California, 1978).
All other variables used in equations 7.1 and 7.2 were introduced previously; the sources
and calculations may be found above.
Chapter 8
fisA (change in revenues or expenditures): Change in various permutations of revenues and
expenditures from 1978 to 1988 (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of Cahfornia,
1978,1988).
The following variables used in equations 8.1 and 8.2 were updated based on the 1990
Census: pop, grow, coun, and incm (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1980, 1990). The following were updated based
on 1988 figures: endb, capt, and tcap (Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of California,
1984-1988; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, General Social and Economic
Characteristics, 1990).
empl (employment in the municipality as a percent of population): This was calculated by dividing
population by employment in various industries (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, General Social and Economic Characteristics; U.S Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, Census of Manufactures, Geographic Area Series: Cahfornia; U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, Municipalities; U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Retail Trade, Geographic Area Series:
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Cahfornia; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Service Industries,
Geographic Area Series: California; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Census of Wholesale Trade, Geographic Area Series: Cahfornia; Financial Transactions
Concerning Cities of Calfornia, 1988)
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Appendix C
Correlation Matrices
Table Cl: Correlation Matrix for Property Tax Change, Fiscal Years 1978-1979.
Variable p txad A ptxpA ptxcA I txtA I pop I grow coun incm resd trat endb tcap
ptxaA 1.000
PtxPA -0.005 1.000
PtxcA 0.078 0.255 1.000
ptxtA 0.036 0.574 0.505 1.000
,O, -0.977 0.052 -0.030 0.020 1.000
grow 0.090 -0.065 -0.116 0.012 -0.098 1.000
coun -0.347 0.186 0.078 0.237 0.427 0.075 1.000
incm 0.074 -0.173 -0.141 -0.581 -0.082 0.084 -0.263 1.000
resd 0.121 -0.152 0.191 -0.196 -0.128 0.372 -0.134 0.297 1.000
trat -0.251 -0.054 -0.483 -0.159 0.198 0.024 0.244 -0.367 -0.081 1.000 1
endb 0.018 0.072 0.021 0.048 -0.021 0.034 -0.056 0.083 -0.012 -0.046 1.000
tcap | -0.0521 -0.0471
Notes: Number of observations is 127.
-0.812 -0.2881 0.0191 0.0411 -0.0551 0.1981 -0.2551 0.2151 0.0451 1.000
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Table C2: Correlation Matrix for Revenue Change, Fiscal Years 1978-79.
Variable ptxaA ptxpA I ptxcA ptxtA I pop I grow I coun incm resd trat endb tcap
ptxaA 1.000
ptxpA -0.005 1.000
ptxcA 0.078 0.255 1.000
ptxtA 0.036 0.574 0.505 1.000
POP -0.977 0.052 -0.030 0.020 1.000
grow 0.090 -0.065 -0.116 0.012 -0.098 1.000
coun -0.347 0.186 0.078 0.237 0.427 0.075 1.000
incm 0.074 -0.173 -0.141 -0.581 -0.082 0.084 -0.263 1.0001
resd 0.121 -0.152 0.191 -0.196 -0.128 0.372 -0.134 0.297 1.000
trat -0.251 -0.054 -0.483 -0.159 0.198 0.024 0.244 -0.367 -0.081 1.000
endb 0.040 -0.100 -0.563 -0.067 -0.067 0.393 -0.046 0.002 0.068 0.147 1.0001
tcap -0.052 -0.047 -0.812 -0.288 0.019 0.041 -0.055 0.198 -0.255 0.215 0.404 1.000
Notes: For pixtA the calculation is based on the initial 1978-79 change in property taxes as a percent of total 1978-79 revenues. Number of
observations is 127.
Table C3: Correlation Matrix for Revenue Change, Fiscal Years 1978-80.
Variable ptxaA ptxpA ptxcA ptxtA pop grow coun incm resd (rat endb tcap
ptxaA 1.000
ptxpA 0.046 1.0001
ptxcA 0.076 0.305 1.000
pIxtA 0.043 0.497 0.429 1.000
POP -0.970 0.007 -0.032 0.020 1.000
grow 0.088 0.121 -0.149 0.012 -0.098 1.000
coun -0.322 0.246 0.099 0.237 0.427 0.075 1.000 1
incm 0.069 -0.077 -0.106 -0.581 -0.082 0.084 -0.263 1.000
resd 0.116 -0.003 0.172 -0.196 -0.128 0.372 -0.134 0.297 1.000
trat -0.245 -0.034 -0.444 -0.159 0.198 0.024 0.244 -0.367 -0.081 1.000
endb 0.035 -0.061 -0.608 -0.068 -0.067 0.393 -0.046 0.002 0.068 0.147 1.0001
tcap -0.049 0.003 -0.747 -0.288 0.0191 0.041 -0.055
Notes: For ptrtA the calculation is based on the initial 1978-79 diange in property taxes
observations is 127.
0.198 -0.255 0.215 0.404 1.000
as a percent of total 1978-79 revenues. Number of
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Table C4: Correlation Matrix for Expenditure Change, Fiscal Years 1978-79.
Variable pop grow coun incm resd I trat endb tcap debtA capt
ptxaA -0.977 0.090 -0.347 0.074 0.121 -0.251 0.040 -0.052 0.014 0.125
ptxpA 0.051 -0.065 0.186 -0.173 -0.152 -0.054 -0.100 -0.047 -0.082 0.178
ptxcA -0.030 -0.116 0.078 -0.141 0.191 -0.483 -0.563 -0.812 -0.054 0.168
ptxtA 0.020 0.012 0.237 -0.581 -0.196 -0.159 -0.067 -0.288 -0.243 0.340
endoaA 0.895 -0.095 0.419 -0.072 -0.174 0.170 -0.091 0.056 -0.023 -0.101
endopA -0.059 -0.079 -0.045 0.049 -0.059 -0.062 0.038 -0.013 -0.035 -0.019
endocA 0.006 -0.094 0.071 -0.064 -0.230 -0.141 -0.139 0.055 -0.018 0.031
enptaA -0.878 0.072 -0.245 0.064 0.068 -0.265 0.001 -0.041 0.005 0.122
enptpA -0.011 0.020 0.139 -0.249 -0.188 -0.167 0.039 -0.021 -0.088 0.184
enptcA -0.014 -0.138 0.099 -0.132 -0.054 -0.394 -0.441 -0.449 -0.046 0.124
enpsaA -0.027 -0.033 0.231 -0.022 -0.108 -0.138 -0.108 -0.010 -0.024 0.015
enpspA -0.008 -0.021 0.085 -0.262 -0.161 -0.220 0.050 -0.120 -0.086 0.122
enpscA 0.008 -0.173 0.084 -0.147 -0.141 -0.364 -0.352 -0.315 -0.037 0.068
totraA 0.585 -0.029 0.242 -0.052 -0.114 -0.058 -0.041 0.028 -0.016 -0.059
totrpA -0.020 -0.009 0.049 -0.172 -0.055 -0.203 0.226 -0.063 -0.039 0.130
totrcA -0.014 -0.087 0.059 -0.130 -0.113 -0.268 -0.012 -0.115 -0.017 0.062
POP 1.000 -0.098 0.427 -0.082 -0.128 0.198 -0.067 0.019 -0.023 -0.117
grow -0.098 1.000 0.074 0.084 0.372 0.024 0.393 0.041 -0.034 0.267
coun 0.427 0.075 1.000 -0.263 -0.134 0.244 -0.046 -0.055 -0.055 0.207
incm -0.082 0.084 -0.263 1.000 0.297 -0.367 0.002 0.198 0.394 -0.218
resd -0.128 0.372 -0.134 0.297 1.000 -0.081 0.068 -0.255 0.017 0.115
trat 0.198 0.024 0.244 -0.367 -0.081 1.000 0.147 0.215 -0.079 0.091
endb -0.067 0.393 -0.046 0.002 0.068 0.147 1.000 0.404 -0.033 0.007
tcap 0.019 0.041 -0.055 0.198 -0.255 0.215 0.404 1.000 0.065 -0.122
debtA -0.023 -0.034 -0.055 0.394 0.017 -0.079 -0.033 0.065 1.000 -0.072
capt -0.117 0.267 0.207 -0.218! 0.115 0.091 0.0071 -0.122 -0.072 1.000
Notes: For ptxtA the calculation is based on the initial 1978-79 change in property taxes as a percent of total 1978-79 revenues. Number of
observations is 127.
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Correlation Matrix for Expenditure Change, Fiscal
pop Igrow I coun I incm resd
Years 1978-80.
trat endb tcap debtA capt
ptxad -0.970 0.088 -0.322 0.069 0.116 -0.245 0.035 -0.049 0.008 0.127
PtxPA 0.007 0.121 0.246 -0.077 -0.003 -0.034 -0.061 0.003 -0.017 0.241
PtxcA -0.032 -0.149 0.099 -0.106 0.172 -0.444 -0.608 -0.747 -0.021 0.161
PtxtA 0.020 0.012 0.237 -0.581 -0.196 -0.159 -0.067 -0.288 -0.238 0.340
endoaA 0.977 -0.099 0.407 -0.075 -0.152 0.208 -0.069 0.048 -0.016 -0.118
endopA -0.030 -0.075 -0.079 -0.094 -0.049 -0.003 -0.054 -0.095 -0.068 -0.108
endocA 0.076 -0.248 0.032 -0.080 -0.163 -0.207 -0.464 -0.209 -0.023 -0.108
enptaA 0.795 -0.097 0.470 -0.071 -0.184 0.104 -0.111 0.037 -0.027 -0.078
enptpA 0.009 0.032 0.116 -0.125 -0.143 -0.109 -0.041 -0.096 -0.089 0.104
enptcA 0.037 -0.240 0.068 0.005 -0.031 -0.351 -0.604 -0.495 -0.026 0.002
enpsaA 0.886 -0.104 0.492 -0.074 -0.191 0.112 -0.100 0.040 -0.029 -0.103
enpspA -0.009 0.075 0.107 -0.120 -0.182 -0.268 -0.125 -0.166 -0.121 0.032
enpscA 0.019 -0.261 0.039 0.007 -0.165 -0.416 -0.534 -0.369 -0.033 -0.055
totraA 0.790 -0.107 0.378 -0.071 -0.206 0.090 -0.094 0.065 -0.028 -0.168
totrPA 0.012 0.021 0.049 -0.003 -0.173 -0.283 -0.098 -0.032 -0.085 -0.311
totrcA 0.031 -0.292 0.000 0.064 -0.211 -0.416 -0.427 -0.233 -0.020 -0.325
,O, 1.000 -0.098 0.427 -0.082 -0.128 0.198 -0.067 0.019 -0.019 -0.117
grow -0.098 1.000 0.075 0.084 0.372 0.024 0.393 0.041 -0.015 0.267
coun 0.427 0.075 1.000 -0.263 -0.134 0.244 -0.046 -0.055 -0.037 0.207
incm -0.082 0.084 -0.263 1.000 0.297 -0.367 0.002 0.198 0.401 -0.218
resd -0.128 0,372 -0.134 0.297 1.000 -0.081 0.068 -0.255 0.021 0.115
trat 0.198 0.024 0.244 -0.367 -0.081 1.000 0.147 0.215 -0.075 0.091
endb -0.067 0.393 -0.046 0.002 0.068 0.147 1.000 0.404 -0.031 0.007
tcap 0.019 0.041 -0.055 0.198 -0.255 0.215 0.404 1.000 0.068 -0.122
debtA -0.019 -0.015 -0.037 0.401 0.021 -0.075 -0.031 0.068 1.000 -0.051
capt -0.117 0.2671
Notes: For pwxtA the calculation is based
observations is 127.
0.207 -0.218 0.115 0.091 0.007 -0.122 -0.051
on the initial 1978-79 diange in property taxes as a percent of total 1978-79 revenues. Number of
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Table C5:
Variable
1.000
Correlation Matrix for Revenue and Expenditure Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88 (Constant $).
ptxaA ptxpA I ptxcA ptxtA I pop I grow I coun incm I resd trat endb tcap
ptxaA 1.000
ptxpA -0.006 1.000
ptxcA 0.080 0.240 1.000 1
ptxtA 0.039 0.547 0.500 1.000 1
POP -0.970 0.058 -0.031 0.023 1.000
grow 0.062 0.125 -0.146 0.270 -0.018 1.000
coun -0.321 0.169 0.070 0.227 0.420 0.213 1.000 1
incm 0.058 -0.162 -0.214 -0.657 -0.077 -0.289 -0292 1.000
empl -0.005 -0.029 -0.237 0.095 -0.001 -0.085 -0.088 0.023 1.000
trat -0.249 -0.072 -0.486 -0.174 0.200 0.255 0.253 -0.299 -0.206 1.000,
endb 0.039 -0.106 -0.561 -0.064 -0.065 0.314 -0.032 -0.015 0.116 0.152 1.000_
-0.050, -0.033 -0.813 -0.288 0.013 0.030 -0.0641 0.287 0.395 0.198 0.3971 1.000
Notes: For pAt the calculation is based on the initial 1978-79 diange in property taxes as a percent of total 1978-79 revenues. No correlations for
capital intensivity measures of expenditures are reported ; these were all below 0.20. Number of observations is 128.
Table C7: Correlation Matrix for Revenue and Expenditure
Variable ptxaA I ptxpA ptxcA ptxtA pop grow
Change, Fiscal Years 1978-88 (Nominal $).
coun incm resd trat endb I tcap
ptxaA 1.000
ptxpA -0.002 1.000
ptxcA 0.078 0.256 1.000
ptxtA 0.037 0.577 0.505 1.000
p2 -0.969 0.058 -0.026 0.028 1.000
grow 0.063 0.125 -0.145 0.269 -0.018 1.000
coun -0.320 0.169 0.076 0.232 0.420 0.213 1.000
incm 0.058 -0.162 -0.215 -0.645 -0.077 -0.289 -0.292 1.000
empl -0.00 -0.029 -0.234 0.095 -0.001 -0.085 -0.088 0.023 1.000 1
trat -0.251 -0.072 -0.482 -0.167 0.200 0.255 0.253 -0.299 -0.206 1.000
endb 0.039 -0.106 -0.564 -0.070 -0.065 0.314 -0.032 -0.015 0.116 0.152 1.0001
tcap -0.050 -0.033 -0.805 -0.278 0.013 0.030 -0.064 0.287 0.395 0.198
Notes: For ptxtA the calculation is based on the initial 1978-79 diange in property taxes as a percent of total 1978-79 revenues.
capital intensivity measures of expenditures are reported ; these were all below 0.20. Numbemfobservation is 128.
0.397 1.000
No correlations for
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Table C6:
Variable
tcap
Appendix D
Fiscal Trends for Specific Municipalities
Table D1: Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures, City of Hayward (constant $).
Fiscal General Public Public Parks & Total Total
Year Government Safety Works Recreation Expenditures Revenues
1969 82.67 90.45 110.51 8.16 362.42 382.96
1970 111.92 97.86 103.94 7.18 390.05 390.03
1971 112.67 100.42 60.65 6.19 353.17 396.45
1972 110.75 108.36 80.48 5.37 373.87 420.59
1973 124.62 112.32 104.08 9.51 429.41 486.40
1974 153.19 129.63 107.03 10.21 471.99 499.03
1975 163.47 191.50 109.69 10.47 525.84 502.28
1976 174.61 190.03 75.68 12.39 539.77 512.23
1977 131.32 176.57 65.39 11.59 472.96 531.72
1978 154.28 182.48 71.66 11.31 554.72 597.86
1979 85.69 176.94 71.30 10.05 483.07 528.84
1980 83.77 166.64 93.65 14.35 486.68 543.61
1981 72.62 186.46 112.50 12.80 501.38 489.26
1982 74.44 168.76 138.83 13.69 469.43 483.53
1983 70.47 167.98 93.64 16.15 412.00 423.03
1984 75.90 181.49 69.85 14.16 431.64 474.94
1985 72.92 189.14 72.47 13.05 415.15 524.02
1986 89.76 183.79 112.92 11.87 470.03 524.81
1987 91.28 203.76 88.24 12.58 477.05 565.54
1988 107.86 197.70 106.47 19.08 476.80 530.72
Sources: State of California Controller'sAnnual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCalifornia, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
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Table D2: Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures, City of Walnut Creek (constant $).
Fiscal General Public Public Parks & Total Total
Year Government Safety Works Recreation Expenditures Revenues
1969 118.17 78.24 86.38 71.06 353.85 344.15
1970 109.82 71.46 78.19 78.39 337.87 336.67
1971 95.56 70.36 50.52 63.54 279.98 320.01
1972 100.31 73.19 59.43 69.80 302.73 334.53
1973 118.57 74.23 62.58 58.43 313.81 365.83
1974 109.70 65.94 96.85 70.86 343.34 382.11
1975 100.76 67.75 93.85 91.86 354.22 384.60
1976 83.99 86.30 91.23 91.38 353.34 393.53
1977 78.22 101.29 74.30 85.02 339.54 384.38
1978 102.34 100.30 88.28 82.24 375.90 414.48
1979 76.34 75.81 49.78 74.49 278.68 318.41
1980 104.66 74.25 74.27 63.94 321.75 334.97
1981 76.40 75.20 59.63 62.47 273.70 319.14
1982 55.95 88.90 48.58 59.48 266.49 373.43
1983 56.20 83.01 58.62 65.56 273.92 333.99
1984 64.98 83.41 87.72 63.65 310.81 386.43
1985 74.36 86.22 139.76 66.31 382.68 420.76
1986 82.29 90.74 90.38 67.05 355.53 426.74
1987 72.06 85.53 100.48 64.37 364.50 415.59
1988 84.59 96.91 86.43 63.37 363.67 437.43
Sources: State of California Controller'sAnnual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCalifornia, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
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Table D: Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures, City of Piedmont (constant $).
Fiscal General Public Public Parks & Total Total
Year Government Safety Works Recreation Expenditures Revenues
1969 57.40 131.49 121.17 55.85 366.24 340.91
1970 62.81 128.59 98.03 56.69 346.41 364.69
1971 66.21 130.23 121.84 54.90 373.51 379.48
1972 69.33 132.19 133.66 53.61 389.93 390.08
1973 73.62 142.15 111.17 56.54 385.63 406.18
1974 75.40 149.92 113.55 80.59 420.56 429.85
1975 79.28 149.05 126.92 58.93 416.18 389.55
1976 81.76 149.71 88.19 52.08 377.79 383.88
1977 87.31 154.72 75.55 65.82 391.11 417.72
1978 92.49 166.67 82.49 56.87 416.74 481.57
1979 82.47 153.55 38.71 41.59 319.99 379.25
1980 53.02 171.31 129.31 42.90 400.26 364.71
1981 42.94 183.02 48.82 44.91 327.49 377.22
1982 42.12 207.30 59.93 55.30 376.22 411.62
1983 43.92 248.30 60.54 59.50 424.82 415.98
1984 82.46 313.02 49.30 63.31 465.83 429.70
1985 48.32 242.49 44.74 74.49 425.54 478.18
1986 56.11 235.66 65.85 82.24 461.15 506.30
1987 57.84 263.36 77.27 89.57 511.30 568.41
1988 66.77 271.59 148.22 90.44 598.58 643.95
Sources: State of California Controller'sAnnual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCalifornia, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
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Table D4: Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures, City of Fairfield (constant $).
Fiscal General Public Public Parks & Total Total
Year Government Safety Works Recreation Expenditures Revenues
1969 46.17 48.84 54.90 19.05 191.56 203.05
1970 93.31 51.47 58.80 19.92 248.75 207.49
1971 63.94 57.16 63.96 15.85 221.85 240.93
1972 72.13 56.33 73.02 28.48 259.92 268.64
1973 67.37 64.68 80.51 42.35 278.46 319.51
1974 72.52 67.60 43.27 27.74 238.86 330.50
1975 84.74 71.04 60.71 32.91 277.55 304.63
1976 74.43 77.87 577.44 40.34 815.13 814.94
1977 84.01 89.62 83.98 32.95 327.41 344.72
1978 90.24 89.41 132.23 77.34 431.27 453.91
1979 97.15 78.44 86.82 37.61 350.57 417.73
1980 162.33 77.29 76.71 32.88 397.35 470.55
1981 95.87 76.91 60.25 24.26 257.62 326.48
1982 62.62 113.33 61.89 23.11 272.38 337.41
1983 61.40 114.29 58.79 12.59 256.73 291.91
1984 64.58 113.16 54.94 12.37 251.46 288.41
1985 65.04 116.72 55.53 13.56 253.17 306.50
1986 67.28 113.35 50.27 14.85 245.78 274.59
1987 69.83 122.95 80.22 23.33 322.07 335.50
1988 70.87 133.30 78.30 28.51 317.90 358.42
Sources: State of California Controller'sAnnual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCahfornia, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
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Table D5: Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures, City of Soledad (constant $).
Fiscal General Public Public Parks & Total Total
Year Government Safety Works Recreation Expenditures Revenues
1969 51.88 46.34 78.28 4.63 204.02 221.90
1970 41.87 46.54 65.02 5.44 185.24 237.77
1971 45.17 41.88 81.35 4.47 193.95 234.00
1972 72.15 45.72 100.48 5.10 243.36 287.80
1973 65.75 66.31 82.74 5.27 244.86 315.88
1974 83.25 70.79 102.61 16.83 359.37 333.97
1975 99.86 71.09 88.44 15.30 314.50 296.17
1976 99.19 69.55 48.86 19.20 265.82 259.73
1977 108.35 75.89 92.88 13.41 327.71 296.47
1978 67.62 82.64 71.38 44.97 306.45 365.96
1979 56.99 73.55 108.47 26.26 302.72 339.95
1980 52.36 70.59 77.98 13.63 248.69 287.01
1981 61.70 79.44 51.14 10.40 237.39 268.39
1982 54.39 94.50 63.92 8.76 238.75 287.37
1983 66.54 67.81 103.15 6.61 303.86 265.12
1984 48.96 83.86 62.91 4.00 224.78 239.91
1985 37.20 88.78 75.54 5.79 242.04 249.01
1986 89.59 93.80 60.78 5.39 320.00 363.26
1987 59.31 96.33 158.92 6.54 353.77 344.53
1988 27.95 102.17 90.33 6.69 277.24 277.02
Sources: State of California Controller'sAnnual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities of California, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
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Table D6: Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures, City of Southgate (constant $).
Fiscal General Public Public Parks & Total Total
Year Government Safety Works Recreation Expenditures Revenues
1969 47.64 103.78 75.43 24.52 283.34 287.67
1970 47.82 103.85 97.71 26.61 306.54 288.18
1971 58.39 110.19 71.07 34.84 302.90 298.21
1972 57.30 119.85 64.23 26.47 299.55 296.89
1973 27.27 134.82 80.21 27.37 305.04 318.75
1974 20.06 138.67 55.28 30.04 275.20 309.89
1975 24.34 152.10 79.38 30.99 318.12 328.01
1976 31.17 142.16 67.56 112.13 387.14 328.29
1977 30.58 153.93 91.57 56.22 366.59 353.14
1978 34.79 104.04 91.82 67.98 325.45 301.19
1979 33.24 98.67 87.01 40.58 284.93 305.03
1980 37.76 93.53 81.81 29.74 272.91 287.16
1981 58.22 83.40 47.34 24.66 240.54 286.73
1982 56.92 89.01 19.17 23.84 211.95 243.98
1983 49.85 91.97 28.39 31.62 235.12 253.54
1984 49.56 91.64 49.32 33.41 270.34 261.86
1985 66.22 97.19 54.81 27.73 331.81 343.22
1986 68.20 105.41 72.12 28.52 336.45 309.59
1987 65.06 109.93 47.49 28.56 297.70 290.79
1988 89.73 109.49 26.47 29.13 315.63 316.57
Sources: State of Califomia Controller'sAnnual Report ofFinancial Transactions Concerning Cities ofCalifornia, Fiscal Years 1969-1988.
371
Appendix E
Sample Characteristics (Percent Property Tax Loss)
Assessed Value
Per CaDita ($)
Median House
Value ($)
Poverty
Rate (%)
Median HH
Income ($)
1. piedmont -.4332772 46613.18 192100 .053 25540
2. ross -.3318517 63087.66 200100 .029 44094
3. palos verdes est -.2888887 50525.46 148900 .019 48750
4. hermosa beach -.2840866 35289.04 148200 .069 22432
5. larkspur -.2803893 38497.84 193600 .07 23742
6. pleasanton -. 2558938 28185.29 116700 .035 28718
7. athterton -.238672 65071.25 200100 .033 54859
8. cerritos -.2374659 28290.81 120900 .032 31313
9. san dimas -.2349355 20735.5 94400 .05 25285
10. el cerrito -.2180581 26792.13 97500 .061 21715
11. lakewood -.2114789 17370.49 81800 .052 23061
12. la mirada -.2072109 18392.92 84700 .049 26066
13. california city -. 1845771 77725.43 49000 .106 17650
14. clayton -. 1781673 27139.82 133300 .022 35067
15. lomita -.1741399 14765.21 106700 .105 17968
16. carlsbad -.1705485 45415.97 123400 .075 22354
17. berkeley -.1599915 23468.9 96400 .21 13506
18. livermore -.1596003 21820.21 86900 .044 24960
19. fremont -.1507373 26948.86 69000 .048 25342
20. south el monte -.1505296 22921.24 61400 .206 14506
21. millbrae -. 1433065 35463.11 152600 .042 26209
22. sausalito -. 1399383 72873.82 200100 .079 24593
23. oceanview -. 1367741 21769.78 75300 .123 14696
24. norwalk -.1358819 11715.19 66500 .105 19467
25. la puente -.1355847 9494.959 63400 .118 18314
26. hayward -.1355213 29603.46 75700 .092 19987
27. walnut creek -.1335439 37814.21 135300 .04 24813
28. paramount -.1334473 19132.61 62700 .189 14969
29. upland -.132063 22040.36 89400 .068 21714
30. palm springs -.1306251 50661.45 102200 .104 16159
31. oakland -.1306009 23954.95 67600 .185 13780
32. fountain valley -.1301706 27313.72 126300 .038 29590
33. huntington beach -.1261042 31734.95 120400 .065 24015
34. sacramento -. 1253912 19076.4 56800 .15 14604
35. san rafael -.1222317 41802.73 148300 .077 21411
36. milpitas -.1218594 22993.7 91800 .064 24950
37. los angeles -.1205501 24767.41 96100 .164 15735
38. long beach -. 1197723 26278.92 82100 .142 15394
39. redondo beach -.1194789 29335.69 113500 .078 21829
40. lemoore -. 1172725 17132.6 61700 .11 17219
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Municipality PT Loss % of
Total Rev.
41. downey -. 116552 20594.88 88400 .07 20191
42. pittburg -.1164152 16159.97 66300 .129 19629
43. san clemente -. 116397 40570.7 136800 .078 19159
44. west covina -. 1162895 18224.56 84000 .053 24376
45. glendora -. 1146545 20155.74 89100 .052 24222
46. monrovia -.1137052 19550.55 79500 .111 16061
47. vista -. 1133189 20501.47 82600 .11 15285
48. del mar -. 1102867 48641.41 200100 .147 22500
49. seaside -. 1102355 10370.5 68300 .147 14603
50. covma -.1098074 22020.57 84700 .063 20875
51. mountain view -.107616 34596.75 123800 .069 19790
52. marina -.1056116 8363.964 85400 .136 15528
53. pacifica -.1029257 21354.78 95200 .058 24175
54. fullerton -.1025379 32424.64 98200 .075 21656
55. huntington park -.1012609 13617.55 62700 .234 11345
56. placentia -. 1001667 26071.55 116600 .051 26874
57. pasadena -.1000036 25984.54 92100 .141 16291
58. asuza -.0985184 20936.6 64700 .114 16443
59. santa ana -.0967654 26295.61 80500 .14 18362
60. watsonville -.0947962 22491.71 71000 .132 14437
61. redding -.0946963 19503.02 62000 .101 14770
62. vacaville -.0934549 15526.59 70300 .085 20911
63. seal beach -.0928172 32586.23 125900 .06 15319
64. torrance -.0927995 35109.61 123100 .047 24152
65. bell gardens -.0923786 8694.76 60700 .253 12137
66. orange -.0922173 31691.31 99900 .067 22100
67. fontana -.0904318 15671.13 58900 .116 18278
68. burlingame -.0904092 50381.89 151000 .058 20268
69. fresno -.0890103 18198.93 93000 .157 14426
70. san buenaventura -.0886669 31107.34 93400 .077 18791
71. visalia -.0869074 23507.04 64000 .108 16724
72. buena park -.0864189 28808.8 85100 .075 22214
73. chula vista -.0858143 23037.73 85700 .084 17997
74. san fernando -.0853055 20025.7 68700 .146 16084
75. glendale -.0840785 25411.32 117400 .101 17205
76. manteca -.0818419 14700.05 59200 .094 18171
77. san gabriel -.0818299 19078.1 86300 .111 16995
78. merced -.0816322 18779.2 57700 .166 14137
79. palo alto -.08092 53074.82 148900 .06 24743
80. alhambra -.0804556 19735.46 85600 .118 16270
81. corona -.0802457 20043.01 77500 .099 20693
82. san diego -.079413 26296.62 90700 .124 16408
83. hawthorne -.0792739 26533.14 87000 .092 17322
84. san jose -.0783992 24243.28 97900 .082 22886
85. el centro -.0778869 15125.19 54900 .115 16358
86. baldwin park -.0753142 9433.278 61300 .152 16439
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87. ontario -.0751983 18948.66 66900 .106 19017
88. sunnyvale -.0751288 37023.75 119800 .048 23059
89. culver city -.0741651 37577.34 118400 .068 22121
90. whittier -.0737557 21956.04 86200 .074 19948
91. farfield -.0711216 17947.61 66100 .094 17975
92. soledad -.0700922 8890.887 57200 .151 15615
93. brea -.0696628 34704.7 106300 .034 25794
94. el monte -.0688785 15648.67 65000 .199 13823
95. rohnert park -.0685596 16827.97 86200 .114 19344
96. red bluff -.0685509 14748.65 45500 .131 13585
97. inglewood -.0671833 15819.42 71800 .154 15016
98. clovis -.0660055 14838.98 66700 .092 16426
99. mods -.0648022 19981.69 64200 .103 17649
100. corning -.0645295 10995.52 40400 .135 11274
101. atwater -.0595599 9088.649 56000 .102 14764
102. santa clara -.0587685 36078.66 96800 .058 21717
103. anaheim -.0585843 31899.66 93000 .077 20026
104. stockton -.0570042 20816.13 55500 .166 14791
105. salinas -.0553762 21522.08 71900 .125 17352
106. santa fe springs -.0552829 94002.2 66500 .113 18595
107. santa cruz -.0537799 27993.49 90300 .165 14026
108. half moon bay -.0529213 28677.02 123500 .069 25467
109. san bernardino -.0523857 17458.84 52600 .163 14095
110. willows -.0488895 15924.44 48000 .096 15151
111. santa maria -.0486954 21297.44 64300 .117 16005
112. lynwood -.0482453 11801.84 59200 .206 15099
113. madera -.0481886 12423.87 51500 .194 13518
114. irvine -.046003 65487.49 136400 .036 31300
115. compton -.0448593 12657.92 45900 .264 13456
116. lompoc -.0431423 9079.552 65000 .131 16345
117. blyth -.0406263 15481.33 45700 .113 14777
118. yountville -.0393109 10018.96 65900 .096 13874
119. calexico -.0367164 12410.88 48000 .238 12122
120. garden grove -.0365107 20962.71 87700 .083 21374
121. riverside -.0356241 19769.58 68000 .113 17849
122. turlock -.0339079 16627.31 62000 .129 14710
123. mendota -.0337511 7309.428 41200 .258 10542
124. ceres -.026256 12330.21 56100 .118 15623
125. orange cove -.0202482 6187.838 33700 .206 11101
126. cresent city -.0169828 27957.17 47100 .141 11635
127. camarillo -.0004705 27495.68 99500 .042 32197
128. foster city 0 31741.76 178900 .035 30131
129. bellflower .0000275 16143.21 76300 .099 16748
130. southgate .0032456 20193.92 64200 .142 14609
mean -.1049043 25611.52 90311 .105 19766
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Appendix F
Sample Characteristics (Aggregate Property Tax Loss)
Aggregate PT
Loss (constant $)
Population Assessed Value
Per Capita ($)
Median HH
Income ($)
ACIR Tax
Capacity ($)
1. los angeles -2.57e+08 2966850 24767.41 15735 1020.721
2. oakland -3.79e+07 339337 23954.95 13780 925.0026
3. san diego -3.33e+07 875538 26296.62 16408 1027.187
4. long beach -3.22e+07 361334 26278.92 15394 1156.05
5. san jose -2.45e+07 629442 24243.28 22886 899.9296
6. sacramento -2.05e+07 275741 19076.4 14604 610.6141
7. berkeley -1.43e+07 103328 23468.9 13506 909.7032
8. fresno -1.20e+07 218202 18198.93 14426 589.6934
9. huntington beach -9623164 170505 31734.95 24015 1469.003
10. santa ana -9368425 203713 26295.61 18362 1018.885
11. pasadena -8516412 118550 25984.54 16291 1117.443
12. stockton -7108471 149779 20816.13 14791 756.6353
13. hayward -6968382 94167 29603.46 19987 1277.178
14. torrance -6945235 129881 35109.61 24152 1801.149
15. fremont -6938098 131945 26948.86 25342 1033.985
16. glendale -6527160 139060 25411.32 17205 1035.623
17. anaheim -5998308 219311 31899.66 20026 1481.229
18. fullerton -5063289 102034 32424.64 21656 1505.303
19. lakewood -4832283 74654 17370.49 23061 436.4381
20. cerritos -4769275 53020 28290.81 31313 1143.976
21. palm springs -4624164 32271 50661.45 16159 4096.901
22. sunnyvale -4541955 106618 37023.75 23059 1971.053
23. oceanside -4355455 76698 21769.78 14696 749.7096
24. mountain view -4282756 58655 34596.75 19790 1863.651
25. redondo beach 4214517 57102 29335.69 21829 1274.518
26. orange -3917947 91788 31691.31 22100 1476.352
27. palo alto -3897481 55225 53074.82 24743 4168.188
28. downey -3696188 82602 20594.88 20191 628.7985
29. west covina -3683047 80291 18224.56 24376 507.8032
30. san bernardino -3673606 117490 17458.84 14095 511.8707
31. inglewood -3528336 94245 15819.42 15016 446.1364
32. riverside -3282262 170876 19769.58 17849 655.1692
33. san buenaventura -3251571 74393 31107.34 18791 1410.178
34. carlsbad -3188661 35490 45415.97 22354 3077.176
35. ontario -2986733 88820 18948.66 19017 571.9222
36. chula vista -2974595 83927 23037.73 17997 777.2313
37. santa clara -2962234 87746 36078.66 21717 1910.907
38. walnut creek -2897213 53643 37814.21 24813 2015.163
39. alhambra -2893543 64615 19735.46 16270 645.7792
40. pleasanton -2866406 35160 28185.29 28718 1114.024
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Municipality
41. modesto -2747977 106602 19981.69 17649 622.188
42. livermore -2713459 48349 21820.21 24960 672.3681
43. norwalk -2711631 85286 11715.19 19467 198.3937
44. san rafel -2641781 44700 41802.73 21411 2425.927
45. upland -2610867 47647 22040.36 21714 755.5352
46. fountain valley -2532196 55080 27313.72 29590 1054.241
47. redding -2479451 41995 19503.02 14770 644.2617
48. hermosa beach -2458544 18070 35289.04 22432 1811.106
49. piedmont -2362622 10498 46613.18 25540 3043.12
50. culver city -2282350 38139 37577.34 22121 2262.573
51. salinas -2279877 80479 21522.08 17352 715.4557
52. buena park -2266900 64165 28808.8 22214 1173.348
53. la mirada -2119153 40986 18392.92 26066 479.4378
54. san dimas -2058498 24014 20735.5 25285 671.613
55. el cerrito -2046950 22731 26792.13 21715 1030.186
56. garden grove -1952596 123307 20962.71 21374 625.3651
57. el monte -1936808 79494 15648.67 13823 366.7172
58. compton -1860196 81286 12657.92 13456 252.3615
59. hawthorne -1849339 56447 26533.14 17322 1016.952
60. fairfield -1771174 58099 17947.61 17975 493.4878
61. whittier -1764924 69717 21956.04 19948 700.6848
62. pittburg -1724142 33034 16159.97 19629 421.7446
63. corona -1720370 37791 20043.01 20693 651.8921
64. pacfica -1706688 36866 21354.78 24175 666.2144
65. visalia -1697628 49729 23507.04 16724 871.4351
66. paramount -1690807 36407 19132.61 14969 528.01
67. merced -1643179 36499 18779.2 14137 583.1972
68. santa cruz -1610388 41483 27993.49 14026 1241.555
69. califormia city -1562432 2743 77725.43 17650 12634.29
70. covina -1550181 33751 22020.57 20875 749.6244
71. san clemente -1545624 27325 40570.7 19159 2388.182
72. monrovia -1534636 30531 19550.55 16061 590.2816
73. huntington park -1484041 46223 13617.55 11345 290.612
74. milpitas -1466425 37820 22993.7 24950 762.8049
75. seal beach -1437785 25975 32586.23 15319 1611.311
76. placentia -1412657 35041 26071.55 26874 983.1339
77. burlingame -1397294 26173 50381.89 20268 3552.91
78. irvine -1392942 62134 65487.49 31300 5910.715
79. vacaville -1388362 43367 15526.59 20911 388.831
80. vista -1362359 35834 20501.47 15285 628.6343
81. baldwin park -1345604 50554 9433.278 16439 134.5253
82. palos verdes est -1332691 14376 50525.46 48750 3376.853
83. glendora -1329258 38654 20155.74 24222 594.509
84. watsonville -1287738 23543 22491.71 14437 842.7122
85. larkspur -1271362 11064 38497.84 23742 2014.687
86. el centro -1179916 23996 15125.19 16358 389.4237
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87. asuza -1038633 29380 20936.6 16443 656.7738
88. santa fe springs -1031908 14520 94002.2 18595 12597.65
89. south el monte -1018785 16623 22921.24 14506 790.1955
90. brea -1016537 27913 34704.7 25794 1807.321
91. santa maria -996373.2 39685 21297.44 16005 747.8124
92. seaside -956619.6 36567 10370.5 14603 157.9342
93. clovis -944031.3 33021 14838.98 16426 396.9787
94. fontana -938714.9 37111 15671.13 18278 386.2409
95. millbrae -840672.4 20058 35463.11 26209 1686.911
96. sausalito -815703.8 7338 72873.82 24593 7781.975
97. san gabriel -797062.3 30072 19078.1 16995 528.9992
98. bell gardens -765237.3 34117 8694.76 12137 112.9515
99. la puente -763303.4 30882 9494.959 18314 132.1229
100. lomita -747669.5 18807 14765.21 17968 310.0613
101. manteca -737915.4 24925 14700.05 18171 381.0434
102. san fernando -716274.8 17731 20025.7 16084 639.9668
103. turlock -617727.8 26287 16627.31 14710 490.0322
104. lynwood -617584 48548 11801.84 15099 206.5804
105. lompoc -563829.4 26267 9079.552 16345 168.4301
106. rohnert park -544102.8 22965 16827.97 19344 461.9872
107. atherton -538895.9 7797 65071.25 54859 5436.127
108. madera -500029.4 21732 12423.87 13518 288.6718
109. atwater -467789.5 17530 9088.649 14764 156.2315
110. marina -414019.7 20647 8363.964 15528 99.67549
111. lemoore -412406.7 8832 17132.6 17219 455.2078
112. red bluff -411284.5 9490 14748.65 13585 402.1641
113. calexico -401351.6 14412 12410.88 12122 265.5883
114. ross -331521.6 2801 63087.66 44094 5233.522
115. del mar -303036.1 5017 48641.41 22500 3314.178
116. ceres -291067.7 13281 12330.21 15623 268.8118
117. blyth -283117.8 6805 15481.33 14777 435.4176
118. willows -175529.8 4777 15924.44 15151 416.1909
119. clayton -154100.6 4325 27139.82 35067 1016.477
120. soledad -144882.4 5928 8890.887 15615 129.1837
121. half moon bay -115388.2 7282 28677.02 25467 1131.134
122. corning -99219.85 4745 10995.52 11274 204.6011
123. mendota -75110.86 5038 7309.428 10542 108.27
124. crescent city -54440 3075 27957.17 11635 1375.686
125. yountville -46870.2 2893 10018.96 13874 144.4226
126. orange cove -32505.78 4026 6187.838 11101 67.56577
127. south gate -19544.01 66784 20193.92 14609 594.2737
128. camarillo -3715.46 37797 27495.68 32197 1024.899
129. foster city 0 23287 31741.76 30131 1279.306
130. bellflower 202.1301 53441 16143.21 16748 359.022
mean 25661.52 19766 1304.31
377
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